

THE SEPOY MUTINY, 1857

A SOCIAL STUDY AND ANALYSIS

BY

HARAPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA,
M.A. (History), M.A. (Politics).

*Professor of History, Asutosh College,
Calcutta.*

Agents :

BOOKLAND PRIVATE LIMITED

PUBLISHERS AND BOOKSELLERS

1, SANKAR GHOSH LANE, CALCUTTA-6

Branches : ALLAHABAD : PATNA

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First Edition, November, 1957

Price Rs. 15/-

Published by the author and Printed by
Sri J. N. Dey, of the Express Printers
Private Ltd., 20-A, Gour Laha Street, Cal.-6

DEDICATED
TO
THE INEFFACEABLE MEMORY OF MY DEAR SISTERS,
LAKSHMI DEBI
AND
BEDBATI DEBI
WHO PREMATURELY BREATHED THEIR LAST IN 1949
AND PASSED TO

Where beyond these voices there is peace.

FOREWORD

Professor Haraprasad Chattopadhyay of Asutosh College, Calcutta, has made a careful study of the great Rising of 1857, which was so much influenced in its development by incidental and local causes. There were occasional disturbances and tumults before 1857. There were mutinies before the Mutiny of 1857. But the popular movement in many areas merged with that of the mutinous soldiers to make the great Uprising of 1857. The Indians had at that time one organised source of power, the so-called Bengal Army. 'It was the proudest section of the Company's forces in India.' Almost the whole of it rose against the Government. The essential and main spring of their mutiny was the religious principle. But as the Mutiny spread it assumed a political character in the North-Western provinces, Bundelkhand, Oudh and many of the districts of Patna and Chhotanagpur divisions of Bihar. Professor Chattopadhyay has made a study of the causes of army-discontent and he has made an analysis of the causes and character of local uprisings with special reference to the Revolt in Bihar. He has read all the published contemporary and semi-contemporary works and the printed records on the Mutiny. He has also examined the original unpublished records in the National Archives of India and in the record rooms of the district Collectorates in Bihar. Perhaps no other writer on the Mutiny has attached so much importance to district records.

A nation's identity is rooted in the consciousness of its history. A new stage in a nation's growth is accompanied by a rewriting of its history with special reference to those episodes that are regarded by it as vital. But nothing can justify smart writing or *a priori* reconstruction. Professor Chattopadhyay is fully aware of the increasing complexity of the techniques of historical research and the ever more exacting standards of scholarly accuracy.

N. K. SINHA

*Asutosh Professor of Medieval and Modern
Indian History, University of Calcutta.*

PREFACE

Since its outbreak in 1857 the historic Sepoy Mutiny has been a favourite subject of discussion to both European and Indian writers, interested in the modern period of Indian history. Much has already been written on the Sepoy Mutiny. The interesting and popular nature of the subject has, indeed, led to the growth of an extensive literature on it both at home and abroad. The existing voluminous literature on the Mutiny has, however, studied the movement mainly in its political aspect and from the point of view of the military exploits and operations of the British generals who conducted their campaigns against the rebels. But no Kaye or Malletson has reviewed the Mutiny against a proper social background or has made a careful study of its socio-economic implications. In the present treatise I have attempted a portrayal of the movement of 1857 against a social background which was not properly taken cognizance of by any writer before. The pre-1857 days in India witnessed social and economic changes which were fraught with tremendous consequences for the future of the country. The socio-economic reforms of the pre-Mutiny period evoked protests from the affected classes of the Indian population. But the discontent and disaffection born of the reforms in the social and economic spheres did not directly lead to the outbreak of the Mutiny. It was the discontent and estrangement of the sepoys that led ultimately and straightway to the upheaval of 1857. In fact, there would have been no Revolt in India in 1857, had not the initiative been taken by the disaffected sepoys of the Indian Army. And the sepoys had sufficient reasons to harbour feelings of hostility towards the British Government of India. Yet the crisis might have been averted, had not the Government bungled in the administration of the Army. The Mutiny, I am inclined to hold, was not inevitable.

The main actors in the tragic drama of the Mutiny were the sepoys. They formed an inseparable part of the civil population of the country. The social and military classes had the same social ties and obligations. The sepoys belonged mostly to the peasant-families of the country. During their periodic leave from the service of the Company they used to return to their village-homes where they spent their leave-period in agricultural pursuits. A treatise on the Sepoy Mutiny with a social background should, therefore, take cognizance of the different aspects of the Sepoy Army, such as the origin of the sepoys, their economic condition, their faithfulness to the hand that fed them, their recruitment both region-wise and caste-wise and above all, the differences in attitude of the three Presidency Armies towards Government both before and during

the Mutiny. I have accordingly devoted two chapters to the discussion of the above-mentioned aspects of the Sepoy Army in the present volume.

The Mutiny of 1857 originated with the sepoys. Gradually, however, it came to draw the support and sympathy of the civil population in certain regions of the country. The Mutiny was popular only on a regional basis, and not on an all-India basis. But a popular movement is not necessarily a national movement. The Mutiny, though a popular movement region-wise, was not at all a national movement. I have devoted an entire chapter to the discussion of the nature of the Mutiny. In the course of collecting the data for my treatise, I came across valuable records on the movement of 1857 in Bihar. I have utilised the records I collected by incorporating a chapter on the Revolt in Bihar in the present treatise.

I completed writing my book in 1954-55 but could not publish it so long for obvious financial difficulties. Meanwhile I published chapters IV and VII of my book in the columns of the *Calcutta Review* (vide the issues of May, July-September, 1956) and the *Bengal, Past and Present* (vide vols. LXXIV-LXXV, 1955-56). Within very living memory I also published a self-contained article on the 'Mutiny and the contemporary Bengal' in the pages of the 'Itihas' published by the Bangiya Itihas Parishad.

In conclusion, let me express my obligations to those who helped me in the preparation of the book. At the very outset I acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Narendra Krishna Sinha, M.A., Ph.D. Asutosh Professor of Medieval and Modern Indian History, Calcutta University, for the invaluable help I was fortunate in getting from him in the writing of my book. I am further indebted to him for his kindly writing a foreword to my book. I acknowledge my indebtedness also to Sri Tripurari Chakravarti, M.A., Lecturer in History, Calcutta University, for the help and inspiration I received from him in pursuing my work to its completion. I am thankful to my former colleague, Dr. Bimal Kanti Majumdar, M.A., D.Phil., now a Lecturer in History, Jadavpur University, for his assisting me in many different ways. I convey my thanks and gratitude to Dr. Miss Niharkana Majumdar, M.A., D.Phil., Principal, Midnapur Women's College for her valuable suggestions towards the improvement of my book. I am thankful also to Sri Amitava Mukherjee, M.A., Lecturer in History, Jadavpur University for the suggestions he offered. I acknowledge my indebtedness to and gratitude for Vice-Principal Shibnath Chakravarti, M.A., Asutosh College, Evening Department and Vice-Principal Nirod Kumar Bhattacharyya, M.A., Asutosh College, Day Department for their encouragement and inspiration to me in the present endeavour. I am also indebted to Professor Nagendra Narayan Chaudhury, M.A., Ph.D. of Asutosh College for his kind help to me in connection with the publication of my book. I take this opportunity to convey my deep sense of gratitude to Sri Gopal Bandhu who placed his strong critical sense and wide knowledge in History at my disposal, while my work was in progress. My thanks are also due to the Librarian of

the National Library, Calcutta and his staff for their giving me all sorts of facilities of library-work. I am, in particular, grateful to the Superintendent, Reading Rooms, National Library, Sri A. K. Roy, for his friendly co-operation and ungrudging help and for his taking a keen interest in the progress of my work from its inception to the end. Lastly, I thank Sri J. N. Dev of the Express Printers for printing the book in a short space of time.

Asutosh College, Calcutta.
Vijaya Dashami, 1364 B. S.
October 3, 1957.

HARAPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA.

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CHAPTER I

REGIONS AFFECTED—CLASSES AFFECTED.

The first shot, fired on the issue of greased cartridges on the afternoon of March 29, 1857 by Mangal Pande, a sepoy no. 1446 belonging to the 5th company of the 34th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, garrisoned at Barrackpur, gave the signal for the outbreak of the historic Sepoy Revolt, better known as the Sepoy Mutiny in the annals of India. Mangal Pande was tried, found guilty, and executed in the prime of life—he was then only 26 years, 2 months and 9 days old—at the Brigade Parade ground of the Barrackpur cantonment at half past five in the morning of April 8, 1857 in the presence of all the troops of the cantonment. (1) Mangal Pande died on the scaffold, but his blood cried for vengeance. Not long afterwards, following the initiative taken by him in making an armed protest against the introduction of the new Enfield Rifle, thousands (2) of disaffected sepoys of the British Indian Army rose in revolt, imperilling the very existence of the British Empire in India. Far and wide spread the news that the Sepoy Mutiny had begun. Before long the Mutiny of the sepoys had its repercussion on the civil population too in certain parts of the country. The storm of the Mutiny arose at first in Bengal proper. The sepoys attached to the military stations of Dum Dum, Berhampur and Barrackpur in Bengal had been in an agitated and disturbed state of mind before the Mutiny actually broke out in 1857. Originating in Bengal the storm of the Mutiny spread through Bihar towards the then North-Western provinces and turned towards the Saugor and Narbada territories and the trans-Vindhyan region as well. It was the destiny of Viscount Canning to pilot the ship of the British Indian Empire during the critical period of the Mutiny. Canning was appointed Governor-General of India in succession to Lord Dalhousie who, relieved of his office, sailed back for England in March 1856, leaving a sullen and discontented India behind. Though an efficient administrator, the retiring Governor-General 'summed up in himself all that led to the great upheaval of 1857'. And he had sufficient apprehension that, after his retirement, peace of the country might be in jeopardy. He was alive to the reaction which his annexation policy produced during the tenure of his office or was likely to produce in future. He was conscious of the numerical superiority of

(1) Forrest—Selections from letters, despatches and other state papers in the Military Department of the Government of India (1857-58) Vol. I, p. 127.

(2) Sir Richard Temple computes that from 80,000 to 90,000 soldiers, horse and foot revolted over an area of at least 1,00,000 square miles with a population of 40 millions—World's Great Events—An indexed history of the world from the earliest times to the present day—Vol. VII, p. 2.

the native Army over the British force in India. Before his departure from Calcutta in March, 1856 after making over his charge to Lord Canning, Lord Dalhousie submitted a minute, formally addressed to the East India Company, giving an account of his stewardship between 1848 and 1856. In this minute he observed as follows :

"When I sailed from England in the winter of 1847 to assume the Government of India, there prevailed universal conviction among public men at home that permanent peace had at length been secured in the East. Before the summer came, we were already involved in the second Sikh War... When little more than two years had passed, the Government of India again was suddenly engaged in hostilities with Burma... Since hostilities with Burma ceased, the Indian Empire had been at peace. No prudent man who has any knowledge of Eastern affairs would ever venture to predict the maintenance of continued peace within our Eastern possessions. Experience has taught us that war from without or rebellion from within may at any time be raised against us in quarters where they were the least to be expected and by the most feeble and unlikely instruments. No man, therefore, can ever prudently hold forth assurance of continued peace in India." (3)

The apprehensions of Lord Dalhousie were not unfounded. The minute was submitted on February 28, 1856 and the first blood of the Sepoy Mutiny was shed on March 29, 1857. Lord Canning's Farewell Banquet speech, delivered under a spell of prophecy, as it were, in the great Banqueting Hall of the London Tavern before a distinguished gathering, presided over by Elliot Macnaghten, Chairman of the East India Company, also seemed to foretell the coming storm of 1857. "I know not", said Canning on the above occasion, "what course events may take. I hope and pray that we may not reach the extremity of war. I wish for a peaceful time of office, but.....we must not forget that in the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may arise, at first no bigger than a man's hand, but which, growing larger and larger, may at last threaten to burst and overwhelm us with ruin... But I gladly dismiss from my mind apprehensions that may not be realised and joyfully recognise a large arena of peaceful usefulness, in which I hope for your kind assistance and co-operation." (4)

The apprehensions which peeped into the mind of Lord Canning on the eve of his departure for India came to be too true after his arrival in India. His prophecy about the sudden appearance, on the political firmament of India, of a little cloud gradually spreading and darkening the horizon was destined to vindication within less than a year of his assumption of office. For years past there was a gradually growing conflict in the mind of the sepoy between his fidelity to Government and his devotion to his ancestral caste and religion. It was this conflict which bred a mutinous spirit among the native Army.

(3) Parl. Papers. Vol. XLV of 1856. Paper No. 245. PP. 4-5. Minute by the Governor-General of India, dated 28th February, 1856

(4) Vide Kaye and Malleison—History of the Indian Mutiny. Vol. I, pp. 277-278.

This mutinous spirit did not take long to travel wide in the country. It spread in the wake of an excitement, produced on January 22, 1857 by the rumour about greased cartridges at Dum Dum (in the vicinity of Calcutta), where a military Depot had been started at the close of 1856 to train up sepoy in the use of the newly introduced Enfield Rifle equipped with greased cartridges. The sepoy, Hindu and Muslim alike, who were attached to the Depot for training, suspected that the grease used in preparing the cartridges contained the fat of cows and pigs, abominable to them. On January 23, 1857 the sepoy at Dum Dum openly displayed their aversion to the use of such cartridges of unholy composition. On January 24, 1857 the telegraph station at Barrackpur was set on fire. (5) Standing on the bank of the Hugli, Barrackpur was then a great military station, garrisoned by four regiments of Bengal Native Infantry, namely the 2nd Grenadiers, 43rd, 34th and 70th. (6) By the end of January, 1857 the regiments at Barrackpur stood highly agitated over what they heard of the greased cartridges and of the designs of Government on the native caste and religion. Towards the end of February of the year another military centre, that of Berhampur came to be infected with the ill-feeling similar to what existed among the sepoy at Barrackpur. Berhampur, the metropolitan city of Murshidabad, was then garrisoned by the 19th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, a corps of Irregular Cavalry and by a body of native gunners. (7) At a time when Barrackpur was in the grip of high excitement, two detachments of the 34th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, the most disaffected of all the regiments at the station, reached Berhampur on official duty and 'spread by personal intercourse the great contagion of alarm' at the latter station. The first detachment, a guard in charge of stud-horses, reached Berhampur on February 18, while the second detachment arrived on the 25th of the month with a party of European convalescents. The two detachments of the 34th Regiment on their arrival at Berhampur came to be entertained with feasts, as was customary on such occasions, by the sepoy of the 19th Regiment who anxiously enquired of their comrades from Barrackpur about greased cartridges and the designs of Government on their caste and religion. What they heard from their hosts seemed to convince them of the unholy composition of the grease and of the evil motives of Government behind the introduction of the greased cartridges, and at the same time tended to excite them to the point of Mutiny. On the evening of February 26 (8) the sepoy of the 19th Regiment refused, in fact, to receive the percussion-caps for the parade of the following morning on the suspicion that the cartridges were greased with objectionable fat. On February 27 they broke out into open Mutiny. They 'seized their muskets, took forcible possession of the dreaded ammunition, stored for the morning parade, and loaded their pieces in a bewilderment of uncertainty and fear.' But the sepoy of the mutinous 19th Regiment had soon to submit to the command of their officers.

(5) Red Pamphlet—P. 18.

(6) Ibid—P. 19.

(7) Kaye and Malletson, *op. cit.* I, P. 366.

(8) Parl. Papers Vol. 30 of 1857, paper No. 259. p. 4.

They came to be punished with disbandment not long afterwards. News of the outbreak at Berhampur reaching Calcutta about March 4, (9) Government resolved to punish the mutineers. Between Calcutta and Danapur there was then only one European regiment, posted at the latter station. (10) A steamer was accordingly sent to Rangoon to bring the Queen's 84th Regiment so as to strengthen the hands of Government against the mutineers. The steamer conveying the 84th Regiment having reached Calcutta, the 19th Regiment at Berhampur was forthwith ordered to march to Barrackpur. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell commanding the doomed 19th Regiment accordingly started with it on March 20, hoping to reach Barrackpur towards the end of the month. Enroute to Barrackpur the sepoys of the above regiment arrived at Barasat on March 29. There they met some of sepoys of the 34th Regiment who proposed to them that 'they should the same evening kill all their European officers, march during the night to Barrackpur, where the 3rd and 34th were prepared to join them, fire the bungalows, surprise and massacre the Europeans at the station, and having secured the guns, march to and sack Calcutta.' (11) But this proposal did not find favour with the sepoys of the 19th Regiment who had no stomach for further Mutiny. In obedience to the orders of their commanding officer they resumed their march towards Barrackpur where they arrived on March 31. On the same day the sepoys of the 19th Regiment were disbanded and marched out of Barrackpur under a European escort. They were not, however, stripped of their uniforms. They were also paid their dues and provided with carriages at public cost to reach their respective village homes. Such acts of kindness impressed them so much so that 'many of them lifted up their voices, bewailing their fate and loudly declaring that they would revenge themselves upon the 34th, who had tempted them to their undoing.' (12) Meanwhile on March 29 the 34th Regiment mutinied at Barrackpur. Government thereupon thought of disbanding the 34th Regiment and of crasing its name from the Army List permanently. Three companies of the regiment had then been away from Barrackpur on detachment duty at Chittagong. With the exception of these three companies the entire 34th Regiment came to be disbanded on May 6, 1857. Following, then, the cartridge disturbances at Dum Dum on January 22 and 23, 1857 the 19th and 34th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry mutinied at Berhampur and Barrackpur on February 26-27 and March 29 respectively. These two regiments were predominantly of high-caste composition (13) and were consequently too much sensitive to their caste and religion. It was in the nature of things that

(9) Forrest, *op. cit.* p. 9—Introduction.

(10) *Ibid.*

(11) Charles Ball—History of the Indian Mutiny. Vol. I. p. 45.

(12) Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.* I. p. 401.

(13) The 34th Regiment of Native Infantry was composed of 335 Brahmins, 237 Chuttrees (Rajputs), 231 Hindus of inferior description, 12 Christians, 200 Mussalmans and 74 Sikhs. Total 1089. vide *Parl. Papers (House of Commons)* Vol. 30 of 1857. Paper No. 270. p. 151. The 19th Regiment at the time of its disbandment contained 409 Brahmins and 180 Rajputs. vide Charles Ball—*op. cit.* I. p. 53 (foot note).

they took the earliest opportunity to make an armed protest against an interference by Government with their caste and creed.

Almost synchronous with the Mutiny at Barrackpur was the rising at Ambala where a musketry depot had been formed to train up sepoys in the use of the new Enfield Rifle. There on March 26 disturbances over the newly introduced greased cartridges came to occur. (14)

The month following saw the infection of disturbances spread to Lucknow, the chief city of Oudh. 'Early in April', writes Holmes, 'Dr. Wells, a surgeon of the 48th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, feeling unwell went to the hospital for a bottle of medicine and raised it to his lips, forgetting that he had thus hopelessly polluted it in the eyes of his Hindu patients. The sepoys soon heard what he had done and raised an outcry for their caste. Their Colonel had the bottle broken in their presence and severely reprimanded the offender. But the matter did not end here. A few days later Wells's bungalow was burnt down and it was soon known that the regiment had been thoroughly disaffected. But still no overt act of mutiny took place. But May brought a change.' (15) On May 3 the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry mutinied in Lucknow. (16) The infection soon spread to Meerut where on May 10 the 11th and 20th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry and 3rd Light Cavalry broke out into revolt. (17) Colonel Finnis, the Commanding Officer of the 11th Native Infantry was fired upon and finished to death—the first victim of the India Mutiny. (18) This outbreak of Meerut is usually treated as marking the starting point of the Sepoy Mutiny. (19) The tide of rebellion now surged towards the imperial city of Delhi 'which with its geographical position, military advantages and its garrison of three regiments of Native Infantry and a battery of native artillery offered inducements to the mutineers from different parts of the country to make it their rallying centre and a base of operations.' The mutineers from Meerut accordingly set their faces towards Delhi and about 8 A.M. of May 11, 1857 (20) reached the city where the three native regiments, the 38th, 54th and 74th of the Bengal Native Infantry mutinied on the same day (21) to fraternize with their comrades from Meerut. Delhi passed under the control of the mutineers who proclaimed Bahadur Shah II, the last representative of the Mughals, as the Emperor of Hindusthan on the very day of the outbreak viz.

(14) Parl. Papers (House of Commons) Vol. 30 of 1857. Paper No. 282. p. 21.

(15) Holmes—A history of the Indian Mutiny. p. 98.

(16) George Dodd—History of the Indian revolt. p. 625.

(17) Home Pub. Cons. 17th September, 1858 No. 35.

(18) The first blood of the Mutiny had, however, been already shed, when on March 29 Lieutenant Baugh and Sergeant Major Hewson of the 34th Native Infantry had been severely wounded by Mangal Pande at the Barrackpur Cantonment. While they escaped with wounds only, Colonel Finnis was the first European to be done to death in the course of the Mutiny. In this sense only the Colonel is looked upon as the first victim of the Indian Mutiny.

(19) Properly speaking, the Mutiny started at Barrackpur on March 29, 1857 with the rising of Mangal Pande over the issue of the greased cartridge.

(20) Charles Ball—op. cit. I. p. 76.

(21) George Dodd—op. cit. p. 625.

May 11, 1857. (22) On June 8, however, a relieving force from Ambala defeated the besiegers of Delhi at Badli-ki-Sarai, a few miles off Delhi. By September Delhi was reoccupied by the forces of Government. On September 21 after the fall of Delhi Bahadur Shah II surrendered to Lieutenant Hodson, the Head of the Intelligence Department, on the assurance from the latter that his life would be spared. Bahadur Shah was carried to the Begam's Palace and detained there under a European guard for trial and punishment. His trial commenced on January 27, 1858 and was concluded on March 9, 1858. He was found guilty of four such charges as aiding and abetting the Mutinies of the troops; encouraging and assisting diverse persons to wage war against the British Government; assuming sovereignty of Hindusthan; and causing and being accessory to the murder of the Christians. With these charges against him the old Bahadur Shah II was sent down to Calcutta and thence exiled to Rangoon where he died in 1862 at the age of eighty-seven. Two of his sons and a grandson had been shot dead by Hodson within a mile of Delhi after the fall of the city.

The news of the outbreak in Meerut and Delhi produced a Mutiny-fever in the then North-Western provinces. (23) The months of May, June and July, 1857 had been the months of serious mutinous occurrences in the North-Western provinces. In Muzaffarnagar, for instance, a detachment of the 20th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry which had taken a prominent part in the famous Meerut outbreak mutinied on May 13. Subsequent to the Meerut outbreak of May 10, the Mutiny broke out in Bijnor in the same month. Detachments of the 9th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry were stationed in Bulandshahr, Mainpuri and Etawah. While the detachments at the first two stations revolted on May 22, the detachment at the third station rose in revolt on 23rd (24) on hearing of the outbreak in Aligarh of the four companies of the same 9th Native Infantry on May 20. (25) Hathras, a few miles from Aligarh witnessed the Mutiny of a portion of the Gwalior Horse on May 24. (26) Three companies of the 44th and 67th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry rose in revolt in Mathura on May 30. On May 31 the 28th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry revolted in Shahjahanpur. (27) It was on the same date that in Bareilly, the capital of

(22) Charles Ball—*op. cit.* I. p. 458.

(23) In 1857 this region was politically divided into Banaras, Allahabad, Agra, Rohilkhand, Meerut and Delhi divisions. The Banaras division was composed of Banaras, Mirzapur, Jaunpur, Gorakhpur, Ghazipur and Azamgarh districts. The Allahabad division comprised the districts of Allahabad, Fatehpur, Kanpur, Banda and Hamirpur. The districts of Agra, Mathura, Mainpuri and Etawah constituted the Agra division. The Rohilkhand division was composed of Bareilly, Shahjahanpur, Moradabad, Bijnor, and Budaun districts. The Meerut division was parcelled out into such districts as Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Shaharanpur, Bulandshahr, Dehra Dun and Aligarh. Lastly, the Delhi division was formed of Delhi, Gurgaon, Hissar, Panipat and Rohtak. Vide Kaye and Malletson, *op. cit.* VI. p. 38.

(24) Home Pub. Cons. 17th September, 1858. No. 35.

(25) *Ibid.*

(26) George Dodd. p. 625.

(27) Home Pub. Cons. 17th Sept., 1858. No. 35.

Rohilkhand, the 8th Irregular Cavalry, and the 18th and 68th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry broke out into open revolt. (28) The very next day, that is, on June 1, the sepoys in Budaun rose in revolt jointly with the landlords and peasants. One 'Naik' (corporal) and sixteen sepoys of the 5th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry mutinied in Shaharanpur on June 2, 1857. (29) In Moradabad also the 29th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry rose in rebellion on June 3, 1857. (30) As a result of the Mutiny of the native regiments in different centres of the Rohilkhand division the whole of the Rohilkhand territory passed for some time under the sway of the rebels. The rebels in Rohilkhand, highly encouraged by their success, sent a force more than 5,000 strong to blockade the passes leading to Naini Tal. This caused a great alarm at the hill station. But the design of the mutineers was frustrated by the prompt action of a body of 300 men of the 8th Irregular Cavalry under Major Ramsay. The Major cleared the mutineers out of Naini Tal which was subsequently placed under the protection of three Gurkha regiments. (31) In Azamgarh, the 17th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry mutinied at 9 p.m. of June 3. (32) while on June 4 the 37th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, the 13th Irregular Cavalry and the Ludhiana Sikhs rose in revolt in Banaras. (33) The 1st, 53rd and 56th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry and the 2nd Bengal Native Cavalry rose in Mutiny on June 5 in Kanpur. (34) The siege of the British entrenchments in Kanpur lasted from June 6 to June 27. The murderous attacks (35) by the Kanpur sepoys on English women and children and the confinement of English women at Bibigarh were avenged with equally matched ferocity by the British forces that soon reached Kanpur under Colonel Neill and Sir Henry Havelock. The English women detained at Bibigarh were not at all dishonoured. (36) Allahabad saw the Mutiny

(28) Home Pub. Cons. 17th Sept. 1858. No. 35.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Charles Ball, op. cit. II. p. 161.

(32) Home Pub. Cons. 17th Sept., 1858, No. 35.

(33) George Dodd, op. cit. p. 625.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Referring to the Nana Saheb's responsibility for the Kanpur massacre Maud writes thus : "One must doubt whether the Nana Saheb was as guilty of complicity in the murder of our women and children, as he is generally believed to have been. I am rather of opinion that his hand, though guilty, was forced by his more blood-thirsty followers whose acts he dared not disavow..... It is certain that on more than one occasion the Nana befriended the helpless creatures; indeed treated them with actual kindness. The massacre at the Ghat was certainly planned with satanic genius and by a master mind, which latter the Nana certainly did not possess." Vide *Memories of the Mutiny*. Vol. I pp. 108-109. According to Mowbray Thomson, it was Azimullah who was the actual murderer of the English women and children at Kanpur. Vide *The story of Cawnpore*. p. 56.

(36) Under orders of the Governor-General, Lord Canning an enquiry was instituted by Sir William Muir (in charge of the Intelligence Department of the North-Western Provinces) into the alleged dishonour of European females during the Mutiny. Sir Muir conducted the investigation with the help of E. A. Reade, Senior Member, Sadar Board of Revenue, North-Western provinces, F. Williams, Commissioner of Meerut, Major G. W. Williams, Superintendent of Police Battalions, Meerut, Rev.

of the 6th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry on June 6. (37) In Jaunpur, a civil station near Banaras a detachment of the Ludhiana Regiment of Sikhs revolted on June 5. (38) A detachment of the 17th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry mutinied on June 5 in Gorakhpur where it was on duty. (39) Mirzapur, though it passed unscathed through the trying days of May, saw the outbreak of a revolt with the arrival of a wing of the 47th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry on June 7. (40) The Mutiny broke out also in Ghazipur. The sepoys posted there belonged to the 65th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, back from Burma. The attitude of the sepoys of this regiment was normally quiescent. But they grew mutinous, as they came into contact with the disaffected sepoys of Azamgarh pouring into Ghazipur on June 5 and 6. The district then rose in revolt almost as one man. (41) At Hansi the Hariana Light Infantry battalion mutinied on May 29, 1857. (42) On June 10 the 60th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry mutinied in Rohtak. (43) On June 14 a detachment of the 56th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry mutinied in Banda. (44) The report of the Mutiny in Meerut produced a tension in Dehra Dun. On June 15 Jullundur mutineers marched upon Dehra Dun but the mutineers had to take to their heels. The Mutiny in Meerut rapidly spread to Agra which eventually became 'a sea of anarchy'. On July 4, 1857 the Kotah contingent mutinied in Agra. (45) On July 9 the 46th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry and the 9th Light Cavalry mutinied in Sialkot, (46) where also, as in Dum Dum and Ambala, a

T. C. Smyth, Chaplain, Meerut, C. B. Saunders, Commissioner of Delhi. C. B. Thornhill, then officiating Secretary to the Government of North-Western Provinces, R. Alexander, Commissioner, Rohilkhand and A. H. Cocks, Special Commissioner, Aligarh. The unanimous opinion of all of them was that nowhere in the North-Western Provinces were the European females dishonoured. The European ladies and children were 'simply massacred' by the sepoys out of their desire 'to wipe out all trace of Europeans and of everything connected with foreign rule'. Such massacres were not committed by the sepoys to gratify their passion. 'The stories of dishonour done to European females were generally false'. Giving his own views on the subject Sir Muir wrote to Lord Canning thus : '..... I gladly add my testimony that nothing has come to my knowledge which would in the smallest degree support any of the tales of dishonour current in our public prints. Direct evidence, wherever procurable, has been steadily and consistently against them..... This Memorandum applies specially to the North-Western provinces including Bundelkhand and Oudh. They apply indirectly to the mutinies in all other quarters, so far as intelligence regarding them has reached us.'

Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of North-Western provinces of India during the Mutiny of 1857—preserved and arranged under the superintendence of Sir William Muir, then in charge of the Intelligence Department, North-Western Provinces. Vol. I, pp. 367-379.

(37) George Dodd, op. cit. p. 625.

(38) Home Pub. Cons. 17th September, 1858, No. 35.

(39) Kaye and Malleison, op. cit. VI p. 54.

(40) Ibid, p. 46.

(41) Kaye and Malleison, op. cit. VI, p. 60.

(42) Parl. Papers. Vol. XVIII of 1859.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Kaye and Malleison, op. cit. III, p. 131.

(45) George Dodd, op. cit. P. 625.

(46) Parl. Papers. Vol. XVIII of 1859.

training centre had been opened for the training of the sepoys in the use of the new Enfield Rifle. A detachment of the 29th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry revolted on July 11 (47) in Saharanpur where an outbreak had already occurred on June 2, 1857.

Various stations in the North-Western provinces had thus been affected by the Mutiny of May 10 in Meerut. Besides the North-Western provinces other parts of the country had also been centres of revolt during the period of the Mutiny.

Oudh which was the nursery of the so-called Bengal Army had been running a high temperature of the fever of disaffection since its annexation in 1856. The 7th Regiment of the Oudh Irregular Infantry was stationed at Musa Bagh near the Residency. (48) On April 30 this regiment showed a disinclination to use the new cartridges.. On May 3 it actually rose in Mutiny, as has been stated before. On May 30 the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry along with the 7th Light Cavalry mutinied in Lucknow. (49) The mutineers assembled at Mudkipur from where they had to retreat. On the night of June 11 the whole of the Cavalry branch of the Military Police in Lucknow broke out into open revolt. (50) The next morning (June 12) the 3rd Regiment of the Infantry branch of the Military Police mutinied at Moti Mohal near the Baillie Guard (51) (Residency buildings). Meanwhile the mutinous troops of the Oudh Irregular force gradually collected at a place called Nawabganj Bara Banki, seventeen miles from Lucknow. The mutineers proceeded therefrom towards Chinhat, a village on the Faizabad road, within eight miles of the Residency. It was June 28. On the 29th was fought the battle of Chinhat (52) which was won by the sepoys. The victory of the sepoys at Chinhat forced concentration of the Government forces in the Residency which also came to be besieged by the sepoys. In the course of the siege Sir Henry Lawrence, the then Commissioner of Oudh lost his life. After the fourth assault by the sepoys relief to the besieged Residency came through Sir Henry Havelock and Sir James Outram towards the end of September. With the coming of Sir Colin Campbell as the new Commander-in-Chief Lucknow was finally cleared of the mutineers and restored to Government possession on March 21, 1858. 'Seldom did the rebels display so much pertinacity and resolution as on this occasion.' On March 20 was published Lord Canning's Oudh proclamation of March 3, 1858. The proclamation professed 'to confiscate the whole proprietary right in the soil of Oudh save in the case of six comparatively inferior chiefs'. The rebel landowners who should at once surrender to Government would be immune from death and imprisonment, provided that their hands were 'unstained with English blood

(47) Kaye and Malleon, op. cit. III, p. 201.

(48) *Ibid* P. 242.

(49) Home Pub. Cons., 17th Sept., 1858. No. 35.

(50) Kaye and Malleon, op. cit., III, P. 279.

(51) *Ibid*. P. 279.

(52) *Ibid* P. 284.

murderously shed'. 'This proclamation had a damaging effect on the prospect of peace in Oudh. 'It arrived just when the city of Lucknow had been gained, but when Oudh was still in insurrection, and when the rebel army which had vainly defended the city had cast itself on the districts, there to offer a fresh resistance. Every leading man who had taken a part in the campaign was struck with the impolicy, at such a moment, of disinheriting a whole people, that people being still armed and in the field.' (53) 'The opposition of the inhabitants of Oudh to this proclamation found expression in guerilla warfare against Government. Finally, however, towards the end of 1858 the disaffected elements were driven towards the Nepal frontier. Of the 'fifty thousand' (54) armed sepoys who had crossed into Nepal a certain percentage laid down their arms and came home back 'trusting that they would be allowed to settle down unmolested'.

The central part of India including Bundelkhand was no less disaffected. On June 14, 1857 the Gwalior contingent mutinied in Gwalior. (55) The 52nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry rose in Jubbulpur on September 18. (56) Bundelkhand stood highly disaffected during the Mutiny. Much disaffection prevailed at Rewah, a native state in Bundelkhand. The Raja of Rewah was known to have been loyal to Government but he was by no means a staunch ally. The subjects of the Raja were opposed to Government. The news of the Mutiny at Nagod and Jubbulpur 'stimulated the rebellious passions of the disaffected at Rewah.' Early in October, 1857 some two thousand five hundred mutineers attacked the office of Willoughby Osborne, the British agent at the court of the Raja, but finally they slunk off. Order was restored at Rewah. Mutiny flared up also in other states of Bundelkhand, namely Jhansi, Chanderi and Jalaun. So far as Jhansi is concerned, the state was most unjustly declared by Lord Dalhousie to have lapsed to Government in 1854 in terms of his Doctrine of Lapse. The action of Dalhousie produced much unrest and discontent in Jhansi. The discontent soon found a mutinous expression. On the afternoon of June 5, 1857 a company of the 12th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry marched straight into the Star fort and captured it. (57) On June 6, 1857, affairs developed into a revolt. Both the civil and military classes of people of Jhansi rose in arms against Government. Lakshmi Bai, the queen-dowager of the state was also ultimately forced by circumstances to rise in revolt and to enter into a life and death struggle with Government in co-operation with Tantia Topi, the friend and general of the Nana Saheb. The Rani was left undisturbed until 1858, when Sir Hugh Rose advanced to attack her. Sir Hugh Rose was then in charge of the operations in central India including Bundelkhand.

(53) Kaye and Malleeson, op. cit., IV, PP. 285-286.

(54) Ibid. V, P. 206.

(55) George Dodd, op. cit., P. 525.

(56) Home Pub. Cons. 17th Sept., 1858, No. 35.

(57) Kaye and Malleeson, op. cit. III, p. 122. The Star fort, a small fort occupied by the Artillery and containing a treasure-chest, stood within the walled boundary of Jhansi.

Starting from Mau, which was the base of his operations, on January 6, 1858 he captured Rahatgarh near Saugor towards the end of January, 1858 and relieved the garrison of Saugor in February. In March he invested Jhansi and defeated a large relieving army under Tantia Topi on April 1, 1858. Tantia Topi fled towards Kalpi. On April 5 (58) Sir Hugh Rose captured Jhansi. The Rani thereupon left the state and rode straight towards Kalpi to effect a junction with Tantia Topi there. Sir Hugh Rose marched from Jhansi in the direction of Kunch (a town in the Jalaun district) on April 26, (59) leaving Colonel Liddell with a small force in charge of Jhansi. On May 7 (60) the force under Sir Hugh Rose attacked Kunch where the rebels had taken up a strong position. The rebels at Kunch were completely defeated. Thereafter on May 9 (61) Sir Hugh Rose advanced towards Kalpi in pursuit of the Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi. He attacked Kalpi on May 23 (62) and succeeded in capturing it. The rebels, accompanied by the Rani of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Rao Saheb (the nephew of the Nana Saheb) and the Nawab of Banda, made off in the direction of Gwalior without being overtaken by a pursuing column, sent after them. (63) Sindhia of Gwalior was, however, loyal to Government. The Gwalior contingent or the subsidiary force in Gwalior and the revolted sepoys of the Bengal Army belonged principally to the same region, namely Oudh and the neighbouring districts and had natural sympathy with one another. But the fidelity of Sindhia to the British Government at first prevented the Gwalior contingent from openly joining the revolted sepoys of the Bengal Army. Subsequently, however, the Gwalior contingent revolted against Sindhia and made a common cause with the mutinous sepoys of the Bengal Army. This facilitated the occupation of Gwalior by the Rani and Tantia Topi. Sindhia was forced to seek refuge in Agra. Rose seemed to be overpowered for the time being by the forces of the Rani and Tantia Topi. Unfortunately, however, the rebel forces soon lost their hold over Gwalior. The Rani also lost her life in battle. Clad in the attire of a man and mounted on horse-back the heroic queen died on June 17, 1858 at the battle of Kota-Ki-Sarai, as 'she was struck by a carbine bullet close to the phul Bagh cantonment. Immediately afterwards a hussar ignorant of her sex dealt her a blow with his sabre. She kept her saddle for a few seconds and then fell dead.' (64) Tantia became 'a hunted fugitive until in April, 1859 his career ended on the gallows.'

(58) Kaye and Malleon, op. cit. V. p. 119.

(59) Pinkney's official narrative, p. 16.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid. p. 17.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Ibid.

(64) Vide Holmes, op. cit. p. 538.

A letter, dated Morar Cantonment, 18th June 1858 (preserved in the Central Records Office, Bhopal) from Munshi Bhawani Prasad, who was the representative of Nawab Sikandar Begum of Bhopal to the Political Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, yields the following information relating to the circumstances in which the Rani met her death : 'Yesterday the Rani of Jhansi and the Nawab of Banda, both present at the entrenchment, were personally directing the bombardment

The Maratha States of Central India were in a ferment during the Mutiny. As in the state of Gwalior of Sindhia, in Holkar's Indore the contingent troops were mutinous. A portion of Holkar's Contingent rose in Mutiny on July 1, 1857. On the evening of the same day *i.e.* July 1, 1857 the 23rd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry and one squadron of the Bengal Native Cavalry mutinied at Mhow, (65) a cantonment town in the Indore State. During July and August Holkar pursued Sindhia's line of action. He remained faithful to the British Government and endeavoured to maintain peace in his territory. Holkar could not, however, prevent the march of the mutineers from Indore to Gwalior. Their march to Agra was, however, prevented by the shrewdness of Sindhia. The chances of success of the revolted sepoys in Central India came to be eliminated with the death of the Rani and the helplessness of Tantia Topi.

The Mutiny spread with rapid strides to the Saugor and Narbada territories too. There were three military stations in the Saugor and Narbada territories viz. those of Saugor, Jubbulpur and Hoshangabad. Saugor was garrisoned by the 31st and 42nd Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment of Irregular Cavalry and sixty-eight European gunners. Jubbulpur was guarded by the 52nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangabad by the 28th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry. On July 2 the 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Regiment, Native Infantry broke out into open revolt at Saugor. (66) The 31st Regiment held aloof, professing loyalty. On September 18, the 52nd Regiment, Native Infantry also mutinied at Jubbulpur, and the surrounding country passed under the control of the mutineers.

In the Nagpur territory of Bhonsla tranquillity was preserved through the disarming of the local troops.

There were several military risings in Rajputana. Reports about greased cartridges left the military class in Rajputana highly disaffected. There the civil population also stood highly unsettled because of the rumours in circulation about the pollution of food-stuffs (flour, for instance) with the mixture of such unholy substances as bone-dust. The Mutiny at last broke out among the sepoys of the 15th and 30th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry at Nasirabad, a military station in Rajputana at 4 P.M. on May 28, 1857. (67) August 9 saw an outbreak of revolt in the Ajmer jail. (68) On August 10 the Hindusthani sepoys of the

against Major R's (Hugh Rose's ?) position. During the engagement that ensued one shell from Major R's battery blew off an arm of the Nawab of Banga and another went off bruising the Rani's breast, which resulted in her death. The mutineers, therefore, cremated the said Rani's body with sandal wood.....'—Indian Historical Records Commission. Proceedings, Vol. XXIX. Part II, Bhopal. PP. 157-158. There are also other statements of the circumstances in which the Rani met her death.

(65) George Dodd, *op. cit.* p. 625.

(66) Home Pub. Cons. 17th September, 1858. No. 35.

(67) *Ibid.*

(68) Narrative of events regarding the Mutiny in India and the restoration of authority. Vol. II. p. 289.

12th Bombay Native Infantry at Nasirabad betrayed symptoms of 'disaffection. The disaffected sepoys of the regiment were in consequence promptly disarmed. (69) To the south of Nasirabad lay another military centre, Nimach which was garrisoned by the 72nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, 7th Infantry Regiment, Gwalior contingent, the left wing of the 1st Bengal cavalry and by the Fourth Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Native Horse Artillery. (70) On June 3, 1857 the sepoys of the 72nd Bengal Native Infantry, the left wing of the 1st Bengal cavalry and of the Fourth Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Native Horse Artillery broke out into Mutiny at Nimach. (71) Nimach witnessed a second Mutiny on August 12, when the disaffected sepoys of the 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry who had been there as a relieving force attempted a rising. The attempted rising was, however, nipped in the bud. (72) At Kotah, a state in Rajputana, the Kotah contingent broke out into revolt on October 15, 1857, imprisoned the ruling chief, Maharao Ramsing in his palace and killed the political agent of Kotah, Major General H. G. Roberts. The authority of the Maharao came to be eventually re-established. (73) The station of Mount Abu at 'Sirohi, a native state in Rajputana, was garrisoned by a detachment of the Jodhpur legion whose headquarters were at Erinpura. This Jodhpur legion was composed of Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry branches and was recruited from those regions wherefrom the sepoys of the so-called Bengal Army had been obtained. The legion mutinied at Mount Abu by August 21 (74) and also at Erinpura on August 22, 1857. (75) The Mutinies were in the long run arrested in Rajputana, as elsewhere.

There were many a rising of the sepoys in the Punjab also. On May 13 the 45th and 57th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry, mutinied at Ferozpur. On the night of June 7, 1857 the native battalions—two regiments of Foot and one of Horse—rose in revolt at Jullundur by setting fire to the bungalow of the Colonel of the Queen's regiment. (76) The Jullundur mutineers, as already noticed, marched on Dehra Dun on June 15, but being opposed by a force sent against them the mutineers finally escaped out of the district of Dehra Dun. There were Mutinies at the Jhelum cantonment and Sialkot. The 14th Sepahi Regiment, posted at the Jhelum cantonment on the bank of the Jhelum was up in arms on July 7, 1857. (77) The 46th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry and the 9th Light Cavalry mutinied at Sialkot on July 9, as already stated. Lahore also was agitated. The 26th Regiment,

(69) Narrative of events etc. Vol. II. P. 289.

(70) Ibid. P. 282. Also Prichard-Mutinies in Rajpootana. P. 107.

(71) Home Pub. Cons. 17th Sept., 1858. No. 35.

(72) Kaye and Malleeson—op. cit. IV. 388. Also Narrative of events. Vol. II. P. 289.

(73) Kaye and Malleeson—op. cit. IV. PP. 397-403.

(74) Narrative of events re : the Mutiny in India of 1857-58 and the restoration of authority Vol. II. P. 312.

(75) Ibid.

(76) Kaye & Malleeson, op. cit. II. P. 375.

(77) Home Pub. Cons. 17th September, 1858. No. 35.

Bengal Native Infantry broke out into Mutiny there on July 29. (78) Earlier on May 13, the 16th, 26th and 49th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry and 8th Bengal Native Cavalry were disarmed at the cantonment of Mian-Mir, six miles from Lahore. The country between Lahore and Multan rose in revolt on September 14, the very day, when Delhi was attacked for reoccupation by the British forces. The rising was as usual suppressed. Henceforth there was almost all quiet on the Punjab front. There were, however, occasional risings, which from being slight in nature could be easily arrested. In July 1858, for instance, a portion of the 18th Punjab infantry stationed at Dehra Ishmail Khan on the Indus planned a Mutiny. But the plot was detected on July 20, 1858 and was consequently suppressed. (79) In the month following the 62nd and 69th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry and native troops of Horse Artillery caused alarm to the authorities there but their rising was quelled with much slaughter. The chieftains of the Cis-Sutlej states were loyal. So were the Rajas of Patiala, Jhind and Nabha.

Peshwar was then garrisoned by the 21st, 24th, 27th and 51st Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry and by the 5th Regiment, Bengal Native Cavalry. On May 21 barring the 21st Infantry Regiment all the other regiments showed unmistakable symptoms of disaffection. On May 22 the disaffected regiments were disarmed. (80) Thanks to its fidelity to Government the 21st Regiment was exempted from the operation of the disarming order.

In 1857, when the Mutiny broke out, the territories under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal were politically divided into eleven divisions such as Orissa, Burdwan, Presidency, Rajshahi, Coach Bihar, Dacca, Chittagong, Assam, West Bihar, East Bihar and Chotanagpur. (81) While some of the divisions witnessed military risings, the rest practically remained immune from the same.

(78) George Dodd—op. cit. p. 626.

(79) Kaye and Malleison, op. cit. V. pp. 212-213.

(80) Ibid. II. pp. 357-359.

(81) The districts comprising each of the eleven divisions are noted below :—

<i>Name of Division</i>		<i>Districts composing each Division</i>
Orissa	...	Cuttuck, Puri and Baleswar.
Burdwan	...	Burdwan, Bankura, Birbhum, Hugli, Howrah, and Midnapur.
Presidency	...	Calcutta, 24 Parganas, Nadia and Jessore.
Rajshahi	...	Rajshahi, Rangpur, Bagura, Pabna, Murshidabad, Dinajpur and Malda.
Cooch Bihar	...	Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar.
Dacca	...	Dacca, Faridpur, Bakarganj, Mymensingh, Sylhet and Cachar.
Chittagong	...	Chittagong, Noakhali, Tipperah and Hill Tipperah.
Assam	...	Goalpara, Kamrup (Gauhati) Durang, Nowgong, Sibsagar, Lakhimpur, the Garo Hills, the Khasia and Jaintia hills, the Naga hills.
West Bihar	...	Patna, Gaya, Sahabad, Saran, Champaran and Tirhut.
East Bihar	...	Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Purnea and the Santal Parganas.

The Orissa division showed few signs of disaffection during the Mutiny and remained peaceful. In November, 1857 it was apprehended that the Dharuahs, one of the aboriginal tribes of the Orissa division would break out into revolt but 'they did not venture to disturb public peace.' (82)

The Burdwan division maintained tranquillity during the Mutiny. (83) On the state of things in the Burdwan division during the Mutiny Frederick Halliday, the then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, recorded the following account in 1858 : "The Burdwan Division has been quite free from any disturbance, though it has not altogether escaped the apprehension of danger. For a long time the Shekawati battalion was a fruitful and not an unreasonable source of apprehension to the residents and inhabitants of Midnapur and Bankura.... But it remained not only faithful to the state but has done very good service in the Chota Nagpur Division... The Burdwan Division has throughout been perfectly tranquil and I have never had the slightest grounds for anticipating any disloyalty on the part of the inhabitants... On the occurrence of the outbreak of the Ramgarh Battalion fresh uneasiness was felt on the subject of the Shekawati Battalion both in Midnapur and Bankura where was a detachment of the corps—an uneasiness which was increased by the close neighbourhood of the Chota Nagpur districts and a fear of outbreak amongst the Chuars and Sonthals inhabiting the country about Bankura. The distrust, however, of the Battalion seems gradually to have passed away, and in October (1857), when increased fear of an outbreak amongst the Sonthals seemed to be entertained, a wing of the Shekawatis was gladly welcomed at Bankura and served to allay the anxiety that was felt. But it is not necessary to record the recurrence of mere apprehensions; it is sufficient to repeat that neither then nor at any other time since, have the apprehensions either about the sepoys or the frontier tribes been realised." (84)

Calcutta was for some time panic-stricken. On May 17, the 25th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry ran riot in Calcutta. (85) On June 13

Chotanagpur	... Lahardaga, Hazaribagh, Sambalpur, Singhbhum, Manbhum and certain tributary Mahals such as Bhokar, Korea, Sirguja, Udaipur, Jashpur, Gangpur Bonai, Sarunda and others. <i>Vide</i> Kaye and Malleon, op. cit. Vi, pp. 3-4.
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(82) Ibid. P. 5.

(83) There had been only stray occurrences of almost negligible nature. A detachment of the two companies of 32nd Native Infantry, for instance, while proceeding from Barhait in the Santal Parganas to the Head quarters of the Regiment at Suri mutinied enroute in October, 1857. On 17th October a detachment of the same 32nd Native Infantry also mutinied at Rampurhat in the district of Birbhum. *Vide* the Minute on the Mutinies as they affected the Lower Provinces under the Government of Bengal, 1858,—by F. Halliday. Also Home Pub. Cons. 17th September, 1858. No. 35.

(84) *Vide* Frederick Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(85) George Dodd—op. cit, p. 625.

the city grew restless out of sympathy with the deposed king of Oudh, then residing at Garden Reach, a suburb of Calcutta. The mercantile and trading community, of course, remained loyal. The day following (June 14) was a panicky Sunday in Calcutta. On 15th the king of Oudh was arrested. The arms found in certain parts of the city were confiscated under orders of the then Police Commissioner of Calcutta, Wauchope. Dwelling on the panic prevailing in Calcutta in June, 1857 Reverend Alexander Duff wrote to Dr. Tweedie from Calcutta on June 16, 1857 as follows : (86) "...Calcutta has been in a state of alarm..... while the atrocities in the North-West were filling peoples' minds with horror, an alarm was raised last week in consequence of fresh symptoms of disaffection and mutiny among the native solidery in this neighbourhood. Our great infantry station, Barrackpur lies about twelve miles to the north of Calcutta and on the same side of the river ; our artillery station, Dum Dum, about four or five miles to the north-east. To the south is Fort William and beyond it, the great Alipur jail, with its thousands of imprisoned desperadoes, guarded by a regiment of native militia ; not far from Alipur is Garden Reach where the ex-king of Oudh has been residing with about a thousand armed retainers, the Mussulman population, generally armed also, breathing fanatical vengeance on the 'infidels' and praying in their mosques for the success of the Delhi rebels. Calcutta being guarded by the native police only, in whom not a particle of confidence can any longer be reposed, seemed to be exposed on all sides to imminent perils, as most of the European soldiers had been sent to the North-west. In this extremity and in the midst of indescribable panic and alarm the Government began to enrol the European and East Indian residents as volunteers to patrol the streets at night... Happily the 78th Highlanders arrived during the week, and their presence helped to act so far as a sedative. Still, while the city was filled with armed citizens and surrounded on all sides with armed soldiers, all known to be disaffected to the very core and waiting only for the signal to burst upon the European population in a tempest of massacre and blood, the feeling of uneasiness and insecurity was intense. Many, unable to withstand the pressure any longer went to pass the night in central places of rendezvous ; numbers went into the fort : and numbers more actually went on board the ships and steamers in the river. On Sabbath (14th) the feeling of anxiety rose to a perfect paroxysm. On Saturday night the Brigadier at Barrackpur sent an express to Government House to notify that from certain information which he had obtained there was to be a general rising of the sepoys on Sabbath. Accordingly, before the Sabbath dawned, all manner of vehicles were in requisition to convey all the available European forces to Barrackpur and Dum Dum. Those which had been sent to the north by railway on Saturday were recalled by a telegraphic message through the night. But the public generally had not any distinct intelligence as to the varied movements ; and even if they had, there would be the uttermost uncertainty as to the result. Accordingly throughout the whole Sabbath-day the wildest and most

fearful rumours were circulating in rapid succession..... On Sunday, at five P.M. the authorities.....proceeded to disarm the sepoys at Barrackpur, Dum Dum and elsewhere. Through God's mercy the attempt proved successful... We soon learnt the glad tidings that all the armed sepoys had everywhere been successfully disarmed, and that during the night, the ex-King of Oudh with his treasonable courtiers was quietly arrested and lodged as prisoners of state in Fort William." On June 18 Duff further wrote to Dr. Tweedie on the state of things in Calcutta thus : "...After the imminent danger from which we escaped on Sabbath was known to be over, people's agitated minds enjoyed a temporary respite from alarm. On Tuesday, however, fresh discoveries began to be made which clearly shewed that, if all went to sleep, it would be on the brink of a volcano, ready for an eruption. The secret assemblages of the Mohammedans in different parts of the city often prolonged throughout the whole night, and the vast quantities of gun-powder and of arms of all descriptions sold to them at high prices in the bazaars would alone be enough to reawaken all our anxieties. And then for months back there has been a constantly augmenting under-current of mysterious feeling and expectation connected with the 23rd June next—the centenary day of the battle of Plassey, which first laid the foundation of our empire in India. A general rising was planned to take place on 23rd instant. The city was to be taken and the British and other Christian inhabitants, to be all massacred..... All this and much more of a similar sort having been... revealed, the authorities have been aroused to fresh energy and the adoption of more effective precautionary measures. Guns have been planted in some of the more dangerous neighbourhoods, as well as small companies of British troops. At night the streets are perambulated by bodies of armed horsemen. Places of rendezvous have been appointed in case of a sudden outbreak in any quarters. All Europeans who could not get arms have been liberally supplied from the Fort arsenal. In fact, we have at this moment all the strange and conflicting sensations of citizens in a state of active siege, with this additional aggravation that, while we are surrounded with enemies from without, there are tens of thousands of them prowling about in the very midst of us." The disarming of the sepoys at Dum Dum and Barrackpur and other strong military measures proved effective in allaying the panic in Calcutta, restoring a sense of security of life and property among the European as well as the native population there, and in keeping the city undisturbed on June 23. Panic was, no doubt, felt in Calcutta thereafter from time to time, but such a panic never ended in a general rising of the people in the city in the course of the Mutiny. Uneasy feeling prevailed in Jessore and Nadia. But peace was not essentially disturbed in either districts.

In the Rajshahi division Berhampur was the scene of the Mutiny of the 19th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry. This mutinous regiment was marched to Barrackpur for disbandment. Berhampur thereafter came to enjoy unbroken peace in the course of the insurrection. The Nawab of Murshidabad had no sympathy with the mutineers. He was loyal to Government. On the nights of December 4 and 5, 1857 detach-

ments of the 11th Irregular Cavalry posted at Madariganj and Jalpaiguri rose in Mutiny and spread alarm in Jalpaiguri, Dinajpur and Rangpur.(87)

Dacca and Chittagong were garrisoned by two companies of the 73rd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, and three companies of the 34th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry respectively.(88) The detachments of the 73rd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry rose in Mutiny at Dacca on November 22, 1857.(89) Great uneasiness was consequently felt in other districts of the Dacca division. The Dacca mutineers passed through Jalpaiguri without attacking the station and finally escaped into the Nepal tarai.(90) Order came accordingly to be restored in the Dacca division. Before their escape to Nepal the Dacca mutineers planned to proceed to Pabna also. They could not, however, mature their plan owing to the opposition of a zemindar of Tatapara, Bijoy Govinda Chaudhury by name, who placed guards at his own expense between Dacca and Pabna. On November 18, 1857 three companies of the 34th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry mutinied at Chittagong.(91) But the Mutiny at Chittagong was suppressed and order was restored in the Chittagong division.

In Assam 'the seeds of rebellion were sown which but for the timely discovery of the plot, the arrest and subsequent execution of the chief conspirators and the secret and timely despatch of European sailors must have resulted in most serious consequences.'(92) In September, 1857, for instance, uneasy feelings were manifest amongst the sepoys of the 1st Assam battalion at Dibrugarh. 'Many of the sepoys of the 1st Assam battalion came from the neighbourhood of Arrah and were related to the men of the 40th regiment that mutinied at Dinapur; while others of them were from the territory belonging to Koer Singh. When, therefore, the outbreak at Dinapur became known to the men of the 1st Assam battalion at Dibrugarh, they openly expressed their sympathy with the mutineers and proffered their services to an ex-rajah, Poorundur Singh whom they promised to restore to the authority and state, he had been deprived of by the English, on condition that he would put himself at their head.'(93) But the mutinous proceedings of the sepoys at Dibrugarh were checked soon. Mutiny could not make much headway in Assam.

West Bihar turned into an area of deep-rooted disaffection during the Mutiny. East Bihar was also in the throes of a great agitation. The Chotanagpur division stood seriously disaffected.

If the north and east of India were highly agitated in the course of the Mutiny, the south was more or less tranquil. The Madras Presidency remained almost entirely peaceful. The city of Madras, Carnatic,

(87) Kaye & Mallsen, op. cit. IV, P. 298.

(88) Vide Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(89) Home Pub. Cons., 17th Sept., 1858, No. 35.

(90) Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(91) Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. XVIII of 1859.

(92) Vide Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(93) Charles Ball, op. cit. II, pp. 161-162.

Tanjore, Travancore, Kanara, Malabar and Mysore were all quiet. The Madras troops even volunteered to help Government against the revolted sepoys in the North-Western provinces. The 3rd, 11th, 16th, 17th, 27th, 30th, 36th and 47th Regiments of the Madras Native Infantry, the 3rd, 5th and 8th Regiments of the Madras Native Cavalry, a company of native foot artillery, a troop of native horse artillery and a detachment of native Sappers and Miners,—all volunteered their services against the revolted sepoys in the north Vindhyan region. (94) Slight alarms were, however, felt in the Madras Presidency, when the 8th Madras Native Cavalry on its way from Bangalore to Madras wherefrom to embark for Calcutta betrayed a mutinous tendency at first on August 17, 1857 about 25 miles from Madras, and again at Poonamallee after a march of a few miles more. As the regiment refused further to take up arms against their countrymen, it was punished by disbandment. On the whole, however, it was all quiet on the Madras front. If there were occasional disturbances, these were very slight and negligible.

The Bombay Presidency was also quiet, but not so quiet as the Madras Presidency. Sepoys of the Bombay Army were not as faithful as those of the Madras Army. On August 1, 1857 the 27th Regiment, Bombay Infantry mutinied at Kolapur to the south of Bombay on the occasion of 'Buckree Ed.' (95) This caused a ferment in the whole of the South Maratha country. Muhammadan conspiracy manifested itself at Poona, Satara, Belgaum, Dharwar, Rutnagherry, Sawantwadi and other places, (96) but the conspiracy was nipped in the bud. The 28th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, stationed at Dharwar, and the 29th, posted at Belgaum, also betrayed a tendency towards revolt. But the timely arrival of European troops restored order in those areas by August, 1857.

Hyderabad was quiet and its Nizam faithful. The Mussalmans of Hyderabad, though disaffected, could not openly revolt because of the Nizam and his chief minister, Salar Jung. Yet 'a single moment of indecision, a single act of impolicy, a single false step or a single admission of weakness might have turned Hyderabad into a Lucknow and made it a second Oudh of the Deccan.' (97)

Aurangabad was uneasy. The station was garrisoned by the 1st Cavalry and 2nd Infantry of the Hyderabad contingent of whom the former stood disaffected. On June 13, 1857 the disaffected sepoys in Aurangabad resented the idea of taking up arms against the mutineers in Delhi. They were pacified by the assurance that they would not be required to march against the mutineers in Delhi.

The area affected by the Sepoy Mutiny was thus wide; indeed. Many a native regiment, garrisoned in various centres, rose in revolt

(94) George Dodd, op. cit., p. 288.

(95) *Ibid.* P. 289.

(96) *Ibid.*, p. 290.

(97) Vide George Dodd—op. cit., p. 291.

in protest against the policy of Government towards native caste and religion. (98)

CLASSES AFFECTED

"...There must be a great diversity," wrote Duff to Tweedie on November 20, 1857 from Calcutta, "in the manifestation of native feeling towards us and our Government. To assert...that the hundred and eighty millions of India positively hate us is an extreme as far removed from the truth as the opposite assertion that these hundred and eighty millions are cordially attached to our sway... The truth lies somewhere in the middle between these extremes.' (99)

The truth is that Dalhousie's high-handed policy of annexation, his refusal to recognise the right of the childless princes of the 'dependent' Native States to adopt sons to succeed them to the sovereign authority of their respective states, the newly introduced revenue system under which the landlords and rayats suffered much in the North-Western provinces and Oudh, and the passing of such laws, regulations and forms of procedure as jarred with the long established religious observances of the Indian priesthood and with the age-worn caste-prejudices of the Indian society caused a great unrest in India and alienated diverse classes of people of the Indian society from the Government of the country. But the Mutiny which ultimately broke out in 1857 was due to the initiative of the disaffected native soldiery only by whose toil and blood the British Empire in India had been built up. The native soldiery in its entirety did not, however, join the Mutiny. There were many sepoy regiments which had no truck with the mutineers. Such native regiments lent their active or passive support to Government in the course of the Mutiny in restoring law and order in the country. (100)

The sepoys were not the only class that stood disaffected on the eve of the Mutiny. Discontent and unrest were prevalent among various other classes, too, such as the peasants, talukdars, and landlords of many a district of the then North-Western provinces as also of Oudh. Among the few disaffected territorial aristocrats mention may be made of Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, the Nana Saheb of Bithur, the Raja of Mainpuri, the Nawab of Banda, the Rajas of Satasi, Narharpur, Barhiapar and Nagar in Gorakhpur, Raja Shankar Shah of Jubbulpur, Rajas of Mitauli and Oel in Sitapur and of the Rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh in the Saugor and Narbada territories. There was also the conservative priestly class, then in an alienated state of mind. "If our lovers are few," wrote Dr. Duff, "our haters also are many. If the former are

(98) Two statements, one containing the names of various centres of Mutiny and the other showing the names of revolted native regiments have been enclosed as appendices A and B respectively at the end of the chapter.

(99) Duff—op. cit., p. 189.

(100) A list of Native regiments which remained faithful to Government during the Mutiny has been enclosed to Chapter IX as an Appendix thereto.

to be reckoned up by units, the latter may be counted by myriads..."(101) Various classes of the civil population who were discontented with the British rule and who have been referred to by Duff as 'haters' of British Government made a common cause with the disaffected sepoys and rose in revolt along with them, not of course wheresoever in the country the sepoys raised the standard of revolt but only in such areas as Bundelkhand, Saugor and Narbada territories, West Bihar, Chotanagpur, Oudh and above all, almost the whole of the then North-Western provinces.

The Mutiny of 1857, then, spread like wild fire, affecting various parts of the country. The initiative was, of course, taken by the sepoys who stood in the gap and bore the brunt of the struggle. As the Mutiny progressed, the sepoys came, however, to be strengthened by the discontented classes of the civil population also in certain theatres of conflict in the northern, eastern and central parts of the country.

* (101) Duff—*op. cit.*, p. 193.

APPENDIX 'A' (CHAPTER I)

Principal places where mutinies occurred	Dates of outbreak
Dum Dum	... Cartridge disturbances on 22nd & 23rd January 1857.
Berhampur	... 26th & 27th February 1857.
Barrackpur	... 29th March 1857.
Lucknow	... 3rd May & 30th May 1857.
Meerut	... 10th May 1857.
Delhi	... 11th May 1857.
Muzaffarnagar	... 13th May 1857.
Bijnor	... May 1857.
Bulandshahr	... 22nd May 1857.
Mainpuri	... 22nd May 1857.*
Etawah	... 23rd May 1857.
Aligarh	... 20th May 1857.
Hathras	... 24th May 1857.
Shahjahanpur	... 31st May 1857.
Bareilly	... 31st May 1857.
Mathura	... 30th May 1857.
Budaun	... 1st June 1857.
Shaharanpur	... 2nd June & 11th July 1857.
Moradabad	... 3rd June 1857.
Naini Tal	... An alarm, created in the wake of the Mutiny at Rohilkhand in 1857.
Azamgarh	... 3rd June 1857.
Banaras	... 4th June 1857.
Kanpur	... 5th June 1857. The siege of the British entrenchments at Kanpur lasted from the 6th to the 27th June 1857.
Allahabad	... 6th June 1857.
Jaunpur	... 5th June 1857.
Gorakhpur	... 5th June 1857.
Mirzapur	... 7th June 1857.
Ghazipur	... June 1857.
Hansi	... 29th May 1857.
Fatehpur	... June 9, 1857.
Rohtak	... 10th June 1857.

* Morning of May 23, 1857 according to J. Power's official narrative on Mainpuri.

Principal places where mutinies occurred	Dates of outbreak
Banda	... 14th June 1857.
Dehra Dun in tension	... by 15th June 1857.
Agra	... 4th July 1857.
Sialkot	... 9th July 1857.
Gwalior	... 14th June 1857.
Jubbulpur	... 18th September 1857.
Jhansi	... 6th June 1857.
Indore	... 1st July 1857.
Mhow	... 1st July 1857.
Saugor	... 1st or 2nd July & 18th Sept. 1857.
Nasirabad	... 28th May & 10th August 1857.
Ajmeer Jail	... 9th August 1857.
Nimach	... 3rd June 1857.
Kotah	... 15th October 1857.
Erinpura	... 22nd August 1857.
Mount Abu	... 21st August 1857.
Firozpur	... 13th May 1857.
Jullundur	... 7th June 1857.
Jhelum Cantonment	... 7th July 1857.
Lahore	... 29th July 1857.
Dehra Ishmail Khan	... July 1858.
Peshawar	... May 21-22, 1857.
Suri	... October 1857.
Rampurhat	... 17th October 1857.
Calcutta	... 17th May 1857.
Madariganj and Jalpaiguri	... 4th and 5th December 1857.
Dacca	... 22nd November 1857.
Chittagong	... 18th November 1857. ...
Bihar	... Details furnished in the Chapter on Bihar.
Madras.	... 17th August 1857.
Kolapur	... 1st August 1857.
Poona, Satara, Belgaum, Dharwar, Rutnagherry, Santwaree	... Muslim conspiracy in 1857.
Aurangabad	... 13th June 1857.
Dibrugrah	... September 1857.

APPENDIX 'B' (CHAPTER I)

Home Pub. Cons. 17th Sept. 1858, No. 35

List of Corps that mutinied, with particulars

Name of regiment. Column No. 1	Where mutinied and when. Column No. 3
6th Light Field Battery ...	Nussecrabad, 28th May, 1857.
15th Light Field Battery ...	Head Quarters, Barcilly, 31st May 1857; detachment, Moorabad, 3rd June 1857.
4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery. ...	Neemuch, 3rd June 1857.
4th Company 9th Battalion Artillery ...	4th Company at Nawgung on the 10th June 1857; one detachment (6th Company) at Azamgurrh, on the 6th June 1857; one detachment (2nd Company) at Dacca on 22nd November 1857, and 14 Privates of the 6th Company from Allaha-bad on the 7th June 1857.
1st Light Cavalry ...	Left wing mutinied at Neemuch on 3rd June 1857; Right wing muti-nied at Mhow on 1st July 1857.
3rd Light Cavalry ...	At Meerut, 10th May 1857.
7th Light Cavalry ...	Captain Staples and Lieutenant Martin were murdered, when out in the district on command with two troops of the Regiment. Lieutenant Raleigh was murdered outside the lines of the Regiment at Moodkeepore on the night of 30th May 1857.
5th Native Infantry ...	Saharunpore, 2nd June 1857.
7th Native Infantry ...	At Dinapore, 25th July 1857.
8th Native Infantry ...	Eight Companies mutinied at Dina-pore on 25th July 1857, and 2 Companies mutinied at Hazaree-bug, 30th July 1857.
9th Native Infantry ...	1 20th May 1857 Allygurrh. 2 22nd Mynpoorie. 3 23rd Etawah. 4 22nd Bolundshuhur.
11th Native Infantry ...	At Meerut, on the 10th May 1857.
13th Native Infantry ...	Lucknow, 30th May 1857.
14th Native Infantry ...	On the 7th July 1857, at Jhelum.

Name of Regiment Column No. 1	Where mutinied and when Column No. 3
15th Native Infantry	... At Nusseerabad, 28th May 1857.
17th Native Infantry	... At Azimgurh, on the 3rd of June 1857 at 9 o'clock at night.
18th Native Infantry	... At Bareilly, on the 31st May 1857.
20th Native Infantry	... At Meerut, 10th of May, 1857.
28th Native Infantry	... At Shajahanpore apparently on 31st May 1857, no authentic information having been received on the subject.
29th Native Infantry	... At Mooradabad in Rohilcund, 3rd June 1857.
30th Native Infantry	... 28th May 1857, at Nusseerabad.
32nd Native Infantry	... One detachment at Deogurh on 19th* October and one at Rampore Haut near Sooree, 17th October.
37th Native Infantry	... Benares, 4th June 1857.
40th Native Infantry	... Dinapore, 25th of July 1857.
41st Native Infantry	... Seetapore, the morning of the 3rd June, 1857.
42nd Native Infantry	... Saugor, 2nd July 1857.
48th Native Infantry	... Rifle and Light Companies on detachment duty near Cawnpore early in June, others with Regimental Headquarters at Lucknow Cantonment on the night of 30th May, 1857.
50th Native Infantry	... Nagode, 16th September 1857.
52nd Native Infantry	... At Jubbulpore, on the 18th Sept. 1857. Patna, 19th September, Kutingee, 19th September.
55th Native Infantry	... Hotee Murdan, 25th May 1857.
61st Native Infantry	... Jullunder, the night of 7th of June, 1857.
68th Native Infantry	... Bareilly, 31st May, 1857.
71st Native Infantry	... Lucknow, 30th May, 1857.
72nd Native Infantry	... Neemuch, 3rd June, 1857.
73rd Native Infantry	... Dacca, November 22, 1857.
Regiment of Loodianah	... Jaunpore, 5th June, 1857.
Ramgurh Light Infantry	At Dorundah, on the 2nd August

* 9th October 1857. Vide Parl. Papers Vol. XVIII of 1859.

Name of Regiment Column No. 1		Where mutinied and when Column No. 3
battalion	...	1857; a detachment when proceeding to Hazareebugh on service on the 31st July; a detachment at Poorliah about 5th August; and a detachment at Chyebassa about the 3rd September.**
3rd Irregular Cavalry	...	Saugor, the 2nd July 1857.***
4th Irregular Cavalry	...	Sirsa, Hansi, Mozuffernugger, Sursowlic.
5th Irregular Cavalry	...	Bhaugulpore, 14th August 1857.
8th Irregular Cavalry	...	Bareilly, 31st May 1857.
10th Irregular Cavalry	...	The first event took place at Nowshera on the 21st May 1857, the second on the 25th Idem at Hotee Murdan. The Regiment was disbanded on the morning of the 26th June 1857.*

Signed/H. W. Burne, Captain. Officiating
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India
in the Military Department.

The above list is not exhaustive.

The following regiments, not included therein, also mutinied on the dates specified against each.

Name of Regiment	Where mutinied and when
19th Bengal Native Infantry ...	Berhampur, 26th and 27th February, 1857.
23rd Bengal Native Infantry	Mhow, 1st July 1857.
24th, 27th and 51st Regiments Bengal Native Infantry ...	Peshawar. The regiments showed signs of diaffection on May 21, 1857 and were disbanded on May 22, 1857.
25th Bengal Native Infantry	Calcutta, 17th May 1857.
26th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry ...	Lahore, 29th July 1857.

** 5th September 1857 vide Parl. Papers Vol. XVIII of 1859.

*** 1st July 1857 vide Ibid.

* The Regiment did not break out into open Mutiny but refused to act against mutineers. Vide Ibid.

Name of Regiment	Where mutinied and when
34th Bengal Native Infantry	Barrackpur, 29th March, 1857. Three Companies mutinied at Chittagong on 18th November 1857.
7th Oudh Irregular Infantry	Lucknow, 3rd May, 1857.
38th, 54th and 74th Regiments,	Delhi, 11th May, 1857.
Bengal Native Infantry ...	
A detachment of the 20th	Muzaffarnagar, 13th May 1857.
Bengal Native Infantry ...	
A portion of Gwalior Horse ...	Hathras, 24th May 1857.
3 Companies of 44th and 67th	Mathura, 30th May 1857.
Regiments, Bengal Native	
Infantry ...	
37th Bengal Native Infantry,	Banaras, 4th June 1857.
13th Irregular Cavalry and	
Ludhiana Sikhs ...	
39th Bengal Native Infantry	Disarmed at Dehra Ismail Khan.
45th and 57th Regiments,	Firozpur, 13th May, 1857.
Bengal Native Infantry ...	
46th Bengal Native Infantry	Sialkot, 9th July 1857.
1st, 53rd and 56th Regiments,	Kanpur, 5th June 1857.
Bengal Native Infantry and	
2nd Bengal Native Cavalry	
58th Bengal Native Infantry	Rawal Pindee, 7th July 1857.
67th Bengal Native Infantry	Mathura, 30th May 1857.
69th Bengal Native Infantry	Manifested a disposition to mutiny in June 1857, mutinied at Multan on 31st August 1858.
6th Regiment, Bengal Native	Allahabad, 6th June 1857.
Infantry ...	
A detachment of 17th Bengal	Gorakhpur, 5th June 1857.
Native Infantry ...	
65th Regiment, Bengal Native	Ghazipur, by the end of the first week of June, 1857.
Infantry ...	
Hariana Light Infantry	Hansi, 29th May. Mutiny of the detachments at the Sirsa and Hisar.
Battalion ...	
60th Regiment, Bengal Native	Rohtak, 10th June, 1857.
Infantry ...	
At detachment of 56th Regi-	Banda, 14th June 1857.
ment, Bengal Native	
Infantry ...	
Native Battalions—two Regi-	Jullundur, 7th June 1857.
ments of Foot and one of	
Horse ...	

Name of Regiment	Where mutinied and when
Jullundur mutineers marched on ...	Dehra Dun, 15th June 1857.
Kotah Contingent ...	Agra, 4th July 1857.
9th Cavalry Regiment ...	Sialkot, 9th July 1857.
A portion of Holkar's contingent ...	Indore, 1st July 1857.
One squadron of Bengal Native Cavalry ...	Mhow, 1st July 1857.
Kotah Contingent ...	Kotah, 15th October 1857.
The Jodhpur Legion ...	Mount Abu, 21st August 1857.
The Jodhpur Legion ...	Erinpura, 22nd August 1857.
A portion of the 18th Punjab Infantry ...	Dera Ishmail Khan on the Indus, July 1858.
Detachments of the 11th Bengal Irregular Cavalry ...	Madariganj and Jalpaiguri, 4th and 5th December, 1857.
8th Madras Native Cavalry ...	At a place, 25 miles from Madras and at Poonamallee after a march of 13 miles more—August 1857.
27th Bombay Native Infantry	Kolapur, 1st August, 1857.
28th & 29th Regiments, Bombay Native Infantry ...	Their Mutiny at Dharwar and Belgaum, arrested by August 1857.
1st Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent ...	Aurangabad, 13th June 1857.
Gwalior Contingent ...	Gwalior, 14th June 1857.
11th Irregular Cavalry ...	Manifested a partial disposition to desert at Berhampur.
3rd Company, 8th Battalion, Artillery ...	10th June 1857.
6th Company, 8th Battalion Artillery ...	Barcilly, 31st May 1857 and Moradabad, 3rd June, 1857.
6th Light Cavalry ...	Jullundhur.
10th Light Cavalry ..	Firozpur—19th August, 1857.
9th Light Cavalry (Right Wing) ...	Sialkot, 9th July, 1857.
2nd Company 7th Battalion Artillery ...	Nasirabad, 28th May, 1857.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL BACKGROUND.

The process of building up the British Empire in India between 1757 and 1857 produced not a little unrest, suspicion and discontent amongst various classes of the then Indian society. The builders of the imperial edifice were out of tune with the social temper of the country and could not, therefore, appreciate the sacrosanctity of caste-distinctions as also of the manifold prejudices and superstitions on which the Indian society rested. They accordingly passed laws and measures introducing social innovations without necessary safeguards against any possible infringement upon native prejudices. As the wheels of Government moved fast, social and religious feelings of the native population sustained serious shocks. 'The faster the vessel glides, the more the need of caution, of watching the weather, the rocks and shoals.' But social reforms were introduced by the British Government in India without proper care and caution being taken towards avoiding offences to the prevailing social and religious beliefs of the conservative class of the then Indian society. The conservative class consequently stood discontented on the eve of the Mutiny.

Indian society was beset too much with rigid caste-distinctions and deep-rooted prejudices before the introduction of beneficent social reforms by the British Government in the country. Caste constitutes the most vital principle of Hinduism. Founded mainly on the moral and intellectual supremacy of the Brahmins, the caste-system has existed since distant past in some form or other throughout the Indian sub-continent from the snowy heights of the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, from the Ganges to the Indus. 'While its minute regulations have been honoured and observed with religious zeal, its spirit has penetrated every native institution and has coloured the simplest actions of life.' In the pre-Mutiny days missionaries in India like Alexander Duff had been well aware of the significance of the caste-system in the Hindu society. In his letter, dated March 6, 1858 written to Reverend Tweedie, Alexander Duff struck the key-note of the Indian caste-system thus :

'.....In the Hindu conception of it caste involves distinctions, not of secular occupation or of civil conditions only, but distinctions of a sacred and religious kind—distinctions neither arbitrarily imposed by mere human power nor casually assumed as the result of social contract or conventional usage, but distinctions absolutely radical and fundamental in the very nature and constitution of man. ...Nothing is more certain than that it has from earliest ages sunk deep into the inner convictions of the national mind of India and upto this hour (period of the Mutiny) continues powerfully to appeal to, and more or less influence, the religious consciences of individuals and whole classes..... No one who has studied the

subject to any purpose can have failed to discover that.....caste as regards its essential nature is not a merely human or capriciously superinduced distinction, but a positively divine and primarily created distinction'.⁽¹⁾

The conservative members of the then Hindu society were deeply alarmed, as they apprehended attacks from Government upon their sacred caste and religion as also upon their long-cherished prejudices. Such prejudices which entered into the very composition of the then social life of India were supposed to have a religious basis and were consequently observed with the zeal of religion. There were prejudices among the Hindus against crossing 'the black water', taking meals in common inside jails, learning English, educating the females, adopting European manners and customs, and against accepting Christianity as the religious faith. The conservative members of the Hindu society, headed by the orthodox priesthood seriously insisted on the rigid observance of the prevailing social practices which they treated as inseparable parts of the Hindu religion. Among the Muslims also there were then prejudices against learning English, female education and against Christianity. A liberal group, however, gradually reared its head, demanding abolition of the obnoxious and pernicious social customs and prejudices the fetish of which clogged the wheels of progress in the country. Raja Rammohan Roy was the eloquent mouthpiece and valiant leader of the liberal section which sought to reform the then Indian society. The work of social and religious reform, initiated by the great Rammohan Roy, was carried on by Pandit Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, Maharshi Devendranath Tagore and their associates. There were also Christian missionaries who took upon themselves the onus of reforming the Indian society after western model. Government also took to reforming the Indian society by legislating against the continuance of the existing unhealthy social practices and by introducing western social ideals and western mode of life in our country. The socio-religious feelings of those who were opposed to social innovations and who stuck leech-like to the old order of things in society came consequently to be badly wounded. Unrest and discontent among them grew apace.

Government prohibited the long standing but inhuman practice of infanticide by the Regulations of 1795 and 1802. In 1829 was abolished the Sati system⁽²⁾ which was widely prevalent among the lower and upper class Hindus in India prior to that date. The Sati system though condemnable from humanitarian point of view was clothed with religious

(1) Duff—op. cit. pp. 321—322.

(2) It was the practice of self-immolation by a pure and virtuous Hindu wife at the death of her husband. The rite by which a Hindu wife became a 'Sati' had two forms viz. 'Sahamarana' and 'Anumarana'. 'Sahamarana' was dying in company with the dead husband on the same funeral pyre. Anumarana meant the burning of a wife to death some time after the death of her husband. In the case of 'Anumarana' the Hindu wife was burnt with something that belonged to her dead husband—his shoes, turban or a piece of clothing. Vide Edward Thompson—Suttee, a historical and philosophical enquiry into the Hindu rite of Widow burning. pp. 1-2. Usually a Hindu widow became a sati by burning herself to death. Sometimes the Hindu widow was buried alive.

How widespread was the Sati system in India before its abolition in 1829 will be evident from the list enclosed as Appendix A to this Chapter.

sanction in India and was highly encouraged by the priesthood on the authority of the scriptures. During the administration of William Bentinck the system was declared illegal and punishable in the Bengal Presidency by the Regulation XVII of 1829. It was henceforth to be treated as 'culpable homicide', equivalent to 'manslaughter' in English law. The Regulation of 1829 applied directly to the Bengal Presidency. Similar enactments were made for the Bombay and Madras Presidencies also soon afterwards. The Sati system was thus declared illegal by legislation much to the chagrin of the priesthood and its votaries. In abolishing the Sati system Government got active and valued co-operation from Raja Rammohan Ray and Dwarkanath Tagore. Rammohan and Dwarkanath had to confront a bitter opposition from the orthodox Hindus, led by Raja Radha Kanta Deb. The orthodox Hindus stood alarmed at the interference of Government with their religious rites. Their alarm further increased, when Lord Dalhousie passed a law granting civil rights to religious converts just to encourage the conversion of the natives to Christianity. 'By an Act passed in 1850 the principle already laid down in a Bengal Regulation of 1832 that change of religion should not involve loss of property or civil rights was extended to the whole of the territories subject to the British Government of India.' (3) 'The Act set aside 'the religious and civil laws of the Hindus and shielded the converts to Christianity, as far as law could shield them, against temporal ill-consequences from their change of faith.' (4) 'The Act was highly unpopular, as it was an attack on Hindu property and Hindu social customs and at the same time, an encouragement to proselytism. It provoked bitter opposition among the influential members of the Hindu society. Raja Radha Kanta Deb, Raja Kali Krishna Bahadur and Kasinath Mallick on behalf of themselves and of the Hindus of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa submitted a petition (5) to the House of Commons recording therein their protest against the Act, mentioned above. In that petition the petitioners recorded their resentment against the Act of 1850 which in utter disregard of the Hindu laws of inheritance provided that Indians could become Christians without forfeiture of rights of property and rights of inheritance. The petitioners concluded their petition with an appeal to Government that the said Act should be repealed in the interest of peace in the country. By the 'Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act' of 1856 the remarriage of high-caste Hindu widows in India came to be legalised. In passing the Act Government was largely supported principally by Pandit Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, Pandit Ramchandra Vidyabagish and Devendranath Tagore all of whom had been carrying on agitation in favour of the remarriage of girl-widows long before the enactment of 1856. The Act, however, proved revolting to the orthodox Hindus. It shocked their religious feelings beyond measure.

In his minute, dated February 28, 1856 Lord Dalhousie recorded with

(3) Parl. papers Vol. No. 43 of 1857-58 ; paper no. 75, p. 19. The Act referred to was Act No. 21 of 1850 entitled. 'An Act for extending the principle of Section 19, Regulation 7 of 1832 of the Bengal Code through the provinces of E. I. Company.' Parl. papers. Vol. 29 for 1857. No. 225, p. 1.

(4) Parl. papers (House of Commons) Vol. No. 43 of 1857-58. paper No. 75, p. 19.

(5) Parl. papers (House of Commons) Vol. 29 for 1857 Paper no. 225. pp. 1-4.

a little self-complacency that the eight years of his administration had witnessed the introduction into the British Indian Empire of some fruits of western science such as canals, bridges, railways and electric telegraph, meant for the improvement of the Indian society. But these very engines of material progress were looked upon by the orthodox section with alarms and failings of heart, as these appeared to them as turning the world upside down. The schemes of material advancement appeared to them as so many attacks on their religious susceptibilities. The Ganges canal at Hurdwar, as recorded by Dalhousie during his visit to it in 1851, wounded the religious feelings of the local Brahmins and their votaries, as they thought it sacrilegious to cause the sacred water of the Ganges to flow through an artificial canal. (6). The railways and electric telegraph, introduced by Lord Dalhousie, were also at the early stage looked upon with alarm by the superstitious people of India. Dalhousie opened the first Indian railway, planned by Hardinge, and set up the first telegraph wire. The railway lines were initially a double source of alarm. It was fancied that there was magic in their construction and working; there was also the inevitable risk of loss of caste in the occupation of a seat, vacated by a man of low caste. (7) Like canals and railways, telegraph wires also reacted adversely on the native mind which took alarm at the supposed play of magic in the very quick sending of message and news through different parts of the country. This transmission of human messages by wire appeared to the orthodox class as a 'bit of legerdemain', or 'Jadu' (sorcery). (8)

Measures of social improvement, as detailed above, caused alarm and unrest among the orthodox class of the country. 'The abolition of Sattee, the abolition of infanticide, the introduction of vaccination, the law to legalise the remarriage of Hindu widows, the promulgation through colleges (set up by Government) of the facts of astronomy, geology etc., so opposed to the priestly cosmogonies of the country, the dissection practised in medical schools (started by Government), the attempts to establish female seminaries and to elevate the moral and social position of the female sex, with many other efforts (of Government) to do good were pressed upon the attention of the army and the masses as so many deliberate assaults on the outworks both of Mahomedanism and of Hinduism. And the simple, superstitious, credulous sepoys were told that time was rapidly approaching when by some piece of jadu (magic) the Christians whose sorceries enabled them to communicate in a few minutes between Lahore and Calcutta through the medium of a mysterious wire would at once

(6) Sir William Lee-Warner—The life of the Marquis of Dalhousie. Vol. II pp. 361-362. This type of superstition survived the suppression of the Mutiny. Lee-Warner notes as follows: 'In 1902, when the Mysore Government were utilising the falls of the Kaveri for electrical purposes, Captain de Lotbiniere reported that for a time he could get no labourers since they were scared by fear of divine wrath, and when an outbreak of cholera occurred, the priests carried conviction to their minds and for a time stopped the progress of their work.' Ibid. p. 362.

(7) Ibid. p. 363.

(8) Ibid. P. 363.

uncaste (outcaste ?) the whole Hindu population and outrage all their traditions and feelings.'(9)

The then Indian society denounced female education as prejudicial and harmful not only to the females concerned but also to the society as a whole. The attempts made by the missionaries initially and by Government later on to introduce female education in India naturally proved revolting to the orthodox class of people of the country. The nature of the prevailing superstition about educating the girls is found set forth in the writing of William Adam thus : 'The state of education amongst this unfortunate class (females) cannot be said to be low, for with a very few individual exceptions there is no instruction at all. Absolute and hopeless ignorance is in general their lot. The notion of providing means for instruction for female children never enters into the minds of parents ; and girls are equally deprived of that imperfect domestic instruction which is sometimes given to boys. A superstitious feeling is alleged to exist in the majority of Hindu females.....that a girl, taught to write and read, wil soon after marriage become a widow, an event which is regarded as nearly the worst misfortune that can befall the sex and the belief is also

(9) Lee-Warner, op cit, II pp. 355-356. Vide also the following letter cited in Parl. Papers (House of Commons) Vol. 44 part IV for 1857-58 pp. 851-852 :—

"...The shastra declares that it is best to follow one's own religion and not to adopt another's, and God himself so declared ; but it is evident to all men that these English are perverters of all men's religion. From time immemorial have they endeavoured to contaminate the Hindu and Mahamedan religion by the production and circulation of religious books through the medium of missonaries and by extirpating such books as afford arguments against them. I have heard from available sources the various endeavours they have made to contaminate our creed. First : the forcible remarriage of the Hindu widows ; Second : the abolition of the ancient rite of suttee ; Third : the exaltation of those who may embrace the christian faith ; so also the succession to the thrones of Hindu princes is permitted only to the legitimate sons ; the adopted sons are prohibited from succession, while the shastra gives them the same privileges as the legitimate heir. These are stratagems by which the Europeans deprive us of our throne and wealth. For instance, I refer to Nagpur and Lucknow. They have forced the prisoners to eat their (Europeans') bread. Some of them (prisoners) starved themselves to death, and so preserved their religion, and others lost their faith by eating it. Finding that these measures still proved ineffectual they powdered bones, and mixed them with flour, sugar etc. and exposed it for sale ; in every way they tried to destroy our creeds. At last a Bengalee thus intimated to them, ' If your army will embrace your religion, there will be no objection with us to do the same '. This assertion of the Bengalee was much admired by them ; consequently they ordered Brahmins and others attached to the Army to bite greased cartridges.....The Europeans determined to destroy the religions of both (Hindus and Mahomedans) and in spite commenced blowing from guns those in any regiments who refused to use the cartridges. Be it known to you that as long as these Europeans may remain in Hindusthan, they will continue to destroy us ; yet some of our countrymen are giving assistance to them.... I conjure the Hindus in the name of Ganga, Toolsee and salikram (Salagram) and the Mahomedans by the name of God and Koran and entreat them to join us in destroying the English for their mutual welfare... Since letters are considered half of a meeting, it is hoped that the contents of this letter may be considered and replied to."

" This letter calling for the joint alliance of Hindus and Mahomedans is published by Maulavi Syud Kootuh Shah at the Bahaduree Press in the city of Barcilly."

Sd/- E. C. Bayley,

Officiating Deputy Secretary to the
Government of North-western Provinces.

generally entertained in native society that intrigue is facilitated by a knowledge of letters on the part of females. Under the influence of these fears there is not only nothing done in a native family to promote female instruction but an anxiety is often evinced to discourage any inclination to acquire the most elementary knowledge, so that when a sister in the playful innocence of childhood is observed imitating her brother's attempts at penmanship, she is expressly forbidden to do so and her attention is drawn to something else. These superstitious and distrustful feelings prevail extensively although not universally both amongst those Hindus who are devoted to the pursuits of religion and those who are engaged in the business of the world.... The Mohammedans participate in all the prejudices of the Hindus against the instruction of their female offspring besides that a very large majority of them are in the very lowest grades of poverty and are thus unable, even if they were willing, to give education to their children'. (10)

Yet in the face of such superstitions in India against female education both the Government of India and the Court of Directors encouraged the education of the females of the country. The initiative was taken by the missionaries who started Vernacular and Boarding schools for boys as also Day and Boarding schools for girls. Provision was also made for domestic instruction in the families of the middle and higher classes of people. Lord Dalhousie himself took a great interest in the spread of female education. So did J. E. D. Bethune, a member of the Governor-General's Council and President of the Council of Education. In 1850 at his suggestion the Government of Bengal instructed the Council of Education that it should consider its functions as henceforth extending to the superintendence of the native female education; and that, wherever any disposition would be shown by the natives to establish female schools, it would be its duty to give them all possible encouragement. Bethune founded a school for the education of the daughters of the men of wealth and rank in the city of Calcutta. The school, founded by Bethune, received patronage from both Lord Dalhousie and the Marchioness of Dalhousie. Subsequently it was maintained as a Government institution. 'A commencement of female education in North-Western provinces was made in 1856 by the exertions of a.....native functionary, the sub-Inspector of Schools, Pandit Gopal Singh. By his influence 97 female schools were established in the city and district of Agra, and each school was attended

(10) This was the 2nd Report to the Supreme Government of India on the state of education in Rajshahi, submitted by Adam in 1836. The picture drawn may be regarded as a general representation of female education of India as a whole. Vide 'Adam's Report on Vernacular Education in Bengal and Bihar, submitted to Government in 1835, 1836 and 1838 with with a brief view of its past and present condition by the Rev. J. Long.' pp. 131—132.

Though aversion to female education was the ordinary rule, there were a few cases of exception, as stated below. First, zemindars occasionally taught their daughters how to write and keep accounts. Secondly, the mendicant Vaishnavas instructed their daughters to read and write. Thirdly, many of the wretched class of 'nautch girls' (dancing girls) acquired some knowledge of reading and writing. These were a few unimportant exceptions. Females in general received no education.

Vide—Calcutta Review Vol. II October-December 1844, pp. 357—358 (footnotes).

on an average by 20 pupils. The.....example was followed by the formation of female schools in the zillahs of Muttra and Mynpooree. In the Bombay Presidency schools for females had been established by natives at Poona.....; and some native ladies of wealth and influence at Ahmedabadendowed a female school at that city.' (11)

This spread of female education was welcomed, no doubt, by the progressive group of the age, but it proved revolting to the conservative class (12) who could not tolerate the changed conditions in which females gave up the seclusion and attended schools. The conservative class that opposed the spread of female education in India also stood against the introduction of English as the medium of instruction and the spread of western education among the Indian students. To promote English education in India William Bentinck passed a resolution on March 7, 1835 to the effect that the natives of India should be taught European literature and science, and that the funds appropriated for the purpose of education should be spent on English education alone. To stimulate knowledge in English further Henry Hardinge declared in his minute dated October 10, 1844 that in every possible case preference would be given in public employment to candidates who knew English.. The encouragement thus given by Government to the learning of English was considered by the conservative class as a fresh inroad upon the caste-sentiments of the Indian people. Learning English was then looked upon as entailing loss of caste. More than a year before Oudh was occupied, a native officer of the Governor-General's Body Guard had betrothed his son to a girl belonging to a high-caste Hindu family in the neighbourhood of his native place, Arrah in Bihar. But when the time for the consummation of marriage came, the bride's family cancelled the marriage proposal on the ground that the would-be bridegroom had been attending an English School and had consequently lost his caste. (13) In Bengal the prejudice of the orthodox class against learning English and their apprehension of the consequent loss of caste were deepened by the most unorthodox doings of the Derozians. In order to overcome the prejudices of the conservative class against learning English Government professed to attach equal or nearly equal importance to the native languages of the country. The native people were assured that it was not the aim or intention of Government 'to substitute the English language for the vernacular dialects of the country'. The native people were further assured thus : 'In any general system of education the English language should be taught where there was a demand for it ; but such instruction should always be combined with a careful attention to the study of the vernacular language of the district and with such general instruction as could be conveyed through that language..... The vernacular languages must be employed to teach the far larger class...ignorant of

(11) Parl. papers. Vol. 43 for 1857-58. Paper no 75. p. 31.

(12) With all his orthodoxy and conservatism in social and religious matters Raja Radhakanta Deb (1784-1867) was an advocate and steady supporter of the female education in India. He also liberally supported the spread of English education in our country.

(13) Such facts of prejudice against learning English were related to Gubbins by Major Banks. Vide Gubbins's 'An account of the Mutinies in Oudh'. P. 88.

or imperfectly acquainted with English.' (14) Despite such declarations primacy was, in practice, given to English as the medium of education and as 'a passport to the most coveted Government service'. The alarm of the conservative class deepened.

Government sought to spread Christianity in India, as the orthodox Hindus and Muhammadans noticed with growing alarm, not only through legislative enactments but also through Christian missionaries. The missionaries systematically preached Christianity through missionary societies, missionary schools, native churches, and through the Calcutta Bible Society, which was founded for the translation of the Biblical texts into oriental languages and for the circulation of the translated texts among the native people. This zeal for missionary preachings can be traced as far back as 1793, when William Carey, a Baptist missionary, came from England to India with a mission to preach Christianity among the natives there. Carey settled at Serampur in Bengal. Serampur became a busy centre of missionary activity. Carey and his co-adjutors, Marshman and Ward, proved untiring in their efforts to popularise the teachings of Christianity among the natives both from platform and through press. The Lutheran missionaries in the like manner were actively engaged in spreading Christianity in South India in the 18th century. The missionaries did not preach in vain. As a result of their missionary labour Christian missions came to be set up in various parts of the Bengal Presidency including Bihar and Orissa, in many a district in the then North-Western provinces, in certain parts of Central India and of the Punjab, in Oudh and in the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras. It was practically all over India, then, that Christian missions had been set up before the Mutiny of 1857. According to the 'Revised statistics of Missions in India and Ceylon' compiled by Reverend Joseph Mullens (15) there were in India and Ceylon at the beginning of 1852, 22 missionary societies, 313 missionary stations, 443 missionaries (of whom 48 were ordained natives), 698 Native Catechists and 331 native churches accommodating 18,410 communicants. The native Christians numbered 1,12,191. The missionaries maintained 1347 Vernacular schools, 93 Boarding schools and 126 English Schools for native boys. The numbers of boys reading in those schools were 47504, 2414 and 14562 respectively in the pre-Mutiny days. For the spread of female education the missionaries established 347 Day schools, and 102 Boarding schools for the native girls. Girls taught in those schools in the pre-Mutiny days numbered 11519 and 2779 respectively. Both the boys and girls were encouraged to study English. The entire Bible came to be translated into different native languages for the easy understanding of the Biblical teaching by the native people. For the wide

(14) Education Despatch no. 49 of July 19, 1854 from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council. Vide Parl. papers (House of Lords) Vol. XII of 1854. Paper No. 333, p. 5.

(15) Vide 'Thoughts on missions to India', Serampore. Printed at the Mission Press (1825). A summary of missions in India and Ceylon is appended as Appendix B to this Chapter. p. 82.

circulation of missionary teachings the missionaries maintained 25 printing establishments. (166)

The activities of the missionaries for the spread of education among native boys and girls and for preaching Christianity to the native population produced not a little discontent and disaffection in the country. In the agricultural districts specially the missionaries earned the reproach of godlessness and were looked upon as 'Government agents, commissioned to destroy peoples' faith.' The disaffection, caused by the missionary propaganda, prevailed in the north rather than in the south. In the north the Muslims looked upon the British people as a ruling race that had unjustly deprived them of their sovereignty over India. Since the missionaries were preaching the religion of the British people, they fell into disfavour of the Muslims in the north. To them the idea of embracing the religion of their supplanters was repugnant and revolting. The Hindus of the north being extremely caste-conscious opposed what the missionaries preached. The Sepoy Army of the north was of high-caste composition and was greatly agitated over the missionary propaganda for the spread of Christianity in the country. Consequently much disaffection was caused by the activities of the missionaries in the northern India. But in the south the missionaries found a field favourable to their missionary work. The Madras and Bombay Armies unlike the so-called Bengal Army of the north were heterogenous in composition, and the sepöys of these two Armies of the south were above caste-prejudices, while in ranks. The missionaries experienced no opposition from them in their missionary work. Again, unlike in the north, in the south, specially in Madras the prospect of a betterment of lot through a change of religion prevailed upon the lower class people to embrace Christianity. The result was that in the pre-Mutiny days Madras contained, according to the 'Revised statistics of Missions in India and Ceylon' as many as 128 native churches, and 76591 native Christians, while Bombay possessed 13 native churches and 744 native Christians (17). The large numbers of native churches and native Christians in the south bear testimony to the fact that the missionary propaganda in the south did not produce any serious ill-feeling among the people there. The slight disaffection, noticed in the Bombay Presidency, was caused not by any missionary propaganda, but by the excitement among the Muslim community scheming with political motives, and by the sympathetic attitude of the sepöys of the Bombay Army towards their brethren in the north. Though the missionary propaganda, it may be mentioned here, produced disaffection in the north, still in the teeth of such disaffection the missionaries could set up 109 (87 + 22) native churches and convert 16810 (14778 + 2032) natives to Christianity in the Presidencies of Bengal and Agra together in the north. (18) But in the Bombay and Madras

(16) Vide 'Thoughts on missions to India', Scrampore, Printed at the Mission Press (1825).

(17) Vide App. B. at the end of the Chapter.

(18) Vide the 'Revised Statistics of Missions in India & Ceylon, compiled by Mullens. Vide also the App. B at p. 82.

Presidencies taken together the native churches and native Christians (19) were more numerous, the former numbering 141 and the latter 77,335.

The missionaries, preaching in India, addressed themselves to the task of turning the native people from the worship of 'dumb idols'. The missionary attacks on idolatry became more pronounced than ever, when the Christian ministers and missionaries in Calcutta and the members of the Orissa Baptist Mission petitioned to Government for severing its connection (20) with the temple at Puri. The connection of Government with the temple of Jugganath at Puri was held by the missionaries as one of the chief hindrances to their missionary work in India. Accordingly the Christian ministers and missionaries in Calcutta submitted to Lord Dalhousie a memorial in which they requested him to sever the connection of Government with the temple at Puri by withdrawing the Government donation, annually paid for the maintenance of that shrine. The memorialists prayed that the temple of Jugganath should be left to be sustained by its own votaries till the time, 'when the idols might be banished from the earth and the true Lord of the Universe whose right it is to reign should establish His peaceful kingdom throughout the world'. (21)

The members of the Orissa Baptist Mission also petitioned to Lord Dalhousie on December 5, 1853 for the severance of the connection of Government with the Puri temple. In their petition they designated the temple as the 'celebrated emporium of idolatry'. (22)

The prayers of the memorialists were granted by Government, as would be evident from the following minute, issued by the Governor-General of India :

".....I think we should make no further grants to Juggernath ; that we should leave to the shrine the lands of which it is possessed ; that we should abstain from all interference directly or indirectly with its offerings or fees ; and should thus dissolve wholly and for ever all connection between the British Government and this chief engine of a hideous superstition." (23)

The Bombay Missionary Conference also submitted a memorial to the Court of Directors on February 22, 1858, condemning the prevalence of idolatry in India. The memorial referred to the connection subsisting between the Government of India on the one hand and the Hindu, Muhammadan and other non-Christian religions in India on the other, and pointed out to the Court of Directors with much regret that Government unduly patronised idolatry in India by spending vast sums of money annually for the maintenance of the temples and mosques in the country. The memorial obviously pleaded that the Government of India should

(19) Vide the Revised Statistics etc.

(20) Government used to pay £9,000 a year for the maintenance of the Puri temple through the Rajah of Khoorda, who was its hereditary keeper.—Wylic—Bengal as a Field of Missions. pp. 378—379.

(21) Parl. Papers (Houses of Commons) Vol. 42 for 57-58. Paper No. 71 (Missionaries ; Idolatry) pp. 19—20.

(22) Ibid. p. 31.

(23) Ibid. p. 32.

strike a blow at the Indian idolatry by stopping all financial help to the temples and mosques. (24)

The missionary propaganda in India before the Mutiny broke out was thus wide-spread. The missionaries openly preached in the country and received encouragement from Government in their missionary work. In the course of his narrative on the missionary work at Fatehpur Reverend Gopinath Nandi stated as follows : "In March 1853 I was sent from Futteghur...to take charge of Futtehpore. From that time upto the day of our escape, which took place a few days before the mutiny broke out, we have had many marks of our heavenly Father's love. He blessed..... our feeble efforts and crowned our labours with some success. We had an English school in the town for heathen boys and another for girls, besides three vernacular schools in three villages about eight or ten miles from the station. The prisoners in the jail were also daily instructed in Christianity and general knowledge by a Christian teacher, and every sabbath morning gospel was preached by me. This privilege was granted by our pious magistrate. ...Preaching in the bazaar and the neighbouring villages was carried on more or less every day ; and in the cold seasons for three months the catechists and myself used to go into the interior to proclaim the gospel news and to distribute the books." (25) As Sitaram Pande wrote : 'I had observed the increase of late years of Padree sahebs, who stood up in the streets of cities and told the people, their cherished religion was all false, entreating them to become Christians. They always said, they were not employed by Sirkar and that they received no money from it, but how could they say what they did without its permission ? Everybody believed, they were secretly employed by it. Why should they take such trouble, if they were not ordered ?' (26) Even Viscount Canning and Lady Canning lent their support to the missionaries. Canning contributed donations to the Calcutta Bible Society and the Baptist college at Serampur. Lady Canning evinced much interest in the English education of the native female children. The Bethune college for girls was specially looked after by her.

Like the missionaries, many covenanted and military officers in India endeavoured to induce the natives to accept Christianity as their religion. 'In some districts covenanted officers of high position and of great influence used to visit the schools (started by missionaries) and encourage the people to attend them. Examinations were held in books which taught the tenets of the Christian religion. Lads who attended the schools used to be asked such questions as the following : 'Who is your God ?' 'Who is your Redeemer ?' And these questions they were obliged to answer agreeably to the Christian belief.....' (27) Among the European officers

(24) Parl. Papers. No. 42 of 1857-58, Paper No. 71-1 (Missionaries ; Idolatry) pp. 25-26.

(25) Rev. M. A. Sherring—The Indian Church during the Great Rebellion. pp. 184-185.

(26) Sitaram—From Sepoy to Subahdar—p. 117.

(27) Sayyad Ahmad—Causes of Indian Revolt—p. 19. The author adds : 'If the people were not satisfied with this course of education, why did they let their children go to schools ?..... We must account for this by the painfully degraded and ignorant

of the so-called Bengal Army there were many zealous Christians who took to preaching Christian faith both to the civil and military classes of the Indian population. Colonel S. G. Wheeler, commanding the 34th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry, for instance, was in the habit of addressing the sepoys under him on religious subjects with a view to converting them to Christianity. Rumours about his missionary activities reaching the Government of India, Colonel Wheeler was asked to explain his conduct for the satisfaction of Government. Colonel Wheeler thereupon submitted a letter to the officiating Brigade Major, Barrackpur on April 4, 1857 in explanation of his conduct, as follows :—

“.....With regard to my having addressed the sepoys on religious subjects I beg to state that during the last twenty years and upwards I have been in the habit of speaking to the natives of all classes, sepoys and others, making no distinction, since there is no respect of persons with God, on the subject of our religion, in the highways, bazaars and villages. I have done this from a conviction that every converted Christian is expected, rather commanded by the scriptures, to make known the glad tidings of salvation to his lost fellow-creatures, our saviour having offered himself up as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world, by which alone salvation can be secured. He has directed that this salvation should be freely offered to all without exception.” (28)

Colonel Wheeler further explained his conduct in a letter, dated April 15, 1857 to the address of the Assistant Adjutant General, Presidency Division thus :

“.....As to the question whether I have endeavoured to convert sepoys and others to Christianity I would humbly reply that this has been my object, and I conceive, is the aim and end of every Christian who speaks the word of God to another.....Such, I feel confident, would be the feelings of every commanding officer, being an experienced Christian.” (29)

The alarm, caused in the country by the religious zeal of the missionaries and of the covenanted and military officers of the Government of India, at last induced the Court of Directors, the Governor-General of India-in-Council and the Provincial Governors to issue proclamations disavowing any intention of Government to interfere with the caste and religion of the natives, so that native suspicions might be at rest, and peace in the country might be maintained. The following proclamation was issued by the Governor-General of India on May 16, 1857 to disabuse the minds of the native people of the suspicion that Government aimed at destroying native caste and religion :

“The Governor-General of India-in-Council has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain Regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is

state of people. They believed that, if their children were entered at the schools, they might have employment given them by Government and be enabled to find some means of subsistence.’ Ibid. p. 19.

(28) Parl. Papers Vol. 30 of 1857, paper No. 263, p. 164.

(29) Ibid. pp. 167—168.

meditated by the Government of India are malicious falsehoods. The Governor-General-in-Council has learnt that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men not only in the army but amongst other classes of the people. He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindus and Mussalmans, soldiers and civil subjects that their religion is threatened secretly as well as openly by the acts of the Government and that the Government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own. Some have been already deceived and led astray by these tales. Once more then the Governor-General-in-Council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them. The Government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of even the humblest of its subjects with careful respect. The Governor-General-in-Council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration and emphatically proclaims that the Government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste and that nothing has been or will be done by the Government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of people. The Government of India has never deceived its subjects. Therefore, the Governor-General-in-Council now calls upon them to refuse their belief in seditious lies. This notice is addressed to those who hitherto by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct have shown their attachment to the Government and a well-grounded faith in its protection and justice. The Governor-General-in-Council enjoins all such persons to pause, before they hasten to false guides and traitors who would lead them into danger and disgrace."(30)

The above proclamation, issued too late, could not control the fury of the Sepoy Army. The Mutiny had broken out before the proclamation was issued.

Social unrest in the pre-Mutiny days was caused to a large extent, no doubt, by the disaffection of the orthodox class whose prejudices about caste and religion were wounded by the policy of Government. Social discontent was also to some extent created by the policy of Government towards Native States. The policy of annexing the Native States created an unemployment problem which supplied a source of discontent among the unemployed classes. The extinction of the Native states gave opportunities for employment and wealth to the Europeans at the expense of the conquered princes and people who were naturally left with a determination to strike a blow for recovering the lost ground. Nagpur was annexed, and native officers, and the rank and file of the Army there were ordered to be disbanded with pension in some cases and with gratuity in others.(31) The annexation of Oudh threw sixty thousand native soldiers out of employment. Out of this number about 15,000 were absorbed in the ranks of the Police or local regiments under the newly formed Government in Oudh. Some were employed in the civil departments; the rest were granted allowances.(32) But the allowances were

(30) Foreign Dept. Proceedings for 1850-59. S.C. No. 521 dated 18-12-1857.

(31) Baird—Private letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie p. 313.

(32) Lee-Warner—op cit, II p. 338. Also Gubbins, op cit, p. 76.

inadequate and therefore, disappointing to the recipients. The powerful talukdars of Oudh came to be deprived of their talukdari rights and to be consequently reduced to poverty, to mere shadows of their former mighty selves. Their retainers also numbering no less than 20,000 were thrown out of employment, as they received discharge orders at the hands of the newly-formed Government in Oudh. (33) In Gwalior the native Army was reduced from 40,000 to 9,000. Such discharged soldiers and unemployed persons stood indignant of and opposed to Government during the Mutiny.

The social unrest which was thus gradually mounting up in the pre-Mutiny India was further increased by the misery and hardship of the rural population in the country, specially in Bengal and Madras. The miserable*condition of the rural population of Bengal was described by the missionaries residing in and near Calcutta in the memorial (34) which they presented in September 1856 to the Governor-General of India through the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. The missionaries stated in their memorial that in many districts of Bengal neither life nor property was secure, that gang robberies of the most daring character were perpetrated annually in great numbers with impunity, and that there were constant scenes of violence in contentions respecting disputed boundaries among the owners of landed estates. The memorialists ascribed these evils to the inefficiency of the judicial department and the tyranny of the Police. (35) The way in which the zemindari system worked in Bengal was considered by the memorialists as one of the contributory causes of the misery of the common people of the province. In their considered opinion it encouraged the commission of crime, impeded the administration of justice, emboldened the rich to set the law at defiance, led the poor to despair of obtaining redress against the wrongs done to them, and tended to demoralise and pauperize the peasantry (36) in Bengal. The rural population of Bengal

(33) Gubbins. *op cit*, pp. 76—77.

(34) Parl. Papers Vol. 29 of 1857, paper no. 43 p. 2.

(35) Wylie's Bengal as a Field of Mission's (page 286) gives the following picture of the then Police department in Bengal : "As to Police no language that has been used respecting it has ever exaggerated its evils. The Police can oppress with impunity. The visit of a Police Darogah to a native village is a calamity. If a robbery is committed, the poor are afraid to complain ; if any one is wanted as a witness, he is taken for several days from his labour and treated as a prisoner ; if a criminal or suspected criminal is arrested, he is at once presumed to be guilty and is very probably tortured to confess. Then a large part of the police consists not of the regular force but of the village chowkidars who are paid by the landlords and are commonly their tools and instruments. Then further, the insecurity of property induces all, who can afford it, to hire watchmen, in fact, bludgeon-men, of their own, and these, whenever occasion arises, are, of course, used as agents of any amount of violence and oppression. The people sink under the weight of fear, and...justice is practically denied them. The landlords and the Police are the chief powers they know ; and they are hunted by both till they surrender themselves to servility in despair." Evidently the poor people got no protection from the higher Government authorities against the Police and Chowkidars who used to oppress them unjustly.

(36) Rev. J. Wanger describes in an article in the Calcutta Christian Observer the wretched condition of the Rayats thus : "The rent or land-tax which the tenants have to pay to the zemindar amounts on an average to about Rupees 2/- per Bigha or taking the Bigha to be 1/3rd of an English acre, to about 12 s. per acre. Those who

evidently lived in a state of poverty and wretchedness, and a spirit of sullen discontent prevailed among them. In Madras, almost as in Bengal, the Police was tyrannical and cared more for the exaction of revenue than for the preservation of the life and property of the people. Burglaries, highway and gang robberies were frequently committed in every district of the province. The collectors' native deputies used to accuse persons of false charges and to punish and harass them unjustly. Cultivators who resisted their demands were imprisoned and forced to submit. As disclosed by the Torture Report in Madras, 'the native officials were addicted to practices before which neither life nor property of the subjects was safe'. (37) Neither in Bengal nor in Madras, however, the discontent of the rural population provoked them to revolt openly against Government. In Bengal there were only military risings in certain districts but the civil population remained quiet during the Mutiny. (38) In Madras the rural people were far from 'conceiving the bold idea of obtaining relief from their misery and hardship by raising a standard of rebellion against Government. The Madras Army also remained, on the whole, attached to Government. (39)

The way in which the administration was carried on created not only social but also economic discontent in the country. This economic discontent was due largely to Government's land-revenue policy which created agrarian disturbances affecting the economic interests of both the zemindars and rayats seriously. (40) The socio-economic policy of Government thus stirred up ill-feeling and discontent among different classes of the Indian society before the outbreak of the Mutiny.

The ill-treatment of the natives by English officers also supplied another cause of discontent and unrest in the Indian society of the pre-1857 days. English officers were inclined towards looking upon the native people as no better than 'beastly niggers.' The missionaries who toured through the eastern part of Bengal recorded the following tour impressions

hold only 'Patrik' (or ancestral) land are more favourably circumstanced, because the rent for that does not generally exceed one rupee per Bigha. But most of those Rayats who hold 'Patrik' land also hold land of a different description for which they have to pay at the higher rate. A Bigha of land in a favourable year yields about Rupees 5. If Rs. 2/- for rent are deducted, there remain Rupees 3 which the Rayat can call his own. It is believed that 12 Bighas is about the average amount which a Bengalee Rayat holds. The proceeds of that after deducting the rent amount to Rupees 36 per annum. Out of this sum he has to provide food and clothing for himself and family, to keep his house in repair and to maintain the necessary stock of cattle and implements, besides paying for extra labour during the seasons of ploughing and reaping...The Rayat is compelled to incur debt.—Wylie—op. cit., p. 284.

(37) Vide Ludlow—British India. Vol. II. p. 285. Ludlow further states that legalised torture and illegal malpractices both subsisted in India in the pre-Mutiny days. In support of his views he refers to two facts. During the administration of Lord William Bentinck a circular letter was sent to the Magistrates of the Bengal Presidency requesting them not to hamstring convicts before execution. In 1847 during the administration of Lord Hardinge the probing by the police of wounds to learn their depth, length, etc. was forbidden in Bengal. Ibid. p. 285, footnote.

(38) Vide also chap. IX.

(39) Vide also Chap. IV.

(40) Vide also Chap. V.

bearing on the subject. "It is curious to hear", it was stated by them, "the various opinions formed of us by the people. Some said, we had come hitherto commissioned to destroy caste,—others, that our preaching and distribution of books were only with the design of getting a large share of religious merit for ourselves. Others, however, gave us credit for more disinterested views and said, we were evidently good men who had come to promote their welfare; in proof of which they added that they saw a great difference between our kind and friendly behaviour towards them and the conduct of other Europeans who were often apt to treat them harshly and contemptuously." (41) Captain Albert Hervey of the 40th Regiment, Madras Infantry also left records on the harsh and contemptuous treatment of the native people in southern India by the European officers. Harsh measures were, as recorded by him, generally adopted by all classes of Europeans towards the people of India. "The very brutes", he noted, "that perish are not so treated..... To maltreat a native is considered a meritorious act, and the younger branches of the service think it very fine and manly to curse and swear at them and behave in such a manner that, if it were known, the most serious consequences would be the result." (42) The sufferings of the Indian coolies and carters at the hands of English officers and English soldiers begged description. They were employed but were not paid. Captain Hervey wrote from his personal experiences as follows: ".....As soon as they (carters) hear of troops being about to move, they hurry off from their dwellings, driving their carts and cattle to some distant village, taking the former to picces, hiding one wheel here and another there and sending the latter to graze among the hills and themselves taking to the plough or other occupation to avoid detection or even the possibility of their being pressed into the service. These poor fellows have a peculiar aversion to being employed by European troops, because the soldiers maltreat them and will not sometimes pay them their hire, to say nothing of overloading their bandies to such a degree as to render it a very hard work for the bullocks to drag them." (43) These sufferings of the labouring class were not peculiar to Madras alone but were prevalent in Bengal also, where, too, natives were put to great straits owing to their conveyances being forcibly seized. Exemptions from such seizures might be purchased by bribe. Those who were poor could not afford to offer the bribes and had, therefore, to suffer much. The coolies were forced to work but were never paid. (44)

European officers of the pre-Mutiny days were known to have employed orderlies whose duty it was to thrash their native servants. Orderlies so employed were often punished in their turn, if they did not thrash the native servants hard enough. (45) Young officers of a Bombay regiment were reported to have maltreated their native servants, leaving their wages

(41) Wylie—op cit p. 126.

(42) Hervey—Ten years in India, Vol. II pp. 35—37.

(43) Hervey—op cit, II p. 310.

(44) Ludlow—op cit, II p. 362.

(45) Ibid p. 357.

unpaid for months together, 'though some of the servants were so faithful that they would pawn their own clothes to procure grain for their masters' horses'. (46) The ill-treatment of the natives by European officers was recorded also by Sir Charles Napier. Young officers were noticed by him to have been insolent to 'black' servants. (47) That the English officers, while in India, often found great pleasure in ill-treating the natives unnecessarily would be borne out by the following statement of Reverend T. Acland who was the chaplain at Puri, Cuttack and Midnapur in the pre-Mutiny days.

"I was standing" wrote Reverend Acland, "with an officer in the porch of his house, when I was last at Midnapur, when his syce or groom brought his horse to the door. Captain L. turned to me and said, 'I have not given that fellow a thrashing for a long time and he'll forget what it feels like and grow lazy.' Now the fact was, the man was so attentive and industrious that Captain L. could not possibly find any fault with him. However, he went down the steps, and on the pretence that the man did not hold his horse properly gave him several violent blows on the face and head, kicked him three or four times with all his force and struck him on the back with a two-foot rule with such violence that the man was obliged to have his back plastered and bandaged up: and all this without the slightest fault on the part of the servant." (48)

The social and economic reforms of Government, missionary activities, annexation of Native states, and the cruel treatment of the natives by English officers thus produced, no doubt, much social unrest and discontent in the country, particularly among the orthodox class of the Indian society before the upheaval of 1857. But the revolt of 1857 would not have broken out, had not the initiative been taken by the disaffected sepoys of the British Indian Army.

(46) Ludlow—*op cit*, II pp. 357—358. Ludlow states that officers were subjected to fines for beating their servants. The very existence of such regulations proves that European officers used to ill-treat their servants in India.

(47) *Life and opinions of Sir Charles Napier*, edited by Sir W. Napier Vol. III p. 260.

(48) T. Acland—*A popular account of the manners and customs of India* p. 83.

Acland observes further in this connection thus: 'Much as has been said about slavery I do not believe that any of the slaves in Jamaica were even worse treated than the servants of some of our officers here. The excuse is that it is impossible to manage with the Hindus without the whip... The natives by their slowness and inactivity are sometimes very provoking; but surely that is no excuse to the Christians who give way to angry feelings.' *Ibid*, p. 84.

APPENDIX 'A' (CHAPTER II.)

Statement of the number of the Hindu Widows who became 'Satis' in different districts of India between 1815 and 1823.

Calcutta Division	1815	1816	1817	1818	181	1820	1821	1822	1823
Burdwan ...	50	67	98	132	75	57	62	40	45
Cuttuck and Balasore ...	9	9	14	11	33	33	28	28	31
Hughli ...	72	51	112	141	115	93	95	79	81
Jessore ...	7	13	21	23	16	25	31	21	14
Jungle Mahals ...	34	39	43	61	31	18	39	24	27
Midnapur ...	4	11	7	22	13	12	6	16	15
Nadia ...	50	56	88	80	47	59	59	50	59
Suburbs of Calcutta ..	25	40	39	43	52	47	39	43	46
24 Parganas ...	2	3	20	31	39	26	33	27	22
Total ...	253	289	442	544	421	370	392	328	340

Dacca Division	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819	1820	1821	1822	1823
Backergunge ...	1	5	9	1	6	3	3	18	11
Chittagong ...	5	5	6	3	7	3	4	1	—
City of Dacca ...	4	6	18	25	15	18	26	9	14
Dacca Jelalpur ...	1	1	5	5	6	8	7	7	2
Mymensingh ...	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—
Syihet ...	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	1	1
Tipperah ..	20	7	13	22	21	17	11	9	12
Total ...	31	24	52	58	55	51	52	45	40

Murshidabad Division	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819	1820	1821	1822	1823
Birbhum ..	1	3	9	4	5	5	3	3	6
Bhagalpur ...	3	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	1
Dinajpur ...	1	4	6	—	—	—	—	1	—
City Murshidabad ...	3	7	7	6	6	3	—	5	2
Purnea ...	2	2	4	1	—	2	—	—	—
Rangpur ..	1	5	11	15	12	8	8	10	1
Rajshahi ..	—	—	1	2	—	1	—	—	—
Maldah ...	—	1	1	1	1	2	—	2	1
Monghyr ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Rangpur Commissioner ..	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	1
Total ...	11	22	42	30	25	21	12	22	13

Banaras Division	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819	1820	1821	1822	1823
Allahabad ...	3	2	5	3	4	4	4	—	—
City Banaras ...	13	12	16	15	18	11	12	11	18
Bundelkhand ...	7	6	14	15	5	4	8	3	4
Gorakhpur ...	14	23	33	52	28	32	44	28	32
Ghazipur ...	8	15	27	43	26	34	35	48	55
Jaunpur ...	1	3	2	3	1	4	2	4	4
Mirzapur ...	2	4	5	5	8	3	9	8	3
Fatehpur ...	—	—	1	1	2	1	—	—	4
Azamgarh ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total ...	48	65	103	137	92	93	114	102	121

Patna Division	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819	1820	1821	1822	1823
Bihar ...	—	—	—	2	5	1	2	4	4
City of Patna ...	2	3	5	3	2	5	5	1	—
Ramghar ...	2	—	2	4	5	4	7	16	5
Saran ...	12	16	25	23	10	11	15	12	7
Shahabad ...	4	9	14	25	17	19	39	36	30
Tirhut ...	—	1	3	—	1	2	1	1	3
Total ...	20	29	49	57	40	42	69	70	49

Bareilly Division	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819	1820	1821	1822	1823
Agra ...	—	1	2	1	1	1	1	—	—
Aligarh ...	—	—	2	2	—	—	1	—	1
Bareilly ...	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	1
Kanpur ...	5	4	3	5	3	6	5	4	4
Etawah ...	4	—	3	3	2	3	4	2	1
Furrukabad ...	1	—	1	—	2	—	1	2	—
Moradabad ...	3	—	—	1	2	1	1	1	—
Saharanpur ...	—	7	6	1	6	6	2	2	3
Meerut ...	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Shahjahanpur ...	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	3	1
Bolundshahr ...	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total ...	15	13	19	13	17	20	15	16	12
Grand Total ..	378	442	707	839	650	597	654	583	575

Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. XXIV of 1825. Paper No. 508. pp. 151-52. Also Parl. Papers. Vols. 21 of 1821 and 17 of 1823.

APPENDIX 'B' (CHAPTER II.)

Summary of Missions in India and Ceylon in the pre-mutiny period.

Presidencies	Stations	Preachers		Native Churches			Native Christians		Boys' Schools						Girls' Schools				English Chapels
		Missionaries	Native Catechists	No.	Admitted	Excluded	No. of Members	Vernacular		Boarding		English		Day		Boarding			
Bengal	89	103	1130	87	229	127	3500	14778	School	Boys	School	Boys	School	Boys	School	Girls	School	Girls	21
Agra	29	66	49	22	69	16	678	2032	61	3707	10	191	22	1754	10	242	10	175	14
Bombay	19	35	16	13	41	2	289	744	70	3480	2	21	7	1144	37	1222	6	101	5
Madras	121	179	405	128	361	26	10662	76591	849	24445	52	1165	41	4286	191	6639	52	1470	22
Ceylon	55	60	98	81	132	11	3281	18046	227	9402	7	247	34	1373	85	2747	5	203	9
Total	313	443	698	331	832	182	18410	112191	1347	47504	93	2414	126	14562	347	11519	102	2779	71

Revised statistics of Missions in India and Ceylon. page 27
vide Thoughts on Missions to India—Serampore.

CHAPTER III.

MILITARY BACKGROUND.

Social reforms which interfered with native usages and native caste-prejudices, missionary activities, construction of railways, introduction of electric telegraph—all these had provoked discontent and disaffection among the conservative class of the civil population of our country before the Mutiny broke out in 1857. The military class also stood disaffected on the eve of the Mutiny. The discontented members of the civil society, however, bore their discontent only sullenly, restraining themselves from taking any initiative in an open rebellion. They chose at first to wait patiently for a turn in the tide in due course or to bear with the existing evils in a spirit of calm resignation to their fate. Occasionally they raised only voices of protest against the reforms, which appeared to them as indirect attempts to destroy their caste and religion, without intending, of course, to rise in an armed revolt against Government. They had, in fact, little or no idea of taking the initiative in declaring a war against Government. The initiative in declaring the rebellion was taken by the sepoys. Recruited from the warlike native population, the sepoys were usually faithful to Government. Their fidelity and attachment principally helped the British Government to carve out an Empire in India. Yet thousands of those sepoys with their fidelity shaken felt constrained to revolt early in the first century year of the battle of Plassey. It was on their open challenge to Government through insurrectionary outbursts that the Mutiny of 1857 battered and thrived.

The *fons et origo* of the Sepoy Army is to be traced to the British policy of conquering India with indigenous forces. The disintegration of the Mughal Empire and the inability of the Marathas and Afghans to set up a government vigorous enough to compel 'the mutually repellent molecules of the (Indian) body politic to stop their gyrations and to submit to the grasp of a superior controlling force' encouraged the English merchants trading with India to seek political fortune in the country. But the English had their rivals in the Danes, Dutch Portuguese and above all, in the French. To meet these European rivals as also to disarm the inevitable hostilities of the native princes and Rajas the English trading company in India thought it necessary to build up a native Army, trained up in European discipline and European tactics of warfare. In the first half of the 17th century the English traders in India used to employ native night-watchmen and guards of peons (1) for the protection of their factories and storehouses

(1) Guards of peons were kept in pay in India not only by the English traders but also by the Portuguese, Dutch, Danish and French traders. Such guards of

at Surat, Masulipatam, Armagon, Madras, Hughli, and Balasore. Though these night watchmen and guards of peons possessed arms for defending the factories and storehouses, they were not soldiers properly so called. Real native soldiers or sepoy were sought to be recruited at first in the southern India from amongst the native warlike classes who were ready to fight for pay and pension. According to Dodwell, the sepoy was discovered not on the east coast but on the west coast of southern India; and the term, 'sepoy' came into use for the first time in 1740. (2) The Sepoy force in its modern form dated, however, from 1765. (3) In course of time the sepoys became useful and dependable fighting hands, helping the English East India Company to win India for Britain. The sepoys are generally believed to have been trained after European model for the first time by the French. The example, set by the French, was followed by the English. Robert Clive took to imparting European training and European discipline to the sepoys in the service of the English East India Company.

The sepoys hailed from such families of the Indian society as usually chose to live by the profession of arms. They were a very hardy race of men, capable of enduring the hardships of war. The sepoys, after they were enrolled as such, were harnessed to a mode of life, quite different from what they were accustomed to before their enrolment. Care-free youngmen with heavy military uniforms (4) turned into grave-looking sepoys. The regular sepoys were to put on tight red coats and trousers in the place of their light habiliments. On their heads they wore heavy shakoes. They were armed with heavy muskets, (5) bayonets and pouches. They were equipped also with knapsacks, containing all their regimental necessities, slung on their back, and with portmantaus, fastened to their bodies by means of leather-straps. They wore 'chuppuls' on their feet. The sepoys had descriptive rolls which kept

peons were called by the name of 'Poligar Peons'. They were so called because they were men of the same class as furnished retinues of the local Poligars i.e., they probably belonged to those local sub-castes which claimed to be hereditary soldiers. H. Dodwell—Sepoy recruitment in the old Madras Army. P. 1.

(2) Sepoy Recruitment in the old Madras Army. Pp. 2-3. According to Camb. Hist. of India Vol. VI P. 153 it was in the course of the hostilities between the French and the English on the Malabar Coast between 1721 and 1729 that the term, Sepoy first appeared as the name of a military force in European service.

(3) Dodwell—op. cit., P. 13.

(4) Vide Sitaram—op. cit., P. 14. Also Harvey—op. cit., II. PP. 96-97.

(5) The sepoys were originally armed with muskets, swords and pikes. In the beginning of the 18th century the pikes were replaced by bayonets, and the sepoys remained armed with bayonets, swords and muskets till the swords came to be abolished. The sepoys were then left only with muskets and bayonets. Vide George Dodd. op. cit., p. 24.

records of their names, castes, age, height and particulars about their home address. (6)

The sepoys were paid for their services to the Company. The sepoys belonging to Infantry regiments joined the service of the Company on a monthly pay of seven rupees only. They had an increment of one rupee only after sixteen years' service and of two rupees after twenty years' service. The maximum pay admissible to them at the fag end of service was thus nine rupees only per month. The initial pay of a sepoy of a Cavalry regiment was twenty seven rupees per month. He had an increment of one rupee only after six years, of two rupees after ten years, and of three rupees after fifteen years of service. From his pay was deducted a sum of fifteen rupees each month on account of the charge for the maintenance of his horse. A further sum of two rupees and ten annas in the minimum was deducted from his pay each month to meet expenses under various heads such as the purchase of his clothings and tent equipments, repairs to his guns and swords, shaving, washing and so on. After such deductions from his pay the balance *viz.*, nine rupees and six annas only was paid to him in cash as his net monthly pay. (7) The sawar's pay was still higher than that of a sepoy of an Infantry regiment. The native Cavalry officers also were paid higher than the officers of the native Infantry regiments. A Risaladar and a Jamadar of Cavalry regiments, for instance, received a monthly pay varying from two hundred to three hundred rupees and from sixty to eighty rupees respectively. (8) A Havildar (native Sergeant), a Jamadar (native Lieutenant) and a Subahdar (native Captain) of Infantry regiments, on the other hand, were paid at the rates of fourteen rupees, twenty-four rupees and sixty seven rupees per month respectively. (9)

Captain Albert Hervey of the 40th Regiment of Madras Infantry left records about the hard economic lot of the sepoys in the Madras Presidency. (10) A sepoy recruit in the Madras Presidency, as recorded by him, was not allowed to draw his monthly pay of seven rupees in

(6) The descriptive roll of a sepoy belonging to the 8th Company, 34th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry contained the following facts about him :—

"Sepoy Ramlal Lalla—caste Kait, age 30 years, height 5 ft. 7½ in., Village Kundahar, Pargana Nagaon, Dist. Lucknow, date of enlistment, 26th February, 1844. *Vide* Forrest, *op. cit.*, I P. 19. "On an average the sepoys were about 5 ft. 6½ in. in height." Hervey—*op. cit.* p. 97. According to the statement of Durgadas Bandyopadhyaya the minimum height of a sepoy of an Infantry regiment was five feet and eight inches, while that of a Sawar was five feet and four inches. *Vide* his *Bidrohe Bangalee*. P. 76.

(7) Durgadas Bandyopadhyay—*op. cit.* pp. 74-75.

(8) *Ibid* p. 418.

(9) *Vide* George Dodd—*op. cit.*, p. 25 and Durgadas Bandyopadhyay—*op. cit.*, p. 65. *vide* also Sitaram, *op. cit.* As a sepoy Sitaram drew his pay at the usual rate of seven rupees per month. When he was promoted to the rank of a Subahdar, he drew the pay attached to the Subahdar's rank, namely sixty seven rupees per month. It may be mentioned here that while on leave a sepoy was not in receipt of his pay in full. His leave-salary was lower than the pay to which he was entitled, when he was on duty. *Vide* Parl. Papers Vol. VIII of 1859. pp. 7-8.

(10) Ten years in India Vol. II. pp. 99-101.

full in one instalment during the training period just to ensure his attachment to his service and to discourage his tendency towards desertion. He received his pay during the training period in three instalments, falling due on the 1st, 15th and on the last working day of a month. These dates of payment were not unalterable but could be changed by the Adjutant in exercise of his discretionary powers. He was entitled to receive his pay in full in one instalment, after he was considered fit for joining the ranks on completion of a course of training, covering five months or more. He was then supplied with the military dress of a regular soldier together with cooking utensils, carpets etc. out of regimental supplies under the supervision of the Quartermaster. These supplies were worth about twenty rupees which was subsequently realised by Government by monthly deductions from his pay. The necessary deductions towards the recovery of the price of the articles, supplied to the sepoy, and the way in which the monthly pay was dribbled out to him in several instalments left him almost on the margin of subsistence. He was quite at a loss as to how to maintain the members of his own family and other dependants under his care. Even after his enrolment as a full-fledged native soldier on completion of the necessary military training, deductions were occasionally made from his pay for something or other. The economic condition of the sepoys in the Madras Presidency was thus very poor. They could not accordingly provide themselves with a nutritious diet. Their diet, as recorded by Hervey, was composed of such simple ingredients as boiled rice, a little curry, made of salt fish or of meat occasionally, the water in which the rice was boiled, with a little salt put into it, and raw onions. He also noted that the breakfast of a sepoy in the Madras Presidency consisted in a cupful of butter-milk only, which was taken usually after returning from drill, and that his dinner was simply a portion of boiled rice (boiled at mid-day), occasionally supplemented by boiled fish. The remainder of the boiled rice was soaked with water in a pot and kept apart for the next day's dish to be taken along with chili, salt, onion, and sometimes with vegetable curry, cooked with fish. (11) Such a diet left the sepoys ill-nourished and broken in health. Captain Hervey was often moved to pity by the wretchedness of the Sepoy Army in the Madras Presidency. (12) The condition of the sepoys in the Bombay Presidency and in northern India was no better. Durgadas Bandyopadhyaya's *Bidrohe Bangalee* (pages 65 to 68) throws sufficient light on the poor condition of the sepoys in northern India. The sepoys of a regiment, as recorded therein, were compulsorily

(11) Hervey—op. cit. II. pp. 108, 104.

(12) *Ibid.* pp. 106-107. Captain Hervey recorded that often the poor sepoys came to him begging to be relieved of carrying their heavy knapsacks, which they were unable to carry. This was a common complaint, he noticed. He had also the experience of being requested by some sepoy or other thus: "Please sir, will you kindly lend me half a rupee? I will repay you, when I get my pay. My family has not had anything to eat these two days and I, too, am starving. I feel so weak that I cannot do my duty, if I eat nothing. Pray, be kind, sir and lend me the half rupee. I will never ask again."

required to obtain supplies of their clothings, shoes and other articles of daily use only from those shops which were approved of by the Commander-in-chief of the regiment concerned. They obtained their daily ration on credit from the grocers who were attached to the regiment. At the end of a month the grocers were paid for their supply of ration by deductions from the pay of the sepoys. The sepoys had a very small balance at hand out of their pay after they had cleared their dues for their purchases of clothings and ration. The balance thus left to a sepoy sometimes amounted to a rupee and a half, sometimes to half a rupee only and sometimes to a ridiculous figure of one anna only. The daily dish of the sepoys in northern India usually consisted of bread and cooked 'dal'. Their poor means did not permit them to take fish, meat, potato and other costly edibles. Very rarely could they afford to purchase vegetables for curry. Again, the main ingredient of such curry was the cheapest possible vegetable known in India as 'Kachu'.

The sepoys of the British Indian Army were normally loyal to Government. Their valour and loyalty were both 'accepted articles of faith and incontrovertible facts of history'. Ever since Major Lawrence enrolled under him 2000 peons for the siege of Pondicherry in 1748 the English East India Company had reasons to be satisfied with the fidelity of their native troops. (13) They won campaigns, conquered territories and thus helped the Company to build the imperial edifice in India. They suffered much in the course of the campaigns, but they remained constant in their devotion to the cause of Government. Sir Charles Metcalfe was sceptic about the much-advertised fidelity of the sepoys. In a letter dated April 19, 1835 he wrote referring to the sepoys thus: 'Our danger is round about us, in the very heart of our own Empire and in every state of India. (14) This view of Sir Charles Metcalfe about the sepoys was challenged by many, including Lord William Bentinck and experienced servants of the Company like H. T. Prinsep. Prinsep wrote on June 9, 1835 'deprecating the proposal to raise the proportion of the Europeans from 1/7th to 1/4th of the Indian army as not being either indispensable as a security against the infidelity of.....other troops or necessary for the increase of the field and reserved armies.' (15) Sir Charles Napier waxed eloquent on the efficiency and loyalty of the native regiments. In a report, dated November 27, 1849, on the military situation in India Sir Charles Napier observed as follows: 'This is a vast army and it is in a good state of discipline, complete in its equipments, full of high courage, and a high military spirit reigns through all ranks. ...Our troops are faithful to a proverb... It is my decided opinion that this magnificent army is sufficient to guard India at present... I have studied Indian troops for nearly eight years constantly at the head of Bengal and Bombay sepoys and I can see nothing to fear from them except when ill-used, and even then they are less

(13) Lee Warner—op. cit., II. p. 274.

(14) *Ibid.* p. 273.

(15) *Ibid.* p. 273.

dangerous than British troops would be in similar circumstances.' (16) Napier's reading of the character of the sepoys was quite accurate. The sepoys were devoted to the cause of Government. They were obedient to their English officers, though the latter 'had usurped all the high places in the Army and kept them down in the dead level of dust.' They were even prepared to lay down their lives in carrying out the orders of their commandants. They were not unoften found lighting up the tombs of their old commanding officers, saluting the pictures of the generals under whom they had fought, attending on an English officer in his illness with the watchfulness and tenderness of a woman and even looking after the children of their officers with care and affection. English women in India felt safe and secure, when they were under the protection of the sepoys. (17)

Though normally loyal, faithful and dependable, the sepoys became furious, when they apprehended attacks on their caste, and religion. Both the Hindu and Muslim sepoys were dead against their conversion to Christianity. The Hindu sepoys, in particular, were extremely anxious for maintaining the sanctity of the foods which they had to take in cantonments or halting stations during campaigns. The Hindu sepoys like the civil class Hindus thought that their foods were polluted when cooked or touched by non-Hindus. During the defence of Arcot in 1751, when the provisions of the soldiers fell short of their requirements, the Hindu sepoys requested their Commander to allow them to boil the available quantity of rice for the whole garrison. They promised the European soldiers the entire quantity of the boiled rice, while they themselves would remain contented with the water in which the rice would be boiled. The idea was that, if the food were prepared by the European soldiers, it would be treated as a polluted dish by the sepoys who would not touch it even. In such a case they would have to starve. (18) The Hindu sepoys were also prejudiced against travelling beyond the Indus which river was looked upon by them as forming the north-west frontier of Hinduism. When, during the administration of Lord Auckland, the Government of India decided to send military help to Shah Shuja 'Ul-Mulk', the deposed Amir of Kabul so as to enable him to regain his throne by defeating Dost Muhammad Khan, the sepoys were seized with a great panic at the idea of having to cross the Indus at the cost of their caste. To cross the Indus was to go out of Hindusthan. This meant loss of caste. Such was the prejudice of the sepoys about going across the Indus. (19)

During and on the eve of the Mutiny various rumours about the attacks on native caste and religion by Government were in the air. The sepoys believed such rumours to be true and stood highly agitated. It

(16) Sir Charles Napier to the Duke of Wellington. Parl. Papers. Vol. 29 of 1857. Paper No. 219—Session 2, p. 1.

(17) Kaye and Malletson. op. cit., I. p. 241.

(18) Major-General Macleod—Indian Mutiny. pp. 46-47.

(19) Sitaram—op. cit., p. 60.

was held by the then official circle that the sepoys, though loyal and submissive by nature, were credulous like children and were inclined towards believing in all sorts of rumours about the desecration of their caste and religion. Therefore they stood disaffected towards Government. In a Minute, dated May 11, 1857, J. Grant stated that the sepoys were 'in many respects very much like children, and acts which on the part of European soldiers would be proof of the blackest disloyalty might have a different significance when done by these credulous and inconsiderate but generally not ill-disposed beings.' (20)

'The sepoy was indeed...a paradox. He was made up of inconsistencies and contradictions. In his character, qualities so adverse as to be apparently irreconcilable with each other met together and embraced. He was simple and yet designing; credulous and easily deceived by others, and yet obstinately tenacious of his own inbred convictions, now docile as a child and now hard and immovable in the stubbornness of his manhood. Abstemious and yet self-indulgent, calm yet impetuous, gentle yet cruel, he was indolent even to languor in his daily life and yet capable of being aroused to acts of the most desperate energy. Sometimes sportive and sometimes sullen, he was easily elevated and easily depressed; but he was for the most part of a cheerful nature... But light-hearted as was his general temperament, he would sometimes brood over imaginary wrongs, and when a delusion once entered his soul, it clung to it with the subtle malevolence of an ineradicable poison.' (21)

Sepoys of such a complex character required to be very carefully and tactfully dealt with for ensuring their loyalty and attachment. But that was not done. The sepoys were led to believe that the policy of Government was directed towards stripping them of their oriental character and towards anglicising them by vexatious military regulations. They were provoked into Mutiny. Often before 1857 they complained against all sorts of novelties bristling up in their path, as also against the 'bad faith' of Government towards them. In fact, the golden age when the most cordial relations subsisted between the sepoys and Government had ceased to exist long before 1857. On more occasions than one during the pre-1857 days the sepoys of different regiments rebelled and were punished into submission. (22) The pre-1857 mutinies were, however, essentially local occurrences. These did not take

(20) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857—Paper No. 270 p. 212.

(21) Kaye and Malletson—op. cit., I, p. 240.

(22) (a) In February 1764 the sepoys of the Bengal Army mutinied.—Holmes—History of the Indian Mutiny. P. 50.

(b) September, 1764, saw the Mutiny of two battalions, posted at Moneah; the Mutiny was suppressed. The 9th or Captain Gallier's Battalion (subsequently called First Regiment, Native Infantry) also mutinied on September 8, 1764 at Manjee.—Broome—History of the Bengal Army, Vol. I, pp. 458-460.

(c) In 1806 the sepoys garrisoning the fort at Vellore mutinied in protest against innovations which they considered as attacks on their religion. The Mutiny was suppressed.—Camb. Hist. of India Vol. VI P. 163.

(d) Barrackpur saw a Mutiny of the sepoys in 1824.—Holmes—op cit. pp. 55-56.

the shape of an all-India revolt. This was so, because the causes which made the Mutiny of 1857 a wide-spread movement were conspicuous by their absence before that date. The particular measure—the introduction of greased cartridges—which led directly to the explosion of 1857 was introduced only towards the end of 1856 and not before. Again, the territorial aristocracy (23) stood more disaffected during the few years of Dalhousie's administration immediately preceding the Mutiny of 1857 than before. Whatever leadership was supplied by territorial aristocrats like Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, Kumar Singh of Jagadishpur (Arrah) and others during the Mutiny of 1857 was not available during the military risings prior to that date. Again, there was a gradual increase of an over-bearing attitude on the part of the British leaders of the Indian Army towards the led. The rank and file of the Native soldiery came to be alienated by the disdainful attitude of their superiors. It was also an undoubted fact that the discontent of the Army was at its maximum during the years immediately preceding the Mutiny of 1857. Above all, the general superstitious belief that the year 1857 would see the fall of the British power in India encouraged the disaffected elements of the country to keep themselves in readiness to strike a blow for recovering their lost privileges with the dawn of the fateful year. As soon as the sepoys rose in revolt, the disaffected elements in certain parts of the country also felt encouraged to follow suit.

The revolt of the sepoys in 1857 was not unforeseen. It was anticipated by Sir Thomas Munro and Sir Charles Napier long before. (24)

(c) In 1844 four Bengal regiments refused to march to the newly annexed Sind, until the extra allowances were restored to them. To induce a Madras corps to march for Sind to the help of the Sind Government the Governor of Madras promised higher pay to the sepoys of the corps on his own responsibility. The corps on reaching Bombay learnt that the Supreme Government had not confirmed the promise. The disappointed sepoys created disturbances while on parade. In 1848 a regiment of Madras cavalry mutinied in protest against the breach of faith on the part of Government. In July 1849 two regiments at Rawulpindee refused to receive their pay, unless the extra allowances were granted to them. There was, however, no open Mutiny. In December 1849 an incipient Mutiny at Wuzirabad was repressed by Colonel John Hearsey. The 66th Native Infantry mutinied at Govindgarh. Sir Charles Napier punished the mutinous corps by disbandment. These isolated acts of Mutiny did not, however, ripen into a general revolt before 1857. "These occasional disturbances were arrested sometime by yielding concessions, sometime by the punishment of the ringleaders. While permanent cures of military discontent were the crying needs of the hour, the authorities were busy applying palliatives only."

Vide Holmes—op. cit, pp. 57-60.

(23) Vide Chapter V for a detailed discussion.

(24) In a minute dated April 12, 1822 on the liberty of Press and on its likely reaction on the Native Army Sir Munro observed as follows :

"The high opinion entertained of us by the natives and the deference and respect for authority which have hitherto prevailed among ourselves have been the main causes of our success in this country ; but when these principles shall be shaken or swept away by a free press, encouraged by our juries to become a licentious one, the change will soon reach and pervade the whole native army. The native troops are the only body of natives who are always mixed with Europeans, and they will, therefore, be the first to learn the doctrines, circulated among them by the newspapers ; for, as these doctrines will become the frequent subject of discussion among the

Had precautionary measures been adopted beforehand by Government to keep the sepoys contented and faithful by meeting their legitimate demands and respecting their caste-prejudices, to harness them to strict military discipline, and to remove the defects in the Army organisation by sufficiently increasing the strength of the British soldiers in the then Indian Army and by fairly distributing them throughout the country, the Mutiny might have been averted. But no such precautionary measures were adopted by Government in time. The result was that what was anticipated and apprehended by Munro and Napier eventually proved to be true. Exceedingly discontented with the policy of the Government towards them, the sepoys rose in revolt in 1857. The causes of the discontent of the sepoys on the eve of the Mutiny were many. Their pay and pension were lower than those of the British soldiers of the British Indian Army. Acts of indiscipline on the part of the sepoys were met by cruel punishment, usually by blowing them up with guns. Their prejudices were very often attacked by Government through enactments and legislations. Though prejudiced against carrying arms outside India, the sepoys in general were required from 1856 to be enlisted for general service, wherever the state might require it. This was the General Enlistment order, which made it 'compulsory on the sepoy to take to the transport vessel, to cross the black water, and to serve in strange parts of the world, far away, perhaps, from all the emblems and observances of his religion, among a people sacrilegious and unclean.' The order affected the sepoys in more ways than one. It was interpreted as an insidious attempt to destroy their caste. Again, the sepoys of the Bengal Army unlike those of the Bombay and Madras Armies were not allowed to be accompanied by their families to cantonments. They accordingly used to go on leave at intervals just to visit their near and

European officers, it will not be long before they are known to the native officers and troops. These men will probably not trouble themselves much about distinctions regarding the rights of the people and forms of Government, but they will learn from what they hear to consider what immediately concerns themselves and for which they require but little prompting. They will learn to compare their own low allowance and humble rank with those of their European officers, to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests, to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields. ...Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans. They will have no great difficulty in finding leaders, qualified to direct them. Their patience, their habits of discipline and their experience in war will hold out the fairest prospect of success. ...They might fail in their first attempts, but even these failures would not, as under a national Government, confirm our power but shake it to its foundation. ...In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people. The native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men, formerly belonging to the revenue and Police departments, who are now unemployed and by many, now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country and of its revenue. The merchants and shopkeepers from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced might wish us success but they would do no more. The heads of villages who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shown a strong

dear ones at home. The new order, however, made it extremely difficult for the sepoys of the Bengal Army to manage to visit their families within the leave periods, granted, from distant cantonments outside India. Though the sepoys of the Madras and Bombay Armies were accompanied by their families to the cantonments outside India, they were also quite at a loss as to how to make their both ends meet in foreign lands, when 'the foreign service batta' ceased to be paid. This 'foreign service batta' in the shape of an extra allowance was sanctioned towards encouraging the sepoys to take the field outside India. As soon as a foreign territory was conquered by the sepoys, Government 'rewarded them by withdrawing the extra allowances and tried to justify their measures by the ungenerous quibble that the sepoys were once more on British territory.' Again, there was a provision in the Army regulations that after fifteen years' service a sepoy, if rendered invalid, might retire from service on a pension of four rupees per month. (25) This provision was an inducement to many a sepoy to obtain release from service with invalid certificates. To counteract this tendency on the part of the sepoys Government at first sought to make an experiment towards inducing them to remain in service by increasing their pay, and by granting them an allowance, called 'hutting money.' (26). The experiment having failed, Government issued an order that the sepoys, declared invalid, should not be permitted to retire on invalid pension, but should be employed on ordinary cantonment duty. This order was strongly resented by the sepoys. It created feelings of dissatisfaction among them. The policy of Government regarding Adoption also tended to create feelings of uneasiness among the sepoys. They were seized with the fear that like princes of Native States, individuals like themselves might in course of time be deprived by Government of their right to adopt. The dangers inherent in Dalhousie's policy regarding Adoption were pointed out by General Briggs. "If you do away," said he to Dalhousie, "with the right of Adoption with respect to the princes of India, the next question will be whether, in the case of estates which you yourselves have con-

desire to be transferred to our dominion but this feeling arose from temporary causes. ...We delude ourselves, if we believe that gratitude for protection they have received or attachment to our mild government would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army."

Paras 11 and 12 of the minute of Sir Thomas Munro.

Vide Parl. Papers (House of Commons) Vol. No. 29 of 1857.

Paper No. 342—Session 2, pp. 9-10.

Sir Charles Napier also gave similar warnings in such statements of his as the following :

(a) "I see the system will not last fifty years. The moment these brave and able natives learn how to combine, they will rush on us simultaneously, and the game will be up."

Life and Opinions of Sir Charles Napier Vol. IV p. 185.

(b) "He (The sepoy) is devoted to us as yet, but we take no pains to preserve his attachment. It is no concern of mine; I shall be dead before what I foresee will take place, but it will take place."

Vide Holmes—op. cit., P. 61 (footnote).

(25) Gubbins—op cit, p. 108.

(26) Ibid. pp. 108-109.

ferred on officers for their services, or upon other individuals for their merits, they should be allowed to adopt... If you are to do away with the right of individuals to adopt, you will shake the faith of the people of India; you will influence that opinion which has hitherto maintained you in your power; and that influence will thrill through your army. Your army is derived from the peasantry of the country who have rights, and if those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity of the army.... If you infringe the institutions of the people of India, that army will sympathise with them; for they are part of the population, and in every infringement you may make upon the rights of individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men who are either themselves in the army or upon their sons, their fathers or their relatives. Let the fidelity of your army be shaken and your power is gone." (27) The imposition of postage duty on the letters of the sepoys also produced much discontent among them. Before Dalhousie's administrative reforms the sepoys' letters were posted free of charge all over India. "Under Dalhousie's administration the sepoy was subjected to the same charge as his officer. These imposts were small in themselves but they greatly restricted freedom and told upon the pocket of the man who received only fourteen shillings monthly with which to support his family, hundreds of miles distant and to provide himself with food and all the necessities of life." (28)

The most serious alarm and discontent among the sepoys were due to the military innovations which the Government introduced among them without due regard for their caste-prejudices and religious beliefs. Such military innovations caused the Vellore Mutiny of 1806, as would be evident from the findings of the Vellore Mutiny Commission which was appointed to investigate the causes of the Vellore Mutiny. (29) The sepoys stationed at Vellore were ordered, as stated in the Commission's report, to use a new turban which was highly offensive to the prejudices of the sepoys because of its resembling a European hat and containing a leather cockade. 'The article of dress was both with the Hindus and Muhamnadans an indication of their caste and a badge of their respective distinctions and place in society.' It was not surprising, therefore, that the innovations in dress such as the new turban, stocks and waistcoat offended the feelings of the sepoys. The report of the Vellore Mutiny Commission further disclosed that it was ordered that the sepoys at Vellore should not mark their faces to denote their caste or wear ear-rings, when dressed in their uniforms; that, while on duty, they should be clean-shaved on the chin; and that uniformity should be preserved in regard to 'the quantity and shape of the hair on the upper lip' as far as may be practicable. When the order was read out to the two battalions at Vellore, discontent among them knew no

(27) India Reform Tract No. 4 "The Native States of India" p. 18, quoted in Ludlow's British India. Vol. II. pp. 226-227.

(28) The Red Pamphlet. P. 12.

(29) Vellore Mutiny Commission Report, dated August 9, 1806, submitted to Lord William Bentinck. Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. XLII of 1861. Paper No. 284, pp. 1-5.

bounds. They broke out into Mutiny which was, however, eventually suppressed. Government learnt nothing from the Vellore Mutiny. After its suppression further military innovations obnoxious to the sepoys should not have been introduced. What should have been avoided in the interest of peace in the country came, however, to be introduced by Government again. The close of 1856 saw the introduction of Enfield Rifles with greased cartridges on grounds of expediency in the place of the old-fashioned muskets. The Enfield Rifle unlike the musket could throw a ball with accuracy at an object at a distance of nine hundred yards and was consequently considered much superior to the musket. Depots for training sepoys in the use of the new Rifle were opened at Dum Dum, Ambala and Sialkot. Among the sepoys, deputed to receive training in the use of the new Rifle, there were many Brahmins. It was at first ordered that the greased cartridges for the new Enfield Rifle to be used in India, should be imported from England. (30) Subsequently, however, large numbers of such cartridges were manufactured at Fort William in Calcutta and were supplied to different Depots. (31) The cartridges imported from England came very soon to be suspected at first at the Dum Dum Depot of having been greased with the fat of pigs and cows, abominable to both the Hindu and Muhammadan sepoys of the Indian Army. The suspicion spread through the agency of a 'Khalasi' attached to the Dum Dum Depot. He requested a Brahmin sepoy of the 2nd Regiment, Bengal Native (Grenadier) Infantry to allow him to drink water from his 'lota'. The Brahmin sepoy having refused it on the score of caste, 'the Khalasi' rejoined with a taunt that he (the Brahmin sepoy) would soon lose his caste, as before long he would have to bite cartridges greased with the fat of pigs and cows. (32) The Brahmin sepoy carried this report to his comrades, and it was soon known to every sepoy at the Dum Dum station. The report soon reached the Barrackpur cantonment, which came to wear the appearance of a mine ready to explode. The report did not take a long time to travel to other military stations also, till at last an unpleasant feeling pervaded the ranks of native soldiery throughout the country. The unrest among the sepoys was due to the fear that the use of the greased cartridges would entail a loss of caste on their part. On January 22, 1857 Lieutenant Wright, one of the officers, attached to the school of Musketry at Dum Dum Depot, intimated to Major Bontein, commanding the above Depot, the fact of the prevailing unrest among the sepoys there due to the introduction of the greased cartridges for the new Enfield Rifle. Major Bontein in his turn reported the matter to

(30) This is evident from para 5 of the correspondence No. 46, dated Fort William, February 2, 1857 from the Governor-General-in-Council to the Court of Directors of the East India Company. The para reads thus: "At the suggestion of the Inspector-General of Ordnance we beg to recommend to your Hon'ble Court that no more ready-made ammunition for the Enfield Rifles be sent to this Presidency." Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857. Paper No. 259, p. 1. In reply, the Court of Directors wrote to intimate that no more cartridges would be sent from England to India.

(31) Forrest—op cit I. Introduction. P. 1.

(32) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857 Paper No. 263. PP. 2-3.

Major General Hearsey, who was then the Chief Commander of the Presidency Division. Major General Hearsey thereupon reported the panicky situation at the Dum Dum and Barrackpur cantonments to the Governor-General of India. To allay the suspicions of the sepoys an enquiry was ordered to be instituted about the composition of the grease, used in the cartridges, imported from England. The Court of Directors thereupon forwarded to the Government of India a memorandum on the subject early in April, 1857 from the Inspector-General of Store's office, J. G. Bonner who furnished the following information :

"From the communication I have had with Captain Boxer, Superintendent of the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich, where all small-arm ammunition for Her Majesty's service is made up, I learn that the laboratory grease, used in preparing the cartridges, forwarded to India, is composed of 5 parts tallow, 5 parts stearin and 1 part wax. But, as these ingredients are purchased in large quantities and delivered at Woolwich, Captain Boxer is quite unable to offer any decided opinion as to the particular description of animal from which the tallow is derived. The only thing certain is that hog's lard does not in any way enter into the composition." Though Mr. Bonner held that the suspicion about the unholy composition of the grease had no basis, the Minute, issued by the Governor-General and concurred in by the members of his Council, however, justified the suspicion of the sepoys about the objectionable ingredients in the composition of the grease. The Minute stated that 'the tallow, used, had been supplied by a contractor' and that 'it was ascertained that no sufficient precautions had been taken in the arsenal to ensure the absence from it of all matter which might be objectionable to the sepoys.' (33)

To ease the tense situation and to soothe the feelings of the sepoys the Government of India suggested to the Court of Directors that no more should ready-made ammunitions for the Enfield Rifles be sent from England to the Bengal Presidency. The suggestion from the Government of India came to be accepted by the Court of Directors. Though ready-made ammunitions ceased to be sent from England, loose balls and cartridge papers, however, continued to be furnished from that country. (34) The cartridge paper received from England was finer than the paper heretofore used for cartridges, was of lighter colour and had a glossy surface. The sepoys looked with suspicion upon the cartridge papers also, which they believed to be greased with the fat of cows and pigs. Major General Hearsey accordingly held at Barrackpur a special Court of enquiry where some of the sepoys of the 3rd Regiment, Native (Grenadier) Infantry were summoned and asked to explain why they objected to the cartridge paper, received from England. The sepoys, who were examined, stated that their suspicion about the unholy com-

(33) Parl. Papers. (House of Commons). Vol. 30 for 1857 Paper No. 263 p. 48. This Minute dated 27th March 1857 was issued over the signatures of Lord Canning, J. Dorin, J. P. Grant and B. Peacock.

(34) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857 Paper No. 259 p. 3.

position of the cartridge papers arose from the facts that these were different in appearance from those formerly used, that they appeared tough and cloth-like in the mode of tearing them and when burnt, gave out a fizzing sound and smelt as if there was grease in them. The sepoys objected to the use of the cartridge-papers on the further ground that it was their general belief that these were made up with objectionable grease. Even the report of the Chemical Examiner, Dr. McNamara that the paper had not been greased with any greasy or oily substance during or since its manufacture failed to be convincing to the sepoys. Their passions ran high and they seemed to have passed out of the stage of control. The efforts of Hearsey to convince the sepoys at Barrackpur that Government was not bent on attacking their caste and religion had no satisfactory results. The mutinous spirit that had taken deep root in the minds of the sepoys at Dum Dum and Barrackpur soon spread among the sepoys of the 19th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, stationed at Berhampur. On the evening of February 26 the sepoys of the 19th Native Infantry refused to obey the orders for receiving the percussion caps for the parade of the following morning. If Subahdar Kurreem Bux should be believed, the commandant of the 19th Native Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell harshly dealt with the sepoys and threatened them that on their refusal to obey orders they would be sent to China and Burma, where through hardship they would all die. (35) The threatenings of Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell could not prevent the sepoys at Berhampur from exhibiting a mutinous conduct. Barrackpur, already in a ferment, heard of the affairs at Berhampur about March 4, 1857. Government determined to nip the Mutiny in the bud and immediately called back Her Majesty's 84th Regiment from Rangoon. The 84th Regiment from Rangoon reaching Calcutta, the 19th Regiment at Berhampur was ordered to march to Barrackpur. But before the sepoys of the 19th Regiment reached Barrackpur, the first blood of the Indian Mutiny had been shed. The firing by Mangal Pande on March 29, 1857 on the issue of greased cartridges gave the signal for the outbreak of the Sepoy Mutiny.

(35) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857 Paper No. 263 p. 50.

CHAPTER IV.

Army administration—strength, composition and recruitment of the Sepoy Army—bungle of Government in the administration of the Army.

In the drama of the Mutiny of 1857 the main actors were the sepoys who formed an overwhelming majority of the British Indian Army of the day. They shared the glory of victories in many a campaign along with the British troops who formed but a small percentage of the then fighting corps in India. The defence of the Indian Empire was then entrusted to both the native and British forces. The British branch of the Indian Army was composed of a part of the Queen's Army and of additional British troops, recruited by the English East India Company on its own initiative. Between 1842 and 1845 the Company recruited a British Army, 4333 strong, for service in India from London, Liverpool, Dublin, Cork and Edinburgh. Of this strength of the British or White Army London supplied 52 p.c., Liverpool 12 p.c., Irish districts 22 p.c. and Edinburgh 14 p.c. The year 1846 saw the opening of two more recruiting centres, namely Bristol and Newry. (1) The British troops belonging to the Queen's Army but serving in India were paid by the English East India Company itself. The Company also maintained a native Army for each of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay (2) The Armies of Bengal Madras and Bombay were separate and distinct, each under its own Commander-in-chief and each presenting some peculiarities of organisation. Though separate in organisation, they fought in large military operations with such oneness of feeling as befitted the soldiers belonging to a single Army.

For military purposes India was parcelled out into a number of divisions each of which was under the command of a general, brigadier or any other officer, responsible for all the troops, British and native, within his division. These military divisions were not necessarily identical in area or boundary with the political divisions of the Empire. The two kinds of divisions, military and political, were treated on two different considerations. (3)

The strength of the native and British troops, spread over different

(1) Parl. Papers. Vol. 42 for 1857. Paper No. 201 p. 35.

(2) There were besides a few irregular and local native corps such as the Hyderabad contingent, the Punjab Frontier Force, a local force for Nagpur, and the Oudh Irregular Force all of which were raised with the growth of the Company's territories and responsibilities in India. The local force for Nagpur, raised after its annexation in 1854, disappeared in the course of the Mutiny, while the Oudh Irregular Force, formed after the annexation of Oudh in 1856, was broken up shortly afterwards. Vide. Camb. Hist. of India. Vol. VI. pp. 164-165.

(3) George Dodd, *op cit.* p. 208.

military stations, has been variously estimated by different writers on Mutiny. In a report, dated November 27, 1849 on the military position of India Sir Charles Napier stated that the four distinct Armies, namely the Queen's, Bengal, Madras and Bombay consisted collectively of about 300,000 fighting men. (4) Lord Dalhousie in his letter, dated November 17, 1849, written to his friend, Sir George Couper stated *inter alia* on the strength of the Indian Army thus : 'While we are 25000, they (the sepoys) are 200,000 disciplined men'. (5) According to Sir George MacMunn the British Indian Army on the eve of the Mutiny was composed of 40,000 Britishers and 311,000 natives, the ratio between them being about 1 to 8. (6) Major General Hancock of the Bombay Army in his report on the results of his enquiry into the organisation of the Indian Army stated that as per the India House Returns the Indian Army before the Mutiny was composed of 38,745 Britishers and 231,374 natives. (7) The returns relating to the Armies of India as issued from the East India House on April 12, 1858 by Philip Melville, Secretary, Military Department recorded the following strength of the Indian Army in each of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay from 1852 to 1857. (8)

	<i>Total European. (British)</i>	<i>Total Native.</i>	<i>Grand Total</i>
1852 Bengal	... 26,089	139,807	165,896
Madras	... 11,687	53,714	65,401
Bombay	... 10,933	45,552	56,485
	<hr/> 48,709	<hr/> 239,073	<hr/> 287,782

(4) Parl. Papers. Vol. 29 of 1857. paper No. 219. p. 1.

(5) Baird, op cit. p. 102.

(6) Sir George MacMunn—The Indian Mutiny in perspective. P. 17.

(7) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Report of the Major General Hancock on the organisation of the Indian Army. Paper 2516. P. 21. The document records the following details of the European and Native forces as per the India House Returns.

		Non-Commissioned	Rank & file
		European	Native
		(British)	Total.
Artillery.	6419	9138
Sappers.	110	3043
Cavalry.	2456	30533
Infantry.	29760	188660
		<hr/>	<hr/>
total	38745	231374
		<hr/>	<hr/>

(8) Parl. Papers. Vol. XLII of 1857-58. paper No. 201. p. 5. The Indian Army the strength of which was estimated by Melville included Royal troops (Dragoons and Infantry) and company's troops consisting of Engineers and Sappers, Artillery (Horse, European Foot & Native Foot), Native Cavalry (Regular and Irregular), Infantry (European, Native Regular and Native Irregular), Veterans, Medical establishment and European Warrant officers.

		<i>Total European. (British)</i>	<i>Total Native.</i>	<i>Grand Total.</i>
1853	Bengal	... 24,986	139,246	164,232
	Madras	... 11,370	53,787	65,157
	Bombay	... 10,577	45,312	55,889
		<hr/> 46,933	<hr/> 238,345	<hr/> 285,278
1854	Bengal	... 26,531	138,674	165,205
	Madras	... 11,172	53,254	64,426
	Bombay	... 9,443	44,921	54,364
		<hr/> 47,146	<hr/> 236,849	<hr/> 283,995
1855	Bengal	... 25,344	139,162	164,506
	Madras	... 10,927	53,031	63,958
	Bombay	... 9,822	44,898	54,720
		<hr/> 46,093	<hr/> 237,091	<hr/> 283,184
1856	Bengal	... 24,591	137,109	161,703
	Madras	... 10,352	53,201	63,553
	Bombay	... 10,158	44,911	55,069
		<hr/> 45,104	<hr/> 235,221	<hr/> 280,325
1857	Bengal	... 24,366	135,767	160,133
	Madras	... 10,726	51,244	61,970
	Bombay	... 10,430	45,213	55,643
		<hr/> 45,522	<hr/> 232,224	<hr/> 277,746

It is evident from the above statement that the total strength of the native troops in all the three Presidencies together during the period between 1852 and 1857 was the highest in 1852 and the lowest in 1857 and that the European troops during the same period numbered the largest in 1852 and the smallest in 1856. The ratio between the native and British troops, as deduced from the same statement, was less than 5 to 1 in 1852 and more than 5 to 1 between 1853 and 1857, the year of the commencement of the Mutiny. According to the computation of another authority (9) British India possessed as on May 10, 1857 an Army of 238,002 troops of whom 38,001 were Britishers and 200,001 natives, as would be supported by the following details :

(9) Vide George Dodd, op cit. pp. 208-209.

	<i>Europeans (Britishers)</i>	<i>Natives</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bengal Army	... 22,698	118,663	141,361
Madras Army	... 10,194	49,737	59,931
Bombay Army	... 5,109	31,601	36,710
	<hr/> 38,001	<hr/> 200,001	<hr/> 238,002

Thus the authorities, mentioned above, are at variance with one another with regard to their estimates of the total strength of the British Army on the eve of the Mutiny. (10) The combined strength of the British and native branches of the Indian Army on the eve of the Mutiny may be approximately estimated to have been in the neighbourhood of 300,000 men in round numbers (11) on the basis of the statements of different authorities, as cited above. Of this strength the majority was commanded by the sepoys. The disproportion between

(10) Besides the authorities indicated above there are others offering different estimates of the strength of the Army. According to Sir Richard Temple (*vide* The World's Great events Vol. VII pages 1-2) the native force numbered more than 2,47,000 men of all arms. Of these about 50,000 belonged to Madras, 30,000 to Bombay and the remainder to Bengal. As recorded by T. R. Holmes (*Vide* his article in the Cambridge History of India Vol. VI Chapter X page 172), at the close of Dalhousie's administration the native troops numbered 233,000 and the British troops, less than 46,000. The disproportion was increased in the same year in consequence of the Persian War. According to Sir William Lee Warner (*Vide* his Life of the Marquess of Dalhousie, Vol. II pp. 354-55, footnotes) the Indian Army contained 27,350 Queen's troops, 14,860 Company's European troops and 243,880 native regular troops in addition to 31,522 irregulars and 24,435 military police. The following strength of the British and Native soldiers of the Indian Army on the eve of the Mutiny is recorded in the Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. IV, p. 338.

BRITISH

	<i>Cavalry</i>	<i>Artillery</i>	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bengal	... 1,366	3,063	17,003	21,432
Madras	... 639	2,128	5,941	8,708
Bombay	... 681	1,578	7,101	9,360
	<hr/> 2,686	<hr/> 6,769	<hr/> 30,045	<hr/> 39,500

NATIVE.

	<i>Cavalry</i>	<i>Artillery</i>	<i>Sappers & Miners</i>	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Total</i>
Bengal	... 19288	4734	1497	112052	137571
Madras	... 3202	2407	1270	42373	49252
Bombay	... 8433	1997	637	33861	44928
Local Forces and Contingent	... 6796	2118	—	23640	32554
—Do—	... —	—	—	(Unclassified)	7756
Military Police	... —	—	—	—	38977
	<hr/> 37719	<hr/> 11256	<hr/> 3404	<hr/> 211926	<hr/> 311038

Grand total of British and Native troops—350,538. Thus the native troops outnumbered the British troops by nearly eight to one.

(11) This figure has been accepted by Kaye. Out of this strength, 40,000 were, according to him, British troops. *Vide* History of the Sepoy War. Vol. I. p. 341.

the strength of the British and that of the Native troops was glaring. During the five years preceding the departure of Lord Dalhousie from India there had been a vast extension of the British power in the country without any corresponding increase of the British element in the Indian Army. On the contrary the strength of the British soldiers in India as in 1852 had been reduced in 1856 by more than three thousand men. (12) Again, as already noticed, the native forces commanded an overwhelming numerical majority over the British troops. The disproportionate ratio between the two branches of the India Army will also be evident from a letter, dated Fort William May 19, 1857 (No. 168) from the Governor General of India-in-Council to the Court of Directors of the East India Company. In that correspondence it was stated that in the Bombay Army the ratio between the British and native troops was as 1 to 9-2/3, in the Madras Army as 1 to 16-2/3, while in the so-called Bengal Army the ratio was as 1 to 24-2/3. (13) The dangers of such a disproportion were aggravated by the ill-distribution of the British troops. As stated by J. W. Fortescue, "The number of the British troops was small and their distribution to the last degree faulty. There were some thirty six thousand British soldiers scattered over the vast territory of the British Empire from the Indus to the Irrawaddy.....On the immense line of communication between Calcutta and Peshawar the first British troops to be found were a single battalion at Dinapur... There were none at Banaras, none at Mirzapur and actually none at Allahabad.... There were only a depot of Infantry and a weak reserve company of artillery at Cawnpur, one weak battalion at Agra and actually none at Delhi.... There was no British garrison at Fyzabad, none at Bareilly, only a single weak battalion at Lucknow. At Meerut there were one regiment of cavalry—the carabineers, the first battalion of the 60th, two batteries and a company of artillery, all of them British. It was very obvious that in case of any rising the overwhelming of the little body at Meerut would signify the loss of Delhi, isolation of the petty garrisons at Agra, Cawnpur, and Lucknow and the severance of all communication between the capital and the Punjab." (14)

The disproportionate ratio between the British and native troops on the eve of the Mutiny and the ill-distribution of the former contributed largely to the great rising of 1857.

The principles underlying the recruitment and composition of the Sepoy Army prepared the ground in no less degree for the great upheaval of 1857. Early in the history of the sepoy recruitment the sepoys were indiscriminately recruited both from the high and low-

(12) As per the statement of Phillip Melville the European troops numbered 48,709 in 1852 and 45,104 in 1856. Evidently the European Army had been reduced in five years by more three thousand men. Vide pp. 65-66 ante.

(13) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857 paper No. 259, p. 9. The ratio between the Britishers and the natives in the Punjab Army was comparatively high. Vide Chapter IX.

(14) History of the British Army Vol. XIII (1852-1870). PP. 243-244. There was a handful of British artillerymen at the Banaras Cantonment. Vide Holmes op. cit., p. 219.

caste men. Subsequently it was decided by Government that except under special circumstances sepoys were not to be recruited from amongst inferior castes. (15) This decision naturally reacted adversely on the low-caste men, as, under the new military regulation, they were not to be admitted to the military service under the Company. Representations were thereupon made to the then Commander-in-chief, Sir J. F. Cradock for the revision of the aforesaid decision. The Commander-in-chief thereupon appointed a private committee composed of such high-ranking military officers as Major-General D. Campbell, Colonel Agnew and Lieutenant Colonel Munro to decide whether the low-caste recruitment should continue or not. The committee thought it unwise to prohibit the enlistment of the natives of low castes as sepoys categorically in consideration of the inevitable adverse reaction of the new military regulation on those low-caste sepoys who had already entered the military service under the East India Company. The committee, therefore, while recommending that the new military regulation, which forbade the enlistment of low-caste men as sepoys, should be annulled, considered it highly desirable that the native Army should be composed, as far as practicable, of men of superior castes, and proposed further that only such low-caste men should be enlisted as were connected with sepoys of respectable character. On the basis of the above recommendations of the special Committee it was finally resolved by Government that the military regulation which sought to prohibit the enlistment of the natives of low castes as sepoys should be annulled, and that it should be left entirely to the discretion of commanding military officers to enlist only such low-caste natives as were connected with sepoys, actually in service, or were of exceptional character. (16) It is evident, therefore, that the tendency was towards confining the sepoy recruitment to the high-caste natives of the country. In fact, Government made no secret of their sincere desire that the whole of the native Army should, as far as practicable, be composed of men of high castes. This principle of sepoy recruitment could not, however, be applied, immediately, without modification, to the composition of the native Infantry. But so far as the formation of the native Cavalry was concerned, the principle was to be rigidly enforced with immediate effect. In other words, the native Infantry might for the time being contain a certain percentage of low-caste sepoys, but the native Cavalry should invariably be maintained on a respectability of footing, that is, should be entirely of high-caste composition with immediate effect. One important consequence of this decision was to make the Indian Army almost homogeneous and patrician in form and structure. For many years before the Mutiny, sepoys were recruited from the upper-class peasantry of the country, usually from the Brahmin class, engaged in agricultural pursuits, almost entirely for the so-called Bengal Army, largely for the Madras Army and to some extent for the Bombay

(15) Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129. p. 2. The above decision was taken on January 19, 1807.

(16) Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129. P. 3.

Army. (17) The numerical superiority of the Brahmins in the Indian Army came in course of time to be looked upon with suspicion as being fraught with danger in respect of the maintenance of discipline in the ranks. Enlistment of an undue proportion of Brahmin sepoys came accordingly to be forbidden. On August 9, 1830 a circular letter No. 1600 was issued from the department of the Adjutant-General of the Army, discouraging the admission of Brahmin recruits into the Indian Army (18). Many Brahmins in the circumstances managed to get themselves enrolled in the military ranks under the inferior designation of Rajputs. A number of sepoys of the 59th Regiment, Bengal native Infantry introduced themselves as Rajputs at the time of their enlistment. They were subsequently detected to be Brahmins. The Governor-General of India-in-Council was then convinced of the impolicy of excluding Brahmins from military ranks and issued orders to the effect that hindrances to the admission of the respectable classes of the native community to the ranks of the Indian Army should cease to exist. (19) Consequently sepoys of high castes came to preponderate in the Indian Army, particularly in the Bengal and Madras Armies during the pre-Mutiny period.

Besides the issue of high and low-caste recruitment, there was another problem which also engaged the attention of Government. This was whether the recruitment of the native troops of one Presidency should remain confined to that Presidency alone or not. The Government of India did not favour the idea that the Army of one Presidency should be composed of sepoys, recruited from other Presidencies. On December 5, 1821 the Court of Directors ordered that the troops of the three establishments should be kept as distinct as possible, and that the recruitment of the Army of one Presidency should, as far as practicable, be confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the same Presidency. (20) The sepoys of the Madras and Bombay Armies enjoyed certain privileges which could not be enjoyed by those of the Bengal Army. In the case of indiscriminate mixing of the forces of the three Presidencies, the sepoys of the north had a fair chance of coming to know that certain privileges which were enjoyed by the sepoys of the south were denied to them. In the circumstances the northern sepoys would inevitably clamour for those privileges which they were not entitled to enjoy, much to the disturbance of discipline and order in the military ranks. To prevent such a possibility Government stood against the mixing of the sepoys of the three Presidency Armies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras.

When, in contravention of definite injunctions against indiscriminate recruitment of sepoys, the Government of Bombay proposed to send a recruiting party to Hindusthan to recruit sepoys from the north

(17) Sir George MacMunn—*op. cit.*, p. 14.

(18) Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129. p. 12.

(19) Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129. P. 12. The order was issued from Calcutta on 29/31.12.1834 by Lord William E. Bentinck and was concurred in by W. Blunt, H. Ross and W. Morison.

(20) Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129. PP. 4-5.

for the Bombay Army, their attention was drawn to the Court's orders, dated December, 5, 1821, which were already communicated to them. The Bombay Government stated in reply that they had not received a copy of the Court's orders and insisted on sending a recruiting party to Hindusthan with a view to recruiting about 200 Hindusthanee sepoy for each battalion of the Bombay Army. (21) Subsequently the Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India on September 11, 1828, pointing out 'the difficulties in the way of recruiting which would be occasioned by the Court's orders against resorting to territories of other Presidencies.' (22) It was also stated in the same correspondence that in cases of emergency the Bombay Government would be forced to recruit sepoy from Hindusthan and Central India. It was further stated in that correspondence that in times of peace it might be possible to keep the Bombay Army complete with the sepoy recruited from the areas, subject to the Bombay Government, but, when a large number of men were wanted to raise the Bombay Army from a peace-time to a war-time level as expeditiously as possible, recruitment from the territories of other provinces *i.e.*, provinces outside the jurisdiction of the Bombay Government would become indispensable. (23) In fact, the Court's ruling against the recruitment of forces by one Government from territories outside its jurisdiction could not always be strictly followed. Ordinarily, however, the sepoy of the Madras and Bombay Armies were recruited from the Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively. But the sepoy of the Bengal Army were not recruited from Bengal proper. The composition of the three native Presidency Armies had, indeed, much to do with determining their respective attitude towards Government during the Mutiny.

Each of the three native Presidency Armies had three branches, namely, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery. The caste-composition and areas of recruitment of the different branches of the Indian Army have been indicated in the paragraphs that follow.

Sepoy for the Bengal Native Infantry were recruited from Oudh, Bihar, the Ganges-Jumna Doab, Rohilkhand, Bundelkhand and from the Punjab after its conquest and annexation. (24) It was chiefly from Oudh that the sepoy for the Bengal Native Infantry Army were recruited. Though politically under the domination of the Muslim 'Raj', Oudh was peopled principally with the Hindus of Brahmin and Rajput origin. The Brahmins were of the agricultural and not of the priestly profession. The Rajputs were a valiant and martial class of people of Hindusthan. These Brahmins and Rajputs of Oudh furnished the bulk of the Bengal Native Infantry before the Mutiny. They had

(21) Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129. P. 5.

(22) Ibid P. 8.

(23) Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. 43 of 1857-58. Paper No. 129 P. 9.

(24) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. P. 172. As per the statement of Major-General Sydney Cotton Commanding the Peshawar Division, the districts of recruitment of the Bengal Native Infantry were Lucknow, Gorakhpur, Rohilkhand, Allahabad, Banaras, Jaunpur, Arrah, Agra and the Punjab. Ibid. P. 127.

reasons to be drawn to military service under the East India Company. 'Though clinging with the utmost tenacity to their ancestral fields, they disdained agriculture, and would not consent, unless pinched by severe want, to handle the plough. But doubtless, the poverty to which these classes were reduced by the rapacity of the Government (of Oudh) and Talukdars and the injustice from which they suffered led many to abandon their houses and seek foreign service.' (25) They sought service in the Indian Army to earn bread for themselves and for their dependants. In Oudh there was not a single agricultural family which was not represented by at least one of its members in the Indian Army. The recruiting authorities excluded Bengal as a centre of recruitment of the sepoys for the Bengal Army. The Bengal Army came accordingly to be composed of recruits obtained from other parts of India. (26)

As to the races, tribes and castes of which the Bengal Native Infantry Army was composed, the evidences, borne by certain military officers (27) before the commissioners, appointed to enquire into the reorganisation of the Indian Army after the suppression of the Mutiny, constitute an important source of information on the subject. The native Infantry of the Bengal Army was composed of Muhammadans, Brahmins, Rajputs, 'Gwallas' (Goalas), 'Kaits' (Kayasthas), 'Ahcers' (Ahirs) and Jats. After the conquest of the Punjab the enlistment of the Sikhs and the Punjabee Muhammadans and Hindus was allowed to the extent of 200 per regiment. A few low-caste men such as 'Malces' (Malis), 'Kachees' (Kachis), 'Malas', 'Gurrereas' (Gurias?) also had been enlisted in the ranks of the Bengal Native Infantry, (28) though such an enlistment was opposed to the letter of military regulations. Clause 6, section XXXI of the General Regulations of the Bengal Army, published in 1855, required a special care to be taken to exclude all men of inferior castes such as 'telees' (telis), 'gurrereas', 'lodhs', 'Kahars', 'Malees', 'Kachees' and others, habitually employed in menial occupations. (29) Eurasians and Christians were employed only as drummers and fifers.

Low-caste recruitment for the Bengal Army was not, however, absolutely unknown in the early phase of the rule of the Company in India. This is evident from the fact that the sepoys who fought under Robert Clive were chiefly low-caste men. But the recruiting authorities soon developed an abhorrence of the low-caste sepoys for the Bengal Army. It was quite in the fitness of things that the Bengal Army came in course of time to be largely composed of high-caste sepoys, not, of course, under any orders of Government but through the recruiting

(25) Gubbins—op. cit., p. 485.

(26) There was, however, one solitary exception. The gun-lashkars of the Artillery branch of the Bengal Army were recruited from lower Bengal.

(27) Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 71—papers laid before the Commission. P. 180.

(28) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 71—papers laid before the Commission. Pp. 180-181.

(29) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 61, papers laid before the Commission. P. 77.

officers' choice being confined to the cleanest and the most handsome-looking high-caste youngmen of the society. These high-caste recruits came to preponderate gradually over the low-caste ones in the so-called Bengal Army. Finally the custom became the rule and low castes came to be excluded from the Bengal Army as far as possible. (30) The commanding officers carried the custom of excluding low-caste men too far. The Bengal Army was not, however, absolutely free from low-caste association. As already noticed, a few low-caste men such as 'Malees', 'Gurrerecas', and others were employed in the Bengal Native Infantry, but such low-caste recruits were in the extreme minority. Majority of the sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry were recruited from the high castes of the Hindu society. (31)

The numerical majority of high-caste Hindu recruits in the ranks of the Bengal Infantry made it almost homogeneous in composition. The manner of recruitment produced a spirit of exclusiveness in it and made its members feel that they were bound together by a close family-tie. Again, amongst the high-caste sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry the Brahmin recruits enjoyed a position of undoubted influence

(30) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 71—paper laid before the Commission. P. 181.

(31) As stated by George Dodd in his History of the Indian Revolt (p. 27), 4/5ths of the Bengal Native Infantry were Hindus mainly of the Brahmin and Rajput castes, and the remainder belonged to the Muslim community. The numerical superiority of the Hindus over the Mussalmans in the Bengal Native Infantry is illustrated by the following caste-composition of 7 regiments (viz. 21st, 31st, 47th, 65th, 66th, 70th and 73rd) of the Bengal Native Infantry Army :

Non-Commissioned Rank and File.

Muhammadans	1170
Brahmins	1878
Rajputs	2637
Hindu of Inferior description	2057
Sikhs & Punjabis	54

7796

Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859—Appendix No. 22, papers laid before the Commission, p. 26. The above statement was issued from the East India House in September, 1858.

The following caste-composition of the 34th N. I. also points to the numerical majority of the Hindus over the Muslims in Bengal Native Infantry Army.

	Subahdar	Subahdar	Jamadar	Havildar	Naiks	Drummer	Sepoys	Total
Major								
Brahmins	... 1	2	4	24	10	...	294	335
Chuttrees	4	3	11	13	...	206	237
Hindus of Inferior description	1	2	14	13	1	200	231
Christians	10	2	12
Mussalmans	2	1	12	24	8	153	200
Sikhs	74	74
Total :	... 1	9	10	61	60	19	929	1089

Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857. Paper No. 270. Appendix to papers relative to the Mutinies in the East India. Inclosure I in No. 7. P. 151.

over the rest. This was due partly to their considerable numerical strength in the military ranks and partly to the reverential attitude of the people in general towards them in the caste-ridden Hindu Society. The Bengal Native Infantry, in fact, fell under the influence and control of Brahmanism. A low-caste Subahdar, for instance, when off duty, had to recognise the superiority of a Brahmin sepoy, though the latter belonged to the regiment under the former's military command. The Bengal Army was in reality under the grip of a 'Brahmanical clique'.

A few lines on the agency of recruitment of the Bengal Native Infantry, on the precautions of its registry and on its organisation in general may in this connection be of some interest. Generally there was no difficulty in obtaining recruits without special agency. Recruiting parties were deputed from time to time by the Commander-in-chief to recruit sepoys from district areas. Again, native officers and sepoys used to proceed on leave at intervals. At the time of reporting themselves for duty on the expiry of their leave they used to bring with them recruits in numbers. It often happened, again, that, when regiments were posted in certain localities, men came in flocks for enlistment.(32) On enlistment native officers were required to take each recruit to the 'tahsildar' of the village to which he belonged in order that the 'tahsildar' might enquire about his name, caste, parentage and residence and could make sure that the same were correctly stated. Lists of recruits with the tahsildar's signature thereon were then to be forwarded to the district officer, who, on being satisfied that the returns were formal and correct, prepared a nominal roll in a prescribed form for transmission of the same to the commanding officer of his regiment through the recruiting officers.(33) Thus were the new recruits obtained and registered.

As to the organisation of an Infantry regiment of the Bengal Army during the pre-Mutiny days, it was then composed of about 1000 privates, 120 non-commissioned officers and 20 native commissioned officers. It was divided into ten companies, each containing one-tenth of the above numbers.(34) When stationery, the Infantry regiments were quartered never in barracks but in ten lines or rows of thatched huts, one row for each company. In front of each row there was a small circular building in which the arms and accoutrements of that particular company were stored under the charge of a 'Havildar' or a native sergeant on duty. Promotion invariably went by seniority in the regiments of the Bengal Army, and by selection in the regiments of the Madras and Bombay Armies. By a gradual process a sepoy became a 'Naik' or cor-

(32) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 61—papers laid before the Commission. P. 77. Sitaram Pande in his 'Sepoy to Subahdar' writes that his uncle, who was a Jamadar in an Infantry battalion, had come home on leave for six months. On the expiry of the leave-period he took him (Sitaram) to Agra for enlistment in the Infantry ranks.

(33) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix 61. P. 77.

(34) Vide George Dodd. op. cit., p. 27. As stated by Durgadas Bandyopadhyaya in his *Bidroh Bangalee* (page 64), each Infantry regiment was divided into eight Companies. Each Company was composed of one Subahdar, one Jamadar, six Havildars, six Naiks, one European drummer and eighty sepoys.

poral; a 'Naik' was promoted as a 'Havildar' or a native sergeant; a 'Havildar' ranked as a 'Jamadar' or native Lieutenant and finally a 'Jamadar' was promoted as a Subahdar' or native captain. The Subahdar's rank was usually the highest rank, then attainable by a native in the Indian Army.

If the Hindus formed the bulk of the Bengal Native Infantry, the Mussalmans commanded majority in the Bengal native Cavalry. Three-fourths of the Cavalry branch of the Bengal Army were recruited from the Muslims of various descriptions such as Hindustanee Muhammadans, sheikhs, syuds, Mughals, Pathans, Rangars, and Afghans, while the remaining portion was composed of such castes and races as Rajputs, Sikhs, Rohillas, Jats and Brahmins.(35) The composition of the 7th Irregular Cavalry as on May 1, 1857 may be treated as indicating the usual numerical majority of the Mussalmans over the Hindus in the Bengal Native Cavalry. The composition stood as follows (36) :—

Muhammadans—Syuds and Pathans.	392
Muhammadan Rajputs (Rajasthanee Muhammadans ?)			82
Brahmins.	62
Rajputs.	28
Sikhs.	20
Hindus of inferior description.	2

Evidently the Muhaminadans were in the majority in the Bengal Cavalry Army. Low castes were usually excluded from the Cavalry branch of the Bengal Army. Indeed the usual practice was to keep Cavalry ranks closed to men of inferior castes, habitually employed in menial occupations. This Cavalry force was usually recruited from Rohilkhand, Delhi and the neighbouring areas. Such areas as Hansi, Hissar, Bulandshahr, Meerut, Moradabad, Karnal, Bareilly, Agra, Bharatpur, Farrukhabad, Mainpuri, Shahajahanpur, Patiala, Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, Kanpur and Lucknow were also recruiting centres of Cavalrymen for the Bengal Army.(37) Recruits for the Bengal Cavalry from these areas were obtained through the agency of native officers and sawars of the Cavalry regiments. Any existing member of a Cavalry regiment who wished a relation or friend of his to be enlisted brought him to the Adjutant and had his name entered in a list, called the 'Omedwar' list. Vacancies occurring, the Commander-in-chief selected the Cavalrymen from amongst those candidates whose names were already entered into the list.(38)

The Artillery branch of the Bengal Army like its Infantry and Cavalry branches was also composed of diverse races, tribes and castes, recruited from different areas. The native gunners were composed of Hindus and

(35) Parl. papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 65. papers laid before the commission. P. 134. Also Appendix No. 72 p. 208.

(36) Ibid. Appendix No. 72, p. 208.

(37) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII for 1859. Appendix No. 72. Papers laid before the Commission. P. 208.

(38) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII for 1859. Appendix No. 65. papers laid before the Commission. P. 134.

and Muslims, almost in equal ratio. In the troop of Major V. Coxe at Rawalpindee the proportion of the two races supplying the gunners for the Bengal Army stood as follows (39) :—

Muhammadans	52
Hindus	58
Brahmins	26
Rajputs	29
Inferior castes	3
			<hr/>
			58
			<hr/>
Total	110

The gun-lashkars were recruited from Muslims and low-caste Hindus.(40) The drivers were chiefly Muslims and less dignified classes of the Hindu society.(41) The gun-lashkars came from lower Bengal.(42) These recruits from lower Bengal were Muslims. Generally, however, the Artillery men were recruited from Oudh, the Doab region, Rohilkhand and Agra.(43) The recruits for the Artillery branch from these different areas were obtained not through any particular agency. Candidates seeking to be enrolled got their names registered in the 'Omedwar' list, and from among such registered candidates the selection was usually made.(44) Promotion in the Bengal Artillery was earned by seniority in service as in the Infantry Army. Promotion to the commissioned grades depended on the recommendations of the commandant of the Artillery regiment and of the Adjutant-General of the Army. Promotions to non-commissioned ranks were made by officers commanding brigades and battalions on the recommendations of officers commanding troops and companies. No native Artillery soldier who had been in service since 1826 was promoted, if he could not read and write one language at least.(45)

The Bengal Army with the solitary exception of the gun-lashkars of its Artillery branch was then composed of recruits obtained from areas outside Bengal proper. In the Infantry the Hindus formed the majority and the Muslims, the minority. The Infantry Army was an Army of aristocratic composition, its sepoy being recruited mainly from the upper-class Hindus. The Cavalry branch was composed mainly of the Muhammadans. So too was the Artillery. Not so exactly were the composition and structure of the Bombay and Madras Armies of the south. The two Southern Armies stood on a footing somewhat different from that of the Bengal Army.

(39) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. P. 20.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Ibid. Appendix No. 58. Papers laid before the Commission, p. 67.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Ibid. Appendix No. 61. Papers laid before the Commission, p. 86.

(45) Ibid. P. 87.

The Madras Army was originally intended to be composed only of Rajputs, Mussalmans, and the three Telugu castes—the Kamma Varu, the Razu and the Velama Varu.(46) The weavers and cultivators who were seldom found to make staunch sepoys were excluded from the ranks of the Madras Army.(47) To ensure attachment and harmony among the sepoys of the same battalion as also to create a spirit of emulation among several battalions it was proposed by the Madras Council that each sepoy battalion should be formed of men of the same caste and religion, either Mussalmans, Malabars or Gentoos.(48) The proposal, however, fell through. 'Thus the composition of the various Madras sepoy battalions depended entirely upon the accidental caste of the recruits who presented themselves for enlistment in the various regiments and upon the equally accidental results of the extensive drafting which took place on the formation of new battalions. What rules existed tended to be relaxed rather than to be tightened. Thus by a general order of the Commander-in-chief of 1839 it was laid down that all natives were eligible for enlistment without reference to caste, provided they were in all other respects perfectly fit for the service. After this, however, a new tendency set in. It was resolved to recruit in equal proportions from the four main classes viz Tamils, Telugus, Mussalmans and men of lower castes, but even so it was not intended to group any of these in any particular regiment but to divide them equally through the whole.' (49) In an order, dated December 3, 1857 (50) it was prescribed by Government that the Madras Native Infantry should be composed of the Tamil-speaking Hindus, Telugu-speaking Hindus, Muslims and low castes of the Madras Presidency, each class forming one-fourth of the total strength of the Madras Native Infantry Army.

The above proportion could not, however, be maintained because of the difficulty, experienced in obtaining the required number of Tamil sepoys. A circular was accordingly issued permitting the enlistment of Tamils and Telingas indiscriminately.(51) Among the Tamils or the Malabars and the Telingas or the Gentoos the Sudra class principally supplied sepoys to the Infantry branch of the Madras Army. The Tamil recruits were the real Madras Hindu sepoys and were considered better fighters than the Telingas (Gentoos) who were 'soft in constitution and heart and were incapable of undergoing hardships of war.' The Tamils or Malabars, though short in stature, were strong, active, courageous well-built and capable of sustained efforts in making long and continuous marches during campaigns. Both the Gentoos and Malabars were, however, docile and disciplined sepoys.(52) Besides the above mentioned

(46) Dodwell.—Sepoy recruitment in the old Madras Army, p. 14.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Ibid. P. 15.

(49) Ibid. PP. 15-16.

(50) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 65, Papers laid before the Commission. P. 127.

(51) The Calcutta Review. Vol. 33, Sept.-Dec. 1859. P. 130.

(52) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Papers connected with the re-organisation of the army in India, Supplementary to the report of the Army Commission. P. 104.

classes there were others composing the Madras Infantry such as Muham-madans, Brahmins, Rajputs, Marathas, Christians and pariahs. The Madras Infantry Army also included a few Hindusthanees, then commonly known as 'Bengalees', hailing from Oudh and the neighbourhood of Kanpur and Delhi. They were not the inhabitants of Bengal proper. Difficulties in securing good recruits within the limits of Madras Presidency once led to a suggestion being made for recruiting sepoy from Bengal for the Madras Army. Captain White who made the suggestion in 1795 was actually sent to Bengal for recruiting sepoy from amongst the inhabitants of the lower Gangetic area. He raised, in fact, 350 sepoy and 150 gun-lashkars from Bengal. But the Madras Government came soon to be convinced of the impolicy of recruiting sepoy from Bengal. The great and frequent desertion of the recruits from Bengal compelled the Madras Government to cease recruiting from that province any further. So the experiment of obtaining sepoy from Bengal for the Madras Army proved unsuccessful. Subsequently the recruitment of sepoy for the Madras Army came to be confined to the families, already settled in the South.(53)

The sepoy of the Madras native Infantry regiments were thus recruited from various castes, races and communities belonging to different areas of the Madras Presidency. The Muhammadan sepoy were recruited from various parts of the Presidency. The Telegu-speaking Hindu sepoy were obtained from the districts of the northern Circars, while the Tamil-speaking Hindu sepoy were recruited from the central and southern Carnatic, Mysore, Ceded districts, Madura, Tanjore, Tinnevely, Trichinopoly, Chingleput, north and south Arcot.

No race, tribe or caste was excluded from enlistment in the Madras Infantry by regulation. Recruits of diverse castes were mixed together in the Madras Infantry Army. The sepoy of the Madras Infantry regiments were usually recruited through the agency of both European and native officers who were deputed to go to districts with recruiting parties for the purpose of recruitment. Recruiting officers as also medical officers who were to certify the physical fitness of the new recruits maintained descriptive registers, showing the recruits' name, age, height, country, village, caste and such other particulars, and forwarded such registers each month to the commanders of the regiments concerned.

The castes and races of which the Madras native Infantry regiments were composed were not, however, represented in the ranks in equal proportions. This would be borne out by the following East India House records, dated September, 1858.(54)

<i>Castes and races</i>	<i>Native Officers</i>	<i>Countries of recruitment</i>	
Christians	... 4	Hindusthan	... 51
Muslims	... 584	Northern Circars	... 317
Brahmins & Rajputs	... 83	Central Carnatic Madras,	
Marathas	... 12	Vellore etc.	... 239

(53) Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

(54) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix 22. P. 26.

<i>Castes and races</i>	<i>Native Officers</i>	<i>Countries of recruitment</i>	
Telingas (Gentoos)	... 242	South Carnatic, Trichinopoly	... 177
Tamils	... 97	Baramahal	... 29
Other castes	... 8	Ceded districts	... 32
Indo-Britons	... 0	Mysore	... 59
		Tanjore, Madura & Tinnevely	... 119
		Deccan & Maharashtra	7
		Canara, Moulmein Jaulnah (Jalna) & Belgaum	x
		Portugal	... x
		Other parts	... x
Total ... 1,030		Total ... 1,030	

<i>Castes and races</i>	<i>Non-Commissioned Rank and File</i>	<i>Countries of recruitment</i>	
Christians	... 1,853	Hindusthan	... 1,938
Muslims	... 15,272	Northern Circars	... 16,938
Brahmins & Rajputs	... 1,922	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore etc.	... 8,841
Marathas	... 385	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	... 4,760
Telingas (Gentoos) (Telegu-speaking people)	... 15,371	Baramahal	... 1,022
Tamils	... 4,275	Ceded Districts	... 1,705
Other castes	... 1,616	Mysore	... 2,698
Indo-Britons	... 1,011	Tanjore, Madura, Tinnevely	... 3,617
		Deccan & Maharashtra	99
		Canara, Moulmein, Belgaum and Jaulnah (Jalna)	28
		Portugal	... 1
		Other parts	... 58
Total ... 41,705		Total ... 41,705	

The separate mention of Muslims and Christians in the above list of the non-commissioned rank and file obviously indicates that the Telegu and Tamil-speaking sepoys, mentioned therein, were all Hindus. The list showing the strength of the non-commissioned rank and file, therefore, establishes the fact of the numerical superiority of the Hindu sepoys over the Muslim ones in the Madras Infantry regiments before and during the Mutiny. The list of the non-commissioned rank and file together with the list of native officers also leads to such conclusions as the following : In the first place, there was then an extreme dispro-

portion between the strength of the Muslims as native officers and the strength of the Muslims as members of the non-commissioned rank and file. The Muslims commanded more than 50 p.c. of the native officers, but they stood far out-numbered by the Hindus in the non-commissioned rank and file. Secondly, the Telingas figured the largest in the non-commissioned rank, and the Telingas and Muslims together commanded majority of the rank and file as a whole. Thirdly, the Christians were proportionately weak in numbers. Still their presence in the regiments sufficed to frustrate secret combination among sepoys of other castes and to thwart the wicked designs of the disturbing elements in the ranks.

If in the Infantry regiments of the Madras Army the Hindus commanded majority over the Muslims, in the Cavalry the latter predominated over the former. The Madras Cavalry was principally composed of Muhammadans, Rajputs and Marathas, and was recruited from Hindusthan, northern Circars, Mysore, Arcot, Madras, Vellore, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Madura, Tinnevely, Baramahal, and Ceded districts.(55) In the Madras Cavalry, recruits from the northern provinces were very few in number.(56) No races, tribes or castes were excluded from

(55) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 22. Papers laid before the Commission. P. 26 and Appendix No. 65. P. 132.

(56) In the course of his replies to the questions on the reorganisation of the Indian Army Lt. General Patrick Grant stated on August 19, 1858 that the Madras Cavalry was composed 'by the latest return' in the following proportions :—

Muhammadans	2341
Rajputs	98
Marathas	324

Of these, only 23 were recruited from Hindusthan, 49 from Northern Circars; about 200 from Mysore; about 2036 from Arcot, Vellore, Madras etc.; about 300 from Trichinopoly and Tanjore and the rest from the Baramahal and Ceded Districts. Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII (House of Commons) of 1859 Appendix No. 65—papers laid before the Commission page 132.

The Muslims, then, came to form the bulk of the Madras Native Cavalry. Vide also the following East India House records, dated September, 1858.

Native Cavalry Officers

Muhammadans	...	68
Marathas	...	6
Rajputs	...	3
Indo-Britons	...	0

Total ... 77

Non-Commissioned Rank and File (Cavalry)

Christians	...	32
Muhammadans	...	1956
Rajputs	...	90
Marathas	...	300
Other castes	...	2
Indo-Britons	...	159

Total ... 2,539

Areas of recruitment of the Native Cavalry Officers

Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore etc.	...	64
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	...	7
Mysore	...	3

Areas of recruitment of the Non-Commissioned Rank and File

Hindusthan	...	22
Northern Circars	...	67
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore etc.	...	1,841

the Cavalry branch by regulation. For many years, however, service in the Madras regular Cavalry was considered as the birth-right of the Muhammadans of the Arcot district. The commanding officers were strongly in favour of recruiting Muhammadans for the Madras Cavalry. The Hindus consequently came to be almost excluded from the Madras Cavalry ranks.

The Madras Artillery was composed of Christians, Muhammadans, Hindus of Brahmin caste, Rajputs, Marathas, Telingas, Tamils, Indo-Britons and others. They were recruited from such areas as Hindusthan, northern Circars, Madras, Vellore, Trichinopoly, Baramahal, Ceded districts, Mysore, Tanjore, Madura and Tinnevely.(57)

As in Madras, so in Bombay the East India Company maintained a native Army and harnessed it to the chariot of British imperialism in India. It was in Bombay that the first native corps were trained and disciplined after European model. The Bombay sepoys had an average height of 5 feet 5 inches.(58) They were robust, hardy, capable of enduring fatigue and hardship even on a very simple diet, and devoted in a remarkable degree to the European officers.

As stated by Lord Elphinstone,(59) the then Governor of Bombay, the Bombay Native Infantry was chiefly composed of sepoys from the southern Konkan, the Deccan, Oudh and the neighbouring areas of Kanpur and Delhi. There were also Beluchees from Sind and Beluchistan, Bheels from Khandesh, hill-men from Gujarat and Koles from Nasik in the Infantry branch of the Bombay Army. The sepoys of the Bombay Native Infantry were recruited from amongst Brahmins, Rajputs, Marathas, Muhammadans, Purwarrees, Malabarees, Telingas, Jews and a few Christians and Sikhs.(60) The records of the East India House, dated September, 1858, disclose the following composition and the areas of recruitment of the Bombay Native Infantry : (61)

Contd. from p. 80

<i>Areas of recruitment of the Native Cavalry Officers</i>				<i>Areas of recruitment of the Non-Commissioned Rank and File</i>			
Tanjore, Madura and Tinnevely	...	1		Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	...	205	
Ceded districts	...	2		Baramahal	...	48	
				Mysore	...	212	
				Ceded districts	...	54	
				Tanjore, Madura & Tinnevely	...	90	
Total				77	Total		
					2,539		

Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. P. 26.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Macleod—op. cit, P. 71.

(59) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix no. 68—papers laid before the Commission, P. 15.

(60) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. PP. 50 and 71.

(61) Parl. papers, Vol. VIII of 1859. P. 27.—Appendix No. 22.

Native Officers.

<i>Castes and races.</i>		<i>Regions of recruitment.</i>	
Christians	... 5	Hindusthan	... 268
Muhammadans	... 111	Northern Circars	... 7
Brahmins and Rajputs	... 188	Central Carnatic, Madras,	
Marathas	... 116	Vellore &c.	... 37
Telingas	... 6	South Carnatic, Trichinopoly	13
Tamils	... 1	Deccan	... 57
Jews	... 3	Concon	... 173
Other castes	... 130	Mysore	... 4
Indo-British	... 0	Tanjore, Madura	
Purwarrees	... 3	& Tinnevelly	... 0
		Guzerat	... 4
	<hr/> 563		<hr/> 563

Non-Commissioned Rank and File.

<i>Castes.</i>		<i>Regions of Recruitment.</i>	
Christians	... 270	Hindusthan	... 11,089
Muhammadans	... 2,048	N. Circars	... 135
Brahmins & Rajputs	... 6,421	Central Carnatic, Madras,	
Marathas	... 7,980	Vellore &c.	... 412
Telingas	... 107	South Carnatic,	
Tamils	... 55	Trichinopoly	... 203
Jews	... 12	Deccan	... 1,820
Other castes	... 7,728	Concon	... 10,878
Indo-Britons	... 22	Mysore	... 36
Purwarrees	... 170	Tanjore, Madura &	
Mochees	... 29	Tinnevelly	... 33
Sikhs	... 28	Mysore & Punjab	... 28
		Guzerat	... 80
		Scinde, Punjab and	
		Rajputana	... 155
		Europe	... 1
	<hr/> 24,870		<hr/> 24,870

The Bombay Native Infantry Army was thus composed of men belonging to diverse areas and professing various religious beliefs. No particular race or tribe or caste was excluded from enlistment in the Bombay Native Infantry either by regulation or by practice except that the hangmen, sweepers and scavengers would not, on account of their calling, be accepted as recruits. (62) Though the feeling as to caste in the

ranks of the Bombay Army was liberal, other races or castes were unwilling to serve in the same corps along with hangmen, sweepers and scavengers. Generally commanding officers of the Bombay Army had a preference for some particular race or caste to which the recruiting of their regiment was, so far as lay in their power, confined. But this was purely a matter of personal preference, and the practice of one commanding officer was often reversed by his successor. Shortly before the Mutiny recruiting authorities of the Bombay Army had a tendency towards enlisting fine-looking, upper-class men of Hindusthan only. To counter this tendency orders were issued from time to time from Army Headquarters for the enlistment of sepoys from such particular races as the Beluchees and Sikhs. In general, however, the traditional policy of the authorities of the Bombay Army was to avoid having a large majority of men of one particular race or caste in a particular regiment.

After the outbreak of the Mutiny the Bombay system as to indiscriminate enlistment from any part of India for the Bombay Army was ordered to be stopped. A circular letter prescribed that recruits for the native regiments of the Bombay Army 'should be wholly drawn from the provinces under the Bombay Presidency'. (63) The circular could not, however, be strictly adhered to by the military authorities at the time of recruiting sepoys for the Bombay Army.

The Bombay Light Cavalry was composed chiefly of the Hindus of upper India and of the Marathas and Mussalmans from the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency. (64) The Bombay Irregular Cavalry was composed of nearly every race, tribe and caste in India and Central Asia. The Sind Irregular Horse was composed chiefly of men from Hindusthan, mostly Muhammadans, the agricultural and land-owning classes of the districts round Delhi, Furrukabad and the adjacent areas. (65)

As to the Bombay Artillery, the native gunners were chiefly men of Hindusthan proper. They hailed principally from the provinces of upper India and belonged to diverse castes. The Bombay Artillery contained a few Marathas also. The gun-lashkars were generally composed of low castes, Purwarrees and others from the Deccan and Konkan. The drivers were a mixture of all the races, tribes and castes of India but their recruitment was confined mostly to the limits of the Bombay Presidency. They were recruited from the Deccan, Konkan and Gujarat. Low castes were not recruited as gunners for the Bombay Artillery. There was, however, no bar to their joining the Bombay Artillery as gun-lashkars and drivers.

In addition to the three Presidency Armies there were the Punjab and Hyderabad Armies the constitution and structure of which, too, should be considered now.

(63) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. p. 71.

(64) Ibid. p. 77.

(65) Ibid. p. 82.

The Punjab Infantry Army was composed of the Muhammadans of such independent countries as Kabul, Kandahar and Swat beyond the Punjab frontier. It was composed also of the trans-Indus Muhammadan British subjects from Peshawar and Kohat as also of the cis-Indus Muhammadans. The Punjab Infantry also contained Sikhs, Gurkhas, Hindusthanees, the Dogra Rajputs (occupying the Jammu hills) and the Rajputs residing in the hills between the Ravi and the Sutlej. (66) The Hindus and Muhammadans occupying the lowest rung of society were excluded from the Infantry branch of the Punjab Army. There were also no Christians in the Punjab Infantry. Originally there were a few Eurasian Christians employed as fifiers and buglers in the Punjab Infantry. Subsequently they were removed therefrom.

The Punjab Cavalry was composed of Brahmins, Rajputs, Syuds and Pathans. (67) As to the districts of recruitment, Haryana and Rohtak furnished the Muhammadan and Rajput sepoys; Delhi, Meerut, Gurgaon and Rohilkhand furnished the Pathan sepoys. Brahmin recruits were supplied principally by Oudh, Kanpur and Allahabad. Low castes such as sweepers, Gujars, barbers were, in practice, excluded from the Punjab Cavalry.

The Punjab Army had also its Artillery branch which was composed of Sikhs, Punjabee Muhammadans and a few Hindusthanees. The Sikh recruits came from about Amritsar, and cis-Sutlej states. The Muhammadans of the Punjab Artillery were recruited from the Jhelum area, Lahore, Rawalpindee and Jullundur, while the Hindusthanees were enlisted chiefly from Oudh. (68)

As to the Hyderabad contingent, its Infantry branch was composed mainly of Mussalmans, Brahmins and Rajputs. (69) The men composing the Infantry regiments of the Hyderabad contingent were recruited from Hindusthan, generally. They were recruited from such areas in Hindusthan as Oudh, Delhi, Rohilkhand and Banaras. A certain percentage of the Mussalmans and Hindus was recruited from the Deccan also. (70) The Hindu recruits from Hindusthan predominated over other recruits in the Hyderabad Infantry in the ratio of three to one. (71) Officers commanding the Hyderabad Infantry regiments generally preferred high-caste men to low-caste ones out of fancy for the physical appearances of the former and from a general belief that they would make the best soldiers. Still no races or castes were excluded (72) from the Hyderabad Infantry regiments. Since the outbreak of the Mutiny, however, recruiting from Hindusthan came to be forbidden. Towards the close of 1857 orders were issued to stop recruiting men from Hindusthan for the Hyderabad contingent.

(66) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. p. 180.

(67) Ibid. p. 215.

(68) Ibid. P. 24.

(69) Ibid. P. 265.

(70) Ibid.

(71) Ibid.

(72) Ibid.

Ten per cent of the sepoys of the Hyderabad Infantry proceeded on leave each year. On the expiry of the leave-period, while returning from home to resume their duties, they were authorised by commanding officers to bring with them their relatives and friends for enlistment in the ranks. It was in this way that recruits were obtained for the Hyderabad contingent. (73)

The Hyderabad Cavalry was composed chiefly of Muhammadans such as Mughals, Pathans, Sheikhs, Syuds and Beluchees. Hindus formed a very small portion of the Hyderabad Cavalry. There were Sikh recruits but they were very few in number. (74) The recruits for the Hyderabad Cavalry were obtained principally from the Deccan. Delhi, Lucknow and Shahjahanpur also supplied recruits for the Hyderabad Cavalry. (75)

As to the composition of the Hyderabad Artillery, the gunners were recruited from among Mussalmans and Hindus. Many of the Hindu gunners were Brahmins by caste. (76). The gun-lashkars and drivers were recruited both from Hindus and Mussalmans. (77) Artillery recruits were usually obtained from the Deccan and Hindusthan. There were few Hindusthanecs among the drivers. (78)

These different divisions of the Indian Army the recruitment and composition of which both region-wise and caste-wise have been discussed above were not uniformly disposed towards Government during the Mutiny. While the Bengal Army revolted against Government, the Punjab Army opposed the mutineers. The Hyderabad contingent and the Bombay and Madras Armies remained, on the whole, loyal to Government during the Mutiny.

The sepoys of nearly the whole of the so-called Bengal Army rose in arms against Government in 1857, while their comrades in Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad and the Punjab espoused the cause of Government during the Mutiny. This difference in attitude on the part of the different divisions of the Indian Army towards Government during the Mutiny may be well accounted for. The composition of the Bengal Army, both region-wise and caste-wise, its caste-consciousness, its airs of superiority and its complaints against the 'bad faith' of Government—all these stamped it with a distinct character, undermined its loyalty to Government and encouraged a mutinous spirit in it. 'The Bengal Army consisting of 74 regiments of regular Infantry and 10 regiments of regular Cavalry and forming along with the irregulars, contingents and Artillerymen more than half of the Indian Army was the largest, the most compact, the most highly privileged, and by far the proudest section of the Company's forces in India.' With the exception of the

(73) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Pp. 265-266.

(74) Ibid, p. 261.

(75) Ibid.

(76) Ibid. P. 270.

(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid.

Sikhs and the Gurkhas the sepoys of the Bengal Army were recruited from a locality of comparatively narrow limits *viz.* the kingdom of Oudh and the adjacent areas. The recruits were mostly high-caste 'Brahmanical Hindus.' Men of low caste were excluded from recruitment as far as possible. Even the Muhammadans who commanded majority in the Cavalry ranks fell under the influence of Brahmanism. On the point of caste they thoroughly sympathised with the Brahmin sepoys. Thus firmly under the grip of orthodox Brahmanism, the sepoys of the Bengal Army were extremely caste-conscious and prone to extreme violence, when their religion and caste-prejudices were slighted or given offence to. The fact of this pride of caste which was a characteristic feature of the sepoys of the Bengal Army was not unknown to the military authorities who often sought to cajole them into submitting to discipline by pandering to their caste-prejudices. It was not an unusual sight that 'a low-born officer was crouching before his subordinate Brahmin sepoy in abject submission, when off parade'. The Bengal Army was further sought to be flattered by granting it the privilege of being engaged in home service only, in order that there should be no loss of caste through the necessity of crossing the 'black water' for foreign service. Concessions such as these only helped the growth of indiscipline in the ranks of the Bengal Army. The Bengal Army consisting of no less than 81 regiments, spread over a vast extent of territory, could not be properly supervised by one Commander-in-chief. It took him no less than six months to visit only 12 military stations out of some 60 or 70. This fact further accounts for the undermining of discipline in the Bengal Army. The decline of discipline among the sepoys of the Bengal Army gave an impetus to the spirit of revolt among them. The sepoys of the Bengal Army were dissatisfied with their own condition. They had long resented the system of their promotion by seniority, introduced since 1796. Commanding officers of Bengal regiments had no power to promote any man to a higher rank without representing the fact to the Commander-in-chief. It often happened that a regiment was suddenly transferred from the command of an experienced native officer to that of a novice, sent out from England to gather experience as a commanding officer of a native corps. 'The youngest English ensign, perhaps a heedless boy, received promotion before any native, however old and tried in the service. Hence arose the custom of paying no attention to the merits of the natives as a spur to promotion, allowing seniority to determine the lift from one grade to another.' (79) Promotion by seniority in the Bengal Army was not only customary but also statutory. The military regulations (Section LIV) directed that 'in all recommendations for promotion the fullest consideration and attention should invariably be given to the claim of seniority in every grade, where no such disqualifications as want of respectability of character or other equally proper and just cause of objection to the advancement of the seniors should exist; and to enable general officers and brigadiers to enforce the strictest observance of the regulations on this subject, commanding officers of corps, in promulgat-

(79) George Dodd—*op. cit.*, p. 24.

ing promotions made by them in regimental orders were required at the same time to publish the names of those, passed over, and the causes of their supersession.' (80) Promotion under the system of seniority was invariably a delayed affair. Usually a sepoy entered service at the age of 16. He could not normally hope to become a 'Naik' (a corporal) before he attained the age of 36, a 'Havildar' (a native Sergeant) before 45, a 'Jamadar' (a native Lieutenant) before 54 and a Subahdar (native Captain) before 60, (81) when he was already a grey-headed man with one foot in the grave. In fact, by the time a sepoy reached the age of 50 'the blood in his veins and the marrow in his bones were dried up or wasted by constant exposure to the trying climate of India: his energies were relaxed, his memory impaired, and in governing and controlling the men who were especially under his surveillance in the lines he could be of but little use to his European superiors.' (82) Naturally, therefore, the provision of promotion through seniority was damaging to the career of a promising and ambitious sepoy. 'Though he might give signs of the military genius of a Haidar, he knew that he could never attain the pay of an English subaltern and that the rank to which he might attain after some thirty years of faithful service would not protect him from the insolent dictation of an ensign, fresh from England. (83)

The sepoys of the Bengal Army had also to complain against the 'bad faith' of Government towards them. Colonel Malleeson explains this bad faith to mean such actions of Government as the following: 'annexation of territories; refusal to the Hindu Chiefs (childless princes of Native states) the permission to adopt; suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex rules to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, Saugor, the Narbada territory and Bundelkhand; breaches of customs more sacred to the Indian people

(80) Parl. Papers. Vol. VIII of 1859. Appendix No. 61. papers laid before the Commission, p. 81.

Lord Dalhousie characterised the qualification of seniority as 'the bane of the Indian Service'. On June 21, 1851 he wrote as follows:—

"The claims of old officers stand high but the interests of the state are above all, and ought to be, paramount in the eyes of those who are entrusted with the charge of them. No system can prevent the intrusion of occasional incapacity or inefficiency among officers who hold regimental command. A rigid system of seniority must of necessity increase the probability of such deficiencies and must multiply instances of them.... I have therefore to record my strong opinion that, while the claims of seniority should always have their full weight, they should be less deferred to than they have been; and that in the appointment of officers to divisional and brigade commands the governing principle should not be as hitherto—the rejection of no man unless he is notoriously and scandalously incapable, but rather the selection of no man, whatever may be his standing, who is not confessedly capable and efficient." Evidently Dalhousie was a strong advocate of efficiency as the main criterion for consideration at the time of promotion in military service. Sir William Lee-Warner—op. cit., II, p. 287.

(81) Sitaram Pande 'in his Sepoy to Subahdar' writes that he entered the service of the East India Company as a sepoy, when he was 17 and that he was promoted to the rank of a Subahdar, when he attained the age of 65.

(82) The Red Pamphlet. P. 5.

(83) Holmes—op. cit., P. 51.

than laws.' (84) Some specific cases of the breaches of faith are cited here. Government, for instance, stopped the batta or the field allowance in course of time for the sake of financial economy. Secondly, Lord Dalhousie had ordered a regiment, stationed at Barrackpur, to proceed to Burma during the Burmese War, though that regiment was not a general service regiment. The regiment refused to start for Burma, and Dalhousie was forced to submit. 'For the first time in the history of India the orders of the Governor-General had been successfully resisted.... The blow to the discipline of the Army was...deadly.' Thirdly, the annexation of Oudh, the home of the Bengal Army, violently shook the faith of the sepoys in the honesty and justice of Government. After the story of the greased cartridges was known, nothing could check the Mutiny of the Bengal Army 'which was but a body of mercenary troops, paid by the East India Company to serve foreign interests, and recruited from amongst races, conquered and held in subjection by the sword.' 'If Queen Victoria engaged in an attempt of governing Ireland by the help of a Romish native army, swarming with Jesuits and officered by Protestants, she would have been in a situation somewhat similar to that of the East India Company, relying on a Brahmanic Bengal Army for the security and stability of their Empire.' (85)

The story was otherwise with the other two Presidency Armies, those of Madras and Bombay. These two Armies remained, on the whole, quiet for reasons stated below. The Bombay and Madras Armies were neither recruited exclusively from one particular area nor were composed mainly of high-caste sepoys. The result was that the two Armies could not have homogeneous composition under Brahmanic preponderance like the Bengal Army. In the Bombay and Madras Armies men of different castes fraternized with one another and remained tranquil. There could be no Mutiny where Brahmanism did not prevail. In those two Armies no individual element was permitted to preponderate to such an extent as to break discipline in the ranks. The Bombay and Madras Armies had been indiscriminately composed of Hindus, Muhammadans, Jews and of Christians too. Because of such discordant and heterogeneous materials entering into the composition of the two Armies chances of united action for Mutiny were invariably eliminated. Though the Bombay and Madras Armies were of a heterogeneous stuff, there was, however, no lack of harmony in the ranks. A guard of the Madras Army, drawn up in line before proceeding on duty, had, for instance, the following caste-composition :

'The right-hand man was a Rajput from Oudh ; next to him stood a Chuckler (tanner) from Madras whose proximity elsewhere would have been a pollution ; on his left stood a Mahomedan of strict belief and old family ; the last in the line being a Tamil soodra from the southernmost district of India ; the whole was commanded by a native

(84) Vide the Indian Mutiny of 1857-59. Vol. V Pp. 282-83.

(85) The Calcutta Review. Vol. XXIX, July-December 1857. P. 417.

Christian.' (86) In spite of such a caste-composition there was perfect harmony maintained in the line. A guard of the Bengal Army could not be of such a caste-composition as above. The Bengal Army was homogeneous in formation and was, therefore, prone to be disobedient and insubordinate in conduct, while the Madras and Bombay Armies were heterogeneous and therefore, loyal to the hand that fed them. The loyalty of the two Southern Armies was due also to the presence of a certain percentage of Christians in the ranks. The presence of Christians in the regiments of the Bombay and Madras Armies proved a deterrent to the secret combination of the sepoys for maturing plans of conspiracy against Government. The loyalty of the southern Armies was no less due to the fact that these were not so much caste-conscious as the Bengal Army was. With the exception of six or seven regiments the Bengal Army was enlisted for service within India. This privilege was granted to it because of its caste-prejudices against crossing the sea. But caste-prejudices were very thin on the sepoys of the Bombay and Madras Armies. They were even ready to embark in foreign service. They were, in fact, levied for general service and were required to proceed on foreign duty like the British troops. In the ranks of the Madras Army there was a free intercourse among the sepoys of various castes, high and low. During parade a high-caste Hindu sepoy of a Madras regiment had to stand in the line not unoften between a pariah and a Chuckler. (87) In the Bengal Army the high-caste sepoys always carried with them the pride of their respective castes, but in the Madras Army the sepoys one and all looked upon themselves as belonging to one caste, 'Sipahee-Ka-Zat' or soldier's caste. (88) There was no admission of social superiority of a sepoy of high caste over a sepoy of low caste in the Madras Army. 'It attained the value of an axiom that in the Madras Army the fact of being a fellow-soldier levelled all distinctions.' (89) It would not, however, be correct to hold that the civil population of Madras whether before or during the Mutiny was free from caste-prejudices. The civil class people of Madras had, in fact, their own prejudices. But the Sepoys of the Madras Army like their Bombay comrades were, while on military duty, above caste-prejudices. It may also be stated in this connection that the separation of the sepoys of the Bengal Army from their families favoured the growth of indiscipline among them in the pre-Mutiny days. It was then urged that the presence of the family afforded the best guarantee for the fidelity and good conduct of the sepoys. Their wives, children and other dependants present with them in garrisons were powerful checks on and effective safeguards against their disciplinary conduct. The sepoys of the Bengal Army were not accompanied by their families. (90) The consequence was that, as is often argued, they were

(86) The Calcutta Review Vol. 33, July-Dec. 1859; pp. 144-145.

(87) A low-caste in southern India—a tanner or cobbler.

(88) The Calcutta Review. Vol. 33 July-Dec. 1859. PP. 144-145.

(89) Ibid.

(90) It was a practice with the sepoys of the Bengal Army to visit their families at home at stated intervals. Any failure in this respect earned them reproach from their relatives in their native villages. In order that they might avail themselves

left free to weave the web of conspiracy against Government. But the Madras Army and partially the Bombay Army, too, were accompanied by their families to different cantonments with the result that they remained peaceful and loyal to Government in the interest, at least, of their wives and children with them. 'The fact of the Bengal sepoys being bachelors or, if married, living apart from their families, though not a cause of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, was still one of the principal evils in the condition of the Army, and permitted so reckless an exhibition of the bad faith.' (91) It was believed that the Infantry of the Hyderabad contingent though composed of Hindusthanees and exposed to evil influences could remain perfectly staunch during the Mutiny only because the sepoys of the Infantry Army had their families with them. (92) 'In the Madras Army bachelorhood was always advanced as a cause of any piece of folly or wickedness, which a sepoy might commit; his being married, was always cited as a test of trustworthiness.' (93) Again, if seniority as a qualification for promotion left the Bengal Army highly dissatisfied, promotion by the test of merit kept the Madras and Bombay Armies highly satisfied with and attached to Government. Their attachment to Government was further encouraged by their dislike of the Bengal Army with its airs of superiority.

Of the three divisions of the Indian Army, the so-called Bengal Army, as the foregoing paragraphs would show, was the most infected with the virus of the Mutiny. In fact, the Mutiny began with the rising of the sepoys of the Bengal Army. The Mutiny, I am inclined to hold, was not inevitable. But for the bungle of Government it might have been averted. The Bengal Army formed by itself more than half of the Indian Army. And yet Government could not control this Bengal Army by harnessing it to strict military discipline. Neither could Government anticipate the danger inherent in the policy of maintaining a low percentage of British forces in India. Had there been a sufficiently large British Army in the country, the sepoys would have thought twice before rising in arms in 1857. But that was not to be. The maintenance of a wide disparity between the strength of the British Army and that of the Sepoy Army in India, and the failure to check the growth of indiscipline in the ranks of the Bengal Army are surely indicative of maladministration in the Military Department before the Mutiny. The bungle of Government in the administration of the Army in the pre-1857 days was fraught with danger to the future stability of the British Empire in India. There came, indeed, a time at last, when 'the cable snapped under an increasing pressure of tide and current and an extraordinary strain of tempestuous weather.' The Mutiny which might have been averted came to break out at length due to the bungle of Government in the Army administration.

of their leave periods for this purpose, they preferred military service nearer home to serving abroad, i.e., out of India.

(91) The Calcutta Review. Vol. 33 July-Dec. 1859. P. 147.

(92) Ibid.

(93) Ibid.

CHAPTER V

TERRITORIAL ARISTOCRACY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE MUTINY

The Mutiny of 1857 though originating with the sepoys did not remain confined to them only. When the Mutiny broke out through the initiative of the sepoys, a certain percentage of the landed and territorial aristocrats such as the princes, land-owners, chieftains and talukdars hailed the revolt of the sepoys with glee and joined them in common opposition to Government. The Mutiny gave them an opportunity to strike a blow towards recovering their former status, powers and privileges of which they were deprived by Government. Such landed and territorial aristocrats as were opposed to Government, it may be mentioned at the outset, were in the minority. Majority of the landed and territorial aristocracy were then in favour of Government.

The triumph of feudalism towards the close of the Mughal rule in India created a number of states under the control of native princes, independent of the central authority in Delhi. The independent existence of such Native states was found by the British Government of India to be incompatible with the consolidation of the British power and with the establishment of a centralised administration in the country. A policy was accordingly pursued by Government towards bringing the Native states under its political control. Lord Wellesley's policy of Subsidiary Alliance succeeded in bringing under the control of the British Government of India a number of Native states such as Mysore, Hyderabad, Oudh, Tanjore, Surat and the Carnatic. Wellesley also forced the Peshwa Baji Rao II to acknowledge the British paramount power and practically dissolved the Maratha confederacy. The policy initiated by Lord Wellesley was abandoned by his three immediate successors, Lord Cornwallis, Sir George Barlow and Lord Minto but was revived by Lord Hastings. It was a policy of partial or complete annexation of Native states to the British Indian Empire. During the administration of Lord Dalhousie the policy of annexation was pursued more systematically than ever before. He sought to justify the annexation of states by his 'Doctrine of Lapse' and by the principle of 'the good of the governed'. In a minute on the famous Satara question Dalhousie wrote: 'I take this fitting occasion of recording my strong and deliberate opinion that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy the British Government is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves; whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural, where the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the Government being given to the ceremony of adoption according to Hindu

law... Where the right to territory by lapse is clear the Government is bound to take that which is justly and legally its due and to extend to that territory the benefits of our sovereignty, present and prospective. In like manner, while I would not seek to lay down any inflexible rule with respect to adoption, I hold that on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be made to lapse and the adoption should not be permitted, excepting in those cases in which some strong political reason may render it expedient to depart from this general rule.' (1) Such was the enunciation of Dalhousie's favourite Doctrine of Lapse. It may be mentioned in this connection that it is an article of religious faith of the Hindus that the childless should adopt sons for the salvation of their souls after death. The principle of Adoption had a political side too. Childless princes of Native States used to adopt sons also for perpetuating their dynasties. Lord Dalhousie hailed from a society where no such custom of Adoption was in vogue. He could not, therefore, appreciate its religious and political significance and declared, as stated above, that 'on all occasions where heirs natural should fail, the territory should be made to lapse and the adoption should not be permitted.' Consequently, when the rulers of the states of Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi and Sambalpur died without leaving natural heirs to succeed them, those states were declared to have lapsed to Government. This high-handed action had its natural reaction. Rebellion broke out in Sambalpur where the principal leader of insurrection was Surandar Sahi. Jhansi rose in revolt in protest against the annexation policy of Government. The rebellion of Jhansi was eventually led by Lakshmi Bai, the childless Queendowager of the state. In Satara and Nagpur the people stood highly disaffected and were inclined towards joining the mutineers in opposition to Government. Replying to a Minute, dated January 28, 1854 by Lord Dalhousie Colonel J. Low made the following observations on the reaction of the annexation policy of Government :

"I think it right.....to record my knowledge of the fact that the confidence of our native allies in our good faith has been a great deal shaken by some of the events of late years and especially so by our conquest and occupation of Scinde, our attack upon Gwalior and our annexation of Sattara ; and it seems to me in the highest degree desirable that we should now endeavour by our acts towards the Native States generally to remove from the minds of those princes their present feelings of uncertainty and distrust and not to run the risk of exasperating such feelings into deep-rooted discontent with their own condition and prospects and in many cases into a hatred of British rule."

(1) Holmes.—*op cit.* p. 35. It may be mentioned in this connection that Dalhousie meant to confine the application of the Doctrine of Lapse to 'dependent' states, that is, states which were created by the British Government or were held on a subordinate tenure. In annexing the states of Nagpur, Satara and Jhansi Dalhousie based his decisions on the fact that no direct heirs existed to inherit the states which were moreover 'dependent'. The Governor-General, on the other hand, refrained from interfering in Hyderabad and Bahawalpur on the ground that these were 'independent' states, that is, states not created by the British Government. Vide the *Camb. Hist. of India*. Vol. V. PP. 581 and 586.

"So soon as the permanent annexation of Nagpur shall be known in the Deccan, Gujrat, Malwa, Rajputana and Bundelcund, there will assuredly be throughout those extensive territories much of the dread and discontent...engendered which cannot be removed without many years of moderation on our part from the minds of the native rulers, generally speaking; but, of course, in an especial degree, from the minds of those who are without sons of their own to succeed to their respective principalities."

"Unfortunately the evil effects which will be produced by such feelings as those above described will not be confined to want of useful co-operation with us on the part of those princes. Many of these men ...will be more cruel and extortionate than ever they were before, if they have no legitimate sons and have consequently every reason to fear that there will be no lands to leave behind them for their widows and other members of their families."

"Every native prince so situated will naturally become more indifferent than ever he was previously about the general prosperity of his dominions, when he shall have reason to believe that at his own death these territories will pass away for ever into the hands of a foreign power."

"In my conversation with the natives, when I was in Rajputana, ...numerous persons...showed me very clearly that they thought it (the annexation of Sattara) a case of might against right and all expressed an earnest hope, evidently accompanied by some dread in their minds to the contrary, that a kind providence would save the Rajput families from such disgrace and disaster."

"When I went to Malwa in 1850, where I met many old acquaintances, ...I found those old acquaintances speak out much more distinctly as to their opinion of the Sattara case, so much so that I was on several occasions obliged to check them."

"It is remarkable that every native who ever spoke to me respecting the annexation of Sattara asked precisely the same question viz. 'what crime did the late Rajah commit that his country should be seized by the Company?'"

"...I mention these facts...in justification of my belief that, as soon as the annexation of Nagpur shall be known, similar question will be anxiously asked by natives all over India, and no human being will be able to answer to their satisfaction."

"...I fear that a large proportion of the people will forget the injustice and oppression which they often suffered under their native rulers and would magnify the annoyances to which they will occasionally be subjected from the strictness of our general system and from the arrogance and petty tyranny of native official servants under our officers, which last is a species of evil that no exertions on our part can prevent." (2)

The absorption of the states of Nagpur, Jhansi, Sambalpur and Satara could not fully satiate Dalhousie's passion for annexing Indian territories. He planned to annex the state of Karauli in Rajputana in pursuance of the Doctrine of lapse, but the Court of Directors decided that the 'policy was inapplicable to Karauli which was not a dependent state but a protected ally'.⁽³⁾ Dalhousie's plan fell through. He also turned to the Nana Saheb, who was the adopted son of the Peshwa Baji Rao II. When Baji Rao died childless in 1852, Dalhousie held that the late Peshwa's pension 'being personal terminated with his death'. In other words, the Governor-General decided that the pension would not continue in favour of the Nana Saheb. This decision of Government reacted adversely on the Nana Saheb.

In 1856 Oudh was annexed. The ground of annexation was its increasing misgovernment. Since Lord Wellesley's treaty of 1801 with Oudh the internal condition of the kingdom grew worse partly on account of the incompetence of the Nawabs but mainly due to the operation of the Subsidiary Alliance of Wellesley. Sir William Sleeman who was the British Resident at Lucknow between 1849 and 1856 duly reported to Government about the growing deplorable condition of Oudh. Sleeman was succeeded by Sir James Outram as Resident early in 1856. Outram's reports on the internal condition of Oudh also fully confirmed his predecessor's statements on the internal affairs of the kingdom. On the question of the annexation of Oudh Sir William Sleeman could not, however, agree with Dalhousie and the Court of Directors. While Sleeman was opposed to annexation, the Court of Directors was in favour of it. Dalhousie also held that 'so far as the people of Oudh were concerned, annexation would be by far the best course to take'. At last, in 1856 Oudh was actually annexed 'for the good of the governed.' Nawab Wazid Ali Shah was declared deposed and sent down to Calcutta to spend the rest of his life there on a pension of 12 lakhs of rupees per year. The annexation was followed not only by a sudden change of Government in Oudh but also by a change in the land-holding and land-revenue arrangement in the kingdom. Prior to the annexation the landed-proprietors in Oudh were known as talukdars. The talukdar was the holder of a taluk or a group of villages and was responsible in the capacity of a 'middle man' for the collection of revenue from the villages under his charge and for the payment of the required amount of revenue to Government. The talukdar had no right to property. In fact, the talukdari right or the right of collection of revenue was quite distinct from the zemindari right or proprietary right in the soil. The talukdar's right was the right to 'all the just rents paid by the actual occupants (of land) after the satisfaction of the Government claims. His property was the rent minus the revenue of a particular estate'. The talukdars possessed forts and maintained small armies for the protection of their 'taluks'. After the annexation of Oudh these talukdars came to be deprived of their occupation as middle men or hereditary revenue-contractors, and the land-revenue arrangement was

(3) Camb. Hist. of India. Vol. V. P. 583.

made with the actual occupants of the land viz., the village communities. With their rights to villages abolished and their forts demolished, the talukdars stood reduced to poverty by the post-annexation revenue-arrangement of the British Government in Oudh. The inevitable reaction of the policy of Government was the complete estrangement of the talukdars during the Mutiny. As stated by Edwin Arnold (4) 'during our brief rule in Oudh before 1857 we took the very breath away from the talukdars by our disgusting accuracy in accounts and painfully correct administration; so that when the rebellion broke out there were not a half-dozen of them in our favour'. As the talukdars lost their occupation, their retainers also became unemployed. Again, with the deposition of the Nawab the soldiers formerly in his pay came to be disbanded.(5) These unemployed talukdars and their retainers as also the discharged native soldiers of Oudh naturally turned into sworn enemies of Government during the Mutiny. The reaction of the annexation of Oudh on the sepoys was perhaps the most adverse. Oudh was a rich centre of recruitment of the sepoys of the so-called Bengal Army. The sepoys hailing from Oudh naturally received a rude shock, when they heard of the annexation of their dear home-land to the British Indian Empire. Consequently they set their faces against Government. The anti-Government attitude of the sepoys from Oudh came in no time to be shared by the rest of the sepoys of the so-called Bengal Army. Sleeman forewarned the Government in vain that the annexation of Oudh would produce disaffection in the ranks of the native Army. When the Mutiny broke out at last, the disaffected talukdars, retainers and sepoys of Oudh rose in revolt against the British Government which had thus to face a serious opposition in that kingdom.

It is significant to study here the attitude of the landed and territorial aristocrats and of the middle-class people towards Government in different areas of the country during the Mutiny. Both the Rani of Jhansi and the Nana Saheb of Bithur had grievances against Government in the pre-Mutiny days. When, however, the Mutiny broke out, the Rani at first sought to maintain cordial relations with Government. Eventually, however, circumstances forced her to rise in arms against Government.(6) The Nana Saheb also ultimately declared himself against Government.(7) In Nagpur, Satara and Hyderabad the people stood disaffected and were disposed towards joining the mutineers but their rulers remained faithful to Government in their own interest and prevented their subjects from breaking out into revolt. Sindhia of Gwalior was friendly to Government, though his subjects were almost to a man against Government. His Prime Minister, Dinkar Rao had no love for the British; still he was in favour of 'a loyal policy' towards Government.(8) Holkar was, on the whole, loyal. The Rajas of

(4) Dalhousie's administration of British India, Vol. II, p. 376.

(5) Vide pp. 41-42 ante.

(6) Vide Chap. IX.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Kaye & Malletson—op. cit., V., p. 294.

Patiala and Jhind were in favour of Government and placed Sikh levies at the disposal of Government during the Mutiny. Princes of almost all the states in Rajputana were loyal to Government.⁽⁹⁾ The Rajas of Dewas, the Nawab of Jaura and Sikandar Begum of Bhopal in Central India were all loyal to Government. The same loyal feeling as among the princes and chiefs in Rajputana and Central India prevailed among the chiefs in Western India excepting the South Maratha territory. The chiefs of Mysore, Travancore and Cochin in the South displayed similar feelings of loyalty towards Government during the Mutiny. The Nizam of Hyderabad was faithful. The Government of Nepal, then virtually under the control of Jung Bahadur, was friendly to the British ruling authority in India. Maharaja Golab Singh of Kashmir was in favour of Government. The Raja of Rewah was loyal. Rulers of Native States enjoyed the protection of Government against internal disturbance and external aggression. They were also to receive British Residents at their courts. So, when the Mutiny broke out, they espoused the cause of Government. Rulers of a very few Native states were driven into rebellion during the Mutiny as a result of the annexation policy of Government. But majority of the rulers or territorial aristocrats of the country were then favourably disposed towards Government. The attitude of the landed aristocrats towards Government during the Mutiny also merits a careful study. Their attitude was largely determined by the land-revenue system, introduced by Government in the country during the years preceding the Mutiny. In such areas as Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Banaras, where Permanent Settlement was introduced, the zemindars had no doubt to suffer much at first from the cruelty of the Sale Law which provided for the sale of zemindaries by auction as a penalty for the failure to pay the stipulated revenue to Government in time. Many of the ancient landlords unable to realise rents from the cultivators could not pay their dues to Government and became defaulters. They were accordingly forced under the Sale Law to part with their lands to new proprietors. These new landlords as also those old ones who succeeded in standing the first financial strain stood to gain much ultimately from the Permanent Settlement. They looked on the Permanent Settlement as the Magna Carta of the landed aristocracy. It was, therefore, natural for Government to expect a friendly response from the landlords of the permanently settled areas during the Mutiny. In fact, when the Mutiny broke out, the Raja of Banaras came forward to help Government against the mutineers. The zemindars, talukdars and other classes of people of Uttarpara, Bhadrakali, Koterung, Konnagar and of the adjacent areas submitted to Government a memorial in which they conveyed their loyalty and expressed their deep sense of sorrow at the melancholy events of the Mutiny. In the same memorial they thanked Government for the strong and adequate measures, adopted to put down the Mutiny, and prayed that a company of European Infantry should be posted at Serampur and that a Police battalion of 500 men be raised

(9) Vide Chapter IX.

for their protection against the mutineers. They hoped that by prompt and decisive measures the Mutiny would soon be put down in the North-Western provinces much to their relief.⁽¹⁰⁾ In an address to Lord Canning the rajahs, zemindars, talukdars, merchants and other classes of people in Bengal assured Government of their loyalty to them and conveyed their warmest congratulations on the success of Government in the battle of Delhi.⁽¹¹⁾ The attitude of the landed aristocracy and of the middle class people of Orissa also towards Government during the Mutiny was friendly. In Bihar, Government experienced opposition from landed aristocrats like Kumar Singh and others but was at the same time supported by some of the landed proprietors of the province during the crisis of 1857-59. A zemindar of Tirhut, Bishnu Prasad Narayan Singh, for instance, donated 25,000 rupees to Government in token of his loyalty during the Mutiny.⁽¹²⁾ The Rajah of Hutwah also was then loyal to Government, as would be evident from the following 'urzee' presented to the Commissioner of Patna on June 20, 1857 for submission to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal :

"Understanding that at the instigation of some bad people certain sepoys have expressed their disloyalty to Government and created disturbances in the North-Western provinces and that some rayats of Government have rebelled. I voluntarily offer to place my life in the service of Government. In compliance with orders of the local authorities I have sent infantry, horsemen and elephants to the officers.....and I have also entertained Infantry and troopers at my zemindary to prevent the mutineers from coming there." (13) Thus the attitude of the zemindars of the permanently settled areas was, on the whole, friendly. The attitude of the landed aristocrats towards Government in areas other than those in which Permanent Settlement of land was introduced may also be studied here. In the North-Western provinces excepting Banaras, for instance, the land-revenue arrangement was not exactly of the nature of the Permanent Settlement. There the arrangement was made with the actual occupants of land who were generally either single families or villages communities. These village communities were, however, of 'the zemindari type, the members being jointly as well as severally responsible. But in many cases the body consisted of only a few persons, often indeed of a single individual who or whose predecessor had been a revenue farmer of the village in the early years following annexation'.⁽¹⁴⁾ In Oudh also after its annexation the settlement of land was

(10) *Parl. Papers*. Vol. 44 part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 221. P. 4.

(11) *Mutinies and the People by a Hindu*. Pp. 137-140. The address was signed by Maharajah Mahatab Chand Bahadur of Burdwan, Raja Radhakanta Bahadur Rajah Kali Krishna Bahadur and others, numbering more than two thousand and five hundred.

(12) *Parl. Papers*. Vol. 44 part I 1857-58. Further Papers No. 5 relative to the mutinies in the East Indies. Paper No. 363 p. 51.

(13) *Parl. Papers*. Vol. 44, part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 364; Appendix (a) to further paper No. 5 relative to the mutinies in the East Indies, Inclosure 145 in No. 1 p. 80.

(14) *Camb. Hist. of India*. Vol. VI pp. 82-83.

made with the village communities. As the land-revenue arrangement in Oudh and in the North-Western provinces excepting Banaras was made not with any middle men, the talukdars in those areas came to be deprived of their proprietary rights to land and stood dispossessed. This dispossession of the talukdars and consequently of their retainers threw them into the arms of the opposition party during the Mutiny. Again, the resumption of rent-free tenures by William Bentinck and the operation of the Inam Commission dispossessed many a land-owner in the North-Western provinces and made them enemies of Government during the Mutiny. For a pretty long time before the establishment of the rule of the English East India Company in India various bodies and persons had been holding land free from revenue. Such rent-free tenures were of various origins. 'Many of them had been fraudulently acquired, while others, having been granted for services which had long ceased to be performed, had become mere sinecures'. (15) As usual, the original titles to these Inam (16) lands had been lost and fraudulent titles were also in some cases brought to light. Government sought to check the misuse of Inams by 'colbertising the lakherajdars' so as to increase the revenue of the state, and accordingly launched upon a campaign of resuming rent-free lands. Bentinck's order for resuming rent-free tenures, no doubt, increased Government-revenue but at the same time made beggars of many land-owners who were thus instigated to revolt against Government during the Mutiny. The actual resumption of Inam lands led to serious disturbances in the North-Western provinces in particular. Along with the resumption measures, the auction-sale of the estates of landed-proprietors as a penalty for default alienated many landed proprietors in the North-Western provinces and drove them into the camp of the rebels during the Mutiny. As the Mutiny broke out, certain landlords of Agra, Kanpur, Hamirpur, Gorakhpur and of some other districts of the North-Western provinces as also the Nawab of Banda revolted against Government. The Raja of Mainpuri also stood disaffected. It is also a fact that Government was supported by not a small number of landed aristocrats of the North-Western provinces during the Mutiny. The zemindars of Mainpuri, for instance, were in favour of Government. Some of the landlords of Agra and some other districts in the North-Western provinces also supported Government during the Mutiny. So far as Oudh is concerned, the dispossessed talukdars and their retainers were opposed to Government. Raja Man Singh of Oudh

(15) Such rent-free lands, it may be stated here, were often granted in support of religious bodies, in support of the family of a man, slain in the defence of a village, or of the family of one, slain while attacking an enemy or in support of a tomb in the memory of a bard or Brahmin who had laid down his life in the interest of the village. There were also other grounds on which rent-free lands were granted. Vide *Land Systems of British India*. Vol. III. P. 301.

(16) 'Inams are grants, complete or partial, of the state's interest in land; they may be made in perpetuity or for a period and commonly take the form of an assignment of the land-revenue, derivable from a given area. These were freely granted in support of public offices or charitable or religious institutions, for the maintenance of Brahmins, or for personal and private reasons.' *Camb. Hist. of India*. Vol. VI. p. 50.

however, rendered distinct services to Government since the outbreak of the Mutiny in Oudh. He was awarded 50,000 rupees for saving some ladies and children from Fyzabad. (17)

From what has been stated in the foregoing paragraphs it may be concluded that the territorial aristocrats namely the Princes, Rajas and Maharajas of India were, on the whole, supporters of Government during the Mutiny. As regards the landed aristocrats, their attitude towards Government was also, on the whole, friendly and loyal. In fact, majority of the territorial and landed aristocrats of the country were favourably disposed towards Government during the critical period of 1857-59.

(17) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 221. P. 4.

CHAPTER VI.

MUTINY AND THE HINDU-MUSLIM REACTION

The socio-religious policy of Government during the years preceding the Mutiny and the introduction of greased cartridges towards the close of 1856 reacted adversely on both the Hindus and Muslims of India. When, through the initiative of the sepoys, the Mutiny broke out in 1857, both the Hindus and Muslims joined it in protest against the attitude of Government towards their religious feelings and social prejudices. It is not, however, a fact that all the Hindus and Muslims of the country rose in revolt. As the Mutiny progressed, Government found its supporters among both the communities of the Indian society. Sometimes in the course of the Mutiny they renewed their old feuds and fell foul of each other. But such Hindu-Muslim feuds were sporadic and were confined to certain districts of the then North-Western provinces only. Those Hindus and Muslims who arrayed themselves against Government stood, on the whole, united in common opposition to Government during the Mutiny.

The Mutiny is ascribed by some writers on the subject to the disaffection and conspiracy of the Muslims only. Since their subjection to the British rule, as held by such writers, the Muslims 'like wounded tigers in their lairs or baffled spiders in their webs' had been marking time with smouldering discontent for an opportunity to feed fat the ancient grudge they bore against the British Government in India. The contemporary Calcutta Press described the Sepoy Mutiny as a Muhammadan revolt. (1) Such a view of the Mutiny is not wholly justified by facts. It would be only partially correct to regard the Indian unrest between 1857 and 1859 as a fruit of the conspiracy of the Muslims only or as exclusively a Muhammadan revolt. 'In a large part of the North-Western provinces, in the districts where the Muhammadans are numerous and the influence of the Delhi Court was strongly felt, the revolt took a Muslim colour and assumed to some extent the character of a holy war against the infidel. Persons whose experiences were confined to that region often erroneously assumed that the rebellion was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy. But elsewhere the revolt was more Hindu than Muhammadan.' (2) In fact, the Sepoy Mutiny thrived on the disaffection of both the Hindus and Muslims. When the combined discontent of both the communities at length found an outlet in the declaration of the Mutiny, majority of the revolted sepoys was supplied by the Hindus but most of the leaders came from among the

(1) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part III for 1857-58. P. 101.

(2) Dr. Smith--Oxford History of India. P. 723.

Muslims. Of the three main divisions of the Indian Army the Bombay and Madras Armies maintained, on the whole, a peaceful front. But the so-called Bengal Army revolted against Government. All the ten regiments of the Native Cavalry and sixty one out of seventy-four regiments of the Native Infantry of the Bengal Army (thirteen remaining staunch) rose in revolt. In 1857 the strength of the Bengal Native Regular Cavalry was 5136, while that of the Bengal Regular Infantry was 84,515. (3) The Cavalry of the Bengal Army was composed chiefly of Muhammadans, while the bulk of the Infantry was composed of the Hindus. As would be evident from the above figures, the Muslim sepoys were far outnumbered by the Hindu or rather non-Muslim sepoys in the Bengal Army. In other words, in the mutinous Bengal Army the non-Muslim revolted sepoys commanded majority over the Muslim ones. That is to say, the mutinous Muslim sepoys were numerically inferior to the mutinous non-Muslim ones. As regards the leaders of the Mutiny, they were mostly Muslims. The Muslim leaders issued proclamations during the Mutiny to enlist the support of both the Hindus and Muslims in their crusade against the Christian rulers of India. One such leader, Prince Mirza Muhammad Feroze Shah issued the following proclamation on February 17, 1858 :

"Be it known to all the Hindoo and Mahomedan inhabitants of India.....that within the last few years the British commenced to oppress the people in India under different pleas and contrived to eradicate Hinduism and Mahomedanism and to make all the people embrace Christianity..... A brief sketch of the views and intentions of the Supreme Court and Parliament is hereby given in order to warn the people that they should get rid of habits of negligence and strive in unity to destroy the infidels. When the Indian troops mutinied to save their religion...the wise men of England were of opinion that, had the British authorities in India kept the following things in view, the mutiny would never have broken out : 1. They should have destroyed the race of the former kings and nobles. 2. They should have burnt all books of every other religion. 3. They should not have left even a biswa of ground to native rulers. 4. They should have intermarried among the natives, so that after a short time all would have become one race. 5. They should not have taught the use of artillery to the natives. 6. They should not have left arms among the natives. 7. They should not have employed any native until he consented to eat and drink with Europeans. 8. The mosques and Hindu temples should not have been allowed to stand. 9. Neither Maulavies nor Brahmins should have been allowed to preach. 10. The several cases brought into the courts should have been decided according to English laws. 11. English priests should have performed all nuptial ceremonies of the natives according to their English customs. 12. All prescriptions of Hindu and

(3) Parl. Papers, Vol. XLII of 1857-58. Paper No. 201. Pp. 4-5. Returns relating to the Armies in India, submitted by P. Melville. The figures, cited above, stand included in the figure 135767 being according to Melville the total strength of the Bengal Native Army in 1857. Vide p. 66 ante.

Mahomedan physicians should have been prohibited and English medicines furnished instead. 13. Neither Hindu nor Mahomedan fakeers should have been allowed to convert people without the permission of English missionaries.... But the authorities did not take means to introduce these measures. Had the authorities kept in view the maxims, above alluded to, the natives would have remained quiet for thousands of years. These are now the real intentions of the English; but all of us must conjointly exert ourselves for the protection of our lives, property and religion and to root out the English from this country.... Since the real purpose of this war is to save religion, let every Hindu and Mussalman render assistance to the utmost. Those that are old should offer prayers; the rich but old should assist our sacred warriors with money. Those in perfect health as well as young should attend in person. But all those who are in service of either Mirza Birjish Kadir Bahadoor in Lucknow and of Khan Bahadoor Khan at Bareilly should not venture out to join us, for these rulers are themselves using their best endeavours to clear the country of all infidels.... The delay in defeating the English has been caused by people, killing innocent children and women without any permission whatever from the leaders, whose commands were not obeyed. Let us all avoid such practices and then proclaim a sacred war. Lastly, the great and small in this campaign will be equal, for we are waging a religious war. I do now proclaim a sacred war and exhort all, according to the tenets of their religion, to exert themselves. The rest I leave to God. We shall certainly conquer the English; consequently I invite the people again to my assistance.' (4)

In the above proclamation the Muslim leader, Feroze Shah sought to appeal to the religious sentiments and caste-prejudices of both the Hindus and Muslims of the country and to convince them of the evil motives of Government towards them with a view to inciting the entire Indian population to rise in arms.

Again, after the conquest of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell Muslim leaders issued proclamations to excite the people to revolt against Government. Printed proclamations were posted up in all the police stations not only in Lucknow but also in other parts of Oudh. In one such proclamation Muslims were asked in the name of the Quoran to break with the Christians, for to befriend the Christians was to commit an act of irreligion. The Muslims, the proclamation further urged, should always hope to gain victory and destroy all Christians and should never think that the Christians would be victorious and would punish them for their rebellion on the restoration of the British authority. Heightening its tone the proclamation called upon every Muhammadan to join the war against Christians and to die a martyr to the cause of Islam. Another Lucknow proclamation, addressed to the Hindus and Muslims alike, reads as follows :

(4) Printed at Bareilly by Sheikh Nisar Ali under the supervision of Maulavi Muhammad Khutub Shah. Vide George Dodd., op. cit., pp. 410-11.

"All the Hindus and Mahomedans know that man loves four things most : 1. his religion and caste ; 2. his honour ; 3. his own and his kinsmen's lives ; 4. his property. All these four are well protected under native rulers ; no one interferes with any one's religion ; everyone enjoys his respectability according to his caste and wealth. All the respectable people—Syud, Shaikh, Mogul and Patan among Mahomedans ; and Brahmins, Chatrees, and 'Kaeths' among Hindoos—are respected according to their castes. No low-caste people like Chumars.....can be equal to and address them disrespectfully. No one's life or property is taken unless for some heinous crime. The British are quite against these four things—they want to spoil every man's caste and wish both the Mahomedans and Hindus to become Christians. Thousands have turned renegades and many will become so yet. Both the nobles and low-castes are equal in their eyes ; they disgrace the nobles in the presence of the ignoble ; they arrest or summon to their courts the gentry, Nawabs and Rajahs at the instance of a Chumar and disgrace them ; wherever they go, they hang the respectable people, kill their women and children ; their troops dishonour the women and dig up and carry off their buried property. They do not kill the mahajuns but dishonour their women and carry off their money. They disarm the people, wherever they go and when the people are disarmed, they hang, shoot, or blow them away. In some places they deceive the landholders by promising them remittance of revenue, or lessen the amount of their lease ; their object is that, when their government is settled and every one becomes their subject, they can readily, according to their wish, hang, disgrace, or Christianise them." (5) This proclamation and similar others which sought to provoke Hindus and Muslims alike to revolt were not without any effect. The Mutiny began to gather momentum largely under Muslim leadership. The principles of Wahabism and the lead given by the Wahabs also went a long way to foment Muslim opposition to Government during the Mutiny. The Wahabi (6) movement had for its ultimate aim 'the resuscitation of the political supre-

(5) Vide George Dodd—op. cit., pp. 427-428.

(6) The term 'Wahabi' is properly applicable to a body of Arabian Muhammadans and is derived from the name of the founder of the sect, Shaikh Abdul Wah-hab, who was a son of a petty chief of Nejd, a province in Central Arabia. As he grew into a young Arab pilgrim, 'he was deeply struck with the profligacy of his fellow pilgrims and with the endless mummeries which profaned the Holy cities'. He first raised his voice of protest against the corruptions and practices forbidden in the Quoran. His views crystallised into a theological system which came to be known to the posterity under the name of Wahabism. In the beginning of the 19th century the Wahabi movement was carried to India by the pilgrims, visiting Mecca. Wahabism spread to Bengal. Doctrines similar to those of Wahabism were known about this time to have been promulgated in the lower Bengal by a native of Faridpur, Hazi Shariyatullah. His followers called themselves Ferazis. Another Muslim leader, called Saiyad Ahmad, who was a native of Rai Bareilly in Oudh, inspired the Muhammadans of India with the ideal of fighting for Islam and incited them to declare 'jihad' or religious war against the Sikhs and the British Government who favoured the Sikhs. He went to Patna, where he appointed Muhammad Hosain, Wilayat Ali and Inayat Ali as his Caliphs or lieutenants. Followers of Saiyad Ahmad increased in number and an anti-British feeling went on gathering

macy of Islam in the world by a return to the original purity of the faith and by a revival of the spirit of its followers'. Wahabism was anti-British and anti-Sikh. As the Wahabs in India plotted to overthrow the British rule, they did not stand completely divorced from the sympathy of the fanatic section of the Muslim community in the country. Some of the principles of Wahabism might not have found favour with the orthodox Muslims; still the bond of common religion kept the Wahab and non-Wahab Muslims united together. Above all, the political programme of the Wahabs was to appeal to the dispossessed Muslim ruling class to take advantage of the Mutiny to recover their lost political supremacy and to rebuild the Muslim Empire in India. It was believed by the Wahabs that a prophet (Imam) would be born to lead the true believers to victory over the 'infidels'. It was also believed by them that they were under an obligation to wage war against the 'infidels'. It is pertinent to infer from the anti-British attitude of the Wahabs that the term 'infidel' was taken by them to refer to the English. The Wahabs had their own literature which abounded in prophecies about the fall of the British power in India. (7) The anti-British activities of the Wahabs in India thus contributed to inflame the feelings of the Muslims against the British Government. (8)

The Mutiny did not, however, find favour with the entire Muslim community. Muslims from diverse parts of the country were reported to have openly sympathised with Government during the Mutiny. The Muhammadans of Calcutta reposed their entire faith in the policy of the British Government and pledged themselves to support Government during the crisis of 1857-59. On May 27, 1857 the members of the Muhammadan Association of Calcutta held a special meeting at 9/1, Maulavi Imdad Ali Lane, Taltalah and passed resolutions, expressing their loyalty to Government and promising their entire aid and support to the suppression of the Mutiny. Some of the resolutions which were passed by them are cited below :—

"The meeting having heard of the havoc and devastation, lately

momentum under an organised leadership. Saiyad Ahmad exhorted upon his followers the necessity and desirability of carrying on hostility towards the British Government till the day of judgment. Patna was fixed as the centre of conspiracy and Muhammad Hosain was recognised as the chief Caliph there. The followers of Saiyad Ahmad were also commonly known as the Wahabis. But they ignored the appellation and held themselves to be 'Hanafis'. They were closely allied to the Ferazis who were perhaps more orthodox Hanafis. After the death of Saiyad Ahmad his principle of 'jihad' against the British Government was sought to be followed by his disciples at various places of India.

(7) Vide Hunter—Indian Mussalmans, pp. 58-60 (footnote).

(8) According to Forjett who was for some time the Police Commissioner of Bombay the activities of the Wahabs of Bombay were not anti-British. Referring to the co-operation he received from them he writes thus: 'Bombay was not free from Wahabee-phobia; but I am glad to say that I experienced no lack of assistance from the Wahabees. The Kazee,—the high priest in Bombay of Mahomedans—was a rank Wahabee, but made his services available at any hour of the day or night; so was the soobedar, Mahomed Booden, of the Police, a Wahabee by whom I was greatly assisted in bringing to light the plot hatched by the sepoys at Sonapoor.' Vide 'Our real danger in India.' P. 131.

committed in some towns of the North-Western provinces, and of the sacrifice of life and property, caused by the disaffection and Mutiny of a small portion of the native soldiery of the British Government, do hereby express their sincere regret and heartfelt sorrow at these lamentable and disastrous proceedings."

"The Committee learn....that the cause of the present Mutiny may be traced to an unfounded report, maliciously spread by ill-disposed men, of a contemplated interference on the part of the Government with the religious rites, ceremonies and persuasions of the natives of this country...."

"...This Committee, relying upon the pledge, repeatedly given by the Government, of their determination never to interfere with the religious principles and practices of the natives, are prepared...to prevent the dissemination of such an unfounded impression or its taking root in the minds of their native brethren."

"Though the Committee are convinced that only a slight effort on the part of Government is sufficient to stifle the rebellion...and to prevent it from causing more damage, yet should the rebellion spread further and endanger the lives and properties of more of their subjects, they are persuaded that it is incumbent upon all, who have experienced the benefits of the mild and beneficent rule of the British Government, to enlist their energies in the preservation of the lives and properties of their fellow-subjects and cordially and vigorously to co-operate with the Government in the restoration of peace and order." (9) A copy of the above resolutions was sent to Government.

Similar instances of Muslim fidelity were brought to the notice of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal by the Commissioner of Patna in a correspondence, dated Patna, October 6, 1857. (10) A Muslim gentleman, Munsif Amir Ali, who was appointed a special assistant to the Commissioner of Patna, kept the Commissioner informed of the feelings of the natives living within his (Commissioner's) administrative jurisdiction in the course of the Mutiny. The Muhammadan villages of southern Bihar generally remained quiet, while the Rajput and Brahmin villages around them rose in arms. (11) In southern Bihar the Muhammadans were reputed to be the foremost in acts of devotion to Government. (12) The attitude of the Nizam of Hyderabad towards Government was quite friendly. While the so-called Bengal Army was carrying fire and sword from one station to another, Hyderabad was in a ferment. Still Hyderabad remained immune from the Mutiny thanks mainly to the endeavours of the faithful Nizam, Afzul-oo-

(9) Home Pub. Cons. June 5, 1857 No. 30. Vide also Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 part I for 1857-58. Paper No. 364 pp. 301-302. The above resolutions bore the signature of Fazlur Rahman (President), Abul Bari, Md. Weyeeh, Vice-Presidents, Md. Abdur Rauf and others. Md. Weveeh was the then the Head Maulavi of the Calcutta Madrasah.

(10) Parl. Papers. Vol. 41 Part III. pp. 99-100.

(11) Ibid. p. 101.

(12) Ibid.

Dowlah and of his faithful minister, Salar Jung. Wherever in Hyderabad disturbances were apprehended, the Nizam and his minister took prompt steps to nip them in the bud. Both of them received thanks from Government in recognition of the services, rendered by them during the disturbances of 1857-59. If the Nizam turned against Government, southern India would have been in a blaze of insurrection. Again, when the regiments at Chittagong and Dacca mutinied, the Muhammadans of East Bengal treated the revolted sepoys with much hostility and hunted them out with much pluck. (13)

The Muhammadans of the Punjab were loyal. The Muslim community of Sind remained, on the whole, attached to Government during the period of insurrection.

Surely then, the entire Muhammadan civil population did not rise in revolt in 1857. The Mutiny, in other words, did not thrive on the support of the entire Muslim civil community.

As regards King Bahadur Shah II, a descendant of the former Mughal dynasty, the mutineers sought his leadership during the siege of Delhi in May 1857. But Bahadur Shah was then too old to assume the real leadership of the mutineers. The Court, that was formed at Delhi under the presidentship of Lieutenant Colonel M. Dawes for the trial of Bahadur Shah, found him guilty not only of open sympathy with the mutineers but also of fomenting sedition by assuming their leadership. (14) But the statement made by the King in the Court in self-

(13) Sir George Campbell—*Memoirs of my Indian Career*. Vol. I, p. 294. No better answer could be given, writes Campbell, to those who supposed that the Muhammadans were all hostile to the British. *Ibid*.

(14) The allegations laid by the Court at the door of Bahadur Shah were many and varied. The Meerut mutineers on reaching his palace in Delhi killed many Europeans including the commandant of the palace guards, Mr. Fraser. The Court held that these murders had been previously sanctioned by Bahadur Shah. The King's servants, who were alleged by the Court to have been accomplices in the murders, were neither dismissed nor was any investigation or enquiry instituted about them. As per the findings of the Court, the contemporary newspapers referred to the appointment as Commander-in-chief by Bahadur Shah of his son, Mirza Mughal who was regarded as the Chief of the rebels in Delhi. It was this Mirza Mughal, who, under written orders of Bahadur Shah, sent military help to Maulavi Muhammad Zohur Ali, Police Officer of Najafgarh to fight against the British. Bahadur Shah received many a petition from Muslim enthusiasts, who addressed him as the 'Shelter of the World' and sought his military aid to exterminate the English. Bahadur Shah used to consider those petitions sympathetically and to issue written orders to his subordinates for necessary help to be rendered. Again, as held by the Court, on the afternoon of the very day of the outbreak at Delhi Bahadur Shah received in the hall of special audience the obeisance of the revolted sepoys and wished them success in their crusade against the 'infidel' British. Bahadur Shah was then declared the Sovereign of India on May 11, 1857. Again, Bahadur Shah was alleged by the Court to have issued orders on September 6, 1857 to the Chief Police Officer of the Delhi city to proclaim by the beat of drum that the war against the British was a religious war and that Hindus and Mussalmans alike should conjointly join the crusade against the British. It was further ordered to be proclaimed that the crusaders fighting against the English would be allowed to remain in possession of whatever property they would plunder from the English and that they would besides receive additional rewards from the King. The Court held that the paper

defence indicates that he was a prisoner in the hands of the mutineers and that he had no genuine sympathy with them. If he agreed to be the leader of the mutineers, he did so most reluctantly.

containing the above orders was found among other documents in the office of the King's chief officer, that it bore the signature of Bhao Singh, assistant to the King's Chief Police Officer, and that a more trustworthy and convincing document could hardly be laid in proof of the king's open hostility to the British Government. It was also alleged by the Court that Bahadur Shah sent Sidi Kambar, Chief of the Abyssinians in the palace of Delhi, to Persia and Constantinople as an ambassador with letters to the kings of those countries, soliciting their help in the restoration of Muslim sovereignty in India. The Court finally held that in its considered opinion Bahadur Shah was an abettor of conspiracy against the British Government during the Mutiny.

Though found guilty by the Court, Bahadur Shah pleaded that he was not guilty. He made a statement in self-defence to the following effect : The appearance of the Meerut mutineers who were never in previous correspondence with him sprang surprise on him. To keep them off he ordered the closing of the gates of the palace and sent immediate intimation to the commandant of the palace guards, Mr. Fraser for taking necessary precautionary measures. He dissuaded Mr. Fraser from approaching the mutineers and in compliance with his request supplied two guns and two palanquins for the rescue of some European ladies. When the mutineers broke into the palace, he became a prisoner in their hands. He had never given orders for the murder of Fraser and other Europeans. As regards the appointment of Mirza Mughal as the Commander-in-chief of the Army, Bahadur Shah said in the Court that at first he rejected the request of the Army for the appointment of Mirza Mughal as the Commander-in-chief, but that subsequently circumstances forced him to give his consent to the above appointment. As regards the orders under his seal and over his signature, Bahadur Shah stated that from the day the mutinous soldiers became masters of the palace and treated him as a prisoner, they themselves stamped with his own seal such papers and documents containing orders and instructions as were suitable to their purpose. Sometimes they brought rough drafts of orders and compelled his secretary to make fair copies of them. At other times they brought the original letters, intended for despatch and left copies of them in the office. Frequently they had his seal impressed on empty unaddressed envelopes. Bahadur Shah could not know what papers were sent in those envelopes or to whom these were sent. Any member of the Army could have orders written, as he chose, without the King's authority, without even acquainting him with their purport. Bahadur Shah and his secretary could not oppose the Army in any way for fear of life. As regards the petitions over his own signature, Bahadur Shah said that these were forced to be signed by him. In case of non-compliance with its orders the Army threatened to depose him and to make Mirza Mughal King in his place. Bahadur Shah denied that he ever participated in the deliberations of the Court, set up by the Army. Tired of the mutineers, he desired to go to Mecca, but was not allowed by them to go on a pilgrimage to the holy city. To evade them he had once escaped to Humayun's mausoleum from where he was brought back on the assurance of the safety of his life. Bahadur Shah denied the allegation that he had sent the Abyssinian Kambar as an ambassador to the court of the King of Persia. He also denied that the rebellious sepoys had ever saluted him or showed him any other mark of respect. They made him a prisoner and used his name as a sanction for their acts. Bahadur Shah concluded that his statements were true to fact and that he was not guilty of the charges brought against him..

Vide Selections from the Records of the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies. No. VII. Trial of Bahadur Shah. Pp. 206-245. Bahadur Shah appears to stand X-rayed as one who played a double game during the Mutiny. He had his own grievances against the British Government. He felt the pinch of indignity in being reduced to his present status. So, he should have a natural inclination to join the mutineers. But he was too old to participate

It is as extreme and untenable a view that the Mutiny was due exclusively to the Muslim conspiracy as the one, held by Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan, founder of the Aligarh College, that the Muslims were loyal to Government whether before or during the Mutiny. Sir Sayyad Ahmad, who was a loyal British subject, sought to convince the British

actively in the Mutiny. At the same time, the mutineers wanted his leadership. In the circumstances, he bowed to destiny or the force of circumstances. He agreed to become their leader, though with much reluctance and disinclination. The rebel Court was formed at Delhi with him at the head. As stated above, the Court, formed for his trial, found him a supporter of the mutineers and charged him with conspiracy against the British Government on more grounds than one. But it is also true that he lacked the real spirit of nationalism or patriotism in him. He had no genuine sympathy with the mutineers, struggling against the British Government. The Meerut mutineers on their first arrival at Delhi received no encouragement from him. The palace gates were ordered to be shut against them. He pleaded his inability to come to their help, as he had neither troops nor magazines nor money. At this crisis he depended much on his personal advisers of whom the chief were the Hakim Ahsanullah Khan and Mahbub Ali Khan (Mukhtar or agent) both of whom were suspected by the Army of having been in sympathy with the British. In a letter dated August 9, 1857 Col. Keith Young wrote to his wife about Ahsanullah thus : "The sepoys suspect Hakeem Hassen Oollah (Hakim Ahsanullah) of being in treacherous correspondence with us ; and, between ourselves, I believe, they are not far wrong." (Vide Delhi—1857 Page 186). In another letter dated August 10, 1857 Keith Young wrote to his wife about the Hakim thus : 'Hassen Oollah is suspected by the sepoys, and not without reason, of being in correspondence with us.' (Ibid. page 190). It was this Ahsanullah who was one of the trusted advisers of Bahadur Shah. It was on his advice that Bahadur Shah sent a letter through a camel-driver to the Lieutenant Governor at Agra, informing him of the crisis, developing with the approach of the mutineers from Meerut (Vide Two Native Narratives. Page 83). Delhi was in great tumult. Bahadur Shah yielded for the time being to the force of circumstances. He assured the soldiers that he would be associated with them in a common cause against the British Government but that he would desire them to place their confidence in Ahsanullah Khan, Mahbub Ali Khan and Queen Zinat Mahal. The relations between the King and the insurgent forces at Delhi became bitter before long. The Army demanded more and more of money of Bahadur Shah, but the latter was quite at a loss as to how to meet their demand for more gold. The Army accused him of sheltering European ladies and gentlemen inside the Fort and demanded their surrender. On this point Munshi Jiwantal recorded as follows :

"I learnt to-day (May 16) that nearly forty Europeans were concealed in the King's palace. The sepoys went into the palace in great anger, as they said, they had seized a messenger with a letter cursing the mutineers. The sepoys threatened to kill Ahsanullah Khan and Mahbub Ali Khan and also threatened to take away Zinat Mahal, Begum Sahiba and to keep her as a hostage for the King's loyalty. There was a great uproar in the palace, the sepoys on the one hand and the king's household on the other, contending with violent language and harsh vociferations. To appease the mutineers Mahbub Ali Khan took an oath that he was not the author of that letter, nor had it been written with his knowledge. (It was on this date that the Europeans in the palace were butchered in a manner that defies description). The King and his assembled councillors stood like dumb puppets. The King ordered the sepoys to separate themselves into two parties, Muhammadans and Hindus and he appealed to each to consult their religious advisers to see if there were any authority for the slaughter of helpless men, women and children. But whose word will a frenzied murderer obey?...'' (Vide Two Native Narratives. Pages 93-94). The bitterness between the King and the Army was steadily on the increase. Jiwantal writes that native regimental officers experiencing difficulties in getting rations approached Bahadur Shah on May 12 and addressed him with such

Government of the basic fidelity of the Muslim community to it. In his 'Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Mussalmans' he repudiated the allegation brought against the members of his community that they were a source of chronic danger to the British Government of India, denied the charge that Christianity was incompatible with Islam⁽¹⁵⁾ and endeavoured to draw the Muslims and the British Government closer to each other. He even went to the length of asserting that even the Wahabs were not anti-British but only anti-Sikh.⁽¹⁶⁾ In fact, Sir Sayyad Ahmad disavowed any design of 'jihad' on the part of the Muslim community against the British Government of India. He held that the thinking and responsible section of the Muslim community was never anti-British and that those who pleaded for a 'jihad' 'were vagabonds and ill-conditioned men. They were wine-drinkers and men who spent their time in debauchery and dissipation. They were men, floating without profession or occupation on the surface of society.'⁽¹⁷⁾

In spite of Sir Sayyad Ahmad's pleadings that the Muslims of India were loyal to Government both during and before the Mutiny the fact remains that those who opposed Government during the Mutiny belonged to both the Hindu and Muslim communities of the country. It was then generally believed that the British sovereignty in India would terminate one hundred years after the battle of Plassey of 1757. The outbreak of the Mutiny was accordingly hailed by the disaffected Muslim community, particularly by the dispossessed Muslim ruling class as the golden opportunity to render *coup de grace* to the British rule in India and to make a last desperate attempt at reviving the Empire of the great Mughals.

disrespectful terms as 'I say, you King.' 'I say, you old fellow. (Ari, Badshah, Ari, Buddha)'. Some one caught him by hand, another touched the old King's beard. (Vide 'Two Native Narratives. Page 87). The Army even threatened to replace Bahadur Shah by Abu Bakr as their king and leader. A sense of security naturally prompted Bahadur Shah to depend more and more on the British Government. Referring to Bahadur Shah's conspiracy with Government during the Mutiny H. H. Greathed, the then Commissioner and Political Agent of Delhi writes thus : 'I went to the Tuhseel office this morning (May 30, 1857) ; and the man who had been acting for the King of Delhi made over to me the money he had in the chest, and the sealed cover he had received from the King : So I have good proof of Royal complicity.' (Vide his Letters written during the siege of Delhi. Page 5). As, however, Bahadur Shah attempted to sail in two boats, sometimes with the mutineers in the one, and sometimes with Government in the other, he failed, in fine, either to enlist the confidence of the mutineers or to earn the favour of Government. He was tried by Government, was declared guilty, and transported to Rangoon to pass the rest of his life there.

(15) Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan supported his statement by the contents of the 85th Verse of Chapter V of the Holy Quoran. The verse runs as follows :

Thou shalt surely find the most violent of all men in enmity against the true believers to be the Jews and the idolators : and thou shalt surely find those among them to be the most inclinable to entertain friendship for true believers, who say 'we are Christians'. Vide Sayyad Ahmad Khan's 'Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Mussalmans ! Page 45.

(16) Vide Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Mussalmans. P. 21.

(17) Sayyad Ahmad Khan—The causes of the Indian Revolt, P. 8.

The reaction of the Mutiny on the Hindus may now be studied here. The Hindus also, like the Muslims, stood aggrieved with Government on the eve of the Mutiny. The attempt at westernising the Indian society caused much irritation and discontent among the caste-conscious Hindus of the country. The Brahmins and other upper class Hindus stood seething with thousand and one complaints against the governmental encroachment on their sacred domains of caste and prejudices. The spread of English education, systematic policy of christianizing the native population, legal protection afforded to widows and converts produced a serious Brahmanic reaction in the country. Government was alleged to have violated the sanctity of caste by bringing the highest and the lowest classes together in schools, in the ranks of the Army and in railway carriages. The Sati system was abolished and with it was closed a source of income of the priestly class. The remarriage of high-caste widows was encouraged and the use of common utensils in jails was insisted on. All such steps proved revolting to the caste-ridden and superstitious Hindu population of the country. (18)

The British Government was looked upon by the Brahmins as a menace to Hinduism, as they believed in the current prophecies that Brahmanism would be abolished and that a new doctrine, namely Christianity would come to prevail. Such prophecies about the end of Brahmanical religion excited among the Hindus the apprehension of a mighty change in religious systems. Among the Brahmins of the pre-Mutiny period there was a superstitious belief that in the existing 'Kali yuga' all distinctions of caste would be obliterated and that all men should be of one faith, forsaking the idolatry and worshipping one Supreme Being. Such a superstitious belief cast a gloom on the Hindu society and caused much uneasiness in it. When, however, the Mutiny broke out, it did not find favour with the entire Hindu community of the country. The Hindus of Bengal, Orissa, Rajputana and of Assam, in general, had no truck with the mutineers. The Hindu population of the south was also, on the whole, quiet. Some specific instances of the fidelity of the Hindu population are cited below. The Hindu inhabitants of the Bhowanipur area in Calcutta were loyal to Government. On May 23, 1857 a meeting was held by them at the premises of Guru Charan De of the Chakraberia locality of Bhowanipur to consider the best means of maintaining peace in the Bhowanipur area. A committee was formed with such men as Guru Charan De, Isan Chandra Mallick, Umesh Chandra Mitra, Chandra Kumar Bose, Prasanna Kumar Chatterjee, and others, and the following propositions were carried out :

"The Committee being apprehensive of the most deplorable state of things, created by the disaffected sepoys in some parts of the country, consider it as a duty of every loyal subject of Her Majesty's empire to be true to her Government.

"As false apprehensions and unfounded tales regarding the exaggerated affairs of Mutiny have prevailed in and about the town through

the maliciously disposed persons, the committee feels it as a necessity to remove them from the minds of peaceful subjects.

"The committee after mature deliberation comes to the conclusion that some of the members...will by every means in their power impress upon the minds of the timid and credulous people the idea of the mightiness of the power of the British Government to repel the aggressions of any foreign enemy, however powerful and indomitable, or to put down any internal disturbance of order.

"The committee determine that these noble feelings of loyalty and attachment to the beneficial British rule that had actuated them to meet (here) be most respectfully communicated to the Governor-General in Council." (19)

The inhabitants of the town and district of Barasat in Bengal submitted to the Governor-General in Council an address in which they recorded their high appreciation of the tolerant attitude of Government towards the people of the country of India, and conveyed their assurance that they would be unsparing in their efforts to maintain order and discipline amongst themselves during the Mutiny. (20)

There were besides many Hindu princes and landlords such as Jaya Krishna Mookerjee, zemindar of Uttarpara, Maharaja Srish Chandra Roy, Bishnu Prasad Narayan Singh, zemindar of Tirhut, Raja Man Singh of Oudh and the Raja of Hutwa all of whom remained loyal to Government throughout the Mutiny. The Hindu population of several districts of the then North-Western provinces also maintained friendly attitude towards Government during the Mutiny.

Thus the Hindu civil population of several parts of India did not participate in the Mutiny. In certain parts, however, such as west Bihar, Chotanagpur, Jhansi and a few districts of the then North-Western provinces the Hindu civil population stood in opposition to Government and rose in revolt. So the fact remains that the Sepoy Mutiny battered on the disaffection of both the Hindu and Muslim malcontents of the country. If the Muslims, particularly the dispossessed Muslim ruling class participated in the revolt out of political motives, the Hindus rose in arms in protest against the interference by Government with their ancestral caste and religion.

(19) Home Pub. Cons. C. 29th May 1857, No. 27.

(20) Home Pub. Cons. 5th June 1857, No. 22. The address was signed by Mohan Lal Panday, Munsiff and Deputy Magistrate, Nabin Chandra Dass, Head Master Government School, Raj Krishna Mitra and others.

CHAPTER VII

REVOLT IN BIHAR

During the historic Sepoy Mutiny the province of Bihar, as it was then constituted, turned into a storm-centre of revolt of the civil and military classes alike against the British Government in India. The then Bihar was under the rule of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Frederick Halliday and was composed of the Patna division comprising the districts of Patna, Gaya, Sahabad, Saran, Champaran and Tirhut; the Bhagalpur division consisting of Bhagalpur, Monghyr, Purnea and the Santhal Parganas; and of the Chotanagpur division embracing Lohardaga, Hazaribagh, Singbhum, Manbhum, Sambalpur and certain tributary Mahals such as Bhokar, Korea, Sirguja, Udaipur, Jashpur, Gangpur, Bonai and Sarunda. Bihar was in the grip of a serious agitation and was up in rebellion against the British Government during the stormy period of the Sepoy Revolt, whereas its neighbours on the east and south then remained, on the whole, undisturbed and tranquil.

The Indian Mutiny was the work of the so-called Bengal Army. In the wake of the revolt of the 19th and 34th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry at Berhampur and Barrackpur respectively the spirit of revolt spread with lightning speed to the then North-Western provinces where Meerut rose in revolt on May 10, 1857. This revolt of Meerut threw the North-Western provinces in a ferment and cast its shadow on Bihar too. In Bihar, revolts broke out at Danapur, Jagadishpur, Patna, Gaya, Champaran, Saran, Tirhut, Bhagalpur, Santhal Parganas, Purnea, Singbhum, Manbhum, Mazaffarpur, Palamau, Chaibassa and Sambalpur. In fact, almost the whole of Bihar then rose in arms against the British Government in India.

Bihar was not destined to escape the contagion of the Mutiny of the so-called Bengal Army. Situated on the border of the disaffected North-Western provinces, Bihar was one of the centres of recruitment of the sepoys of the Bengal Army. The recruits from Bihar were posted in that province. The native regiments at the Danapur cantonment were, for instance, composed of sepoys who were recruited from Sahabad. In fact, it was mostly from Sahabad that the Rajput sepoys garrisoned in Bihar were recruited. The Bhojpuri-speaking people of Sahabad formed 'the fighting nation of Hindusthan. ... They furnished a rich mine of recruitment to the Hindusthani army and took a prominent part in the Mutiny of 1857.' (1) Again, the Ramghar battalion, which was a local corps, composed largely of the Hindusthanis of the

(1) District Gazetteer—Sahabad. P. 39.

province, garrisoned the stations of Hazaribagh, Ranchi, Purulia, Chaibassa and Sambalpur. The Army in Bihar being thus composed of sepoys who were locally recruited and who formed a part of the revolted Bengal Army had a natural sympathy with their mutinous comrades in the North-Western provinces and rose in sympathetic revolt in 1857.

The hostility of the military class only would not have by itself sufficed to produce almost a general conflagration in the province of Bihar. The disaffected Army in Bihar had the privilege of being guided by several able leaders the foremost of whom was Kumar Singh (2) who was a highly influential Rajput zemindar of Jagadishpur in the district of Sahabad. His father, Shahajada Singh bequeathed to him three-fourths of his landed property. The remaining one-fourth was shared by Kumar's three other brothers, Dayal Singh, Rajpati Singh and Amar Singh. Kumar's name was a name to conjure with throughout his estates. He was suave in manners, dignified in bearing, courteous in dealings, noble in appearance and conduct and above all, an embodiment of praiseworthy heroism and bravery. He was a noble looking old man who had already seen the change of eighty summers at the commencement of the Mutiny. In the pre-Mutiny days he was a staunch supporter of Government and an intimate friend of William Tayler, the then Commissioner of Patna. Gradually, under pressure of circumstances he came to cool in his friendship for Tayler and the British Government, and turned into a rebel-leader. Though Kumar Singh inherited a lion's share of the paternal property, he failed to supervise and manage it efficiently. The result was that with the income from his mismanaged property he found it increasingly difficult, as years wore on, to make his both ends meet. In course of time he became deeply involved in debt and his estates came to be mortgaged. By 1854-55 the Government of Bengal just to save him from complete ruin undertook the management of his estates from the proceeds of which his creditors were to be gradually repaid through the Collector of Sahabad. Kumar Singh at the same time engaged to borrow money to the extent of twenty lakhs of rupees for the purpose of clearing his debt. Eventually Kumar failed to get the loan, and shortly before the outbreak of 1857 the Sadar Board of Revenue sent through William Tayler 'a peremptory message to Kumar Singh that unless he obtained the entire loan within a month (which was impossible) they would recommend the Government to withdraw all interference with his affairs and to abandon the management of his estates'. (3) This decision of the Board of Revenue was regarded by Kumar Singh as 'the sequestration of his property' and by Tayler as unjust. Tayler protested against it in a private letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Frederick Halliday but in vain. In pursuance of the recommendation of the Board of Revenue the Government abandoned the management of Kumar's estates. Kumar's position became precarious. He was left to his own fate. The withdrawal of the supporting hand of Government from the management of his estates was a rude

(2) Also known as Kunwar Singh.

(3) Kaye--op cit, III, p. 100 footnote.

shock to him. Still he remained loyal to Government as before. But the friendly relation between them did not last long. The way in which he came to be subsequently dealt with by Government tended to provoke him to join the mutineers. Government could not believe that Kumar could remain a loyal subject even after the unkind treatment, meted out to him so lately. Gradually conviction grew upon Government that Kumar could improve his position not so long as law and order reigned in his estates but as soon as a lawless state of things would come to prevail there in the wake of the outbreak of rebellion. Labouring under this conviction Government began to look upon Kumar as one who was meditating revenge on them. William Tayler was no longer friendly to Kumar. Suspecting that Kumar was disposed towards rebellion Tayler deputed Saiyad Azimuddin Hussain, the Deputy Collector of Arrah, to persuade Kumar to see him at Patna. Saiyad Azimuddin Hussain came to Kumar and 'found him lying on bed, pleading extreme sickness, old age and infirmity as preventing obedience to the order of the Commissioner to proceed to Patna. He was profuse in his expressions of loyalty and good will, maintained that it was difficult and dangerous for him to arrest mutineers and deserters, utterly denied having any intention of acting with disloyalty, pleaded old age and infirmity in excuse of his not being personally active in the cause of order, and pledged himself to repair to Patna as soon as his health would permit and the Brahmins could find a propitious day for the journey.' (4) On July 19, 1857 H. C. Wake, officiating Magistrate of Sahabad wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal thus : '...The Commissioner (of Patna) has sent for him (Kumar Singh) to Patna to speak to him on the subject of the reports about him : he is said to be ill, and I dare say will object on that plea, but I have heard that he has stated that he will not go to Patna and will resist, if he is sent for.' (5) Kumar Singh might have suspected that Tayler sent for him perhaps with evil motive of detaining him at Patna in order to prevent him from fomenting rebellion at Sahabad. The suspicion that he might be detained or kept under surveillance at Patna violently shook his faith in Government. The spirit of opposition to Government began to grow on him. His followers also were then violently disposed towards rebellion. Of these followers Ranadalan Singh and Harekrishna Singh started instigating Kumar to rise against Government as seriously as possible. Matters headed towards a crisis, when the mutineers from Danapur reached Sahabad, the native district of Kumar. Kumar could no longer remain indecisive. He crossed the Rubicon. Circumstances forced him at long last to raise the standard of rebellion against Government. Amongst his immediate followers during his campaigns against Government mention may be made of Ranadalan Singh, Hare-

(4) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 363. P. 38. Narrative of events, dated August 31, 1857.

(5) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 part II 1857-58. Paper no. 79. P. 28. It may be inferred from the date of Wake's letter to the Secretary, Government of Bengal that Tayler sent for Kumar Singh through the Deputy Collector of Arrah before 19th July, possibly in the early part of July, 1857.

krishna Singh, Amar Singh, Reethnarayan Singh, Nishan Singh, Jai Krishna Singh, Narhan Singh, Joohun Singh, Thakur Dayal Singh and Bisheswar Singh.

With the alienation of Kumar Singh who was supported by a large following, provoking him to rebel and with the arrival of the Danapur mutineers at Arrah, Sahabad passed into the grip of revolt. Patna also was not quiet. There was then at Patna an organisation of the Wahabis (6) who were fanatically anti-British. The Wahabi Muslims sought to instigate the entire Muslim community of Patna to rise in arms against Government. Besides the influence of Wahabism other causes were at work to prepare the soil of Patna for the seeds of rebellion. Oudh, which was then a storm-centre of rebellion, cast its shadow on Patna. 'The annexation of that country (Oudh) had sent to Patna a small Oude colony with all kinds of embittered resentments against the British Government, and there was an active correspondence continually going on between the Mahomedans of the two great cities, Patna and Lucknow.' (7) Again, agents of conspiracy such as Khaja Hassan Ali Khan were engaged in encouraging the sepoy regiments at Patna to rise in revolt by instilling into their minds the fear of interference with their caste and religion by Government. It was a credulous time. So, people readily believed in whatever reports had been brought home to them. Reports had been in circulation to the effect that it was the intention of Government to destroy the caste of the Hindus, and also to abolish Muhammadanism 'by forbidding the initial ceremony through which admission is obtained to the number of the Faithful as well as by prohibiting *pardah* and compelling the Muslim females to go about *unveiled*.' (8) Hindus and Muhammadans, high and low, compared these reports with the actual legislations of Government on inheritance, education, messing system in jail and so on, and felt convinced of the sinister designs of Government upon native caste and religion. It was also a very popular belief that 'the introduction of the messing system into the gaols was to be followed by its introduction into the Army, and that the sepoy was not much longer to be allowed to have uncontrolled dominion over his own cooking-pot.' The situation became alarming and exciting at Patna. Not only the civil but also the military classes, including the Police and the Najibs at Patna, stood highly unsettled and ready to revolt. (9) Again, the existence of an opium-godown at Patna and a cash deposit of some twenty lakhs of rupees in the Collector's court there offered sufficient inducements to the city-rabble to rise in revolt for the sake of plundering the treasure and looting the opium-godown. Thus alarmed and agitated, Patna entered into a conspiracy with Sahabad, Danapur and other districts of Bihar, producing a pro-

(6) Vide Chapter VI for details about Wahabism.

(7) Kaye—op. cit., III. p. 78.

(8) Kaye—op. cit., I. p. 304.

(9) As recorded by Kaye in his 'History of the Sepoy War in India' Vol. I, p. 308, a scroll, many cubits long, was found containing the names of some hundreds of respectable inhabitants of Patna, Hindus and Muhammadans who were pledged to a solemn oath to die in the defence of their religion.

vince-wise conflagration. In fact, what with the hostility of the Muhamadans at Patna, what with the alienation of Kumar Singh from Government, what with the local composition of the regiments in Bihar and last but not the least, what with the popular suspicion about the designs of Government on native caste and religion, revolt came to break out at last in the province of Bihar.

Mutiny in the North-Western provinces had its early repercussion on Bihar. At Rohini, a village in the Deoghur sub-division in the district of the Santhal Parganas three men of the 5th Irregular Cavalry rose in revolt on the evening of June 12, 1857. They killed the Commander of the regiment, Major Macdonald, Sir Norman Leslie, Adjutant of the Commander and Dr. Grant, assistant surgeon, attached to the Cavalry regiment, managed to effect their escape with injuries only. The mutineers were seized, tried and hanged to death in the presence of the entire regiment. The failure of the rising at Rohini and the execution of the three mutineers as mentioned above did by no means arrest the progress of Revolt in Bihar. The situation in the west Bihar division with Patna as its Headquarters was gradually growing alarming. The Muslims of the Wahabi sect in Patna had been engaged in conspiracies against Government for some time past. Agents of conspiracy were appointed and regularly paid; subscriptions to finance mutinous preparations were raised, and the collections were distributed among the agents of conspiracy. In a letter dated June 19, 1857 William Tayler wrote to Frederick Halliday on the situation in Patna thus: 'All is seemingly quiet in Patna, but the quiet itself is suspicious. There is a general feeling that something is brewing and I have secret information of nightly meetings, collection of arms etc. among the Wahabees and some others. A little more, and I shall act.' (10) Tayler determined to arrest the ringleaders beforehand and thus to prevent them from acting in accordance with their contemplated plan to rise against Government. He determined, in other words, to strike at the root of disaffection by arresting the three Maulavis, Muhammad Hussain, Ahmad Ullah and Waizul Huq who were at the head of the Patna branch of the Wahabi organisation. Along with a few other respectable citizens of Patna the Maulavis were invited by Tayler to his house 'for consultation on the state of affairs.' At the end of the discussion Tayler placed the Maulavis under arrest to maintain peace in Patna. They were conducted to the circuit house where they were to stay in detention under the watch of Captain Rattray and his Sikh guard. This happened on June 20 of the first year of the Mutiny. (11) Soon after the arrest of the Maulavis Tayler issued orders that the city of Patna should be disarmed and that the citizens were to keep indoors after 9 O'clock in the night. Tayler's measures, however, failed to tranquillise Patna. On July 3 some 200 men with flags and slogans and armed with guns assembled in the house of a Muhammadan book-seller, named Peer Ali Khan and thence proceeded towards and attacked the Roman Catholic Church in the heart

(10) Correspondence connected with the removal of William Tayler, p. 4.

(11) Parl. Papers, Vol. 11 Part I of 1857. Paper No. 364. P. 21.

of the city. This was followed by the murder of Dr. R. Lyall, the principal Assistant to the Opium Agent of Bihar. Referring to the nature of this rising the then Magistrate of Patna, J. M. Lewis wrote to A. R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal as follows :

"The fact of the rioters choosing the Catholic Chapel as the first place of attack, their destroying a considerable quantity of property, none of which was taken away by them, the green flags, carried and the cry of 'deen, deen', raised by them, show that the rising was a religious one.... If the object of these rioters was to raze the city, the attempt was a miserable failure, and the ease with which the disturbance was put down cannot but be a source of confidence, and had it not been for the sad fact of Dr. Lyall's self-sacrifice and the loss sustained by his death, this attempted rising might almost have been looked upon as a subject of congratulation.' (12) On the nature of the outbreak of July 3 in Patna Tayler wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on July 19 thus : 'The parties concerned in the outbreak appear to have been Soonnees and Hindoos....The inscription on the flag is that used by the Wahabees, but there appears to me to be a gradual intermingling of the Soonnees' and Wahabees' faiths, and an ultra Soonnee is much inclined to merge into Wahabeeism. The Sheeah, on the contrary, is strongly antagonistic to both. I do not, therefore, think the Wahabees as a sect or party had any connection with this outbreak and am confirmed in this belief by the fact of Ahmud Oollah's (a Wahabi Maulavi) father, Hahee Buksh, having sent intelligence of the affair the day before, a thing which I now feel sure he would not have done, had his party any active connection with it..... That there has been an understanding, however, between Peer Ali (one of the leaders in the outbreak of July 3) and one at least of the Wahabees first arrested by me is placed beyond a doubt by intercepted correspondence, and had not the elderly gentlemen of that sect been under the glitter of the Seik (Sikh) sabres, I have little doubt they would have been found in active participation of Peer Ali's adventure.' (13) Tayler had no doubt in his mind about the aggressive designs of the Wahabees of Patna so far as he could study them. Consequent on the failure of the attempted rising of July 3 the ringleaders were sought to be arrested, and the city underwent a thorough search. In the house of one such ringleader, Peer Ali, were found letters betraying the existence of a widespread conspiracy. He was arrested along with many others. In fact, thirty one ringleaders were apprehended. The prominent amongst them were Peer Ali, Sheikh Ghuseeta, the jamadar of Looft Ali Khan, the richest banker in the town and Looft Ali Khan himself. The three men were released by Samuells, the successor of Tayler, with a view to eliciting more information from them. Of the thirty one, who were arrested, fourteen were hanged to death. Among those who were hanged there was one man, named Waris Ali, jamadar of Ali

(12) Home Pub. Cons. 31st July, 1857. No. 65.

(13) Correspondence connected with the removal of Tayler. P. 87.

Kareem. 'A man of great wealth, large estates and corresponding influence' (14) Ali Kareem himself escaped falling into the hands of Tayler. When Waris Ali was taken to the gallows, he cried aloud : 'If there is any one who professes to be a friend of the King of Delhi, aid me.' (15) The boldness of the steps taken by Tayler made Patna secure against further mutinous development, it is true, but his high-handed dealings with and treachery towards the Maulavis of Patna wounded the religious feelings of the Muhammadan population and served to augment their fanaticism and incite their revengefulness which found an outlet in the rising of July 3. Tayler's policy of 'constant arrests' and 'continued hangings' was, of course, warmly supported by the mercantile community of Calcutta the commercial interests of which demanded a peaceful state of things in Patna, Danapur and Tirhut. The interests of the mercantile community of Calcutta were bound up with the indigo-plantation in Tirhut. 'Any revolt before the plant had been cut and even subsequently during the process of manufacture would have been fraught with ruin to many of them.' But much to their dismay, along with Patna, Danapur also assumed a threatening attitude and began to mark time for a suitable opportunity to strike a blow. The station of Danapur was at that time garrisoned by one European Infantry regiment, the 7th, 8th and 40th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry, and by one company of European and another company of native Artillery. (16) The sepoys of the Danapur station had decided to mutiny; but there was a difference of opinion between them and the townspeople as to the date when they should rise in revolt, the sepoys choosing Sunday, while the townsfolk preferring Friday, being the day sacred to the Muhammadans. (17) The three native regiments, the 7th, 8th and 40th mutinied at last on Saturday, July 25, 1857. (18) The immediate cause for the Mutiny was the order issued to them by General Lloyd for surrendering percussion caps. The mutineers escaped from Danapur almost unharmed, crossed the Sone and proceeded unopposed to Arrah on the other side of the river to muster strong under the banner of Kumar Singh. According to the author of the Red Pamphlet 'it was Kumar Singh who procured boats for the passage of the mutineers across the Sone and it was he who had advised them to march without delay on Arrah, plunder the treasury, murder the residents and then crossing the Ganges at Buxar, to make at once for Ghazeepur and Oudh. It was a bold plan and was very nearly succeeding. The sepoys mutinied on 25th; on 26th they crossed the Sone and were joined by Kumar Singh; on 27th they arrived at Arrah, let loose the jail-birds, plundered the treasury and attacked the residents.' (19) From other sources, however, it is learnt that Kumar Singh had never bothered to procure boats for the passage of the mutineers across the

(14) Red Pamphlet. P. 176.

(15) Ibid. P. 177.

(16) District Gazetteer—Patna. P. 36.

(17) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part II for 1857-58. Paper No. 79. P. 72.

(18) Ibid. P. 147.

(19) Red Pamphlet. P. 182.

Sone from Danapur to Arrah and that he had not even the faintest idea beforehand that the Danapur mutineers were on their way to Arrah under the escort of Harekrishna Singh. It was Harekrishna Singh who skilfully induced the Danapur mutineers to come over to Arrah and to place themselves under the leadership of Kumar Singh. The Danapur mutineers reaching Arrah, Harekrishna Singh sent words to Kumar Singh at Jagadishpur to come over to Arrah immediately to assume the leadership of the mutineers failing which he would have to suffer much at their hands. The conspiracy of Harekrishna Singh bore fruit. Kumar Singh had to meet the mutineers who proclaimed him as their leader on the spot. Kumar Singh had to yield to the pressure of circumstances ultimately.

The arrival of the mutineers, two thousand strong, from Danapur at Arrah gave the immediate signal for a revolt of the sepoys in the district of Sahabad. The sepoys garrisoning Sahabad were locally recruited. Their Mutiny accordingly aroused a natural and spontaneous sympathy among the members of the civil population of the district. As consequence would have it, Sahabad became the scene of a popular revolt declared against the British Government in India. The entire body of the mutineers marched on Arrah, the Headquarters of the district of Sahabad. The native population of Arrah was composed of the brave Rajputs who were valiant fighters and who considered no sacrifice too great for the sake of maintaining their national honour. There were at that time 300 or 400 prisoners in the Arrah jail. The European inhabitants of Arrah and the neighbouring areas at the beginning of 1857 consisted of Government officers, their assistants and their families as also of certain railway engineers and inspectors. In anticipation of a revolt in Arrah the European women and children were sent early in June to Danapur where the presence of 600 soldiers of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment was expected to ensure their safety. The rest of the European community in Arrah took up their abode all together at the house of the Judge, Littledale. Meanwhile, disquieting and panicky rumours began to pour into Arrah from Patna and Danapur very frequently. 'The cry of wolf, wolf from Patna and Danapur having been so often heard without the appearance of danger began after a time to be almost disregarded. But the peril was the same as before. The crisis was, in fact, approaching and the wolf came at last.' On July 25, the Danapur regiments mutinied. The immediate problem before the European population at Arrah on receipt of this Danapur Mutiny was to find out a suitable shelter for themselves. On the night of the day following they took shelter in Vicars Boyle's (the Railway Engineer) two-storeyed building, originally meant for a place for billiard game. Regardless of the jeers and opposition of his friends, Boyle had kept this building in a state of defence and fortification and stored therein a large quantity of food-stuff, a prudent step that saved him and other Europeans from the fury of the sepoys. The party that took shelter in Boyle's bungalow consisted of 9 Europeans, 6 Eurasians, and 1 native gentleman (Deputy Collector of Arrah, Syed Azimuddin Hossain). There were also with them 50 Sikh police whose fidelity remained unshaken even in the face

of alluring inducements to them for abandoning the party to its fate. Had the Sikh police been treacherous, they might have killed all the men of the party too easily. On Monday, July 27 at about 8 A.M. the insurgent sepoys belonging to the 7th, 8th and 40th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry arrived from Danapur at Arrah, and having first released the prisoners from the jail, rushed to the Collectorate, where they were at once joined by the Najibs, and looted the treasure amounting to 85,000 rupees.(20) Then they besieged the fortified two-storeyed building where the European residents had taken shelter. Hiding behind the trees, which were too many in the compound of the building, and occupying the out-houses and Boyle's residential quarters which stood within 60 yards of the temporarily fortified building, they kept up an incessant fire on the besieged party during the whole day. They came to be joined soon by the forces under Kumar Singh. Every endeavour was made by the rebels to induce the Sikh police to abandon the party. Heavy bribes were offered to them. But they treated every offer with derision, and remained firm in their allegiance to the European party in danger.(21) The besieged party determined to hold out as long as their provision would last. The want of water was removed by digging a well, 18 feet deep within 12 hours.(22) The rebels tried to suffocate the besieged men to death by setting fire to a heap of chillies outside the walls, but a favourable wind arose and blew the stifling smoke away. The same wind carried off the disgusting stench arising from the rotting carcasses of the horses belonging to the European party. The rebels had killed these horses and purposely piled them up around the house. A rescue party, four hundred and ten strong, sent under the command of Captain Dunbar to pursue the mutineers from Danapur and to relieve the besieged, was rendered *hors de combat* by the mutineers who were fighting under the cover of thick groves of trees. Real relief at last came, when Major Vincent Eyre marched towards Arrah. He defeated Kumar's forces at Bibiganj on August 3, 1857, reached Arrah and relieved the European party, besieged by the revolted sepoys. Eyre won the game. Kumar seemed to lose it. After his reverses at the hands of Eyre Kumar Singh disappeared in the jungle fastness of Jagadishpur on the way to Sassaram. At Jagadishpur Kumar Singh had stored a vast quantity of grain, enough, it is said, to feed an army of 20,000 men for six months and had also established a manufactory of arms and ammunition.(23) Eyre followed Kumar to Jagadishpur, captured his stronghold and forced him to leave his native village. Kumar fled towards Sassaram. Kumar's residential building at Jagadishpur was razed to the ground under the orders of Eyre. A Hindu temple standing near Kumar's house was also destroyed. Finally after setting fire to the village of Jagadishpur Eyre departed with his forces, following the route taken by the rebels towards Sassaram. Eyre privately wrote to Tayler about the

(20) Home Pub. Cons. 21st August, 1857. No. 41.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid.

(23) District Gazetteer—Sahabad, P. 27.

reaction on the Hindus of the destruction of the temple thus : 'It was curious to see how the Hindus in my camp seemed rather to delight than otherwise in the sacrilege of its destruction. I suppose, the fact is that they care as a rule only for public fanes such as Juggernaut (Jagannath) and are indifferent as to the fate of private ones, built like this one for self-glorification. I regarded the act at the time as necessary to injure Kumar Singh's prestige and think it had that effect.' (24) Eyre could by no means feel the pulse of the Hindus correctly. Nothing would wound a Hindu, it is idle to stress upon, so seriously as the injuries done to his religious feelings or to the religious institutions, public or private. The feelings of the local Hindus had definitely been outraged by Eyre's vandalism. If they did not take up arms in protest against Eyre's action subsequently and remained peaceful, it was because they felt helpless at the flight of Kumar Singh and of the mutinous sepoys on the failure of the siege of Arrah. While, however, the siege of Arrah was in progress, the people of Arrah and Jagadishpur had demonstrated their manly vigour and warlike nature by fighting shoulder to shoulder with the sepoys against the forces of Government.

The Danapur mutineers crossed the Sone to reach Arrah, and from Arrah they proceeded towards Sassaram after the failure of the siege of the extemporized fortress of Boyle. Kumar Singh, Harekrishna Singh and Ranadalan Singh were also in their company. On their way to Sassaram they came to a hilly place, where they halted for some rest. Surrounded by his followers Kumar Singh sat there, smoking tobacco, while big drops of tears were rolling down his cheeks. Kumar had his own explanation of the sorrow of his broken heart. Government had played false to him by withdrawing its support from the management of his property which was consequently left open to sale by auction. He had to agree most reluctantly to be the leader of the revolted sepoys under pressure of circumstances over which he had no control. His first encounter with the forces of Government ended disastrously for him. His native village of Jagadishpur was set on fire. His dwelling house was razed to the ground. There was no knowing what worse fate was still in store for him. It occurred to him that by foolishly agreeing to take up arms against Government he outwitted none but himself. As Kumar was thus brooding over his misfortune and was thinking of his future, he could not help feeling dejected and shedding tears of sorrow and helplessness. Still there was no going back. Once he had drawn the sword, he must either sheathe it after a complete victory or must perish with it. The mutineers from Danapur and Arrah under his leadership fell on Sassaram but got no support from the local people. The inhabitants of Sassaram and of the neighbouring areas were kept under control by a native gentleman named Shah Kabiruddin Ahmad who had a considerable hold over the local Muslim community. A petition, expressive of loyalty to Government, was submitted by him and other local people on June 20, 1857 as follows :

(24) Vide Kaye—op. cit., III, P. 116 footnote.

"We hear that some native troops have rebelled against the Government. We never expected that these people who had hitherto experienced every kindness from Government would adopt such a course; and we feel assured that they will soon be visited with merited punishment and that the ryots will continue to live in comfort under the British Government as heretofore. The rebels have given out that Government intends to interfere with the religion of its subjects, but this is evidently a lie; for since the last 100 years during which Government has held the administration of this country it has never interfered with the religion of any class of people, though it has every power to do so. Nay, it issued notification annually, declaring that it had no intention to interfere with the religion of its subjects and thereby removing their apprehensions. It would fill up a volume, were we to describe the measures which the Government is adopting at a considerable expense for the benefit of the people. We are prepared to perform voluntarily whatever the Government may order and what we are capable to do." (25) The people of Sassaram did not evidently respond to the call of the mutineers, but remained peaceful.

Circumstances meanwhile prevailed upon Kumar Singh to change his line of action. Thinking it useless to confine his military operations to Bihar towards recovering his lost ground there, he sought to carry on the fight with Government from outside Bihar with the help of his heterogeneous Army of sepoys and feudal retainers. In September, 1857 Kumar attempted to march into upper India through Rewah the young Raja of which was related to him. It was expected by him that the Raja would not stand in his way. But the Raja's position became pitiable at the outbreak of the Mutiny. The mutineers burnt his villages, while the British authorities in Allahabad denounced him as 'a fox not to be trusted.' (26) To win back the confidence of Government the Raja had to declare himself against the mutineers in the long run. Kumar Singh had to fall back on Banda. In March 1858 he started to attack Azamgarh, north of Ghazipur and east of Oudh. On March 17 he laid his hands on a village called Atraulia, then situated at a distance of 20 miles from Azamgarh. The British troops under Colonel Milman who was the officer in command at Azamgarh attacked Kumar Singh and the forces under him. But Milman and his troops were defeated and were compelled to retreat to their entrenchment at Koilsa near Azamgarh, leaving behind their guns and baggages. Kumar Singh straightway took possession of the town of Azamgarh. On March 26 Colonel Dames made an attempt to dislodge Kumar Singh from his newly acquired stronghold of Azamgarh, but he too came to be repulsed with a heavy loss. Seeing the danger to which Azamgarh was exposed Lord Canning deputed Lord Mark Kerr to proceed to Azamgarh to help Milman and Dames. Lord Kerr reached Azamgarh on April 6 and succeeded in joining the troops in the entrenchment there after a sharp conflict with Kumar's force, posted to intercept his entrance. Thereupon Kumar

(25) *Parl. Papers*, Vol. 44 Part II of 1857-58. Paper No. 79. P. 6.

(26) *Martin—The Indian Empire*, Vol. II. P. 491.

Singh strategically quitted Azamgarh on April 13 with some of his followers, leaving the rest of them behind. Lord Kerr after reaching Azamgarh anxiously waited for the arrival of Sir Edward Lugard who was already deputed by Sir Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-chief, to come to the relief of Azamgarh with 3 regiments of European Infantry, 700 Sikh Cavalry troops and 18 guns.(27) Sir Edward Lugard reached the bank of the Tons flowing past Azamgarh on April 15. While Lugard and the forces under him were attempting to cross the river by a bridge of boats, they encountered an opposition from the remnant of Kumar's followers in Azamgarh. But Kumar's followers were defeated and cleared out of Azamgarh on April 15. They were pursued for several miles by Brigadier Douglas under orders of Sir Lugard. A reward of 25,000 rupees was announced by Government for the apprehension of Kumar Singh.

After leaving Azamgarh Kumar retreated towards Jagadishpur. Hotly pursued by Brigadier Douglas on the east and by Colonel Cumberlege on the west Kumar Singh reached the district of Ghazipur on April 20, 1858. The presence of Kumar Singh in the Ghazipur district excited a tremendous popular agitation there in favour of the rebels. There 'he found himself amongst friends, and the wants of his troops were voluntarily supplied by the villagers who were almost universally in his favour.' Not only the villagers but also the discontented Chiefs and landlords of the district came forward to the help of the retreating chief, Kumar Singh. To them he owed much for his success in deceiving his pursuers as to the exact point at which he would cross the Ganges. The villagers voluntarily supplied him and his party with food and shelter which they were badly in need of. Kumar could not still escape the pursuing hands of Douglas who succeeded in overtaking him on April 21 at Bansdeh, a town midway between Ghazipur and Chapra. The force of Kumar came to be badly defeated. He himself received a severe wound in the thigh. Kumar, however, escaped falling into the hands of Douglas. He had before him the ultimate aim of crossing the Ganges to Jagadishpur. Through the devoted fidelity of the local peasantry he collected a number of boats and crossed the Ganges flowing past Ghazipur in the night of April 21 from the Sheopur Ghat, seven miles below Ballia. He thus completely outwitted Colonel Cumberlege who with two regiments of Madras Cavalry was lying in wait for him at Ballia.

Kumar thus safely crossed the Ganges from the Sheopur Ghat and reached Jagadishpur where he found himself amidst surroundings, so familiar to him. He came to be joined at Jagadishpur by several thousand armed villagers, collected by his brother, Amar Singh.(28) Kumar reached Jagadishpur on April 22 (21?). On the day following he had an encounter with Captain Le Grand who was defeated and killed in action. Kumar Singh himself was seriously wounded. Douglas hastened towards Sahabad with a reinforced army to avenge the discomfiture of

(27) Holmes—op. cit., P. 461.

(28) Charles Ball—op. cit., II. p. 287.

Le Grand. But before his arrival at Arrah the valiant Rajput hero no more able to bear the strains of campaigns and burden of anxieties came to die at Jagadishpur. His death occurred three days after he had defeated Le Grand. (29)

After the death of Kumar Singh the leadership of the rebels in Sahabad devolved on his brother, Amar Singh. The rebels under Amar Singh and his associates, Nishan Singh, Harekrishna Singh and others were then about 1800 strong. Under the leadership of Amar Singh the rebels persisted in presenting a tough opposition to the reinforced forces of Lugard. Sahabad remained in the possession of the rebels throughout the month of July 1858. The Commissioner of Patna wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on July 30, 1858 thus : "The main body of the rebels still continue in the neighbourhood of Jagadishpur and ape our government in the appointment of Commissioners, Judges and Magistrates. They even copy our revenue system (which some people tell us has produced the rebellion) to the letter and sell all the estates of our friends for arrears of revenue with as much punctuality as the Collector himself could evince. Umur Singh hanged a sepoy the other day for the murder of a 'bania' which shows that the rebels were compelled to conciliate the people by occasionally giving them justice, even when the offending party was one of themselves." (30) But Amar Singh and his party were not destined to hold their own for long in the face of the overwhelming strength of the opponent. Lugard resigning his command due to ill-health was succeeded by Douglas who had under him an army, seven thousand strong. Douglas determined to crush the enemy root and branch. He arranged his force into seven columns which were to move in such a way as to surround the rebels in Sahabad on all sides and to compel them to surrender. The rebels, however, managed to escape the trap laid by Douglas, and rushed out of the jungle of Jagadishpur towards the river Sone. The forces under Douglas pursued them and succeeded in killing a few hundreds of them in the course of their flight. The main body, however, fled on. The neighbouring villagers were very particular about not disclosing the route followed by the rebels. The rebels escaped into the Kaimur hills, where also they were not allowed to stay in peace for any length of time. Douglas pursued them even to this new asylum of theirs. Charged by his army the rebels 'stole down the hills, entered the plains and tried to cross the Ganges. But the captains of some steamers, which were patrolling the river, opened fire upon them and sent them flying from the bank. Their spirit was now at last broken. They no longer attempted to preserve their organisation. The leaders fled for their lives. The rest skulked off by twos and threes to their homes, and before the close of the year peace was restored to the land.' (31) The Jagadishpur jungle was deforested by the British force.

(29) Home Pub. Cons. 9th July, 1858. No. 28.

(30) Vide Journal of the Bihar Research Society. Vol. XXXIX March-June 1953. p. 104.

(31) District Gazetteer, Sahabad. P. 35.

The Mutiny which spread from Danapur to Sahabad had its repercussion on Gaya also. On July 28, 1857 the officiating Magistrate of Gaya, Alonzo Money wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal thus : "The Mutiny at Dinapur has thrown Gaya into a ferment. There is nothing to be apprehended from the townspeople. They are surrounded by a new and strong Police and have a wholesome dread of the 45 English and 100 Sikhs. A town-row would be put down in ten minutes. The present causes of apprehension are two : the inroad of any large number of the Dinapur mutineers or the approach of the Monghyr and Deoghur 5th Irregulars, who are sure to rise, I imagine.....There is a treasury here, the only one in Behar. The force guarding it is 45 English, 100 Sikhs, and 150 Nujeebs. These last are scarcely to be trusted.....They are all Oudh men and the approach of their mutinous brethren would be a great trial of their staunchness." (32) It is evident, therefore, that the Mutiny at Danapur, the likelihood of the approach of the Danapur mutineers and of the Monghyr and Deoghur 5th Irregulars, and the existence of a treasury which was a very likely target of attack for loot and plunder in times of disturbance by the bad elements of the society fast paved the way for the outbreak of a revolt in Gaya. There was also the Gaya jail which contained some eight hundred captives who were ever ready to commit any enormity at the earliest opportunity. These numerous captives were kept under the watch of a guard of Najibs who were expected to remain staunch and trustworthy only so long as the Danapur sepoys remained quiet. The general population in Gaya also stood highly unsettled to hear of such rumours as the mixture of bone-dust or the blood of swine and oxen with the flour, sold in the market. The attitude of the zemindars was by no means friendly. There were many of them who were prepared to rise against Government, only if the sepoys were once up in arms in Gaya, though none of the zemindars, so far as the officiating District Magistrate of Gaya could study them, were likely to hazard their life and property before the rise of the military class.(33) Factors such as these favoured the outbreak of revolt in Gaya. There was, however, no overt act of hostility before the abandonment of the station at the bidding of the Commissioner of Patna, William Tayler. Before an actual outbreak, however, Gaya was in a ferment. The arrival of 150 Sikhs at Gaya increased the ferment in the district all the more. The townspeople refused to sit or smoke with them, calling them Christians. A carpenter was alleged to have reported to the Sikhs that their food was mixed with pig's fat and ox's ground bones. The man was hanged to death. On July 31 the officiating District Magistrate, Money, received from Tayler an express letter intimating to him the defeat of Dunbar's party in Arrah and ordering him to proceed at once to Patna with all the force at his command, removing the money from the treasury, if possible, without, of course, endangering personal safety. (34)

(32) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 part II of 1857-58. Paper No. 79. Pp. 154-155.

(33) Ibid. P. 155.

(34) This order of Tayler directing the abandonment not only of Gaya but also

In obedience to Tayler's orders, Money and his party left Gaya at six that very evening, leaving behind the treasure, as neither carts nor elephants were available for its transport. When at a distance of three miles from Gaya, Money decided at a second thought to return to Gaya and to remain there 'in the hope of maintaining order in the district and preserving the property including the Government treasure valued at about 8 lacs of rupees, and a gaol containing about 750 prisoners'.⁽³⁵⁾ So, Money, accompanied by C. Hollings, the Sub-Deputy Opium Agent of Bihar, returned to Gaya to find all quiet there. On August 1 news reached him that all the mutineers from Danapur entered Arrah and were engaged in loot and plunder there. On August 3 he heard of a large body of rebels marching towards Gaya. To stay or not to stay in Gaya in the face of an impending attack by the mutineers—that was now the question before Money. A detachment of 80 men of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment under Captain Thompson had, of course, already arrived at Gaya to rescue the officers there from the immediate personal peril in which they were placed. But this small detachment was very likely to be overpowered by the large rebel force which was on march towards Gaya. In such an eventuality the treasury in Gaya, as Money had reasons to apprehend, could not be saved from the fury of the rebels. In an emergency council, called by Money, it was accordingly resolved that the Europeans, civil and military, should leave Gaya at once with the money in the treasury in their custody. The entire European party accordingly took possession of the money in the treasury and left Gaya without delay. Having seen the party off Money returned to his bungalow in Gaya. As in other places, so in Gaya, the removal of the treasury-deposit gave the signal to the disaffected elements to break out into open revolt. Scarcely had the party left the station, when the Najibs let loose the prisoners from the jail, and joining with them pursued and attacked the European party whom they overtook in the rocky pass on the Dhobi road. They were repulsed with some loss and the party proceeded, without being further molested, down the Grand Trunk Road on the way to Calcutta via Raniganj. Meanwhile, Money managed to effect his own escape from his bungalow in Gaya and joined the party of the Europeans marching along the Grand Trunk Road. He

of all the out-stations in the Patna division was considered ill-advised by Frederick Halliday, the then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. He accordingly decided to remove Tayler from the commissionership of Patna.

According to Kaye and Malleon 'the purport of Tayler's order could not be mistaken. It was clear that in the presence of the danger of an attack from an overwhelming body with which their small force should be unable to cope Tayler took upon himself the responsibility of saving the lives of his subordinates even at the risk of abandoning the money, if the attack should take place, or if, in the opinion of his subordinates, it should be so imminent as not to admit of their taking the usual measures for removing the treasure. In a word, he relieved his subordinates of the responsibility of uselessly sacrificing their lives in attempting to defend money-bags which they could not save.' Vol. III. P. 71 (Footnote).

(35) The Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William Aug. 13, 1857. Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 Part II of 1857-58. Paper No. 79. P. 410.

deposited the treasure rescued from the Gaya treasury in the General Treasury in Calcutta.

Gaya came to be reoccupied by Government on August 16, 1857. Gaya was still susceptible to further attacks by the rebels. One such attack came from the side of Bhagalpur. The 5th Irregular Cavalry which mutinied there on August 1 marched into Gaya in the teeth of the opposition of Rattray, broke open the jail, freed the prisoners, murdered the munsiff of Bihar and rode off for Tikari and the Sone. These events took place on September 8 and 9, 1857. (36) Gaya stood much disturbed in September. It is gathered from a correspondence, (37) dated Gaya, September 17, 1857 between A. Money and the Secretary to the Government of Bengal that the forces against Government were quite strong. The mutineers were joined by some Bhojepuri men, led by a leader, Judhar Singh by name. The disaffected elements of many villages on the Gaya side of the Sone also had shaken hands with them. A large part of the district went out of the control of Government. To the west, parganas Arwal, Anchha, Goh, Manorah, and a part of Siris were overrun by the Bhojepuri men as also by the dwellers of different disaffected villages. Many of the roads passed into their control. To the east the area near Nawada was most unsettled. Some of the Rajwars (38) and zemindars were busy spreading the rumour that the British rule was at an end in Gaya. Evidently the forces of opposition to Government in Gaya caused a serious headache to Money who was quite at a loss as to how to restore order in the district in the absence of an army, large enough to cope with the situation. Towards the end of October, 1857 a fresh alarm was caused by the advance of two companies of the 32nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry which had mutinied at Bhagalpur. But the mutineers passed by Gaya without entering it. The activities of Judhar Singh caused no less consternation to the authorities in Gaya. He spread a rumour that the British rule was at an end. He strengthened himself by collecting around him a large following whom he kept attached to him by making grants of lands to them. In the course of his campaigns against Government he shook the British power round about Arwal. He, however, took care to avoid counter-attacks by retreating to his strongly fortified house at Khamini. (39) The sweep of the revolt in Gaya received a temporary checkmate, as some of the rebels came to be executed, and armed Police forces were posted there. The month of June, 1858 witnessed the plunder of villages near Arwal by the rebels from Sahabad, an attack on the Gaya jail and release of prisoners therefrom by two hundred rebels. This was followed by a surprise attack on the Jahanabad *thana*, the burning of Government buildings and the murder of a Daroga whose mangled body was exhibited by hanging it up by heels on a tree opposite the *thana*. Judhar

(36) F. Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies in the lower provinces.

(37) Parl. Papers, Vol. 44 Part III of 1857-58. Further papers No. 7 (in continuation of No. 5) relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies. Pp. 105-108.

(38) A caste in Gaya.

(39) District Gazetteer—Gaya. P. 29.

Singh seemed to carry everything before him, till at last he came to be completely defeated by the forces under Captain Rattray on July 4, 1858 at Kusma. (40) This victory sealed the fate of the rebel forces in Gaya. Law and order came to be gradually restored in the district.

The revolt in Gaya was widespread. In certain areas of the district it had assumed popular character under different leaders. Judhar Singh at the head of the Bhojepuri men had enlisted the sympathy and support of numerous villages on the Gaya side of the Sonc. In the north-eastern part of the district the leadership was supplied by Hyder Ali Khan who attempted to regain the Rajgeer Pargana, formerly belonging to his ancestors. (41) Mr. Curton, a writer in the Collector's office in Gaya was rewarded with two hundred rupees for arresting Hyder Ali Khan. Hyder was hanged on charges of rebellion and plunder. (42) Wazeergunj in the neighbourhood of Gaya was widely affected. The movement there was broadbased on the support of villagers who, under the leadership of Kosheal Singh, a 'ticadar' of many villages, rose in revolt, and hoisted his flag in defiance of the British Government. On January 4, 1858, Mr. Bayley, the then Assistant Magistrate of Bihar, wrote to the Magistrate of Bihar on the existing state of things in Wazeerganj thus : "On my arrival here (a village in Wazeerganj) I found the village entirely deserted. The cattle and all moveable property have been taken away, and little except the houses and grain remained. The state of the neighbouring villages is similar.I have as yet taken three separate cases of plunder and rebellion in Wazeergunj. There are in all fifteen villages implicated. Of these the lesser belong to the Mahal of Sukrodap of which Ranee of Tikaree is the 'malik' (owner). The other villages are owned by various people. It is clear that it has not been an assemblage of isolated 'badmashes' from these villages but that there was a distinct, organised attack made by all the villages in union. There were some 2000 men seen altogether. They surrounded Wazeerganj in the night. They looted every house and shop in the place. The leaders, Kosheal Sing and Jumunoa Sing of Khoowra declared that the English Raj had gone, and that they were now the Rajas. They made every 'dukandar' (shop-keeper) and 'Bunnea' of the place sign a 'sarkhatt' to that effect agreeing not to pay them (the British Government) in future. They then set up a standard of their own which was removed only when the 5th Irregulars passed through. They then inaugurated their reign by seizing everything they could lay their hands on and carrying them on bullocks which they plundered at that time. Of all the villages engaged in plunder, Khoowra was the worst. That was the place whence Kosheal Singh proclaimed his reign and whence he summoned his coadjutors of the

(40) Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India (Mr. C. Beadon) to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal (Mr. A. R. Young). The letter is preserved in the office of the District Magistrate of Gaya.

(41) District Gazetteer—Gaya ; P. 38.

(42) Letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Commissioner of Patna dated March 4, 1858. The letter has been preserved in the office of the District Magistrate, Gaya (Gaya Collectorate).

neighbouring villages to establish it. It was from Khoowra that most of the loot was carried. I, therefore, beg to submit that Khoowra should be burnt. Men worthy of punishment are 'tidadars.' and Jet Raiyats." (43).

It would thus appear that the revolt of Gaya had a popular basis. Still the rebel forces in Gaya were overpowered by the forces of Government in the long run. The failure of the revolt in Gaya is to be ascribed to the want of a strong leadership capable of organising the scattered rebel forces into a disciplined army and keeping alive the fighting spirit till the end.

As in Gaya, so at Muzaffarpur, the Headquarters station of the Tirhut district, the situation was very tense on the eve of the Mutiny of the regiments at Danapur. Muzaffarpur stood undefended and was thus susceptible to sneezing in the event of Danapur catching cold. It transpires from certain correspondences (44) of H. Richardson, Magistrate of Muzaffarpur, with the Secretary to the Government of Bengal that considerable panic prevailed at Muzaffarpur as early as June 1857 among the European residents of the station, the 'banias' of the bazaar and the Indigo-planters. 'The 'banias' were panic-stricken, apprehending that they might be compelled to supply 'rasad' (food) at a low price. The indigo-planters stood highly unsettled for fear of their lives and 'resolved that in case of necessity all European inhabitants should meet in one particular house in the station.' The assembling together of the indigo-planters in one particular place produced a panic among the neighbouring people who stood apprehensive of an imminent danger. The panic was allayed, as the indigo-planters dispersed and returned to their former abodes. About the attitude of the zemindars Richardson wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on June 29, 1857 thus : 'The zemindars of the district seem generally well-wishers of Government—no doubt a few have talked seditiously. I have one at present on trial but by far the larger portion is well affected.' (45) With the outbreak of the Mutiny at Danapur Tayler directed the officials at Muzaffarpur on July 31, 1857 to leave at once for Patna. In obedience to Tayler's orders all the Europeans in the district immediately started for Patna, leaving the cash-deposit in the treasury behind them. This encouraged a small detachment of the 12th Irregulars to revolt in the district. The mutineers robbed the Monghyr mail, plundered the judge's and Collector's bungalows, attacked the treasury and Government offices, and finally decamped towards the district of Saran. The then Collector, Mr. Lator, who had already left Muzaffarpur for Patna in obedience to Tayler's orders, soon returned to Muzaffarpur of his own accord only to find everything quiet there. (46) The revolt of the sepoys

(43) Letter from Assistant Magistrate of Bihar to the District Magistrate of Bihar. The letter is preserved in the office of the District Magistrate, Gaya.

(44) Quoted at pp. 1-3 of the Annual Report of the Ad Hoc Records Regional Survey Committee, Bihar (1952-53).

(45) Ibid. p. 3.

(46) District Gazetteer, Muzaffarpur, p. 24.

at Muzaffarpur and for the matter of that, in Tirhut could not proceed to any satisfactory length. This was due to the unfriendly attitude of the wealthy and influential Hindu traders and bankers of the district, who sought the protection of Government for the security of their property against the fury of the revolted sepoys, and also to the unsympathetic attitude of the Tirhut zemindars, whose interests were bound up with those of Government. Such influential zemindars as Raghunandan, Bishnu Prosad Narayan Singh, Keerut Singh, and Kooldeep were reported by the Magistrate of Tirhut to have rendered services to Government during the Mutiny. Bishnuprasad Narayan Singh is known to have helped Government with so large a contribution as 25,000 rupees. (47)

Though zemindars, traders and bankers of Tirhut went against the mutineers of the district, it would be far from truth to hold that the revolted sepoys stood entirely divorced from popular support. They were joined by many of the civil population in the different parganas of the district. (48) The revolt in Tirhut was, however, finally crushed as elsewhere. The rebels came to be defeated in the long run. Those who were captured were punished. Many, disguised as pilgrims, found their way into Nepal.

The revolt in Bihar, as in the North-Western provinces, did not remain confined to a particular locality. As in Danapur, Arrah, Gaya and Tirhut, so in Champaran revolt broke out. Major Holmes was then in command of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Sagauli in Champaran. On the evening of July 23, 1857 this regiment, so much trusted by him, rose in Mutiny. It is learnt from a letter dated July 25, 1857 from Maharaja Bahadur Rajendra Krishna Singh of Bettiah to C. Beadon, Secretary to the Government of India that 'the Sawars at Sagowlee (Sagauli) having, on 23rd instant (July), at about 8 o'clock in the night, mutinied, murdered Major Holmes and his wife, the surgeon and his wife and children, and then bolted with the treasure in their keeping towards Chaprah or Allegunge Sewan (Aligunj Siwan).' (49) This Mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Sagauli gave the signal for a serious disturbance in the district. At this crisis the joint Magistrate, Raikes left Motihari, capital of Champaran to take refuge at a place of safety near Motihari and looked after the affairs of the district therefrom. (50) But he soon returned to Motihari to resume the civil administration of the district. The Maharaja of Bettiah remained loyal to Government. (51) Even before the actual outbreak of the Mutiny, he wrote to Tayler expressing his loyalty and promising to remain constant in his devotion to Government. "I observe," he wrote to Tayler on June 9, 1857, "that some evil-minded men have studiously given out unfavourable reports that Government have a design to convert their

(47) Parl. Papers, Vol. 44 Part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 363. P. 51.

(48) A list of Tirhut rebels belonging to the civil class has been enclosed as Appendix "A" to this chapter.

(49) Home Pub. Cons. 7th August, 1857. No. 11.

(50) Home Pub. Cons. 7th August, 1857. No. 12.

(51) Home Pub. Cons. 7th August, 1858. No. 13.

subjects to Christianity, which has produced a panic among the people who have actually begun to revolt. I deny their assertions and most truthfully declare that Government have no such designs. The stories are mere inventions of bad men to serve their ends. Now nearly a hundred years the British are the paramount rulers of India; they have in no instance interfered with religion of our forefathers; on the contrary, they have allowed us a free exercise of our religious functions and they have further enacted a law that whoever scoffs at one's religion or molests one in his religious duties should be severely punished." The Maharaja wrote further in this connection thus: "I have proclaimed to my people through my several tessildars the purport of the first paragraph of this letter and have assured them that they must soften their anxiety and fears, as Government has already taken prompt steps to punish the disturbers of the public peace by strong hands, and (that) the disturbance created by the insurgents will soon be settled." (52) The Maharaja was true to his words. He remained a supporter of Government during the upheaval of 1857-59.

Though the Maharaja and his subjects were favourably disposed towards Government, the situation in Champaran gradually tended to be difficult of control due to the incursions of the leader of the Oudh mutineers, Muhammad Husain who had been active also at Muzaffarpur and Chapra. The arrival in August of two Gurkha regiments from Nepal came, however, to arrest the revolt in Champaran. Towards the end of December the Gurkha regiments arrived at Bettiah. On December 26 a fight took place at Sahibganj between the two regiments, sent by Jung Bahadur, and a party of mutineers. The mutineers were completely defeated. (53)

The Mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Sagauli on July 26, 1857 caused a great consternation in Saran. The fears of an outbreak in Saran were not unnatural in consideration of the fact that as many as 10,000 sepoys in the employ of Government were natives of the district. The property valued at a crore of rupees belonging to the Raja of Hathwa in the Siwan sub-division of the district of Saran offered an irresistible temptation to the mutinous sepoys to rush into Saran for loot and plunder. (54) On the news of the outbreak at Sagauli the European residents in Saran apprehending a sympathetic rising in the district left the district Headquarters, Chapra for Danapur on July 28. "But they returned on August 12 to find everything in a tranquil and orderly state, with the jail and treasury untouched and the detachment of Najibs still loyal, order having been preserved during their absence by a Muhamedan gentleman, named Kazi Ramzan Ali." (55) But the tranquillity was subsequently disturbed for some time by the incursions of Muhammad Husain, the leader of the Oudh mutineers, as also by the plunder of two factories, one near Darauli and the other at

(52) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 364. P. 7.

(53) District Gazetteer—Champaran, p. 34.

(54) District Gazetteer—Saran P. 29.

(55) District Gazetteer—Saran. P. 28.

Gangua, by a party of 500 mutineers from Gorakhpur. (56) But this was merely a temporary phase of disturbance. Order came soon to be restored in Saran. The Raja of Hathwa presented an 'urzee' to the Commissioner of Patna on June 20, 1857 for submission to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in token of his loyalty to Government. (57) The Raja of Hathwa, true to his words, came forward with offers of assistance, placed men and elephants at the disposal of Government and remained a staunch supporter of Government during the Mutiny.

The flood of the Mutiny which inundated the Patna division also dashed against the Bhagalpur division. The Bhagalpur division was not, however, so widely affected as the Patna division. The Mutiny of the three regiments at Danapur gave the signal for the rising of sepoys in the Bhagalpur division. On the eve of the Mutiny the Bhagalpur division was garrisoned by the sepoys of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, and of the 32nd and 63rd Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry. (58) After the Mutiny at Danapur the sepoys of the 5th Irregular Cavalry mutinied at Bhagalpur at the midnight of August 14. They then marched towards Rohini (in the Santal Parganas) and Bausi, a village in the south of the district of Bhagalpur. The sepoys of the 32nd Infantry refused to make a common cause with the mutineers. Their fidelity saved the stations of Bausi and Deoghar from the hands of the mutineers. (59) The revolted sepoys of the 5th Irregular Cavalry got no favourable response from the local zemindars also. The local zemindars lent their help to Government in suppressing the Mutiny. The Commissioner of the Bhagalpur division, Yule, had also taken prompt steps to maintain peace in the division. He stopped a detachment of 150 men of the Fifth Fusiliers, who happened to be passing up the Ganges, posted 100 of them at Bhagalpur and sent the remaining 50 to Monghyr. (60) The panic, caused by the rise of the sepoys, came soon to be allayed. Bhagalpur was left practically untouched by the Mutiny.

Like Bhagalpur, Monghyr also remained practically immune from any mutinous rising. This was due principally to the prompt step, taken by Yule, as stated above. The posting of 150 men of the Fifth Fusiliers partly in Bhagalpur and partly in Monghyr made the important highway of the Ganges secure against any attack of the mutineers. By the end of 1857 situation in Monghyr eventually permitted the withdrawal of the 50 men therefrom. Referring to the state of things in Monghyr during the days of the Mutiny W. Tucker, the Magistrate of the district wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on July 25, 1857 thus: '.....There has been no disturbance in this district. In consequence of the extraordinary high price of grain dacoities, burglaries, and thefts appear to be on the increase. A great number of the offenders confess and state that they committed the offence in conse-

(56) District Gazetteer, Saran, Pp. 28-29.

(57) Vide Chapter V. Page 97.

(58) Kaye and Malleeson, op. cit., IV. P. 92.

(59) Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(60) Ibid.

quence of hunger. This is likely to increase, as the rain drop has failed in consequence of the dry heat in June and the excessive and continual rain in July. I am not aware of any unusual excitement or bad feeling in the district....' (61)

The Mutiny of the 73rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry and of a detachment of the 11th Irregular Cavalry, stationed at Jalpaiguri, spread alarm and panic in the district of Purnea. When the mutinous regiments of Jalpaiguri made for Purnea, they encountered an opposition from Yule and from the detachment of the 50 men of the 5th Fusiliers, withdrawn from Monghyr. The mutineers were driven into Nepal. Eventually they escaped into Oudh. (62)

The Santal Parganas also were not free from unrest and excitement at the commencement of the Mutiny. Closely following the Santal insurrection of 1855 came the Sepoy Mutiny casting its shadow on the Santal Parganas. But the Santals of the Santal Parganas did not appear to have been aggressive. In a letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on the affairs of Santal Parganas on June 21, 1857 the officiating Deputy Commissioner, Santal Parganas wrote thus : '.....as far as the Santals are concerned, there are not in my opinion any grounds for apprehension.... I am constantly conversing with the Santals themselves and I do not believe that they have any other wish than a good season for their crops. In what state the Santals about Runeegunj and towards Pachete and Hazaribagh are I cannot state, as I know nothing of them, but at present I do not see any cause to fear a disturbance either in the Damunikoh (Dumka) or any other portion of the Santal Parganas.....' (63) Yet it was not all quiet in the Santal Parganas. The activities of the 5th Irregular Cavalry caused a great disturbance there. Reporting (64) on the intriguing activities of the 5th Irregular Cavalry the Commissioner of the district wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on July 16, 1857 that about half past eight on the night of the 12th ultimo Major Macdonald, Sir Norman Leslie and Dr. Grant of the 5th Irregular Cavalry sat together in front of their mess-bungalow at Rohini in the Santal Parganas, when three men with naked swords made a sudden rush on them. Sir Leslie was disabled at the first blow. He died almost instantaneously. Major Macdonald and Dr. Grant escaped with serious wounds on their person. These three men were definitely ascertained to have belonged to the 5th Irregular Cavalry. They were caught hold of and sentenced to be hanged to death. The incident was indicative of an organised conspiracy in the regiment. There was a temporary lull which came to be broken, when the sepoys of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, stationed at Bhagalpur, mutinied in August, 1857. The mutineers marched on from Bhagalpur to Rohini, where they were joined by the other sepoys of the regiment. After having extorted 12,000 rupees from the rich inhabitants of the

(61) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part II of 1857-58. Paper No. 79. P. 95.

(62) District Gazetteer, Purnea. P. 52.

(63) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 Part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 364. Pp. 273-274.

(64) Ibid. P. 272.

station the mutineers marched in a body towards Deoghar and Bausi, the Headquarters of the 32nd Native Infantry. From both these places the mutineers were kept off through the loyalty of the 32nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry. This regiment rejecting offers of increased pay and promises of promotion in the service of the King of Delhi stood firm in its devotion to Government. (65) Moreover, the military authorities of Bausi as also of Deoghar came to learn of the approach of the mutineers beforehand and kept themselves in readiness to meet them. The Mutiny of the 5th Irregular Cavalry came to be consequently arrested. 'The Deoghar mutineers after advancing as far as Wazeerganj in the direction of Gaya suddenly turned to the north, entered Atta Serai (Atasarai or Islampur) zilla in Patna and thence moved rapidly to the west, crossed the Trunk Road to the south of Jahanabad and the Sone at Mahatullupore near Urwul (Arwal). Thence they proceeded by the neighbourhood of puroo, by Rupsagar and Dhunsolee, towards the Karummassa. They gave out that their destination was Rewah..... This body of mutineers was piloted across the country by Goodhar Singh who had formerly acted as a guide to the 5th Irregular Cavalry in their passage through Behar'. (66) The rising of the Deoghar mutineers came also to be finally crushed. A portion of the 5th Irregular Cavalry was posted at Dumka but the precautionary measures of Shyamalananda Mookerji, Sub-assistant Commissioner at Naya Dumka saved the area from any mutinous outbreak. Having good reasons to suspect the fidelity of the sepoys of the 5th Irregular Cavalry at Dumka he arranged for the transfer of the treasury-deposit of 4,000 rupees from Dumka to Suri. (67) The Santal Parganas came to be freed from the mutineers in the long run. After the departure of the 5th Irregular Cavalry from the Santal Parganas, it was all quiet and peaceful in the district. In consideration of the honesty, courage, fidelity and hardihood of the Santals Government planned to raise from among them a corps of policemen to be posted in their own district. But the caprices and impatience of external control on the part of the Santals prevailed upon Government to begin the experiment with caution, and to conduct it through the agency of an officer known to, and trusted by, the Santals. Their pay was to be not less than five rupees a month and no deductions were to be made from it on any account. They were to be enlisted for short periods in the beginning. Their arms would consist of light rifles and their own battle-axes. It was proposed that at first a small force of about three companies should be raised from among the Santals of the Dumka area (68) Two hundred Santals (69) were, in fact, initially enlisted for military service with the sanction of the Government of India.

There was a wide-spread revolt in the hilly division of Chotanag-

(65) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part 1 of 1857-58. Paper No. 363. P. 51.

(66) Commissioner of Patna to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal. Parl Papers. Vol. 44. Part IV of 1857-58. Paper No. 67. P. 8.

(67) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part 1 of 1857-58. Paper No. 363. P. 47.

(68) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44. Part 1 of 1857-58. Paper No. 363. P. 52.

(69) Home Pub. Cons. 30th April, 1858. No. 28.

pur between 1857 and 1859. The military position of the Chotanagpur division at the commencement of the Mutiny was such as to invite troubles at an early opportunity. Various stations of Hazaribagh, Ranchi, Purulia, Chaibassa and Sambalpur were, as stated before, garrisoned by detachments of the Ramghar battalion, which was formed of locally recruited sepoys, and was composed of all the three branches of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery men. Its loyalty was supposed to depend on the fidelity of the regiments at Danapur. Of the above-mentioned stations Ranchi and Hazaribagh were garrisoned not only by the detachments of the Ramgarh battalion but also by those of the 7th and 8th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry respectively. In Ranchi the Artillery branch of the Ramgarh battalion, much distrusted by the commanding officer, was a source of trouble and anxiety to Government. Hazaribagh then contained a treasury with more than a lakh of rupees in it and two jails accommodating 900 prisoners. (70) Troubles began in Hazaribagh in the wake of the Mutiny at Danapur. The two companies of the 8th Native Infantry on duty in Hazaribagh knew nothing of the Danapur Mutiny until it was communicated to them by Captain Drew through the native military officers. (71) The intelligence of the occurrence of the Mutiny at Danapur produced a sympathetic mutinous spirit in the two detachments of the 8th Native Infantry in Hazaribagh. They broke out into revolt apparently at about 1 p.m. of July 30, 1857 shortly after which the station was abandoned by all the officers there. (72) The mutineers thereupon knocked off the irons of the prisoners and incited them to escape. They burnt some bungalows and plundered the treasury. The mutineers and the released convicts then proceeded towards Ranchi along the Pittoria (Pithauria) road. (73) They thus escaped meeting Lieutenant Graham who was sent from Ranchi with two companies of Infantry and thirty horsemen with two guns of the Ramgarh battalion to disarm the two companies of the 8th Native Infantry at Hazaribagh. The Hazaribagh mutineers turned off from the 'Pittoria ghat', finding it well guarded by the 'Per-gunnait', Juggut Pall Singh, who had been directed to watch it carefully, and proceeded towards another 'ghat' to the west. It might be that they intended to proceed to Sambalpur under the leadership of Surandar Sahi who was a leader of the revolt in Sambalpur. (74) The detachment of the Ramgarh battalion under the command of Lieutenant Graham proceeding towards Hazaribagh also mutinied on the way on hearing of the rising of the detachments of the 8th Native Infantry, and joined the latter at Burmu on the way to Ranchi. The combined forces then marched towards Ranchi 'with the avowed hostile intentions against the British officers there'. Captain Dalton, officiating Commissioner of Chotanagpur, meanwhile reoccupied Hazaribagh and busied himself with restoring normal condition there. After a stay

(70) Fredrick Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(71) Home Pub. Cons. 14th August, 1857 No. 25.

(72) Ibid.

(73) Home Pub. Cons. 14th August, 1857. No. 22.

(74) Ibid.

for a month or so in Ranchi the mutineers proceeded westward to meet Kumar Singh near Rohtasgarh. They marched through Chandwa and Balumath in Palamau to Chatra. At Chatra they suffered a serious defeat at the hands of a small force of 320 men and managed to effect their escape in the direction of Sherghati. (75)

A significant episode of the Mutiny at Hazaribagh was the rising of the Santals there. Unlike the Santals of the Santal Parganas, those of Hazaribagh availed themselves of the Mutiny of the sepoys at the station to rise against the oppressive money-lenders and incidentally against the Government too. Along with the local bad characters they took to plundering such areas as Kuju on the Ramgarh road and Jharpo near Bagodar. At Mandu they were instigated by three local landholders to commit murder as also to plunder the village.

It is learnt from a letter, dated September 16, 1857 from the officiating Commissioner of Chotanagpur to the address of the Secretary, Government of Bengal that early in September 1857 'a large body of Santals had after plundering several villagers surrounded the house of a relative of Ramgarh Raja at Jharpo, 14 miles from Hazaribagh on the road to Bagodar. Lieutenant Graham was sent out with a party of his sawars and 16 Sikhs. He found the plunderers, about 200 or 300, encamped on a rising ground near Jhurpo, cooking. They immediately discharged a flight of arrows at Lieutenant Graham's party and wounded some of his men. The Sikhs and the Cavalry then charged and dispersed them, killing some ten or eleven and wounding more, and taking three prisoners and restoring to the villagers a quantity of grain etc. that had been plundered. Lieutenant Graham then returned to Hazaribagh. The prisoners freely confessed that under the orders of Ropoo Manji they had been for some time engaged in plundering.' (76) The Santals were not properly organised and could, therefore, be easily defeated into submission. There was, besides, another class of people, the dispossessed 'Bhuiya Tikayats' (Chiefs) who also rose in revolt in the wake of the sepoy rising at Hazaribagh for recovering their lost lands from those who purchased them. (77) The rising of the 'Bhuiya Tikayats' was also early controlled.

In Hazaribagh the non-military classes excepting the Santals, the dispossessed 'Bhuiya tikayats' and a very small number of local zemindars like those of Mandu were generally speaking favourably disposed towards Government during the Mutiny. Such warlike people in and around Hazaribagh as the 'Chowars,' 'Coormies', (Kurmis) 'Coles' (Kols) and others were then on the side of Government. These people possessed the peculiar virtue of never siding with the enemy of those to whom they once swore allegiance. During the Mutiny at Hazaribagh the then Additional Principal Sadar Ameen of the 24 Parganas, Rai Taraknath Sen suggested to Government to raise a small force from among the warlike people of Chotanagpur. (78) Shortly after the sup-

(75) District Gazetteer—Hazaribagh. P. 68.

(76) Home Pub. Cons. 25th September, 1857. No. 95.

(77) District Gazetteer—Hazaribagh. P. 89.

(78) Home Pub. Cons. 14th August, 1857. Nos. 28, 29.

pression of the Mutiny at Hazaribagh a levy of Kols and Santals for the military police was accordingly decided to be raised. Such a levy of 500 men came to be actually enlisted under orders of Government. (79) The zemindars of the Hazaribagh district were, on the whole, loyal. "I learn", wrote Captain Dalton from Hazaribagh on August 6, 1857 to the Secretary, Government of Bengal, "that the mutineers have not as yet been successful in inducing any influential person of the district to join them. They invited Thakoor Bisnath Sahi of Barkagarh to be their leader but he refused; they next offered the post to Lall Oopundernath Sirkar, the nephew and heir presumptive of the Maharaja of Chotanagpur, but he declined to act, referring them to his uncle. Of all the landlords of Chotanagpur these two were the most likely to have joined them and it is said, the mutineers are much discouraged at their invitations to them having been rejected, and much puzzled and divided in opinion as to their future plans." (80) About the attitude of Thakur Bisnath Sahi towards the mutineers other sources present a different account such as follows: "Thakur Bisnath Sahi of Barkagarh who had long been regarded as disaffected openly joined the mutineers and was reported to sit daily in one of the cantonment bungalows, administering justice. He also assisted the mutineers by cutting several breaches in the road over Ramgarh ghat with the obvious intention of making it difficult for troops advancing against Doranda,..... Thakur Bisnath Sahi was hanged in April, 1858." (81) It might have been that Thakur Bisnath's sympathy with the rebels was a subsequent development.

In Ranchi there was some disturbance during the Mutiny. At the commencement of the Mutiny Ranchi was the Headquarters of the Ramgarh battalion. Two companies of Infantry and thirty horsemen of the Ramgarh battalion had been sent with two guns under Lieutenant Graham to disarm the mutinous sepoys in Hazaribagh. But on the way to Hazaribagh they themselves rose in arms on receipt of the news of the Mutiny of the sepoys in Hazaribagh, seized the guns, ammunition and four elephants, and in defiance of the Lieutenant's orders marched back to Ranchi along with the Hazaribagh sepoys whom they met at Burmu, twenty miles north of Ranchi. The horsemen, however, remained loyal and proceeded with Graham to Hazaribagh. Captain Dalton and a few other European officers who were then in Ranchi left for Hazaribagh, when they felt it unsafe to continue staying in Ranchi. Dalton reoccupied Hazaribagh, but Ranchi and Doranda temporarily passed under the control of the mutineers. In the restoration of order in Hazaribagh Captain Dalton obtained valued assistance from the Raja of Ramgarh. The Raja placed some 40 or 50 armed men at his disposal. Of the Ramgarh Raja's loyalty there could be no question. Meanwhile, the mutineers after a short stay in Ranchi for a month or so left the station and proceeded towards Rohtasgarh to meet Kumar Singh there, and finally they marched through Chandwa and Balumath

(79) District Gazetteer—Hazaribagh, p. 69.

(80) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44, Part II of 1857-58. Paper No. 79. P. 241.

(81) District Gazetteer—Ranchi. Pp. 42 and 43.

in Palamau towards Chatra. (82) Before leaving Ranchi 'they behaved in the most brutal manner to the townspeople, plundering, torturing and violating their women.... They burnt all the officers' bungalows, the lines etc. A bungalow belonging to Dr. Brougham was the only one left standing. The Principal assistant's cutcherry (court) and the jail were also burnt by the sepoys, and the records were destroyed. They left 50 sick in hospital, and this building was in consequence left standing.' (83) The mutineers also beheaded an old native doctor, attached to the jail. The departure of the mutineers paved the way for a return to normal life in Ranchi. Order soon came to be restored there. Dalton returned to Ranchi on September 23, 1857.

The mutineers received very little support from the civil population in Ranchi. Most of the leading zemindars stood by Government. Among the few zamindars who stood against Government mention may be made of Ganpat Rai Bhaunro, who was an ex-Dewan of the Maharaja of Chotanagpur. (84)

Closely connected with the Mutiny in Hazaribagh and Ranchi was the revolt in Palamau through which the mutineers of the two former stations passed on their way to join Amar Singh. The revolt in Palamau assumed a serious appearance due mainly to the activities of Nilambar and Pitambar who were the two sons of the deceased chief of the tribe inhabiting the territory between the high lands of Sirguja and the low country of Palamau. They had to pay a quit rent to Government for the estates which passed to them on the death of their father. The Mutiny in Hazaribagh and Ranchi encouraged them to strike a blow for complete independence. In alliance with the Chero zemindars they openly declared themselves against Government and against such loyal Rajput Jaigirdars as Thakurai Raghubar Dayal Singh and his cousin Thakurai Kishun Dayal Singh. Late in October, 1857 a large body of the Cheros and Kharwars including 500 Bhogtas, led by Nilambar and Pitambar made an attack on Chainpur, Shahpur and Lesliganj. (85) Towards the end of October disturbances of a serious nature were reported by the Commissioner of the Chotanagpur division to have broken out in Palamau. The insurgents plundered Shahpur, Chainpur, Lesliganj and other adjoining areas and committed several murders. At Lesliganj the Excise office, Police station, and a few houses belonging to private individuals were set on fire. With the advance of Lieutenant Graham, then officiating as junior Assistant Commissioner in the district, with a small force, the insurgents retreated into the jungles and hills of Sirguja. The loyal Rajput jaigirdar, Thakurai Raghubar Dayal Singh had the credit of dispersing about 2,000 insurgents who

(82) District Gazetteer—Hazaribagh, P. 68.

(83) Letter from Capt. Dalton to the Secretary, Govt. of Bengal. Home Pub. Cons. 25th September, 1857, No. 94.

(84) District Gazetteer—Ranchi. P. 12

(85) District Gazetteer—Palamau, P. 36. Cheros and Kharwars were the two tribes of which the population of Palamau was mainly composed. The Kharwars were sub-divided into several classes of which the principal one was the Bhogta class Ibid. P. 35.

fell on Chainpur. The Commissioner of Patna intimated to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal in a letter, dated Patna November 12, 1857 that about 6,000 Cheros and Kharwars armed themselves and carried fire and sword in all directions.(86) By the end of November and the first week of December 1857 nearly the whole of the district of Palamau rose in arms. Lieutenant Graham was besieged by a large body of the insurgents at Chainpur.(87) One of the principal insurgents was Debi Baksh Rai who came to be captured by an army, sent under Major Cotter to relieve Graham. Graham was relieved and the mutineers had to withdraw from Chainpur consequent on the capture of Debi Baksh Rai. Their attack on the Ranka fort proved unsuccessful because of the opposition of Kishun Dayal Singh; but they burnt the village of Manka, near the Palamau fort. By the first week of January 1858 the affairs in Palamau were reported to have taken a favourable turn for Government. The withdrawal of the principal Chero zemindars from the insurrection tended to intimidate and dishearten the insurgents who were reported to be consequently deserting in numbers.(88) The Palamau fort came to be rescued from the control of the mutineers by Dalton and Graham acting together, the former having arrived at Palamau on January 16, 1858. The mutineers left the Palamau fort leaving guns and ammunitions behind them.(89) They also left behind a baggage which contained letters addressed to Nilambar and Pitambar Sahi and Naklout Manjhi as also certain communications from Amar Singh, promising immediate assistance from Kumar Singh.(90) Besides Nilambar and Pitambar Sahi and Naklout Manjhi there were some other leading insurgents such as Tikayat Unaras Singh and his Diwan. Unaras Singh and his Diwan were executed.(91) Captain Dalton and Lieutenant Graham followed up this victory by occupying the areas, inhabited by the Bhogtas. They also occupied Chemu, which was the native village of the insurgent brothers, Nilambar and Pitambar; this village was afterwards destroyed. But Nilambar and Pitambar could not immediately be captured. Meanwhile, there was a fresh flare-up of revolt in the middle of March 1858 under the leadership of Ganpat Rai and Bishnath Sahi both of whom, however, came eventually to be executed. Even Nilambar and Pitambar Sahi came to be captured and hanged to death. With their execution the district was tranquillised. Grants of land came to be made to Thakurai Raghubar Dayal Singh of Chainpur, Thakurai Kishun Dayal Singh of Ranka and Bhikhari Singh of Manka in recognition of the services rendered by them to Government during the Mutiny.(92)

If the revolt in Hazaribagh and Ranchi had its shadow cast on Palamau, it had its repercussions on Singhbhum also. The chief town

(86) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44, Part IV of 1857-58. Paper No. 67. P. 136.

(87) Ibid. P. 334.

(88) Ibid. P. 347.

(89) District Gazetteer, Palamau. P. 38.

(90) Ibid. P. 38.

(91) District Gazetteer, Palamau. P. 38.

(92) Ibid. P. 40.

and administrative Headquarters of the district of Singhbhum was Chaibasa. Like other stations in Chotanagpur Chaibasa was garrisoned by a detachment of the Ramgarh battalion. The news of the revolt in Hazaribagh and the report of the sympathetic revolt of the two detachments of the Ramgarh battalion sent from Ranchi under Graham to disarm the Hazaribagh rebels threw Chaibasa into a state of excitement. Captain Sissmore, the Assistant Commissioner of Chaibasa, took alarm, left the station and took shelter with the Raja of Saraikella, Chakradhari Singh. After the abandonment of Chaibasa by Captain Sissmore the detachment of the Ramgarh Infantry, stationed there, mutinied. The mutineers plundered the Government treasury, and broke open the jail. They then attempted to escape out of Chaibasa to join their comrades at Dorunda, but in vain. Their position improved a little, when they came to be joined by Arjun Singh, the zemindar of Porahat in the district of Singhbhum. With a hope to fish in troubled waters Arjun Singh entered into negotiations with the Chaibasa mutineers and agreed to give them all possible help in their campaigns against Government. On September 16, 1857 Lieutenant Birch who succeeded Captain Sissmore as the Assistant Commissioner of Chaibasa reached Chaibasa with the Rajas of Saraikella and Kharsawan. On his arrival at Chaibasa Birch learnt that the Kols made a common cause with Arjun Singh and that a large number of them, equipped with arms, were already on the way to Porahat to join Arjun Singh to deliver attacks on the Saraikella estate. Arjun Singh appeared to have taken no serious notice of the presence of Birch at the Sadar station. Birch had accordingly to take coercive measures against him. Arjun Singh thereupon proceeded to Ranchi hoping to come to terms with Government. He deposited a sum of Rs. 19,578-8-9, recovered from the mutineers, in the Lohardugga treasury for credit to Government accounts. He also promised to hand over to Government the gold and silver ornaments, secured from the persons of the mutineers as also to make a further payment of Rs. 5,956-8-8½ to Government.(93) The mutineers were also delivered up with their arms and booty to the Government authorities in Ranchi. They were tried and punished, some by execution and the rest by long periods of imprisonment. As to Arjun Singh, he was ordered to return at once from Ranchi to Chaibasa to surrender himself to Lieutenant Birch for trial. 'The Raja (Arjun Singh), however, appeared to have been completely in the hands of his Diwan, a man named Jagu for whose apprehension a reward had already been offered by Government. This man was reported to be doing his best to excite the Kols to rise and, using all his influence with the Raja, to prevent his submitting to Lieutenant Birch. Whatever may have been the cause, the Raja did not give himself up, but continued to make professions of loyalty and to promise that he would keep his pledges.'(94) The attitude of the Porahat Raja induced Lieutenant Birch to undertake a campaign against him. The Diwan, Jagu was consequently captured and executed and

(93) Home Pub. Cons. 8th January 1858 No. 145.

(94) District Gazetteer, Singhbhum, Saraikella and Kharsawan, P. 39.

the stronghold of Arjun Singh was stormed. Arjun Singh, however, managed to effect his escape. This happened towards the end of November, 1857. So long as Arjun Singh was at large, excitement among the Kols and other tribes in Singhbhum continued unabated. In fact, by the end of December 1857 Lushington, who had been temporarily appointed Special Commissioner for Manbhum and Singhbhum, reported the prevalence of a wide-spread excitement among the various tribes in Singhbhum. (95) Meanwhile on January 17, 1858 a Shekawati battalion arrived at Chaibasa under Colonel Forster. They destroyed the stronghold of Arjun Singh, the village of Chakradharpur and defeated his close followers, the Kols. Arjun Singh and the Kols still persisted in their hostility to Government. Between March 1858 and June 1858 several battles were fought between them and the forces of Government. The rebels were forced to take refuge in the mountain fastnesses of Singhbhum. By February 15, 1859 Arjun Singh and his surviving followers had at long last to surrender to the Commissioner of Singhbhum. The revolt in Singhbhum received a quietus. (96)

Singhbhum thus stood highly unsettled during the Mutiny. The spirit of fight with Government was kept alive mainly by Arjun Singh, the zemindar of Porahat and by his close followers, the Kols. At times, tribes other than the Kols had risen in arms. Captain Dalton wrote in 1858 that Chotanagpur was full of 'tribes whose predatory habits were notorious long ago and whom recent disturbances had shown that they had not forgotten their hereditary renown.' He also believed that they were 'not impelled by feelings hostile to the British Government but that they could not resist the temptation of following any chief who would lead them on plundering expeditions.' (97) There was Arjun Singh to lead the Kols to plundering expeditions during the Mutiny. The landlords and petty chiefs in Singhbhum, generally speaking, maintained a friendly attitude towards Government. The Raja of Saraikella remained a staunch supporter of Government during the Mutiny. In his report on the Mutiny in Chotanagpur the Commissioner, Captain Dalton stated that one of the relatives and feudatories of the Raja of Saraikella informed him (Dalton) that the sepoys of the cantonment of Chaibasa had been invited to plunder the treasury there and to join the mutineers at Dorunda. The relative assured that if the sepoys at Chaibasa were to make the attempt, they would be overpowered and plundered in their turn and that none would escape. "I believe this", wrote Dalton in his report, "to be the feeling of the Singhbhum chiefs."

Manbhum was also unsettled during the Mutiny but not to the extent to which Singhbhum was. Purulia was the principal town and administrative Headquarters of the Manbhum district. On August 5, 1857 the sepoys of the Rangarh battalion, stationed there, mutinied. They plundered the treasury, released the prisoners from jail and then proceeded towards Ranchi 'without apparently creating any serious dis-

(95) District Gazetteer, Singhbhum, Saraikella and Kharsawan. P. 89.

(96) District Gazetteer, Singhbhum. Pp. 40-42.

(97) District Gazetteer, Manbhum. P. 66.

turbances either in Purulia or en route.' (98) The Deputy Commissioner, Captain Oakes, in charge of Purulia had meanwhile sought refuge at Ranigunge. The Santals of the district stood highly agitated. They made an attack on the zemindar of Jaypur, but were beaten off. The Raja of Panchet estate, Nilmoni Singh rose in revolt against Government. He was arrested and sent in custody to Calcutta. He was not released until March 1859. (99) The departure of the mutineers from the district and the timely arrest of the Raja of Panchet brought the revolt in Manbhoom to an early end.

The spirit of insurrection spread also to the Sambalpur district, then forming a part of the Chotanagpur division. Sambalpur was then garrisoned by a detachment of the Ramgarh battalion. The news of the Mutiny of their comrades in Hazaribagh produced a mutinous feeling among the sepoys in Sambalpur. They came to be led by two brothers, Surandar Sahi, and Udwant Sahi. Captain Leigh, the Senior Assistant Commissioner in charge of the district sought to disarm the hostility of Surandar Sahi but in vain. The situation gradually tended to be extremely tense. 'Many of the principal zemindars were collecting their *paiks* for the purpose of resisting Government, and the whole country in the neighbourhood of Sambalpur was temporarily in the hands of the insurgents....By the beginning of December (1857) the 'dak' road to Bombay was obstructed; two of the 'dak' stations had been burnt down, while large bodies were collecting in various directions, and committing excesses of all sorts.' (100) The arrival of Major Bates early in January, 1858 in Sambalpur as the supreme commander of the district brought a turn in the tide. He defeated Udwant Sahi at the Shergati pass and destroyed the village of Kolabira 'which had been a nest of rebels'. The activities of Captain Leigh and other officers went a long way in arresting the progress of the revolt in Sambalpur. Towards the close of 1858 way was eventually paved for the restoration of tranquillity in Sambalpur.

The facts about the revolt in Bihar, as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, lead to the conclusion that Bihar was widely affected during the Mutiny of 1857-59 and that in several parts of the province the revolt assumed a popular character. In Sahabad the native warlike Rajput population rose in arms out of sympathy with Kumar Singh. Kumar Singh's presence in the Ghazipur district in the Banaras division caused a tremendous popular agitation against Government among the local chiefs, landowners, and villagers. Referring to the attitude of the zemindars of Sahabad the then officiating Magistrate of Sahabad, H. C. Wake wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on February 19, 1857 as follows: 'The influential zemindars (of Sahabad) unlike those of the neighbouring districts have not given me the slightest assistance, but while they endeavour to keep up appearances by sending numbers of sepoys on leave, not one deserter has been apprehended by

(98) District Gazetteer, Manbhoom. P. 65.

(99) Ibid.

(100) District Gazetteer, Sambalpur, Pp. 32-33.

them, nor has any information of the arrival or presence of such been given by them. I have hitherto refrained from noticing in my reports the conduct of the Raja of Dumraon and Babu Koer Singh (Kumar Singh) in this respect, because I was in hopes that they would yet by zealous co-operation and assistance redeem their good names. Their influence throughout their very large estates is so great that, if they chose, they could be of the greatest assistance.' (101) But the zemindars of Sahabad chose rather to head a rebellion against Government than to support them. The Raja of Dumraon had every sympathy with the mutineers, though at the same time he wanted to pose as a loyal subject of Government during the Mutiny. In a letter, dated September 8, 1857 (102) to A. R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, E. A. Samuells, the Commissioner of Patna wrote about the Dumraon Raja as follows : '.....He (The Dumraon Raja) has furnished an explanation of his conduct during the late rebellion in Sahabad..... He positively denies any previous knowledge of Kumar Singh's intention to rebel and alludes to the enmity between Kumar Singh and himself as negating the possibility of such knowledge on the irruption of sepoys into Arrah. About Kumar Singh's rebellion, he says, he sent information to the Commissioner first by means of a sawar and then by water, but both his messengers were compelled to return. He then, he says, hid himself from fear first in one village and then in another, but directed his people to keep quiet and support Government. He then enters at great length into the assistance, which he rendered to the Magistrate and Collector previous to the outbreak, the number of men he furnished for various services and so on..... Since the restoration of order, he says, he has given Mr. Wake 24 horses for his mounted police and has advanced a lakh of rupees to the opium agent on his requisition....' (103) But the Commissioner of Patna could not take him as a sincere friend of Government and held in the same correspondence that 'the Rajah of Dumraon was a time-server. He was not sure which side would prove victorious, and wished to offend neither. It was at one time reported that he had paid a large sum to Koer Singh and had even had an interview with him, but I have been unable to obtain any confirmation of these rumours. His conduct, however, if not actively hostile, undoubtedly amounted to gross dereliction of duty. As a zemindar he was bound under the regulations to give the authorities early notice of the incursion of armed rebels into his estates, but during the whole continuance of the rebellion no Government officer received any communication from him whatever, and he entirely failed to restrain his own villagers from plundering and destroying the property of Europeans. The aid he afforded to Major Eyre's detachment was of the most niggardly character, and it was not until Koer Singh was driven out of the district and victory had declared itself unmistakably on our side that he made his appearance again as a landholder and a British

(101) Parl. Papers, Vol. 44 Part II of 1857-58. Paper 79.

(102) Home Pub. Cons. 18th September, 1857. No. 63.

(103) Ibid.

subject, bound to support the Government.' What stands deduced from the Commissioner's correspondence is that the Dumraon Raja had leanings towards the rebels. So, the fact remains that the rising of the Rajput villages and of the influential zemindars of Sahabad turned the district into a centre of popular agitation during the period of the Mutiny. The revolted sepoys in Gaya were strengthened by large numbers of disaffected villagers and Bhojepuri men under the leadership of Judhar Singh, and Hyder Ali Khan. The attitude of the zemindars of the Gaya district was by no means friendly to Government. Wazeer-gunj was widely affected. The villagers there under the leadership of Kosheal Singh rose in arms against Government. In Hazaribagh the Santals, some local landholders, and the dispossessed 'Bhuiya Tikayats' rose against Government. The activities of Nilambar and Pitambar in alliance with the Chero zemindars made Palamau a centre of a serious popular agitation during the Mutiny. Singhbhum witnessed a struggle of the sepoys in conjunction with the Kols and other tribes of the district under the leadership of Arjun Singh. In Manbhum the sepoys, the Santals and the Raja of Panchet estate, Nilmoni Singh rose in revolt against Government. In Sambalpur the mutinous sepoys in their struggle against Government were led by Surandar Sahi, Udwant Sahi and other leaders from civil ranks.

It would not be true to hold that throughout the province of Bihar the revolted sepoys received the sympathy and support of different classes of civil population in the course of the Mutiny. In certain parts of Bihar the movement remained confined to the military class alone. At Sassaram, for instance, the sepoys rose in revolt without any support from the civil population. Bhagalpur and Monghyr were left practically untouched by the Mutiny. Purnea was only slightly affected by the Mutiny. The revolt in Saran remained confined to the military class alone. The Raja of Hathwa stood by Government and helped the arrest of the Mutiny in the district. Though the 12th Irregular Cavalry mutinied at Sagauli in Champaran, the Maharaja of Bettiah in collaboration with Jung Bahadur of Nepal came to the help of Government to suppress the rising of the sepoys of the 12th Irregular Cavalry. In Tirhut the rebels, some of whom were, of course, from civil ranks, practically got no support from the traders, bankers and zemindars. In the Santal Parganas, while the 5th Irregular Cavalry mutinied, the Santals themselves remained indifferent to the mutineers. The Muhammadan villages of southern Bihar generally remained quiet, while the Rajput and Brahmin villages around them rose in arms. In the district of Patna the rural population did not rise in revolt. (104) There the

(104) This is testified to by Edward Lockwood who was then in Patna. Lockwood had to pass two days in a boat on the river Gandak in order to move all the boats from one side of the river to the other, to prevent certain native regiments from crossing the river and to keep a sharp watch on the mutineers. He spent most of his time reading the 'Vanity Fair' inside the boat, taking a stroll only in the evening. He always found the villagers most polite and humble. None of them offered to molest him, though he was quite alone. Vide *The early days of Marlborough College*. P. 171.

spirit of opposition to Government was confined mainly to the Muslims of the Wahab school. It does not appear that the entire Muslim community of the district stood committed to hostility to Government during the Mutiny. Many a respectable native resident in Patna rendered services to the Commissioner of Patna during the days of trouble between 1857 and 1859. Among such residents of Patna mention may be made especially of Wilayat Ali Khan, Shaikh Ruza Hossain, Altaf Hossain, Maharaj Bhoop Singh, Roy Hurre Kishen, and Babu Chuni-lal.(105) Wilayat Ali Khan cast in his lot with Government from the commencement of the disturbances. In a correspondence, dated July 21, 1857 with the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, the Commissioner of Patna wrote about Wilayat Ali Khan thus: "A few days after the news of the Mutiny reached Patna, he (Wilayat Ali Khan) presented to me (Commissioner of Patna) a petition, stating that he was ready to devote life and property to the service of the state and from that day he incessantly exerted himself in the cause of Government, seeking for information, ferreting out bad characters, watching the city, and obtaining good information through emissaries, employed at his expense, from the neighbouring villages. Both he and Dewan, Moula Buksa incurred the deadly hatred of many in the city for the services they performed, and their lives were in danger." (106) The Munsiff of Jahanabad in Patna, Muhammad Farid-Uddin espoused the cause of Government, when the adjacent Rajput villages broke out into rebellion and sought to make a common cause with Kumar Singh.(107) Government had its supporters among both Hindu and Muslim gentlemen in other parts of Bihar also during the Mutiny. Among them were Shah Kabiruddin Ahmad of Sassaram, Kazi Ramzan Ali of Chapra, Muhammad Wajid, munsiff of Siwan, Nundeput Mahtoc, a wealthy 'mahajan' of Muzaffarpur, Hydar Buksh, the Nazir of the Fauzdari court in Muzaffarpur, Mahesh Lal, the Jail Daroga in Muzaffarpur, Enayat Hossain, Daroga at Siwan, Shah Khyrat Hossain and his brother, Shah Ahmad Hossain. The last two gentlemen were members of an old Muhammadan family which suffered much under the operation of the resumption laws of Government. Still they stood by Government and saved the life and property of many English officers from the fury of the rebels during the period of insurrection between 1857 and 1859.(108) There was also the Maharaja of Chotanagpur who was a strong supporter of Government during the Mutiny. It is gathered from a correspondence from Captain Dalton to A. R. Young that the Maharaja's jaigirdars and followers were all prepared to oppose the mutineers and that the Maharaja himself was anxious for the speedy reoccupation of Chotanagpur by Government.(109)

Thus, while in some parts of the province of Bihar the revolt had a popular basis, in other parts this popular character was lacking. On

(105) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 Part. II of 1857-58. Paper No. 79. P. 73.

(106) Ibid.

(107) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 Part III of 1857-58. Further papers No. 7. P. 162.

(108) Ibid. Pp. 161-162.

(109) Home Pub. Cons. 25th September, 1857. No. 94.

the whole, however, it may be said that the Mutiny in Bihar had a popular basis. Again, the same causes had not been at work everywhere in the province to produce the insurrections during the Mutiny. In Sahabad the Rajputs rose in revolt out of their allegiance to and sympathy with Kumar Singh, who in his turn was forced by circumstances to rise against Government. In Patna the spirit of insurrection was fomented mainly by the Wahabi Muslims whose religious feelings were deeply wounded by Tayler's treacherous dealings with the Maulavis. The revolt at Danapur had a military origin. The news of the Mutiny of the Danapur regiments together with the spread of various rumours about the attacks by Government on native caste and religion instigated Gaya to revolt. In the wake of the rise of the regiments at Danapur, revolt broke out in Muzaffarpur. The rise of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Sagauli eventually led to the outbreak of revolt in Champaran and Saran. Purnea rose in revolt under the influence of the Jalpaiguri mutineers. The contagion of the Danapur Mutiny and the provocation of the detachments of the Ramgarh battalion provoked Hazaribagh to revolt. The revolt in Hazaribagh had its repercussion on Ranchi and Sambalpur. Again, the news of the revolt in Hazaribagh and Ranchi excited Palamau and Singhbhum to rise in arms. The revolt in Manbhum was due to the excitement among the local Santals as also to the rising of the sepoys of the Ramgarh battalion who formed the local garrison there. Thus different sets of causes conspired to cause revolt in different areas of the province of Bihar. In this sense the Revolt in Bihar may be treated as having a regional character.

APPENDIX—A

Statement of Tirhut rebels belonging to civil Class, punished upto 15th April, 1858.

CHAPTER VII

Name of rebel, caste & place of residence.	Full particulars regarding the capture of the delinquent with or without arms and by whom captured.	Date of sentence	Nature of sentence
1. Ramdead Sahee, caste Babbun, inhabitant of (Baragaon), parganah Behurah, Zillah Tirhoot.	For using seditious languages and committing plunder; apprehended by Burkundauzes, deputed with Dumree Lal, acting Thanadar of Muzafferpore, without arms.	18th September, 1857	Transported beyond sea with forfeiture of property of every description.
2. Kadyce Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
3. Chadu Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
4. Kishna Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
5. Tiluck Tewary Do.	Do.	Do.	7 years with hard labour in irons, and forfeiture of property of every description.
6. Sheotuhul Doormee Do.	Do.	Do.	7 years Do.
7. Nathoo Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	14 years Do.
8. Chuttoo Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
9. Hunsraj Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
10. Sobah Sahai Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
11. Bijnath Tewary Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
12. Tiluck Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
13. Pundeo Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
14. Kirteeu Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
15. Chutterdhary Sahai Do.	Do. by Roorkishwar Lal, Tehsildar of Mahal's Burkagawn, without arms	19th December 1857	Do.
16. Durshun Sahee Do.	Do.	Do.	Transportation beyond sea with forfeiture of every description.
17. Raushun Sahee Do.	Do. by one Ramdeal Pandey Omaidwar, without arms.	?	...
18. Sheikh Koreban Ali, caste Sehikh, Residence unknown.	For using language to incite persons to commit act of sedition.	17th August/57 (The Hon'ble R. Forleo, Commr. under Act 14/57).	3 years.

Name of rebel, caste and place of residence.	Full particulars regarding the capture of the delinquent with or without arms and by whom captured.	Date of Sentence	Nature of Sentence
19. Ramtuhul, caste Gwala, inhabitant of Shuraf Nagur, parganah Turra-nce, Zillah Tir-hoot.	For using seditious lan-guage and committing robbery by open vio-lence, apprehended by Peadah, deputed with Sheikh Hyder Buksh, Nazir of this court, without arms.	17th August/57	5 years impt. and for- feiture of property of every description.
20. Bhagearuth, caste Gwala, inhabitant of Dhurmpoore, parganah, Turra- nce, Zillah Tir- hoot.	Do.	Do.	Do.
21. Ramdhunee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
22. Dingopal, caste Gwala, Inhabitant of Pota Surka, parganah Terrea- nce, Zillah Tir- hoot.	Do.	Do.	Do.
23. Tufani, caste Gwala of, Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
24. Ranjeet Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
25. Bhageerut Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
26. Suntokhee Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
27. Ghasee Khan, son of Shamshu Khan, caste Phythan, for- merly Town Police Sawar.	Mutinied with the 12th Irregulars and was arrested at the time, without arms.	24th August 1857	Transported for life with forfeiture of property of every description.
28. Khyrathee Khan, caste Phythan, in- habitant of mohalla Sulamganj, Zillah Chapra.	Do. with a sword.	Do.	Do.

Tirhoot Magistracy,
The 22nd May, 1858.

(Sd.) H. L. Dampier,
Offg. Magistrate.

Vide Annual Report of the Ad Hoc Records Regional Survey Committee, Bihar, 1952-1953.

CHAPTER VIII

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE MUTINY

The final suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny was followed by certain changes in the social and military organisations of the country. The Sepoy Mutiny was 'a revolt of the old against the new, of Indian conservatism against aggressive European innovation.' The conflict between the old ideas and the new ended in the victory of the latter over the former. The Mutiny shook the superstition-ridden Indian society to its very foundation and cast the old society into a new mould. The old order in the Indian society and in the domain of thought changed, yielding place to the new. The process of modernization of the Indian society which began under the impact of western culture before the outbreak of the Mutiny was fast nearing completion under favourable circumstances after the Mutiny received a quietus. In the modern, westernised society of the post-Mutiny period, Indians, educated in western science, in other words, those, who were Indian in blood but English in thought and way of life, held the keys to unlock the gates of material prosperity in the country. While the Hindus were irresistibly drawn to the study of English and western science without fear of loss of caste, the Muslims stood prejudiced against western education and kept it at an arm's length. The Muslims stood disinclined to appreciate the rush of light and air coming through the windows of the west. The Muslim religious preachers forbade the learning of English on religious grounds. This aversion to learning English and imbibing western civilisation came to react adversely on the Muslim community in the post-Mutiny period. Since status in the society then depended much on knowledge in English, the aversion of the Muslims to it closed to them every avenue of prosperity in public life and arrested the growth of the Muslim Middle class in the country. The mental predilection of the Hindus for acquiring knowledge in English and for imbibing the spirit of western civilisation, on the other hand, brought them social prestige and prosperity. Again, in the lower ranks of civil administration the English-knowing Hindus came to replace the Persian-writing Muslims not long after the suppression of the Mutiny. Before the Mutiny the Muslims largely outnumbered the Hindus in Government services which were meant for the natives, but the position changed after the movement. After the suppression of the Mutiny Muslims remained for some time excluded from Government services meant for the native people. Practically these became the monopoly of the English-knowing Hindus. The result was that the mass of the Muslims remained for some years economically hard pressed till a turn in the tide in their favour in course of time. To promote western education among the Muslims Sir Sayyad

Ahmad in 1875 founded a school which eventually developed into the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College of Aligarh. As the Muslims learnt to appreciate the value of western culture through the endeavours of this institution, they sought to equip themselves with the necessary western education to enter into a competition with the Hindus for acquiring posts in Government service. The social status of the Muslims began to improve.

The Muslims had to remain in the background for some time in the post-Mutiny period on account of their wilful indifference to the western education. They had also to suffer for some time after the suppression of the Mutiny, as Government followed a policy of repression towards them on grounds political. The Hindu-Moslem unity, exhibited, on the whole, during the Mutiny, could not be viewed with favour by an imperial power whose best interests were to be served in a divided rather than in a united India. The Government of India accordingly followed in the post-Mutiny period the old Roman policy of 'Divide et impera' by favouring the Hindus and repressing the Muslim community for some time to come. As early as 1843 Lord Ellenborough, the then Governor-General of India, 'suggested the use of communalism to preserve imperialist rule'. 'I cannot close my eyes,' he wrote in a despatch to the Duke of Wellington on June 18, 1843, 'to the belief that that race (Muhammadans) is fundamentally hostile to us and our true policy is to reconcile the Hindus.' The activities of the Muslim leaders during the Mutiny appeared to strengthen the belief of the ruling class that the Muslim community was anti-British and was hostile to the British rule in India. It was believed by Government that, if the Hindus rose in revolt in 1857 to prevent the destruction of their caste and religion, the Muslims rose in arms to vindicate their political grievances. The Muslims were, in other words, alleged by Government to have participated in the movement to exploit the fury of the soldiery for making 'a last desperate spring after the shadow of a lost Empire'. The consequence was that Government looked upon the Muslims as their political opponents and sought to cripple them after the storm of the Mutiny passed out of the country. The Muslims came to forfeit the confidence of the British Government for some time to come. The Hindus, on the other hand, remained in the good book of Government for the time being. But the Muslims were not to suffer in the cold neglect of Government for a pretty long time; nor were the Hindus destined to enjoy the confidence of Government for any considerable period of time. In 1885 was brought into being the Indian National Congress which did not take a long time to exhibit its stormy potentialities by criticising Government policy and demanding for political reforms. The national agitation in the country in the wake of the foundation of the National Congress was due largely to the initiative of the Hindus. The growth of national consciousness among the Hindus gradually led to a change in the policy of Government towards them. Government withdrew its support from the Hindus and began to favour the Muslims. It also became the policy of Government to alienate the Muslims from the Hindus at an early date so as to arrest the national

agitation in the country. The Morley-Minto Act of 1909 introduced 'Separate Electorate' for the Muslims with the result that the political gulf between the Hindus and Muslims came to be widened. The subsequent policy of Government was directed towards widening this gulf between the Hindus and Muslims further by playing off the latter against the former.

It was the native Army, the so-called Bengal Army that had taken the initiative in the Revolt of 1857-59. To prevent the recrudescence of any such military revolt in future the British Government of India took care to reorganise the military system of the country. The suppression of the Indian Mutiny was, in other words, followed by a radical military reconstitution.

On July 15, 1858 Queen Victoria who came to be announced Empress of India in terms of the Government of India Act, 1858 appointed a commission to consider the question of re-organising the Indian Army. The commissioners were required to report *inter alia* on the following points :—(1)

1. 'The terms on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.'
2. 'The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces after the restoration of the tranquillity.'
3. 'The proportions which the European troops should bear to the Native troops in the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery branches of the Indian Army.'
4. 'How far should the European portion of the Indian Army be composed of troops of the Line and how far of troops, raised for service in India only?'
5. 'Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native troops, either regimentally or by brigade?'
6. 'Whether the Native force should be regular or irregular or both; and if so, in what proportions?'
7. 'Whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned?'

The commissioners examined quite a large number of witnesses, gave the most careful consideration to the evidences borne by them and finally submitted the following report (2) on March 7, 1859.

With regard to the terms of transfer the commissioners held that 'the 56th clause of the Act for the better Government of India assured the forces, then (*i.e.* after the passing of the Government of India Act of 1858) belonging to Her Majesty's Indian Army, of the like pay, pensions, allowances and privileges and like advantages as regards promotion, as if they had continued in the service of the said Company. The privileges and advantages, thus referred to, consisted in a prescriptive

(1) Parl. Papers. Vol. 8 of 1859. Session 2. Pp. V--VII.

(2) Ibid. Pp. IX to XV. Also The Annals of the Indian Administration Vol. III, edited by Meredith Townsend. Pp. 245-251.

right to rise strictly by seniority to the rank and emoluments of the Colonel of a regiment, with the option of retiring before attaining that position or after various periods of service, on a scale of pay or pension considerably higher than that granted to the officers of the Line. No change, therefore, could be made which would in any way disturb the system of promotion by seniority as affecting the officers, now in the service, but new regulations might be framed on this and all other points for all, who hereafter might enter the Indian Army.'

As regards the permanent force to be maintained in India the commissioners reported that the estimates of force, given by the witnesses, examined by them, ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 Europeans. The commissioners dwelt on the necessity of maintaining for the future defence of India a European force of much greater strength than that which existed previous to the outbreak of 1857. The strength of such a force should be about 80,000 of which 50,000 would be required for Bengal, 15,000 for Madras and 15,000 for Bombay.

As to the proportion of the Native to the European soldiers the Commissioners opined that 'the Native force should not, under present circumstances, bear a greater proportion to the European in Cavalry and Infantry than two to one for Bengal and three to one for Madras and Bombay respectively.' Commissioners unanimously held that the Artillery should be mainly European in composition. Commenting on the formation of the Military Police, the commissioners held that they saw in it elements of future danger and recommended that precaution should be taken 'in not giving the force a stricter military training than might be required for the maintenance of discipline, lest a new Native force should be formed, which might hereafter become a source of embarrassment to Government.'

On the point namely 'should the European soldiers of the Indian Army be troops of the Line or troops of a Local Force' the witnesses were not unanimous in their evidence. Majority of them argued against the maintenance of European troops, raised for service in India only. The views of the majority were supported by Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, Sir George Clark, Under Secretary of State for India, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Governor of Madras and others, who were long associated with India and Indian administration. The minority, headed by Lord Canning, the first Viceroy of India, and others, on the other hand, proposed the maintenance of a local European Army in India. The minority, however, agreed that a portion of the European force to be maintained in India after the suppression of the Mutiny should be supplied from the Army of the Line to the extent of one-fourth or one-third of the whole.

On the question of the admixture of European and Native forces the commissioners reported that in the opinion of the majority of the witnesses any admixture of the two forces regimentally would be detrimental to the efficiency and discipline of both but that the admixture by brigade would be most advantageous.

With regard to the point, namely whether the Native Force should be regular or irregular or both, the commissioners opined that the native Cavalry throughout India should be organised on an Irregular system. The members of the Irregular Cavalry should be well paid, so that they should be able to purchase and maintain horses and arms of a superior description. The Native Infantry should be mainly Regular, but some Infantry regiments should be organised on an Irregular system only on the recommendation of the provincial Governors. The Commissioners held that the Regular Regiments should be larger in number than the Irregular ones.

As regards the point *viz.*, 'whether any Native Artillery corps should be sanctioned' the commissioners stated that the Artillery should be mainly a European force. The commissioners at the same time submitted that every consideration should be given to those corps of Native Artillery which proved loyal during the late Mutiny.

The commissioners also submitted for the consideration of Queen Victoria such other recommendations as were suggested to them by the various witnesses in the course of their evidences on the question of Army reorganisation. Some of those recommendations were as follows :—

1. 'That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, mixed promiscuously in each regiment.'
2. 'That all men of the Regular Native Army should be enlisted for general service.'
3. 'That a modification should be made in the uniform of the Native troops, assimilating it more to the dress of the country and making it more suitable to the climate.'
4. 'That the Articles of War which govern the Native Army should be revised and that the power of commanding officers should be increased.'
5. 'That the promotion of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be regulated on the principle of efficiency rather than of seniority and that commanding officers of regiments should have the same power to promote non-commissioned officers as is vested in officers commanding regiments of the Line.'
6. 'That the Commander-in chief in Bengal should be styled the Commander-in-chief in India and that the general officers commanding the armies of the minor Presidencies should be commanders of the forces, with the powers and advantages which they have hitherto enjoyed.'

Before and during the Mutiny the Army in India was composed of both native and British soldiers. The British branch of the Indian Army was composed of a part of the Queen's Army and of such British soldiers as were recruited by the Company on its own initiative. When the Government of India Act, 1858, ended 'the antiquated system, which interposed the mechanism of the East India Company between the

(British) Crown and the Indian Empire,' it was decided that the British Army of the East India Company should be amalgamated with the Queen's Army and transferred to the Crown. Many British officers and British soldiers in the service of the Company 'had made and many more, perhaps, intended to make India their home and had married or hoped to marry Indian or Eurasian wives whom they could not take to Europe.' This fact together with the possibility of a reduced pay in the case of the transfer to the Crown evoked strong protests from the Company's British officers and British soldiers against the decision of Government to transfer them to the service of the Crown. Some of them even displayed a tendency towards Mutiny, known to the posterity as the White Mutiny. But the Home Government adhered to the decision of complete amalgamation of the Company's British troops with the Queen's Army. In protest 10,000 British soldiers disliking service under changed conditions took their discharge with a bounty offered to them. The officers were assured of pensions due to them as under the Company's rules. The discontent was allayed. As regards the permanent force to be maintained in India as a whole, the total strength was reduced but the British element was increased. In 1863 the Army in India had an aggregate strength of 205,000 of whom 65,000 were British. In other words, in 1863 there were 65,000 British troops as against 140,000 native troops.(3) The experience of the Mutiny of 1857 led to the implementation of the suggestion of the commissioners that in the Bengal Presidency including the Punjab the ratio of British to native troops should be normally one to two, whereas their ratio in Bombay and Madras Presidencies should be one to three. The native Artillery was abolished. The Artillery was transferred to the charge of Europeans. The corps of Bengal, Madras and Bombay Artillery and Engineers were amalgamated with the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers.

The uniform of the regular native soldiers came to be much modified. 'The shako and the kilmarnock cap were discarded in favour of the turban, and the long, closely fitting trousers in favour of wide breeches or knickerbockers and puttees, approaching the Indian rather than the European style of dress.' (4)

A radical change came to be introduced in the composition and recruitment of the Indian native Army. Formerly the sepoys were recruited mainly from the high-caste Hindus of Oudh and the neighbouring areas. This high-caste composition of the sepoys and their recruitment from a particular region were adjudged responsible for the undermining of the discipline of the sepoys of the Native Army before the Mutiny. With this bitter experience gained from the Sepoy War

(3) In 1885, when the Punjeh incident made war with Russia imminent, the Government of India increased the number of both European and native forces subsequently. The total of European forces was raised to 73,500, and the native troops came to be 154,000 strong. Vide Camb. Hist. of India Vol. VI p. 397.

It may be recalled here that in 1857 the total strength of the British soldiers in India was 15,522 and that of the sepoys was 232,224. Vide p. 66 ante.

(4) Camb. Hist. of India. Vol. VI. P. 397.

the Government of India re-organised the system of the composition and recruitment of the native soldiery after the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny. Henceforth, as the commissioners suggested, the native Army was to be composed of men of different nationalities, castes and creeds and was to be recruited mainly from the Punjab and not from Oudh. No longer would the native troops be recruited from the Brahmins and Rajputs of Oudh. They came to be replaced by Gurkhas, Pathans and Sikhs of the Nepal and the Punjab areas. The high-caste Hindus came to be excluded from the Oudh Police Force which was ordered to be composed of Muslims and Hindu Kayasthas alone after the suppression of the Mutiny. (5) The Madras Army ceased in course of time to be composed of the Telugus and came to be formed of the Sikhs, Gurkhas and other martial classes of the north. Thus was the Indian society, civil and military, affected by the Mutiny. To prevent the recurrence of any revolt in future the Government of India adopted the policy of creating division and disunion in the civil ranks. The native Army was also purged of dangerous elements, and was ordered to be composed of such martial native races as promised to remain loyal to Government in future.

(5) Indian Historical Records Commission proceedings Vol. XXIX. Part II. P.

CHAPTER IX.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THE MUTINY

Various social reforms, introduced by the British Government in India during the pre-Mutiny period, created much unrest in the conservative class of the then Indian society. (1) The reforms appeared to the orthodox class as so many attempts to subvert the native caste and religion and to upset the existing structure of society only to remodel it after European fashion. Abolition of the socio-religious practices like Sati and infanticide, legalisation of widow-remarriage, granting of civil rights to religious converts, spread of female education, introduction of English as the medium of instruction, preaching of Christianity to the Indians by the missionaries, construction of railways, foundation of the electric telegraph system—measures such as these aroused suspicion in the conservative class regarding the designs of Government upon native caste-prejudices and religious beliefs. Fear and suspicion were in the air. The impact of passion and prejudice upon the native mind was tremendous. Again, Lord Dalhousie's policy of not allowing the childless princes of 'dependent' Native states to adopt sons to succeed them as rulers in their respective states as also his policy of annexing the territories of such childless princes at their death in pursuance of the Doctrine of Lapse left the Native princes in an unsettled and agitated state of mind. The annexation of Oudh, 'the crowning act of British usurpation' added much to the prevailing unrest in the country. There also arose protests of 'the old order against the new, of the Indian conservatism against European innovation.' Government came to be accused of the breach of faith and of disregarding native caste and religion. The country then appeared like a mine ready to explode at the slightest spark. The spark came at last to be supplied by the newly introduced Enfield Rifle, which was equipped with cartridges, greased with the fat of cows and swine. The sepoys read in the introduction of the greased cartridges the determination of Government to destroy their caste and religion. So they decided to strike a blow to avenge the wrongs done to them. With the blow, dealt by Mangal Pandey, a sepoy of the 34th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, on March 29, 1857, the Mutiny commenced.

The initiative in declaring the Mutiny was thus taken by the military class. The Mutiny at its commencement was, indeed, a military revolt. It is not, however, the fact that the entire native Army had been up in arms against Government in vindication of their grievances. Out of about 2,33,000 sepoys in the then Indian Army only 80,000 to

(1) Vide Chapter II for a detailed discussion.

90,000 actually rose in arms. (2) Of the rest many openly sympathised with Government at a time, when more than one-third of them was mutinous. All the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers as also all the sepoy of the 70th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry placed their services at the disposal of Government. In a petition, dated Barrackpur, May 25, 1857 to the Governor-General they expressed their willingness for marching to Delhi to fight with the mutineers there. (3) The sepoy and officers of the 7th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, garrisoned at Danapur, submitted the following petition to the Governor-General through H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel, commanding the 7th Regiment, in token of their fidelity to Government:

"At present, the men of bad character in some regiments and other people in the direction of Meerut and Delhi have turned from their allegiance to the bountiful Government and created seditious disturbances and have made choice of the ways of ingratitude and thrown away the character of sepoys true to their salt. At present, it is well known that some European regiments have started to punish and coerce these rebels. We trust that by the favour of the bountiful Government we also may be sent to punish the enemies of Government, wherever they are....." (4) The native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, drummers and sepoy of the 63rd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, stationed at Berhampur, were also loyal to Government, as would be evident from the following petition, submitted by them to the Governor-General of India on June 1, 1857 :

"...We petition that we may be numbered among the good and trustworthy soldiers of the state, as we have always been; and we are prepared and ready to go wherever and against whomsoever you may please to send us, should it even be against our own kinsmen." (5) The sepoy of the 32nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry in the like manner expressed their loyalty to Government and their readiness to be sent to Delhi and other places to quell the disturbers of peace. (6) The sepoy of the 53rd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, posted at Kanpur, were also faithful to Government during the Mutiny. (7) Subahdar Major Bhawani Singh, an old native officer of the 2nd Regiment of the Bengal Native Cavalry at Kanpur stood against the revolted sepoy of his own regiment even at the risk of his life. (8) The corps under the command of Captain Rattray, Commandant of the Bengal Police Battalion at Suri, volunteered their services against the mutineers anywhere in the country. (9) Again, 'in regiments, which mutinied and for the most part went over to the rebels without murdering their officers or committing any other sanguinary outrage, there were sepoys, who appeared to have

(2) Vide P. 1 (footnote, 2) ante.

(3) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857. Paper No. 263. Pp. 337-338.

(4) Parl. Papers. Vol. 30 of 1857. Paper No. 282. P. 50.

(5) Ibid. P. 70.

(6) Ibid. Paper No. 286. P. 68.

(7) Kaye and Mallsen, op. cit. II. P. 245.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 Part I of 1857-58 Paper No. 364. P. 265.

had no heart in the revolt, though they failed in their duty as soldiers, and who evinced their peaceable disposition and their want of sympathy with those, who were armed in open rebellion against the Government, by dispersing to their villages, when the regiments broke up, and by mixing quietly with the rural population'.⁽¹⁰⁾ Many Infantry and Cavalry regiments of the Madras Army remained loyal to Government during the Mutiny. ⁽¹¹⁾ It is evident, therefore, that many a native regiment of the British Indian Army were then loyal to Government and that the entire native Army did not rise in revolt. ⁽¹²⁾

As regards the attitude of the territorial and landed aristocrats of the country towards Government during the Mutiny, it was, on the whole, friendly. Majority of the Princes, Rajas, Maharajas and landlords then stood favourably disposed towards Government. ⁽¹³⁾ It is no exaggeration to say that, had the landed Chiefs and the Princes of Native states made a common cause with the mutinous sepoys and jointly risen in revolt against Government in 1857, India might have emerged crowned with political freedom out of the welter of the Mutiny. If the Nizam revolted, he might have carried with him against Government the wavering population of the southern and central India. Sindhia and Holkar being alienated might have stimulated the opposition of the Marathas by offering them their leadership. The hostility of the Rajas of Patiala and Jhind might have left the British Government deprived of the help of those Sikh allies who helped to crush the rebellion in the north. But such was not to be. All the above-mentioned Chiefs were, in reality, strong supporters of Government during the Mutiny.

Thus, the fact remains that the entire native Army had not risen in revolt against Government during the Mutiny. It is also a fact that majority of the landed and territorial aristocracy of the country were then pro-Government. Whether or not the movement of 1857 was broad-based like the French Revolution of 1789 or the Russian Revolution of 1917 upon the willing support and co-operation of the civil population at large is a question around which centres not a little controversy. The nature of the Mutiny requires indeed an unbiased study to ascertain the extent of the general awakening of the Indian people by 1857 and to decide whether it really merits to rank as a struggle for political freedom of the country. While the contemporary British Press and the British military authorities considered the Mutiny as a controversy between the Government and its soldiers, not between the Government and the people, other authorities admitted only a slight degree of popular force behind the movement, though describing it, on the whole, as essen-

⁽¹⁰⁾ Statement of the Secretary to the Government of India, C. Beadon, Vide Home Pub. Cons. 31st July 1857, No. 11. Also Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 Part I for 1857-58. Paper No. 26, P. 9.

⁽¹¹⁾ Vide P. 19 ante.

⁽¹²⁾ A further list of native regiments that remained loyal to Government during the Mutiny has been enclosed under App. A at the end of this chapter.

⁽¹³⁾ Vide Chapter V for a detailed discussion.

tially a military revolt. A modern tendency is towards characterising the Mutiny as India's Freedom Movement in which the people of the country participated to free themselves from the British yoke. To ascribe an exclusive military character to the movement of 1857, on the one hand, and to hold, on the other, that the movement was inspired by the patriotism of the Indian people, and was well planned and properly organised on an all-India basis with a view to achieving their political self-determination would both be, however, too extreme views. While the first view is untenable, the second one is an unduly overcoloured statement of the nature of the Mutiny and is not, therefore, acceptable without modification. It is true that the entire civil population of the country did not come forward to side with the revolted sepoys. It would not be, however, true to hold that throughout the period of the Mutiny in every Mutiny-stricken area of India the revolted sepoys stood absolutely divorced from the sympathy and support of the civil population. The fact is that the Indian Mutiny was a movement of a mixed character. In certain regions the mutinous sepoys were joined by the civil population out of various motives, while in others they stood deprived of people's support. The leaders of the Mutiny lacked the personality and organising ability of a Lenin or a Washington and could not, therefore, organise the movement on a popular basis all over India. They also failed to enlist the support and sympathy of the new middle class people who were growing up under the British rule.

In almost the whole of the then North-Western provinces, in Bundelkhand, Oudh, the Saugor and Narbada territories, in west Bihar and Chotanagpur, the Mutiny wore the appearance of a popular revolt. Those areas had been scenes of risings of the sepoys and people alike. So far as the North-Western provinces were concerned, these looked like a blazing mine in the course of the Mutiny. A great unrest then prevailed among the people there due to reasons many and varied. Peasants had to suffer much at the hands of the local executive officers. The 'hateful baniah' (money-lender class) was left free in his policy of extortion under the protection of Government. The talukdars, with their occupation gone, vowed revenge on Government and swelled the rank of the mutineers. Various social reforms, introduced by Government, caused much agitation in the North-Western provinces, where the majority of the population was commanded by the Hindus.⁽¹⁴⁾ Again, the so-called Bengal Army, which was the soul of military opposition to Government during the Mutiny was composed of men, belonging largely to the agricultural class of the North-Western provinces. The agitation of the Bengal Army accordingly found its spontaneous and sympathetic echo among the civil population of that region. 'In no other part of the country was there so close an alliance between the military and the agricultural classes; and nowhere else, therefore, was a great movement among the former more likely to evoke the sympathies of the latter and

(14) Out of upwards of 33 millions of population of the then North-Western provinces the Hindus numbered 28 millions in round numbers and the Muslims
Vide Kaye—op. cit., III, P. 194 footnote.

to swell into a popular revolt.' In no other part of the country, again, did the operation of the land-revenue system of Government react so adversely as in the North-Western provinces. There the resumption of rent-free tenures by Government and the sale of estates of numerous landed-proprietors by auction to the highest bidders in accordance with the decrees of civil courts in satisfaction of the claims of Government to arrears of rent did not go by unchallenged. Measures of resumption and sale of estates by auction dispossessed many a land-owner in the North-Western provinces and reduced them to poverty. The auction-purchasers who stepped into their shoes were strangers, chiefly traders and Government officials having no sympathy with the peasants. The dispossessed land-owners looked upon the British Government as the author of all their calamities. They continued living on lands, which were formerly theirs, merely as tenants, while the new purchasers considered it safe to remain away from their purchased lands. The peasants unable or unwilling to get reconciled with their new masters, allied themselves with their former lords, bestowed upon them all their sympathy, reserving their hatred for their new masters and for the British Government of India. The impolitic measures of resumption and sale by auction consequently led to a serious social disturbance in the North-Western provinces on the eve of the Mutiny. There was yet another cause of discontent and unrest in the North-Western provinces before the Mutiny. This was the higher assessment of revenue in that part of the country in the pre-Mutiny days. As borne out by the evidence (15) of Ross Donnelly Mangles before William Ewart on March 3, 1859, the land revenue in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa with a total area of 1,26,133 square miles was by the last returns $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions sterling, while the land-revenue in the North-Western provinces covering an area of 72,052 square miles was by the last returns nearly 5 millions sterling. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the area of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa was nearly twice the area of the North-Western provinces the revenue realised from the latter far exceeded the revenue, collected from the former. In other words, the people of the North-Western provinces had to bear a heavier burden of revenue than the people of the permanently settled areas and consequently chafed under a sense of discontent and oppression. To sum up, sufferings of the people at the hands of local executive officers, resumption of rent-free tenures, sale of estates by auction, evils of higher assessment and larger-revenue, introduction of social reforms, prejudicial to the Hindus, and the popular belief that Government was bent on defiling native caste and religion, created a serious ferment in the rural society in the North-Western provinces before the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857. To keep the people alert over the coming storm and to prepare them for an active participation in the impending revolt 'Chapaties' or cakes of unleavened bread were widely distributed throughout the North-Western provinces and Oudh. The 'Chapaties' produced the desired effect. The people took alarm. The Mutiny breaking out in Meerut, the North-Western provinces were in a blaze.

(15) Parl. Papers, Vol. 4 of 1859 P. 121.

The rising in Meerut did not remain confined to the sepoys alone. In the early part of 1857 Meerut was full of disquieting rumours about greased cartridges and sale of food, polluted with bone-dust. The Hindus of Meerut, who commanded the majority of the population there and were extremely caste-conscious, readily believed in those rumours and stood highly agitated over the supposed design of Government to destroy native caste and religion. As stated by Fleetwood Williams, the then Commissioner of Meerut, 'all the rumours by which the minds of the native soldiers were prepared for revolt were industriously disseminated at Meerut, especially those regarding the use of polluting grease in the preparation of the new cartridges and the mixture of ground bones in flour by which, it was said, Government desired to destroy the religion of the people. One of the many emissaries who were moving about the country appeared at Meerut in April, ostensibly as a fakir, riding on an elephant, with followers and having with him horses and native carriages. The frequent visits of the men of the Native regiments to him attracted attention and he was ordered through the police to leave the place; he apparently complied, but, it is said, he stayed some time in the lines of the 20th Native Infantry.'⁽¹⁶⁾ Meerut was thus in the grip of a great excitement on the eve of the Mutiny. When the Mutiny began, it was joined by the civil population too. Mixed crowd of sepoys, villagers,⁽¹⁷⁾ released convicts, evil-minded men from the Sadar bazaar of Meerut and the Gujars were all up in arms against the ruling authorities. The rebels got an ample supply of arms from the shops of native armourers. Lawlessness reigned supreme. Major G. W. Williams, Commissioner of Military Police, North-Western provinces wrote on November 15, 1858 about the lawless state of things in Meerut thus : "The scene, as described by eye-witnesses, must have been appalling. In an instant all order was subverted. Raging mobs of marauders roving about in search of plunder; loud yells and cries of 'Ali', 'Mi' (for the Muhammadans soon took the lead, raising above all other sounds this, the watchword of their religion); bungalows blazing in all directions; Europeans, the objects of popular fury, flying in haste and confusion; and the bodies here and there of our poor countrymen and helpless women and children, weltering in their blood must have formed sights once seen, never to be forgotten."⁽¹⁸⁾ The rebels came at last to be punished and order was fully restored in Meerut.

The news of the outbreak in Meerut reached Saharanpur on May 12, 1857. On receipt of this news the disaffected sepoys and the civil population of Saharanpur stood ready for revolt. There was, however, no general outbreak, until disturbances in Muzaffarnagar commenced. Thereafter wave after wave of disquieting news rolled through Saharanpur. A serious disorder followed, as the Gujars and Rangars started plunder-

(16) Official narrative on Meerut. P. 26.

(17) The revolted villagers belonged to such villages as Kumhera, Ikhtiyarpur, Gagaul, Sisari, Muradnagar, Panchlighat, Nagla and others. Vide District Gazetteer, Meerut. History of the Mutiny.

(18) Official narrative on Meerut. P. 7.

ing the property of the bankers, money-lenders and traders. The bankers and traders closed their shops, and buried their valuables under ground. Business was all but suspended.(19) Revolts broke out at such villages as Fatehpur, Sanpala Bakal, Babupur, Gokulwala and others.(20) The inhabitants of the village of Gokulwala were punished by Government with the help of the zemindars of the Kheri pargana. The villages of Fatehpur, Sanpala Bakal and Babupur were set on fire. The village of Manakpur also rose in revolt under the leadership of one Umrao Singh who assumed the title of Rajah and levied money from the surrounding villages.(21) Manakpur was finally burnt but Umrao Singh could not be apprehended. Three other rebellious villages, namely Sandauli, Randahwa, and Buddha Kheri were also burnt. The sepoys posted in Saharanpur also rose in Mutiny with the support of the civil population. Two companies of the 5th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry and a detachment of the 29th Native Infantry mutined with people's support on June 2, 1857 and July 11, 1857 respectively. Though the authority of Government was, in fine, restored in Saharanpur, the fact remained that it was not so much the soldiery as the civil population that stood hostile to Government in Saharanpur during the Mutiny. The newly introduced land-revenue system and the decrees of the civil courts hard hit the peasantry and the small land-holders in Saharanpur and drove them into the camp opposed to Government. The disaffected peasantry and small land-holders were prepared to go to any length to reverse the decisions of the civil courts.(22)

In Muzaffarnagar, as in Saharanpur, it was the civil population rather than the soldiery that took the lead in the revolt against Government. The intelligence of the revolt of Meerut caused a great excitement in Muzaffarnagar. A detachment of the 20th Regiment of the Bengal

(19) Spankie's official report—Pp. 2-3.

(20) F. Williams—official narrative on Saharanpur. Pp. 2-3.

(21) Ibid. P. 3.

(22) On the popular nature of the Saharanpur revolt Kaye writes thus : "The fear was not of the soldiery but of the populace. Whilst the soldiery were at least outwardly tranquil, among the people were the throes and spasms of feverish emotion. Class rose against class ; the strong against the weak ; the debtor against the creditor : the beaten defendant against the successful plaintiff. The greatest joy of all was to reverse, by stretching forth a mailed hand, the decisions of the English courts. But underlying all this internecine strife there was a hatred, strong, though subdued, of British rule..... The zemindars were one with the lower orders. Rebellion, not plunder alone, actuated the mass of the population... In the city, men were closing their shops, and burying their valuables. There was an almost entire suspension of business, whilst on the public roads, formerly 'crowded to excess', there was something like a solitude, broken only by a few bands of armed men. There was no longer any security for life or property. The civil power was utterly prostrate. Yet all this time there was no danger from the sepoys. The Sepoy Treasure-guard continued true to their duty. A strong party of sepoys accompanying the English gentlemen and the horsemen of the District Police went out to coerce the rebel villages... Whilst in some parts the authorities were eager to rid themselves of the great danger of the sepoys, here they were regarded as elements of safety, and our people sought their protection against the enmity of the inhabitants of the towns and villages—and this at no great distance from Meerut and Delhi, where military mutiny was rampant." History of the Sepoy War in India. Vol. III. PP. 249-251.

Native Infantry which mutinied in Meerut formed the native guard to watch over the treasury in Muzaffarnagar. Apprehending that the detachment in Muzaffarnagar might rise in revolt to hear of the Mutiny of the main body of the 20th Regiment in Meerut the District Magistrate, Berford, ordered that the public offices in Muzaffarnagar should at once be closed. This order for closing the Government offices in Muzaffarnagar led the people there to think that the British rule was at an end throughout the district and that a reign of anarchy commenced. The result was that the land-owners and peasants of the district rose in revolt. The sepoys also followed suit and joined the civil population, demonstrating their grievances by plundering the treasury, and burning public records and Government quarters. The British revenue system operating in Muzaffarnagar added much to the popular agitation there during the Mutiny. The Syud zemindars who were reduced to poverty under that revenue system carried on hostility to Government conjointly with the disaffected villagers. Government offices and records were burnt, officers' quarters were destroyed, and the treasury was plundered. The 'banias' and 'mahajans', who enjoyed the favour of Government suffered much at the hands of the furious populace. The police of Muzaffarnagar were sympathetic towards the rebels. They remained indifferent to the cause of Government and did literally nothing to restore order in the district by arresting the miscreants. As recorded by R. M. Edwards, the then District Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar, 'The Police appear to have come to an understanding with the people that one should not interfere with the other: that, if the villagers permitted the police to remain quietly at their stations and draw their pay, the villagers might commit what crimes they pleased without any attempt at prevention on their part. The natural result was that violent crimes of all kinds were daily, almost hourly, committed throughout the district, not secretly or by night, but openly and at noon-day.'⁽²³⁾ Thus Muzaffarnagar stood highly agitated and disturbed during the Mutiny. The parganas of Budhana, Shikarpur, Baghra, Chauthawal, Thana Bhawan, Kandhla and Jhunjhana, and the Jat villages of Shamli were important centres of the risings of the people of Muzaffarnagar.⁽²⁴⁾ Khairati Khan of Parasauli in the Khandhla pargana, Qazi Mahbub Ali and his nephew, Inayat Ali as also the Syud zemindars were among the leaders of the Mutiny in Muzaffarnagar. The rising in Muzaffarnagar was finally suppressed and order restored in the district.

A detachment of the 9th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry mutinied in Bulandshahr on May 22, 1857 on hearing of the revolt of the four companies of the same 9th Regiment at its Headquarters, namely Aligarh. The sepoys in Bulandshahr rising in revolt, the Gujars of the district joined hands with them and unitedly released prisoners from jail and took to destroying public offices and records. The Gujars of the parganas, Dadri and Sikandaraabad sacked the rich and populous town of Sikandaraabad, situated within a few miles of Bulandshahr. The chief land-owner of Malagarh, Walidad

(23) Vide his official narrative on Muzaffarnagar. P. 4.

(24) Ibid. P. 13.

Khan who was a man of considerable influence declared himself against the British Government and came to be joined by bad elements of the district. He occupied Aligarh and Khurja and attracted to his standard the valiant Pathans of Barah Basti in the Bulandshahr district. The villages in the Bulandshahr district then stood, in general, highly disaffected. The general attitude of the Muslims of Bulandshahr towards Government was hostile. But the Jats stood in favour of Government.

Aligarh witnessed the Mutiny of the four companies of the 9th Native Infantry a detachment of which was garrisoned in Bulandshahr. The Mutiny broke out immediately after the execution of a local Brahmin, named Naren.(25) who was accused of preaching rebellion to the sepoys of the 9th Native Infantry. The revolted sepoys plundered the treasury-building and the local post office, set them on fire and finally left the district with three lakhs of rupees looted from the Collector's treasury. The revolted sepoys did not stand divorced from the support of the civil class people. Many of the civil population of the district joined them for the sake of loot and plunder. Certain ambitious, self-seeking chiefs sought to avail themselves of the opportunity to replace the authority of the British Government in the district by their own. At Khair, for instance, one Rao Bhopal Singh assisted by his Chauhan followers deposed the tahsildar, took possession of the tahsil-building and proclaimed a Rajput Government. Bhopal Singh was consequently executed. Certain Muslim leaders like Nasim-ullah, Muhammad Ghaus Khan, Mahbub Khan and Hasan Khan set up a Muslim Government in the district for the time being. Two Rajput zemindars of Akrahad, Mahtab Singh and Mangal Singh, then stood opposed to Government.(26) It may also be mentioned in this connection that during the Mutiny in Aligarh the Jats were at feud with the Rajputs and that the Hindus and Muhammadans of the district were hostile to each other. In their attitude towards Government if the Muslims were unfriendly, the Hindus were rather apathetic.(27)

In the districts of the Rohilkhand division the hostility of both the civil and military classes towards Government during the Mutiny was quite manifest. The Muslims of Rohilkhand seized the opportunity afforded by the Mutiny to make a last desperate attempt at reviving the glory of the Mughal Empire. They defied the British Government in India and rose in arms against them under the leadership of Khan Bahadur Khan and Mobarak Shah Khan of Bareilly. Provocations of these two rival leaders together with the news of the risings in Meerut and Delhi, and the spread of various kinds of disquieting rumours produced anti-government and mutinous feelings in the Rohilkhand division. This division then comprised the districts of Bareilly, Budaun, Shahjahanpur, Moradabad and Bijnor. Bareilly was then garrisoned by the 18th and 68th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry, the 8th Regiment of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry and a Native battery of the Bengal Artillery. The news of the Mutiny in

(25) W. J. Bramley. Official narrative on Aligarh. P. 1.

(26) Ibid. P. 7.

(27) Ibid.

Meerut and Delhi reacted adversely more on the civil population than on the above-mentioned regiments, garrisoning the district. Air was then thick with various rumours which disturbed and irritated the public mind and made men ripe for rebellion. As recorded by J. F. D. Inglis, 'During the months of April and May (1857) various reports were in circulation throughout the district all tending to incense the minds of the people against the English Government, and to impress them with the idea that attempts were about to be made to destroy their caste and ultimately to compel them to embrace the Christian religion. The native regiments were kept in order for some time by the skilful management of their officers but on the 31st May, 1857 they rose in open Mutiny.' (28) Bareilly was in a blaze. Khan Bahadur Khan proclaimed himself the Viceroy of Rohilkhand. He set up his own Government and began to rule in the name of Bahadur Shah. He issued a proclamation calling upon the Hindus and Muslims alike to co-operate with one another and to make united efforts to draw down the curtain over the British rule in India. The authority of Khan Bahadur Khan was well established over a considerable part of Bareilly. Jaimal Singh, Thakur of Kiara (in the Karor Pargana), the Thakurs of Sheogarh, Nagaria and of other areas in Bareilly declared themselves in favour of Khan Bahadur Khan and against the British Government of India. The Thakurs of the Rajput Parganas of Faridpur and Nawabganj, however, refused to acknowledge the authority of Khan Bahadur Khan and refrained from offering their submission to him. Thakur Raghunath Singh of Budhauri at first offered his allegiance to Khan Bahadur Khan. He was honoured with the title of 'Raja' and appointed a tahsildar of the Faridpur Pargana. Subsequently, when he was deprived of his rank of the tahsildar, he turned against Khan Bahadur Khan. The tussle between Raghunath Singh and Khan Bahadur Khan soon culminated in a scuffle between the Rajputs and Pathans of Bareilly. The Rajputs suffered terribly at the hands of the Pathans and consequently withdrew their support from Khan Bahadur Khan. Referring to the condition of the Hindus in the regime of Khan Bahadur Khan Inglis wrote as follows: 'The Hindus had been treated almost from the first as slaves to the Muhammadans; their prejudices against cow-killing had been disregarded; in fact they soon found that in the place of the English rule, giving equal justice to all, they had assisted in raising a Muhammadan Government, intolerant and bigoted to the last degree. Khan Bahadur Khan from motives of policy had attempted to attach the Thakurs and Hindus to him and had succeeded for a short time; but the bulk of the Muhammadan followers took little trouble to conceal their contempt and hatred for Hindus.' (29) The prevalence of ill-feeling between the Hindus and Muhammadans in Bareilly in the course of the Mutiny ultimately ruined the cause of Khan Bahadur Khan who had subsequently to end his life on the scaffold. And the Mutiny was suppressed and order restored in Bareilly.

(28) Official narrative on Bareilly. P.

(29) Ibid. P. 14.

In Budaun, also, another district in Rohilkhand, there was popular agitation against the British Government during the Mutiny. When the news of the outbreak in Meerut reached Budaun, the civil population there grew much excited and unsettled to the point of rebellion. Disturbances flared up in different parts of the district. The evil-disposed persons took advantage of the disturbed state of things in Budaun to plunder others' property, destroy Government records and to burn Government offices and bungalows. The ancient proprietors of lands availed themselves of this opportunity to resume possession of their hereditary property by expelling or murdering the auction-purchasers.⁽³⁰⁾ The civil class in Budaun had started creating serious disturbances even before the sepoys actually rose in arms. The sepoys in Budaun broke out into open Mutiny on June 1, 1857. The mutinous sepoys came to be joined by the evil-minded men of the district, and all kinds of atrocities began to be committed. The mutineers from Bareilly reached Budaun on June 2, took possession of the Government treasure and set fire to the Government bungalows. 'Most of the inhabitants of Budaun meantime had joined with, and entertained the mutinous troops from Bareilly. Others again, the better disposed, wishing to get rid of their presence disseminated a report that a European force was at hand, and this had the desired effect of causing the sepoys to march immediately back to Bareilly with their treasure.'⁽³¹⁾ Meanwhile the spirit of rebellion spread far and wide in the district. The rural people of Behta Goshain, Nagla Sharqi, Rasulpur, Gunnaur tahsil and of many other areas of the district were deeply engaged in such acts of violence as murder, plunder and arson. The Ahirs of Gunnaur tahsil, the Thakurs of the parganas of Kot, Bilsa, Ujhani, Budaun, Dataganj and Uschat, the Muhammadans and Thakurs of the pargana of Bisauli, and the Ahirs, Thakurs and Muhammadans of the pargana of Sahaswan—all were out for raid and plunder, for fishing in troubled waters. The zemindars of the village of Nagla Sharqi, and of the parganas of Budaun, Bichaula, Ujhani and a few others were then friendly towards Government. Khan Bahadur Khan who proclaimed himself the Viceroy of Rohilkhand set up a Muslim Government in Budaun and appointed Abd-ur-Rahim Khan the Nazim of the district. The Muslim Government, as set up in Budaun, was not, however, recognised by the local Hindus and Rajputs. The Nazim sought to raise subsidies from the land-owners of Budaun. The Rajput land-owners of Khunak and Rafiabad refused to pay the subsidies, demanded from them. Their villages

(30) Referring to the Mutiny in Budaun William Edwards, the Magistrate and Collector of the district wrote thus in his 'Personal adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rohilkhand, Futteghur and Oudh' P. 17 : "I am fully satisfied that the rural classes would never have joined in rebelling with the sepoys...had not... causes of discontent already existed. They evinced no sympathy whatever about the artridges or bone-mixed flour and could not then have been acted upon by any ray of their religion being in danger. It is questions involving their rights and interests in the soil and hereditary holdings, invariably termed by them as 'Jan se azeer' 'dearer than life' which excited them to a danger degree."

(31) C. P. Carmichael, officiating Magistrate, Budaun.—Official narrative on Budaun. P. 2.

were consequently set on fire. This only served to increase the hostility of the Rajputs of the district towards the Muslim Government set up by Khan Bahadur Khan. The Rajputs were finally overpowered by the rebel general, Niaz Muhammad Khan. This opposition of the Rajputs to the Government, set up by Khan Bahadur Khan in Budaun, forms a special feature of the Mutiny of the district. The rebel Government, however, proved short-lived. The British rule was soon restored in Budaun.

In Shahjahanpur, another district in the Rohilkhand division, the sepoys and the civil population alike rose in arms during the Mutiny. The circulation of reports about greased cartridges and the sale of flour adulterated with pounded bones caused much panic and excitement in Shahjahanpur on the eve of the Mutiny. A Maulavi, named Sarfaraz Ali, a resident of Gorakhpur, was chiefly instrumental in exciting the sepoys in Shahjahanpur to revolt. There, the Maulavi had his followers in Kudrut Ali (Faujdari Sherestadar), his brother Niaz Ali and others. The Ali brothers were on the side of the rebels. (32) The arrival of the news of the Meerut rising further increased the excitement among both the civil and military classes of the district. On the morning of May 31 the sepoys broke out into Mutiny. The district sank into anarchy and lawlessness. The rebels including many villagers at once fell to plundering Government property, burning officers' bungalows, breaking open the jail and releasing the convicts therefrom. The inhabitants of such villages as Atbara, Sehramau, Khanpur, Banthara, Shahganj, Sirtauli and Amora were engaged in plundering Government property and committing all sorts of violent crimes. (33) The mutinous sepoys proclaimed Nizam Ali the Kotwal, and Qadir Ali Khan and Ghulam Husain Khan the joint Nawabs. When the news of the Mutiny in Bareilly reached Shahjahanpur, Nawab Qadir Ali Khan issued a proclamation through the Kotwal, Nizam Ali that the British rule in Shahjahanpur was at an end, that in future the name of the English should not be mentioned and that any one being heard to do so should lose his life. (34) Before long Qadir Ali Khan came to be degraded and the supreme authority in the district passed into the hands of Ghulam Husain under orders of Khan Bahadur Khan. Ghulam Husain Khan thereupon set up his own Government under the overlordship of Khan Bahadur Khan. The attempt of the rebel-Government to collect revenue from the villages in the direction of the Kant pargana showed how unpopular it was. The Thakurs of the village of Ladpur resisted the collection by the rebel-Government. Coercive measures had been adopted against them before they yielded. It was with great difficulty that the rebel-Government could bring the villages of Atbara, Sehramau, Banthara, Shahganj, Sirtauli and Amora under its control. Coercive measures had to be adopted against them. The Thakurs of the village of Sehramau, for instance, were severely dealt with by the forces of the

(32) G. P. Money—Official narrative on Shahjahanpur. P.

(33) Ibid. P. 4.

(34) Ibid.

rebel-Government. Some of the Thakurs were killed; their heads were severed from their bodies and exhibited over the gateway of the fort of Shahjahanpur.(35) Like the Thakurs of the Rajput villages, the Hindu land-holders of the district were the least inclined to recognise, and submit to, the rebel-Government which for some time replaced the British rule in Shahjahanpur. Many of them were rather supporters of the British Government during the Mutiny. The Thakurs of Khandar and Bangaon and those in the neighbourhood of Khera Bajhera were then loyal to the British Government.(36) After the fall of Delhi the rebels were thrown on the defensive. They could no further offer active resistance to Government with the result that their rising came to be suppressed. During the Mutiny in Shahjahanpur, it may also be mentioned here, while the Hindus and Rajputs of the district were, on the whole, friendly to Government, the Muslim community there was actively hostile to it.

In Bijnor also, another district in the Rohilkhand division, the hostility towards Government during the Mutiny did not remain confined to the sepoys alone. At the outbreak of the Mutiny the Jats from Bhojpur and Jahangirpur, Gujars from Sheikhupura and Husainpura, and Chauhans from Narayanpur (37) raised a storm of disturbances in the district. 'In Mandawar and all along the Ganges the Gujars were engaged in systematic plunder, and their example was followed by the Banjaras of the North and the Mewatis on the Moradabad border.'(38) There was, above all, the Muslim community, which then stood dead opposed to Government. The Nawab of Najibabad, Mahmud Khan proclaimed himself the Nawab of Bijnor, owing allegiance to the King of Delhi. The British authority in Bijnor suffered a temporary eclipse. The district remained under the Muslim rule for some time till at last the British authority came to be restored there. Unlike the Muslims, however, the Hindus of Bijnor were, on the whole, friendly to Government during the Mutiny. The Hindu landlords of Bijnor like the Chaudhuris of Haldaur and Tajpur, for instance, placed their services at the disposal of Government.(39) For their friendly attitude towards Government the Hindus had to suffer at the hands of the Muslims. Chaudhuri Umrao Singh who was a loyal Hindu zemindar of Sherkot was deprived of his property by the agents of Mahmud Khan. The attacks of the Muslims often invited counter-attacks from the Hindus in the course of the Mutiny. Thus there developed a strong line of cleavage between the Hindus and Muslims from the beginning of the Mutiny in Bijnor. The civil war between these two major communities of the Indian society gave a handle to the British Government to reassert itself by suppressing the revolt in the district.

Another district of the Rohilkhand division, Moradabad, stood highly

(35) G. P. Money—Official narrative at Shahjahanpur. P. 6.

(36) Ibid. P. 7.

(37) District Gazetteer—Bijnor, P. 183.

(38) Ibid.

(39) A. Shakespear—Official narrative on Bijnor. P. 2.

disturbed during the period of unrest between 1857 and 1859. There the sepoys were joined by Gujars, Mewatis and other tribes, all engaged in loot and plunder in every direction. The Pathans of the Thakur dwara tahsil and the Syuds of the town of Amroha openly revolted against Government. The Syuds of Amroha rose under the leadership of Gulzar Ali, himself a Syud of ruined fortune. A Maulavi, named Munnu was engaged in instigating the Muslims of the district to rebel against the British Government. In fact, Moradabad witnessed a general revolt of the Muslim community. But the Muslims could not present a united front for long. The rebel Government, set up during the Mutiny by a leader, called Majju Khan, came to be opposed by his rivals, Abbas Ali and Asad Ali and was eventually set at naught by faction. The Muslims, thus divided among themselves could not work in harmony with the Hindus also during the period of insurrection. Such objects of Hindu worship as 'Siva lingas' and 'tulsi-plants' were dishonoured by the Muslims out of spite against Hinduism. A compromise between the Hindus and Muslims was at last effected. The Mutiny was eventually arrested and order was restored in Moradabad.

In Agra the revolted sepoys were joined by the members of the civil population of the district. On May 21 news of the Mutiny of the 9th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry in Aligarh was received in Agra. This news occasioned a general consternation throughout the district. Early in July prisoners in the Agra jail broke out of their prison-cells with the connivance of the jail-guards. The prisoners and the jail-guards rather made a common cause with the mutineers. The Police on duty in the city of Agra deserted Government almost to a man. On July 6, Murad Ali, the Kotwal of the city proclaimed the rule of the King of Delhi throughout the city. There was then organised an armed procession which was headed by the Kotwal himself and followed by the leading Muhammadan Police officers and the city-rabble.⁽⁴⁰⁾ British authority thus stood shaken in the city of Agra. Elsewhere also in the district, the British authority was flouted and overthrown, and a state of anarchy came to prevail. Marauding bands chiefly composed of Gujars, Mallahs and other turbulent elements of the civil population began to attack tahsils and police-stations. A prominent Gujar of Dholpur, Deohans by name, then supplied leadership to the rebels in the south of the district. At Fatehpur Sikri, as noticed by the Deputy Collector, Mr. Parsick, everybody was alarmed, and the disorderly elements stood aggressive. Parsick got help from the friendly zemindars of Dabar, Nagla Sarai, Basahra Raja, Nagar, Santha, Singharpur and Abhuapura in maintaining order at Fatehpur Sikri.⁽⁴¹⁾ Though the above-mentioned zemindars were friendly to Government, the zemindars of Lakhanpura, Untgiri, and Bhilaoiti stood opposed to the British authority during the Mutiny. There was also the tahsildar of Raja Khera, Bhawani Shankar, who leaned towards the mutineers. Thus broadly speaking, both the civil and military classes of Agra joined the rising of 1857.

(40) A. L. M. Phillippis—Official narrative on Agra. P. 9.

(41) Ibid.. P. 4.

In Mathura, the agitation against the British Government was traceable since January, 1857. Prior to the actual outbreak of the Mutiny in Mathura the famous 'Chapaties' serving as signals of an impending rebellion against the British Government were distributed among the people of the district. There was a military rising in Mathura in the wake of the Mutiny in Meerut, and it did not take a long time for the civil population also to rise in arms throughout the district. The temper of the people in general there was decidedly hostile to Government.⁽⁴²⁾ The rumour that the British rule was at an end came to be widely believed in by the people of the district where anarchy and disorder reigned supreme for some time. The mutinous sepoys set fire to Government buildings and bungalows, released prisoners from jail with the help of the jail-guard and set their faces towards Delhi with five lakhs of rupees, looted from the district treasury. They also left behind them a large amount of money in cash and jewels in the city of Mathura. As soon as it was known that a rich treasure was left behind by the sepoys, the whole city and the neighbouring villages flocked together to plunder it. Those who came to plunder the treasure fell foul of one another as a result of which about thirty men lost their lives.⁽⁴³⁾ People nursing resentment against decree-holders and auction-purchasers took advantage of the gradually increasing confusion and disturbances in the district to eject them from their holdings or to murder them even. The 'banias' were everywhere assailed and robbed of their property. Kumar Dildar Ali Khan, a big zemindar in the tahsil of Mat, came to be murdered by his tenants. Umrao Bahadur, a relative of his, was besieged in his house. Eventually, however, he managed to effect his escape. The inhabitants of the town of Raya rose in arms under one Debi Singh who proclaimed himself a Raja. Debi Singh was finally hanged. There were the Gujars who had all along been the most active promoters of disaffection. A few zemindars also were up in arms against Government. Some of the zemindars at Chhata, for instance, were arrayed against Government during the Mutiny. Many of the big merchants of the district were only 'watchers of the atmosphere.' The Seths of Mathura were sincerely loyal to Government. Among the Seths mention may be made of Radhakrishna and Govindadas in particular as having rendered valued services to Government during the Mutiny.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The tahsildar of Kosi, Mir Imdad Ali Khan, stood Government in good stead during the Mutiny. Yet the fact remains that Mathura witnessed the rising of both the civil and military classes of people between 1857 and 1859. The members of the civil population of the district availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the Mutiny to deliver attacks on the decree-holders and auction-purchasers by way of feeding fat their grudge against them.

The two districts, Mainpuri and Etawah, were garrisoned by the detachments of the 9th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry of which the Headquarters were Aligarh. In the wake of the rising of this regi-

(42) M. Thornhill—Official narrative on Mathura. P. 4.

(43) Ibid. P. 3.

(44) Ibid. P. 6.

ment at its Headquarters the detachments in Mainpuri and Etawah rose in sympathetic revolt. At the early stage of their revolt the mutinous sepoys of Mainpuri do not appear to have been supported by the civil population of the district. The Raja of Mainpuri, Tej Singh stood disaffected, but Rao Bhawani Singh, uncle of the Raja, was a well-wisher and supporter of Government. The zemindars of the district remained loyal. The zemindars of Kurowlee, Bharaul and Bhongaon specially stood the Government in good stead during the Mutiny. In the early part of June, when the districts surrounding Mainpuri openly rose in rebellion, when 'every night villages were to be seen burning in all directions around Mainpuri, and when every hour brought notice of some heavy affray having occurred or the commission of some fearful murder', Mainpuri itself was undisturbed and remained loyal to Government.(45) Towards the end of June, however, Mainpuri appeared to be rapidly passing out of the control of Government. The whole district came to catch the infection of the rebellion, then raging in the surrounding districts. The jail was broken open and the convicts were released. The plunder of Government property and the burning of office-quarters by the street-rabble proceeded apace. The whole district passed for the time being under the control of the 'rebel' Raja of Mainpuri. The authority of Government could not be restored in the district till late in 1858.

The Mutiny broke out in Etawah also. A party of the 3rd Native Light Cavalry which participated in the Mutiny of Meerut found its way into Etawah on May 19 and took shelter in a temple in Jaswantnagar, a few miles off the Sadar station of the district. The mutinous sepoys having been besieged in the temple by the British forces, the townspeople, composed for the most part of low-class Muhammadans, came to the rescue of the besieged by supplying them with food and ammunition.(46) It was mainly due to the help of the townspeople that the besieged mutineers could effect their escape. Subsequently, the detachment of the 9th Regiment, stationed in Etawah, also broke out into Mutiny. Immediately thereafter, the city-rabble, the Mewatis, Julahas and some Rajputs found the opportunity favourable to plundering others' property, raiding the magazines and bells-of-arms, burning the bungalows, post office, and Collector's office with all the records therein. Jails were broken open and four lakhs of rupees were looted from the district treasury. Those who had suffered by the action of the civil courts of Government sought to avail themselves of the opportunity to reverse court-decisions. In a village in Samthar, the new proprietor, who was recognised by Government, came to be ousted from his holdings by the former landlords. The village was finally burnt.(47) The villages of Shahpur, Rajpura, Ramnagar, and Ayana rose in arms,(48) and were punished into submission. Rana Mahendra Singh of Sakrauli, Narayan

(45) J. Power—Official narrative on Mainpuri. P. 6.

(46) G. F. Harvey—Narrative of events on Etawah included in the narrative on the Agra Division. P. 13.

(47) Allan Hume—Narrative of occurrences in the district of Etawah. P. 3.

(48) District Gazetteer—Etawah. P. 160.

Singh of Chakarnagar, Raja of Ruru, Raja of Bhareh (Rup Singh) and a few others of high social standing in Etawah were opposed to the British rule. Government, however, did not stand entirely unsupported by the civil population of the district during the Mutiny. Amongst the supporters of Government from civil ranks mention may be made of Lala Debi Prasad, tahsildar of Bidhuna, Ishri Pershad, tahsildar of Lakhna, Ram Baksh, tahsildar of Auraiya, Sham Behari Lal, Kotwal of Etawah, Rao Jaswant Rao of Dalipnagar, Kunwar Zohar Singh of Partabner, Laik Singh of Harchandpur and Lala Chhatar Singh of Sahar.(49) It is, however, a fact undisputed that a considerable portion of the civil population of the district stood against Government during the Mutiny.

June 4 saw the outbreak of the Mutiny in Banaras. About the middle of May news of the revolt in Delhi and Meerut reached Banaras. The news produced a great panic and excitement in the district. The military force, then quartered at the Banaras Cantonment, consisted of a handful of English Artillery men, and three native regiments, namely the 37th Bengal Native Infantry, the 13th Irregular Cavalry and the Ludhiana Sikhs. The Sikhs were believed to be faithful to Government; the irregular Cavalry was expected to remain true to its salt; the 37th Regiment was distrusted. The immediate cause of the outbreak of the Mutiny in Banaras was the mismanaged disarming of the 37th Regiment under orders of Colonel Neill. On June 4, the sepoys of the regiment were quietly laying down their arms on the parade-ground, when they saw British troops marching towards them. Panic-stricken and bewildered, the sepoys thought that the British troops were coming to shoot them down after they had been disarmed. Those who had already been disarmed rearmed themselves in self-defence and began to fire on the British troops. The Sikhs also fell to attacking the British Artillerymen. Thus did the Mutiny start in Banaras. Flames of rebellion spread far and wide in the district in no time. Auction-purchasers came to be ousted from their holdings by the Rajput zemindars. Bad elements played their usual game. Dwellers of some villages also joined the forces opposed to Government. In the course of the Mutiny the local Muslims made an attempt to raise the green flag on the temple of Visheswar in the city of Banaras.(50) Their attempt failed mainly because of the opposition of the Rajputs in the city. Finally, the revolt was suppressed, and order was restored in the district. The revolt of Banaras was suppressed with much cruelty by the British military officers, headed by Colonel Neill. The rebels were hanged 'with as little compunction, as though they had been pariah-dogs or jackals or vermins of a baser kind.'(51) On the morning of the day following the disarming parade, Colonel Neill was busily engaged in hanging batches of mutineers on a row of gallows, as fast as they were brought before him. The old and young were hanged with indiscriminate ferocity. These executions have been described as

(49) Allan Hume—Official narrative on Etawah. P.

(50) Taylor—Official Narrative on Banaras. P. 10.

(51) Kaye—Op cit II. P. 236.

'Colonel Neill's hangings.' (52) In the course of the Mutiny in Banaras, a few natives of influential position remained loyal to Government. Among them mention may be made specially of the titular Raja of Banaras, a Sikh Sardar, named Soorut Singh, Pandit Gokul Chand, the Nazir of the Judge's court, and of some such bankers as Gurudas Mitra, Hirak Chand, Narain Das and others.(53)

In Jaunpur, a detachment of the Ludhiana Regiment of Sikhs rose in revolt on June 5. The report of the violence committed by Colonel Neill and other military officers in Banaras reaching Jaunpur, the detachment of the Ludhiana Regiment of Sikhs there cried for vengeance and rose in revolt to take revenge for the atrocities committed on their comrades in Banaras. They sought the co-operation of the villagers also in their struggle with Government. The revolt in Jaunpur was, however, finally suppressed.

On June 3, 1857, the 17th Native Infantry rose in revolt in Azamgarh with the result that the district eventually became the scene of a struggle between Government on the one hand and the Palwars (a clan in Azamgarh), released convicts and the outraged sepoys, headed by Kumar Singh of Jagadishpur, on the other. Kumar Singh could not cope with Government successfully during his campaigns in Azamgarh which came to be consequently freed from the forces of opposition to Government and won back for law and order.

Gorakhpur was then garrisoned by two companies of the 17th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry and a small detachment of the 12th Irregular Cavalry. The Headquarters of the 17th Native Infantry were Azamgarh. The news of the revolt of the 17th Native Infantry at its Headquarters reaching Gorakhpur, its detachments on duty there at once rose in sympathetic revolt on June 5, 1857. Mutiny thus breaking out in Gorakhpur, the northern and western parganas of the district fell into utter confusion and disorganisation. The Rajas of Satasi, Narharpur, Barhiapar, and Nagar openly revolted against Government and joined the camp of the rebel-leader, Muhammad Hasan who proclaimed himself the Nazim of Gorakhpur.(54) Many zemindars including those of Paina openly defied Government. In the midst of general disorder, that followed in the wake of the Mutiny in the district, money was extorted by the mutineers from merchants and bankers, while auction-purchasers were ousted by the former proprietors of soil. There were, however, a few Rajas who stood by Government during the Mutiny in Gorakhpur. They were the Rajas of Bansi, Gopalpur, Tamkuhi and of Majhauri.(55) The Mutiny of Gorakhpur came at last to be crushed and the insurgents including Muhammad Hasan were cleared out of the district.

The district of Allahabad was then garrisoned by the 6th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry and by a wing of the Ferozpur Regiment

(52) Kaye—Op cit. II. P. 236.

(53) F. B. Gubbins—Narrative of events on the Banaras Division. Pp. 2-3.

(54) Wingfield—Official narrative on Gorakhpur. P. 5.

(55) Ibid. Pp. 5-6.

of Sikhs. News of the revolt in Meerut reached Allahabad on May 12, producing much excitement among the civil and military classes of the district. Rumours about the proselytizing intentions of Government were then widely believed in both by the sepoys and the civil population in Allahabad. Again, a rumour spread that Government fixed May 25 as the date, when the sepoys in Allahabad would be compelled to use the objectionable greased cartridges. Such rumours caused a great excitement and uneasiness among the civil and military classes of the district.(56) While Allahabad was thus in the grip of a great excitement, from Banaras came the news that the sepoys, stationed there, had already risen in revolt and that the revolted sepoys and other rebels had been ruthlessly persecuted by Colonel Neill and other military officers. This exciting news from Banaras eventually provoked the sepoys in Allahabad to make an armed protest against the persecution of their comrades at the former station. So they rose in revolt on June 6 to at 9-15 P.M. at Daraganj. Along with the sepoys rose in rebellion a considerable portion of the civil population of Allahabad. In the Doab parganas of the district the zemindars who were chiefly Mussalmans raised the cry of a religious war against the English in India. They raised the standard of rebellion with the avowed object of exterminating the English and replacing the British Government by the Muslim rule. Anti-British feelings reached a very high peak at the pargana of Chail, where the Muslim zemindars held a great sway. The Hindu priests of Prayag at the confluence of the Ganges and the Yumna also stood opposed to Government. They got the support of the Hindu community of the district in carrying on their hostility to Government.(57) It was seriously believed by the priests of Prayag that the overthrow of the British Government would free the holy Prayag from the unholy contact with the Christians in which case pilgrims would flock to the holy place in increasing numbers and the income of the priests would correspondingly increase. "So these 'prayagwallas' stirred up the Hindu population of the Doab, and soon there was scarcely any man of either faith who was not arrayed against the British." (58) The district police in the Doab pargana rose against Government almost in a body and for some time anarchy came to reign supreme in the pargana. A Maulavi, Liaquat Ali by name, declared himself at this juncture the Governor of Allahabad with the support of the zemindars of Chail. But the Maulavi was finally compelled by Government to leave Allahabad. In the trans-Gangetic parganas of the district, the old zemindars who had been dispossessed of their property by the decision of the civil courts rose against the Government and sought to regain their property from the auction-purchasers. In carrying on their hostility to the British Government and the auction-purchasers, the former zemindars got whole-hearted support from the peasants of the parganas. The auction-purchaser was generally a resident of the city and never visited his village except for the hateful purpose of collecting his rents or enforcing his decrees. The people,

(56) F. Thompson—Official narrative on Allahabad. P. 2.

(57) Ibid. P. 9.

(58) Kave & Malleison—Op cit. II, P. 196.

therefore, naturally, sided with the zemindars to whom the outbreak seemed a grand opportunity for recovering their position.' (59) In the parganas south of the Jumna, the opposition to the British authority was less than that elsewhere in the district. Here and there the disaffected individuals made common cause with the bad elements in causing incendiarism and other disturbances to the south of the Jumna. But the disturbances there could not assume formidable proportions, thanks mainly to the weight thrown by the three Rajas of Manda, Bara and Daiya on the side of peace and order in the district. (60) Thus, did different classes of people in Allahabad entertain hostile feelings against Government in the course of the Mutiny. Government had to contend not only with the sepoys but also with the civil population in Allahabad. Men of property including certain bankers, zemindars and the three Rajas of Manda, Bara and Daiya who had everything to gain through the maintenance of law and order preferred supporting Government during the Mutiny to espousing the cause of the rebels in the district. The fact, however, remains that the Mutiny in Allahabad had a popular basis.

In Kanpur the uncertain temper of the native Army, of its Cavalry branch in particular, the agitation among the city-rabble inclusive of a large number of fugitives from Oudh, and above all, the wide-spread rumour that objectionable cartridges were to be served to the sepoys in Kanpur on May 23 fast prepared the ground of the district for the seeds of rebellion. On May 14 news of the revolt in Meerut and Delhi reached Kanpur. The arrival of this news at Kanpur increased the prevailing excitement which found a mutinous expression at last on June 6. Along with the insurgent populace the zemindars of the Chauhan, Chandela and Bundela tribes and the zemindars of Bithur rose in arms. The villages of Nanamau, Kakadeo, and Panki Gangaganj stood in opposition to Government. So did the Rajas of Sheorajpur, Sachendi and Nar. Practically the whole of Bithur, Jajmau, Sheorajpur, Narwal and Rasulabad openly revolted against Government. The whole of the Rajput community of Kanpur was up in arms during the Mutiny. (61) The revolted sepoys in Kanpur invoked the leadership of Dundu Pant, commonly known as the Nana Saheb of Bithur near Kanpur. The Nana was the adopted son of the last Peshawa, Baji Rao II. His chief advisers during the Mutiny were Bala Rao, Baba Bhut, Azimullah and Jawala Prasad. The Nana Saheb stood aggrieved against Government on the eve of the Mutiny. He was denied Baji Rao II's pension, though he was Baji Rao's adopted son. The injustice thus done to him rankled in his mind. Yet he maintained friendly relations with the Europeans in Kanpur. Occasionally he invited the officers of the Kanpur garrison to entertainments at his residence. When he apprehended that Mutiny was very likely to spread to Kanpur, he began to correspond with Hillersdon, the Collector of the district and assured him of his help in the case of a rising of the sepoys in Kanpur. A retinue of 500 Cavalry and Infantry

(59) F. Thompson—Op. cit, P. 9.

(60) Ibid.

(61) District Gazetteer, Kanpur. P. 216.

with three guns of small calibre was accordingly placed at the disposal of the Nana Saheb. On May 26 the Collector of Kanpur called in his aid and put him in charge of the district treasury.(62) On June 6 the sepoys garrisoning Kanpur actually rose in Mutiny. The Nana is generally believed to have placed himself at the disposal of the mutineers, when they insisted on his making a common cause with them and becoming one of their leaders. Referring to this general belief Maud writes thus : "From everything I have heard I do not think this is an accurate statement. It is possible, and perhaps probable that the Nana saw a way to getting his pension by putting the English under a great obligation ; and certainly he could not at first come to any agreement with the sepoys ; or at least he did not... The revolted sepoys left Cawnpur and made two marches towards Delhi... But the advisers of the Nana induced him to send messengers after the sepoys and offer them ample monetary remuneration, if they would return. They did return, and all the world knows with what results. Then the Nana's name became the one to conjure with, but of his individual influence there seems no trace throughout. We know something of what Azimollah did ; and the hand is not difficult to discover, at times, of Jawala Pershad, Baba Bhut, Tantia Topce and the rest ; but the stolid discontented figure of the Nana himself remains in the background, rejoicing doubtless in the success of his treachery, and gladly consenting, probably, to the cruelty ; but inanimate, incapable of original ideas, and more elated perhaps with the present glory of a hundred guns fired in his honour than with any distinct idea of future dominion." (63) It is, indeed, very difficult to pronounce with certainty as to whether the Nana's brain was as active as the brains of his counsellors in devising revenge on Government during the Mutiny. It is doubtful whether it was the Nana who had organised the massacre at Kanpur.(64) It is, indeed, much doubted whether the Nana possessed the gift of real leadership in times of crisis.

The Hamirpur district was in the grip of anarchy and lawlessness during the Mutiny. The mob and the sepoys together committed murder, looted the Government treasury and plundered everyone they could lay their hands on. The bankers, 'banias' and auction-purchasers were the special victims of the fury of the rebellious civil and military classes of the district. George Freeling, the then Collector and Magistrate of Hamirpur, wrote that this attack by the rebels on the auction-purchasers, bankers and 'banias' formed a significant feature of the revolt which broke out in the district.(65) The zemindars of Mauza Ramari joined the camp that was opposed to Government. The Raja of Charkhari at first threw his weight on the side of Government but, when Subahdar Ali Baksh proclaimed the rule of the King of Delhi and declared himself as his agent in Hamirpur, the Raja offered his allegiance to him.(66) The Nawab of

(62) Sherer—Official narrative. P. 4.

(63) Memories of the Mutiny. Vol. I. Pp. 219-220.

(64) Vide P. 7 ante.

(65) Freeling—Official narrative on Hamirpur. P. 4.

(66) Ibid.

Baoni and the Rao of Beri were in favour of Government.(67) But the landholders of Ramari, Surauli Buzurg and Surauli Khurd stood opposed to Government. They were looked upon as 'the chief offenders in respect of rebellion and plunder'.(68)

The Mutiny of the sepoys in Banda was broadbased on the support of the civil population. The earliest signs of agitation in the district were noticed in the villages of Marka and Darsenda situated in the tahsils of Baberu and Kamasin respectively. Since the early part of June armed sepoys used to assemble together and hold secret councils in those villages. Banda headed towards a crisis, when the rebels from Kanpur and Allahabad arrived there and poured out the news of the revolt of the districts from where they came. They found the people of Banda ready to join them in opposition to Government.(69) On June 14 the sepoys of the 1st Native Infantry, garrisoned in the district, actually rose in Mutiny. On June 15, the mutinous sepoys released prisoners from jail with the help of the Ajaigarh chiefs. Many of the leading 'banias' of the town of Banda had been present on the occasion and distributed sweetmeats (70) among the mutineers evidently to stimulate their opposition to Government. Gradually the revolt became wide-spread in Banda. It spread like wild fire even to the distant parganas and villages of the district. The auction-purchasers and decree-holders came to be deprived of their holdings which they acquired under the land-revenue system then obtaining in the North-Western provinces. These holdings were restored to their former owners. Government records and buildings came to be destroyed by the rebels. A regime of unchecked anarchy and rebellion prevailed in the district of Banda for sometime. 'Never was revolution more rapid—never more complete.'(71) Many villages and tahsils were then opposed to Government. Even the Nawab of Banda eventually turned into a thorough rebel. He received Kumar Singh cordially on his arrival at Banda with 2,000 men on September 29.(72) It appeared that the British authority was waging a losing fight against the strong popular opposition in the Banda district where both the sepoys and the civil class people rose in revolt with the avowed object of effacing every sign of British rule from the district. The balance of victory, however, ultimately rested with Government.

The news of the revolts in Allahabad and Kanpur created an alarming situation in Fatehpur, where the disaffected sepoys actually rose in Mutiny on June 9. The Mutiny of the sepoys gave the signal for the rising of certain disaffected elements of the civil population against Government. The townspeople plundered Government property and burnt the mission-premises. Law and order appeared to have been prostrate in the dust. Besides the townspeople, certain zemindars also collected bands of

(67) Feeling—Official narrative on Hamirpur. P. 5.

(68) District Gazetteer—Hamirpur District. P. 157.

(69) Mayne—Official narrative on Banda, dated 11.9.1857. P. 2.

(70) Ibid dated 10.11.1858. P. 2.

(71) Mayne—Narrative of events on Banda, dated 10.11.1858. P.

(72) Ibid. P. 7.

retainers around them and put up a tough opposition to Government. The then Deputy Magistrate of Fatehpur, Hikmatullah, assumed the style of Chakladar of the district and offered his submission to the Nana Saheb. (73) The authority of Government was, however, finally restored in Fatehpur.

The centre of revolutionary activities in 1857 was Delhi. The outbreak in Meerut had its immediate repercussion on Delhi, where the sepoys rose in arms on May 11. The insurgent sepoys were joined also by a fanatic section of the Delhi Muhammadans and bad elements of the city. The presence of the old King, Bahadur Shah II in Delhi was very likely to supply a great incentive to the native opposition to the British Government during the Mutiny. Yet majority of the civil population, Hindu and Muslim, residing in Delhi appeared, on the whole, to have kept aloof from the Mutiny. "The mercantile class, both Muslim and Hindu, had done nothing to promote the outbreak, and gained from it nothing but terror and loss. The bankers and brokers, mostly Hindus who sustained the financial structure of the whole region were in like case. For them the whole period was a long nightmare of forced loans, extortions and domiciliary visits, of insult and indignity. The shopkeepers and craftsmen fared no better. Silversmiths had their ornaments seized to be melted into rupees; shopkeepers, their stocks removed by roving soldiers and city badmashes. The clerical class, mainly Hindu, tinctured with the new learning and British sympathies, lived in fear of denunciation as 'friends of the English.'" (74) The revolted sepoys always clamoured for money which they sought to extort from the rich and poor alike, specially from the city-bankers. The sufferings of the peace-loving civil population at the hands of the rebel Army knew no bounds. 'The better class of city-people offered prayers for the speedy advent of the English and for the defeat of the rebels. All valuable property had by this time been buried, and a private police force had been raised by the better class of citizens to protect themselves and their property from plunder and violence.' (75) The old Bahadur Shah II had to assume the leadership of the mutineers most unwillingly. Circumstances compelled him to ally himself with the mutineers for sometime. But with them he had no sincere sympathy. He was often addressed by the mutineers in an insulting tone. He felt like a prisoner at their hands. During the Mutiny 'he was distraught, perplexed and cowed at finding himself in a position which made him the mere puppet of those who had formerly been only too glad to humbly obey his orders but who now taking advantage of the spirit of insubordination which was rife in all classes of the city...were not ashamed to mock and humiliate him.' (76) The old King was quite at a loss as to how to restore normal life in Delhi.

(73) Sherer—Official narrative on Fatehpur. P. 4.

(74) Percival Spear—Twilight of the Mughuls. P. 212.

(75) Narrative of Munshi Jiwanlal. Vide Two native narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi. P. 98.

(76) Ibid. P. 87. Vide also PP. 106-109, ante for details about Bahadur Shah's dealings with the mutineers.

Appeals were made to him in vain for repressing the forces of disorder in Delhi. His position was all the more embarrassed by the development of communalism in the course of the Mutiny. In May Maulavi Muhammad Saiyad set up in the Jumma Masjid the standard of 'Jehad' or 'holy war' for the purpose in inflaming the minds of the Muslims against the Hindus. (77) Bahadur Shah immediately ordered the removal of the standard, proclaimed the equality of Hindus and Muslims alike in his eyes and prohibited the slaughter of cows, oxen and buffaloes. (78) Subsequently the Mutiny in Delhi came to be suppressed.

Thus analysed, the Mutiny in the North-Western Provinces presents certain broad features which are indicated below. Different military Headquarters in the North-Western provinces were then garrisoned by native regiments which heard of the introduction of greased cartridges, and readily believed that Government were deliberately aiming at destroying the sanctity of their caste and religion. Consequently they stood in an unsettled and alienated state of mind on the eve of the Mutiny and were ready to revolt at the slightest provocation. This provocation was supplied partly by the news of the revolt of sepoys at the neighbouring station or stations. The news of the Mutiny in Meerut, for instance, was partly responsible for provoking the sepoys garrisoned in Budaun, Bareilly, Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Shahjahanpur, Etawah and Mathura to revolt. The report of the revolt in Allahabad and Kanpur gave the signal for the revolt in Fatehpur. Sepoys stationed in Banaras rose in revolt at the news of the rising of the sepoys in Delhi and Meerut. Again, reports of atrocities committed by British officers on the native regiments of one station caused a serious excitement among the regiments, garrisoned in some neighbouring stations, and provoked them to revolt in a spirit of revenge. Colonel Neill violently dealt with the rebels in Banaras. His violent and cruel dealings with the Banaras rebels, his hangings in Banaras made the sepoys in Jaunpur, Allahabad and some other districts cry for revenge and eventually provoked them to rise in arms.

Another noteworthy feature of the Mutiny in the North-Western provinces was that the Mutiny of a regiment at its Headquarters invariably provoked its detachments at the outposts to revolt. Aligarh, for instance, was garrisoned by four companies of the 9th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry. Detachments of the same 9th Regiment were posted in Bulundshahar, Etawah and Mainpuri. When the news of the Mutiny of the sepoys in Aligarh reached Bulandshahar, Etawah, and Mainpuri, the detachments posted at the three latter stations also broke out into revolt very soon. Again, Azamgarh was garrisoned by the sepoys of the 17th Native Infantry, two companies of which were stationed in Gorakhpur. The arrival at Gorakhpur of the news of the Mutiny of the Headquarters regiment in Azamgarh provoked the two companies at the Gorakhpur station to mutiny before long.

(77) Two native narratives—P. 98.

(78) Spear—op. cit., p. 207.

The Mutiny in the North-Western provinces had a popular basis. Besides the sepoys, many sections of the civil population in the North-Western provinces rose in arms against Government during the Mutiny. Against the Government were arrayed the 'Rajas', the ejected landlords and their tenants, the townspeople, villagers, Rajputs, Gujars, Rangars, Mewatis, city-rabble, convicts and even the police. The ejected landlords and talukdars were bent on reversing the decisions of the civil courts regarding agrarian settlement and on recovering their lands by driving out the auction-purchasers from their 'usurped' holdings. In their struggle with Government and the auction-purchasers they received support from their former tenants as also from townspeople and villagers. Opposition to Government thus pervaded different classes of people in the North-Western provinces. What is also significant to point out in this connection is that in the course of the Mutiny in the above region the rebels there lost no opportunity to break open jails, release convicts, plunder Government treasury, burn officers' bungalows and destroy state-documents. The classes, engaged in such works of destruction, consisted mainly of the city-rabble, released convicts from jails, Gujars, Rangars and Mewatis. Villagers and sepoys also were not infrequently found engaged in works of destruction along with the classes, mentioned above. It is not unfair to conclude that the plunder of Government treasury, the burning of officers' quarters and the destruction of state-papers by the civil class, and the flouting of the decisions of the civil courts by the dispossessed zemindars and talukdars were but so many expressions of their bitter resentment against the policy of British Government in India. In some districts of the North-Western provinces, it is true, the Hindus and Muhammadans did not pull together but renewed their old feuds during the Mutiny, as would be evident from the foregoing analysis of the nature of the Mutiny in the above-mentioned region. Such feuds between the Hindus and Muhammadans were, however, sporadic in nature and did not form a common feature of the Mutiny in all the districts of the North-Western provinces. The facts stated above thus lead to the conclusion that the over-all appearance of the Mutiny in the North-Western provinces was popular, but not national.

The disaffection among the military and civil classes in the North-Western provinces found its way across the Jumna to Bundelkhand and to the Saugor and Narbada territories also. The Saugor and Narbada territories were then composed of twelve such districts as Jalaun, Jhansi, Chanderi, Nagod, Saugor, Damoh, Jubbulpur, Mandla, Sioni, Narsingpur, Hoshangabad and Baitul. (79) Of these districts Jhansi, Jalaun and Chanderi actually formed parts of Bundelkhand. In Chanderi, the Thakurs and their followers had broken out into rebellion even before the troops at Lalitpur (the then Headquarters station of the Chanderi district) showed any signs of disaffection. In Jalaun, on the other hand, the civil population remained peaceful even after the sepoys had risen in revolt. (80) Jhansi stood intensely alarmed and agitated on the eve

(79) Erskine—Official narrative on Saugor and Narbada territories. P.

(80) Pinkney—Official narrative on the events at Jhansi. P. 24.

of the Mutiny. The slaughter of cows (81) by the Muhammadans with the sanction of Government, the rumour that ground bones were mixed with the flour sold in the market under orders of Government, and the resumption of grants made by the former rulers for the support of temples (82) caused much alarm, irritation and discontent among the Hindu population of Jhansi. Again, both the Hindu and Muslim sepoys in Jhansi stood intensely agitated consequent on the introduction of the new Enfield Rifle, equipped with greased cartridges. So far as the Rani of Jhansi was concerned, she was most unjustly dealt with by Government. Left a widow in the prime of life and having no son of her own (83) to succeed her to the throne of Jhansi after her death, the Rani adopted Damodar Rao as her son with a view to transferring to him the sovereignty of the state of Jhansi. But the adopted son was not recognised by Government, in accordance with the Doctrine of Lapse, as the legitimate heir of the Rani at her death. Worse still, the state was declared annexed to the British India in 1854. This annexation had its natural adverse reaction among the people of Jhansi. It raised among them a storm of indignation against the Government of India. The indignation found a mutinous expression at length. The sepoys garrisoned in Jhansi took the initiative in raising the standard of rebellion against Government. The mutinous sepoys soon came to be joined by the civil population of the state in common opposition to Government. The influential Rajput jaigirdars of Udgaon, Noner, and Jigna, whose estates had wholly or partly been resumed by Government, joined the rebels during the Mutiny. The rebels came to be strengthened also by the prisoners who escaped from jails, by the 'barkandazes' and by the city-rabble as well. There was incendiarism; there was blood-shed. Such acts of the rebels naturally invited retribution from Government. The rebellion in Jhansi came to be finally crushed. As to the role of the Rani during the Mutiny, it does not appear from the evidences at our disposal that she had any sympathy with the rebels of Jhansi at first. She was, on the other hand, in favour of maintaining cordial relations with Government. When the mutineers left Jhansi and set their faces towards Delhi, the Rani began to strengthen the fortifications of Jhansi and Kurrara. At the same time the Rani, as learnt

(81) Pinkney writes : 'Previous to November, 1854 the slaughter of cattle was not permitted in Jhansi. On the country coming under British rule, this restriction was, of course,, removed upon which the Rani petitioned against the practice and caused the inhabitants of Jhansi to do the same. The matter was referred to Government, and the slaughter of cattle was authoritatively allowed.' Vide his official Narrative on Jhansi. P. 1.

(82) 'The temple of Luchmee, situated outside the walls to the east of Jhansi had long been supported by the native rulers of the country, and an ancestor of Gangadhar Rao had made over the revenue of two villages for its support. When he died, Captain Francis Gordon, Deputy Commissioner, recommended that this arrangement should continue, but it was ordered that the villages should be resumed. This was strongly objected. But before the resumption order could be carried out, the outbreak at Jhansi took place.' Vide Pinkney's official narrative on Jhansi.' Ibid P. 1.

(83) The Rani gave birth to a son who died before he was hardly three months old. Vide Rajani Kanta Gupta--Sipahi Yuddher Itihas. Vol. V. P. 388.

from the official report of Pinkney, (84) the then Commissioner of Jhansi, endeavoured to remain on good terms with the British Government. She carried on correspondences with the Commissioner of Jubbulpur and other officials, regretting the massacre of the Europeans in Jhansi, stating that she was in no way connected with it, and declaring that she held Jhansi only as a representative of the British Government, till they could arrange to re-occupy it. Circumstances ultimately conspired to induce her to rebel. Government could not believe that the Rani whose estate was annexed unduly could remain friendly to them. The enemies of the Rani meanwhile began to prejudice the ears of Government against her. She became a suspect in the eyes of Government. Gradually enmity developed between them. When in 1858 Sir Hugh Rose marched against the Rani, she met the forces of Government as bravely as possible and fought with them till she embraced death on the battle-field. The Rani, it would thus appear, was forced by circumstances to entertain hostility towards Government and to fight with them during the Mutiny.

Other parts of the Saugor and Narbada territories were also affected by the virus of the Mutiny. In January, 1857 the mysterious *chapaties* were passed from village to village in most of the districts of the Saugor and Narbada territories. Much agitation was caused among the sepoys there by the introduction of greased cartridges. In May rumour spread in Saugor, Damoh and Jubbulpur to the effect that 'ghee, atta (flour) and sugar had been adulterated by the order of Government with pig's and cow's blood and bone-dust in order that all Hindus and Mohame-tans (Muhammadans) partaking of them might lose their caste and religion.' (85) The application of the Thomasonian principles (86) regarding the settlement of land to the Saugor and Narbada territories alienated the landlords there. News of the outbreak of revolt in Meerut and Delhi reached Saugor and Jubbulpur on May 17 and Damoh on the next day. The news spread panic and consternation in those places. After the rising of the three companies of a regiment of the Gwalior Contingent and after the revolt of the Rajas of Banpur (a pargana in the Lalitpur district) and Shahgarh (a town in the Saugor district), disturbances in the Saugor and Narbada territories became general. The Rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh sent emissaries in July 1857 to nearly all the petty chiefs in the Saugor and Narbada territories, instigating them to join in the general rebellion. While the response from some districts was poor, that from others was satisfactory. In Mandla, for instance,

(84) Vide his Official narrative. P. 7.

(85) Erskine—Official narrative on Saugor and Narbada territories. P. 2.

(86) James Thomason was the Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Provinces before the Mutiny. His policy was to discourage large landowners and to deal directly with people, the rayats. This system proved galling to the landed aristocracy which accordingly tended to become well-nigh extinct. The suffering landlords naturally took up arms against Government along with their former tenants who made a common cause against Government what with the sympathy with their former masters and what with their resentment against the heavy amount of rents, claimed of them.

many chiefs joined the revolt, in Saugor several and in Damoh nearly all. A few chiefs from the Jubbulpur district also joined the revolt. (87) In August, 1857, nearly the entire area on the north of the Narbada was in a state of revolt, but peace remained undisturbed in the area on the south of that river. (88) In September, 1857, Jubbulpur turned into a storm-centre of conspiracy against the Europeans residing in the district. The main wire-pullers from behind were the old Raja, Shankar Shah residing close to Jubbulpur and his son, Raghunath Shah. Both of them were convicted and blown away with guns. A search in the Raja's house brought to light several documents which proved that both he and his son had been engaged in conspiracy against Government during the Mutiny. (89) The month of September, 1857 saw the outbreak of rebellion in the district of Hoshangabad also, where a Maratha Pandit from Sindhia's territories appeared with a rebellious following. He took possession of a pargana in the district, hoisted a Maratha flag there and began to collect money in the shape of revenue for himself. He was joined by the mutinous police. (90) The wheels of the Mutiny rolled on even during the first few months of 1858. By May, 1858, the rebel-leader, Delun Shah of Narsingpur came to be captured and executed. (91) Gradually the Mutiny came to be arrested and order was restored in the Saugor and Narbada territories.

Oudh turned into a stage of popular revolt during the Mutiny. Annexation of Oudh, deposition of the Nawab, introduction of a new revenue-system which abolished the rank of talukdars, disbandment and consequent unemployment of thousands of native soldiers formerly in the service of the Nawab of Oudh, imposition of heavy taxes on opium to which the people of Lucknow were so fondly addicted, increase in the price of ordinary articles of consumption, reaction of the abolition of the rank of talukdars on their retainers, who came to be involved in common ruin along with their former masters, social legislations adversely affecting the superstitious Rajput population of Oudh, rumours about the pollution of food-stuffs with bone-dust, introduction of greased cartridges,—all these eventually led to the outbreak of revolt in Oudh. Oudh having then been an important centre of recruitment of the sepoys of the so-called Bengal Army easily caught the infection of the Mutiny of that Army. On May 30, the native regiments garrisoned in Lucknow rose in revolt. The rising of the sepoys in Lucknow encouraged the dispossessed talukdars, their retainers, the unemployed soldiers and the disaffected nobility of Oudh to rise in arms against Government. The zemindars of Tulsipur and Sabtipur and of the adjacent areas collected 60,000 sepoys and 112,000 country-people to fight against the English. They even wrote to the Nawab of Oudh, then in Calcutta, offering the proposal to drive the English out of Oudh.

(87) W. C. Erskine—Official narrative on Saugor and Narbada territories. P. 12.

(88) Ibid. P. 17.

(89) Ibid. P. 20.

(90) Ibid.

(91) Ibid. P. 47.

But the Nawab did not give his consent to their proposal and sent instructions to them to remain quiet. (92) The talukdars almost without exception espoused the cause of the mutineers. This was notably the case in the Faizabad district of Oudh. Maulavi Ahmad Ullah who was a very capable leader of the mutineers was himself a talukdar of Faizabad. In Sitapur, while the landlords of Ramkot, the Seths and Kayasthas of Biswan were loyal, the Rajas of Mitauli and Oel stood opposed to Government. One Bande Husain of Tambaur appeared in the role of a leader of the mutineers. (93) The Begum of Oudh was violently hostile to the British 'Raj' in India. During the period of insurrection the Begum, followed by a band of devoted Rajputs, showed 'more sense and nerve than all her generals together.' When on November 1, 1858 Queen Victoria proclaimed the transference of India from the control of a trading Company to that of the British Crown, the Begum issued a counter-proclamation in which she held that 'the laws of the Company, the settlement of land by the Company, the English servants of the Company, the Governor-General and the judicial administration of the Company'—all these remaining unchanged even after the Queen's proclamation, the people of Hindusthan would derive no benefit from the transference of the power from the East India Company to the British Crown. The Begum commented on the ill-treatment of the native princes and chiefs at the hands of the British Government, dwelt on the unjust annexation of Oudh and asked the people of the country not to allow themselves to be deluded by the proclamation of the Queen. (94) The Revolt in Oudh could not, however, proceed further. It came to be suppressed before long. Still there is no gainsaying the fact that the rebellion in Oudh was a composite movement which batted on the support of the talukdars, retainers, nobles and of the native soldiers of the province, although certain instances of loyalty on the part of the native people of Oudh towards Government during the Mutiny were not wanting. (95)

(92) Home. Pub. Cons. 19th June 1857 No. 53.

(93) District Gazetteer—Sitapur. P. 133.

(94) Vide Martin—op. cit., II. P. 502 (footnote).

(95) Some such instances of loyalty towards Government during the Mutiny in Oudh may be cited here. (a) An influential zemindar of Oudh, Hurdeo Buksh gave shelter to William Edwards, the then Magistrate and Collector of Budaun in Rohilkhand. (b) The inhabitants of a village on the Oudh side of the Ganges supplied food and milk to a fugitive party from Budaun. (c) Another fugitive, Mr. Jones after escaping from a boat, captured by the sepoys, hid himself in a village under the jurisdiction of Hurdeo Buksh. Mr. Jones was much helped by the villagers, one of whom brought him a 'charpoy' on which he lay down and fell fast asleep. He slept till morning, when a poor Brahmin took pity on him and permitted him to remain in a little shed, where he was partially sheltered from the sun. There he remained for some time unmolested by the villagers. These are only a few exceptional instances of loyalty to Government in Oudh during the Mutiny. Vide Personal adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rohilkhand, Futteghur and Oudh by William Edwards, Pp. 136-137.

Like the North-Western provinces and Oudh, the province of Bihar was widely affected by the risings of the sepoys. In many districts of the then Patna and Chotanagpur divisions of Bihar the sepoys and civil population fought together against the British Government. (96)

Thus, in the North-Western provinces, Saugor and Nerbada territories, Bundelkhand, Oudh and in most of the districts of the then Patna and Chotanagpur divisions of Bihar the revolt of the military class raised an echo in the civil class too. Various sections of the civil population of those areas participated in the movement of 1857-59. But the agitation of the sepoys received little or no sympathy and response from the civil population in the rest of the country. If the Mutiny in the above-mentioned regions had a popular basis, the Mutiny elsewhere in the country was only a military movement, not a rebellion of the people. In Bengal, for instance, sepoys mutinied in certain districts between 1857 and 1859 but the civil population remained quiet. After the disbandment of the 19th Regiment of Berhampur and of the 34th Regiment of Barrackpur excepting its three companies, then on detachment duty in Chittagong, armed sepoys remained garrisoned mainly at Rampurhat, Chittagong, Jalpaiguri and Dacca. There were also regiments of the Shekawati battalion garrisoned in Midnapur and Bankura. The Shekawati battalion was loyal to Government and rendered distinct services in Chotanagpur and Sambalpur. Not so were the sepoys garrisoned at Rampurhat, Chittagong, Jalpaiguri and Dacca. They mutinied, but their Mutiny was finally suppressed. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th companies of the 34th Regiment were garrisoned in Chittagong, when the Mutiny broke out. These three companies of the 34th Regiment rose in Mutiny at 11 P.M. of November 18, 1857. The revolted sepoys in Chittagong 'plundered the treasury, released the prisoners from the jail, killed one of the jail 'barkandazes' (native constable), burnt down their own lines, fired the magazine and then left the station, carrying with them three Government elephants and the whole of the treasure they found in the Collectorate with the exception of 300 rupees in cash, stamps, government securities etc. which they left untouched. None of the European residents were injured.' (97) Leaving Chittagong at 3 A.M. next morning the mutineers proceeded at first towards Tipperah and subsequently towards Hill Tipperah. They entered Hill Tipperah on November 22 and marched into Sylhet and Cachar. They were finally all killed or captured by the Sylhet Light Infantry and the Kuki Scouts. (98) While the sepoys posted in Chittagong were thus mutinous, the people of the district did not share their rebellious spirit. The Commissioner of Chittagong had the pleasure to record the good feeling, evinced by the native population of Chittagong towards Government throughout the crisis. (99) As recorded by Frederick Halliday.

(96) Vide Chapter VII for details.

(97) Narrative of events regarding the Mutiny of India and the restoration of authority. Vol. II. P. 107.

(98) District Gazetteer. Chittagong. P. 46.

(99) Narrative of events—Vol. II. P. 118.

'in the town of Chittagong the population was of a mixed race, consisting largely of Maghs, Rajbansis and other Arracanese tribes with a considerable sprinkling of Christians, and all classes were at least free from any sympathy with the sepoys, and the same may be said of the two districts of Noakhali and Tipperah.' (100) There was no Mutiny in Noakhali. Even in November, 1857, when the Mutiny was at its height and the mutineers were marching through Hill Tipperah, the Collector of Noakhali reported that his district was quiet and peaceful. (101) F. B. Simson, the then Collector of Noakhali, received valued assistance from the Rajas of Bhola, Pratap Chandra and Iswar Chandra Singh, and from their Naib, Jasodakumar Pain. Wherever within their estates the Mutiny became imminent, they promptly took steps to nip it in the bud and thus helped Government to maintain law and order in the realm. The attitude of the people of Noakhali towards Government during the days of the Mutiny was in every way friendly and sympathetic. The zemindars (Hindu and Muslim), talukdars and men of common rank, of Noakhali, as also the members of the 'Hita Sadhanee Sabha', a native club in Noakhali, presented an address to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, expressing their devotion and attachment to Government. In that address they acknowledged their indebtedness to the Government that had increased their material comforts, given them the benefit of the civil and criminal courts and had never intended to violate the sanctity of the native caste and religion. They also prayed in the same address for the prosperity of such Government and for the destruction of the revolted sepoys and their supporters. They passed resolutions expressive of their loyalty to Government. (102) In Tipperah a panic was caused in November, 1857 by the news of the approach of the mutineers from Chittagong towards Agartala and by the actual entrance of the Chittagong mutineers into Hill Tipperah. The alarm subsided, when the mutineers passed into Sylhet and Cachar. 'No doubts were entertained concerning the good faith of the Raja of Tipperah beyond some vague suspicions based on the circumstance of his having a relative of Kooar Singh (Kumar Singh) in his employ.' (103) The Raja of Tipperah was, in fact, loyal to Government. It was reported during the Mutiny in Tipperah that the hill tribes were not favourably disposed towards the Raja of Tipperah but were in sympathy with the mutineers. (104) The hill tribes might have been sympathetically disposed towards the mutineers but the rest of the inhabitants of Tipperah had no truck with them and remained peaceful. 'Nearly a year later the arrival of a boat, laden with salt, defiled with some yellow substance, gave rise to a suspicion that Government was trying to ruin the caste of the Hindus and nearly led to serious disturbances.' But the popular suspicion and resentment came to be allayed, when the Collec-

(100) Vide his Minutes on the Mutinies as they affected the lower provinces.

(101) District Gazetteer—Noakhali. P. 30.

(102) Home Pub. Cons. 10th July 1857 No. 77 and Home Pub. Cons. 24th July 1857. No. 144.

(103) Narrative of events Vol. II P. 117.

(104) Ibid.

tor explained that 'the substance found in the salt was only pitch that had oozed from the seams of the boat.' (105) Dacca had been the scene of the Mutiny of two companies of the 73rd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry. The sepoys rose in Mutiny in Dacca on November 22, 1857, when an attempt was made to disarm them on receipt of the intelligence of the Mutiny in Chittagong on November 21. The Dacca mutineers left Dacca and proceeded towards the north. After leaving the neighbourhood of Mymensingh on the 25th, they reached Dewanganj on the 28th. They crossed the Brahmaputra on the 30th at the Chilmari Ghat to the north of Dewanganj. They then proceeded towards, and passed through Jalpaiguri and finally escaped into the Nepal Tarai. In the face of this military rising in Dacca the people of the district, however, remained quiet. The then officiating Collector and Magistrate of Dacca, Mr. Carnac was assisted by his Nazir, Jagabandhu Basu and by two Muslim gentlemen, Khwaja Abdul Ghani and Abdul Ahmad Khan in the maintenance of peace in Dacca. The students of the Dacca College celebrated the transfer of power from the Company to the British Crown with fireworks, and enthusiastically displayed their loyalty to Government. (106) When the sepoys in Dacca were up in arms, the inhabitants of Barisal were extremely anxious for the safety of their lives and the security of their property. They sent their wives and children to the interior of the district and buried their valuables under ground. (107) Neither the fanatic Ferazis of Faridpur, nor the turbulent people of Backergunge nor the large Muhammadan population of the city of Dacca had shaken their hands with the mutinous sepoys in the course of the Mutiny. 'Their undoubted antipathy to the sepoys was sufficient to prevent their lending them any aid or assistance, and...neither before nor since the breaking loose of the Dacca detachment had they by any overt act shown a want of loyalty.' (108)

Much alarm reigned in the Rajshahi Division for some time partly on account of the Mutiny of the 19th Native Infantry at Berhampur and of the detachments of the 11th Irregular Cavalry at Jalpaiguri and partly because of the threatened approach of the Dacca mutineers towards Pabna. But the people at large did not rise in revolt. The Nawab of Murshidabad espoused the cause of Government during the Mutiny. The Bengal *Hurkaru* of June 19, 1857 published a report that the Nawab and all his principal officers were implicated in acts of rebellion against Government and that European soldiers were sent on the 17th to arrest the Nawab and to bring him to Calcutta. The report was, however, contradicted by a special issue of the Bengal *Hurkaru*, published on the evening of the same date i.e., June 19, 1857. (109) The Secretary to the Government of Bengal, A. R. Young also wrote on July 4 to Lieutenant Colonel MacGregor, Agent to the Governor-General in

(105) District Gazetteer, Tipperah. Pp. 19-20.

(106) District Gazetteer—Dacca. Pp. 48 and 53.

(107) Narrative of events, Vol. II. Pp. 116-117.

(108) Vide Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(109) Home Pub. Cons., July 17, 1857. No. 17.

Murshidabad, intimating that the report about the disloyalty of the Nawab of Murshidabad was entirely unfounded.(110) The then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Frederick Halliday also entertained no doubt about the loyalty of the Nawab. He wrote about him thus : 'I must do the Nawab of Murshidabad the justice to say that he has throughout conducted himself with the utmost loyalty, giving all the assistance in his power and always showing himself ready to anticipate any requisition on the part of the Government.'(111) Rani Swarnamayī, zemindar of Baharband in the Rangpur district, was on the side of Government during the Mutiny. Her services were appreciated by the Magistrate of Rangpur.(112) The zemindars and inhabitants of Rajshahi were, in fact, favourably disposed towards Government. On June 13, 1857 certain zemindars and other respectable persons of Rajshahi held a meeting at the house of Raja Prasanna Nath Roy Bahadur of Dighapatia 'to evince their sincerest loyalty to Government and to consider the best means to give extensive publicity to the utter groundlessness of the reports, said to have created the disaffection of the Native soldiery.' The following resolutions amongst others were unanimously adopted at the meeting under the chairmanship of Raja Prasannanath Roy Bahadur :

"That in this deplorable state of things, created by the mutineers in several parts of the country, the members consider it a bounden duty of every loyal subject to be true to the local Government."

"That the members, relying, as they do, upon the pledge, repeatedly given by the Government, of their determination never to interfere with the religious tenets and practices of the natives use every possible means to prevent the dissemination of opinions leading to a contrary impression."

"That although the members are perfectly aware of the sufficiency of the resources of Government for putting down the rebellion, still they think it incumbent on them to enlist their energies in the preservation of the lives and properties of their fellow subjects and vigorously to co-operate with the Government in the restoration of peace and order."

"That in case the members come to know that any mutineers are spies, have taken shelter in the district or are instigating others to join them in their crimes, immediate measures be taken as well to arrest such offenders, together with those who may be harbouring them and to make them over to the nearest police, as to give the latter every necessary aid in securing their persons."(113)

The resolutions, cited above, indicate that the civil population of Rajshahi stood favourably disposed towards Government during the Mutiny.

The Burdwan Division remained almost undisturbed during the

(110) Home Pub. Cons. July 17, 1857, No. 17.

(111) Vide Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(112) Ibid. Also Narrative of events, Vol. II, P. 199.

(113) Home Pub. Cons. June 26, 1857, No. 51.

upheaval of 1857-1859. In Midnapur a jail 'burkandaz' attempted to incite the sepoys of the Shekawati battalion under the command of Colonel Forster by exciting addresses to them. It was alleged by the 'burkandaz' that Colonel Forster and other officers had been to the jail on the night of June 3, 1857 and fed the Muslims and Hindus there with pork and beef respectively. It was also alleged that those officers after flogging certain sepoys filled their mouths with the forbidden food. The attempt of the 'burkandaz' to incite revolt among the sepoys of the battalion, however, proved abortive, and tranquillity remained undisturbed.(114) Birbhum was almost immune from the Mutiny. The inhabitants of Suri had a meeting under the chairmanship of Peari Mohan Banerjee on June 30, 1857 in the Vernacular School premises to express their denunciation of the activities of the mutineers as also to convey their sense of loyalty to Government.(115) In an address to the Governor-General of India the inhabitants of Dewangunge in the district of Hugli conveyed their sincere feelings of loyalty to Government, while the sepoys rose in arms.(116) The zemindars, talukdars and other classes of people of Uttarpara, Bhadrakali, Koterong, Konnagar and of the adjacent areas pledged themselves to support Government against the mutineers during the Mutiny.(117) The rich 'Gossains' (Goswami family) of Serampur lent some of their houses free of rent for the temporary accommodation of the soldiers of Government.(118)

There was no rising of the civil population in the Presidency Division, though it was there that the first blood of the Sepoy Mutiny was shed. The commotion in Jessore remained confined to the military class alone. The Najib guard there grew mutinous but this rising was nipped in the bud. At Jhingergachha, a village in Jessore, 'a police Jamadar, named Muhammad Ali, had circulated a religious proclamation to the effect that the day of judgment was at hand.'(119) The proclamation was paid little heed to and could not produce the desired effect. On June 21, 1857 the District Magistrate of Jessore wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to intimate that he had no apprehension of any popular rising in the district in his charge. The public mind was tranquil and the natives appeared not to take much interest in the Sepoy Mutiny with the particulars of which they were very imperfectly acquainted.(120) The civil population of Jessore, in fact, maintained a peaceful front during the Mutiny. In Nadia, people's mind was uneasy and unsettled due to the prevalence of rumours about the interference by Government with native caste and religion. The people of Nadia believed in the rumours that Government would soon legislate for regulating the sale of food, raising the price of uncooked food and

(114) Parl. Papers. Vol. 41. Part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 364. P. 143.

(115) Home Pub. Cons. July 24, 1857. No. 141.

(116) Home Pub. Cons. 3rd July, 1857 No. 50.

(117) Vide also Chapter V.

(118) Mutinies and the people by a Hindu. P. 143.

(119) Vide Halliday's Minute on the Mutinies.

(120) Parl. Papers Vol. 44 part I for 1857-58. Paper No. 364. PP. 168-169.

for cheapening cooked rice, Christians having been the cooks.(121) Rumours such as these prepared the tinder but the spark was not struck. The people of Nadia ultimately showed no signs of joining the sepoys in opposition to Government. They appeared, on the whole, as loyal and peaceful as ever. Calcutta was quiet, undisturbed. The presence of prisoners in the Alipur jail and of the deposed Nawab of Oudh at Garden Reach together with the reports of the Mutiny pouring from the North-Western provinces created, no doubt, a panicky situation in Calcutta, specially in the months of May and June 1857. But the panic subsided in course of time. The Hindu, Christian and Muhammadan communities of Calcutta remained firm in their attachment to Government, denounced the activities of the revolted sepoys and were ready to lend every possible help to Government to restore order in the country by suppressing the Mutiny. In a meeting, held at the premises of Guru Charan De of Chakraberia, Bhowanipur, a suburb of Calcutta, the Hindus of the Bhowanipur area deplored the state of things, created by the disaffected sepoys in some parts of the country, denounced the maliciously disposed persons spreading false panic and at the same time recorded their loyalty and allegiance to Government.(122) The Muhammadan population of Calcutta held a special meeting on May 27, 1857 at 9-1 Maulavi Imdad Ali Lane, Taltallah, and passed resolutions expressive of their loyalty and promise of help to Government during the Mutiny.(123) Another meeting was convened by the native inhabitants of Calcutta on May 25, 1857 under the chairmanship of Raja Radhakanta Bahadur. In that meeting they expressed their loyalty to Government and passed the following resolutions a copy of which was also duly forwarded to Government : 'That this meeting has with deep concern and sorrow learnt of the dissatisfaction, manifested by a portion of the Native Army, and of the atrocities, committed by them in some parts of the country, and that it views their mutinous conduct with entire disgust and horror.'

'That this meeting contemplates with the highest and most sincere satisfaction that the sepoy disaffection has met with no sympathy or encouragement from the civil population of any part of this vast empire, nor has it been shared in by the major portion of the Native soldiery ; but the same feeling of loyalty and attachment to the British rule which they have hitherto been inspired with still continues to animate them with unabated fidelity.'

'That this meeting contemplates with the deepest concern of the lamentable delusion, which some of the sepoy Regiments appear to be labouring under, and that it desires to record its firm and sincere conviction that the malicious reports, which have given rise to such a delusion, are not founded on truth.'

That this meeting is of opinion that should occasion require, it would

(121) Parl. Papers. Vol. 44 part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 364. PP. 159-160.

(122) Home Pub. Cons. C. 29th May 1857, Nos. 26 and 27.

(123) Vide PP. 104-105, ante.

be the duty of the native portion of Her Majesty's subjects to render the Government every aid in their power for the preservation of civil order and tranquillity." (124)

So far as the European community in Calcutta was concerned, it stood highly alarmed, apprehending that the mutineers pouring in from outside Bengal might cause disturbances in the city. The feeling of alarm and apprehension pervading the European community was all the more intensified by the unrestricted and indiscriminate sale of arms to the natives of all classes in Calcutta and its suburbs during the early period of the Mutiny. The Europeans in Calcutta, headed by E. D. Kilburn, brought the above fact to the notice of Government and desired that the native population of the city of Calcutta should be disarmed.(125) A memorial on the same subject of the disarming of the natives of Calcutta was also submitted to Government by William Roberts, Master of the Calcutta Trades Association, on behalf of the Trades Association and of other European inhabitants of Calcutta. In that memorial it was stated that one-third of the population of the city was in possession of offensive arms. Majority of this one-third was believed by the Christian community to have been commanded by the Muslims of Calcutta. In the same memorial the Christian community appealed to Government to remove the source of apprehension by a temporary disarming of the native population of the city and of the areas in its immediate vicinity.(126) Necessary instructions were accordingly issued by the Governor-General of India to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to take steps towards preventing the improper use of arms in the city of Calcutta and its suburbs. The Commissioner of Calcutta Police and the executive officers of the suburbs were specially required to keep a close watch over the sale of arms in the bazaar and to prevent the dealers in arms from disposing of them to persons who might be suspected of requiring them for any evil purpose. The officers were further instructed to induce the dealers to remove the arms temporarily to places of safety where in case of riot these would be beyond the reach of the mob.(127) Such measures helped the preservation of peace in Calcutta and went a long way in allaying the panic of the Christian community of the city. The Christian inhabitants of Calcutta were in fact, loyal and devoted to Government during the Mutiny. The revolted sepoys got no support from any of the communities living in Calcutta, Hindu, Muslim and Christian. The citizens of Calcutta, in other words, had no truck with the mutineers and were supporters of Government. A millionaire of the city, Shyama Charan Mallick, offered his splendid mansion on the Chitpur road for the housing of the Hindu School, when soldiers were quartered in the school building.(128) The civil population of Bengal was thus indifferent to the lot of the mutineers. The 'Hindu patriot' disowned the Mutiny.

(124) *Hom Pub. Cons. C.* May 29, 1857 Nos. 21 and 22.

(125) *Home Pub. Cons.* 31st July, 1857. Nos. 93 and 95.

(126) *Ibid.* Nos. 97, 98.

(127) *Ibid.* No. 96.

(128) *Mutinies and the People by a Hindu.* P. 143.

The British Indian Association, formed in 1851 and composed of radicals, moderates and conservatives, stood highly unsettled and frightened at the mutinous conduct of the sepoys and lent all possible help to Government for an early restoration of order. The rising of the so-called Bengal Army found no echo in the minds of the educated Bengal.

Though the people of Bengal did not rise against Government during the Mutiny, yet they might well have hailed the Mutiny of the sepoys as an opportunity to ventilate their manifold grievances against Government. Life and property in the Lower Provinces were then most insecure largely through the misconduct of the native officials of the Company's Government. Gang-robberies of the most daring character were perpetrated annually in great numbers with impunity. Owners of landed-estates often created scenes of violence over contentions, resting on disputed boundaries of their lands. The police was an engine of oppression to the people. Christian missionaries in Bengal had occasions to complain of this general insecurity in the Lower Provinces.(129) Again, Bengal had to bear the entire expenditure for the maintenance of the so-called Bengal Army, though it was composed of men belonging to provinces other than Bengal. The people of Bengal had reasons to resent the swallowing up of the revenue of their province by the so-called Bengal Army and the consequent enormous deficiency in the budget.(130) Still the civil population of Bengal did not rise in arms against Government during the Mutiny.

The reasons why the civil population of Bengal did not sympathise with the mutineers and join them in opposition to Government are not far to seek. The Mutiny of 1857 was in reality the Mutiny of the so-called Bengal Army. It was composed of sepoys who did not belong to Bengal proper. The rising of such non-Bengalee sepoys naturally failed to arouse any sympathy of the civil population of Bengal for them. One of the reasons for the widespread rising of the civil population of the then North-Western provinces and Oudh, it may be mentioned here, was that the revolted sepoys were recruited from among the war-like natives of those regions. Secondly, under the patronage of the English East India Company a trading middle class came to rise in Bengal. This trading middle-class people were bent on accumulating wealth for themselves through undisturbed trade and commerce. Naturally, therefore, they fervently longed for the preservation of peace in the country during the Mutiny. Lastly, under the impact of the British rule there was an intellectual and cultural awakening in Bengal in the early part of the 19th century. Wave after wave of social, religious and literary reforms inundated Bengal before 1857 with the result that a new Bengal was born, a Bengal that was saturated with the spirit of Renaissance to a considerable extent. The pioneer reformers in the field of the renascent Bengal were Raja Rammohan Roy, Dwarkanath Tagore, Pandit Iswar chandra Vidyasagar, and Devendranath Tagore. They lent their whole-hearted support to

(129) Vide also Chapter II.

(130) Parl. Papers. Vol. 4 of 1859, Minutes of evidence. P. 122.

Government in its attempts to introduce a new social outlook and western ideas of life in India. The social reforms introduced by Government changed the face of the society of India, in general, and of Bengal, in particular. Gradually a series of religious and cultural societies such as the Atmiya Sabha, the Tattvabodhini Sabha, the Academic Association, the Bethune Society and the like came to be founded in Bengal, where the age of superstition came consequently to be superseded by the age of reason. A middle-class people, enlightened with English education, grew up and began to exercise a tremendous influence on the society in Bengal. This educated middle-class people and the leaders of the renaissance Bengal stood enamoured of British culture and British civilisation. It was, therefore, quite natural for them to desire that the Sepoy Mutiny should end early, so that there might be rapid and undisturbed progress of British culture and civilisation in the country. Moreover, the possibility of a return to the anarchy and disorder, prevailing immediately before the British rule was established in the country, induced them to render all possible help to the British Government to ensure its victory over the mutineers. The zemindars of Bengal also were in favour of the British Government and set their faces against the mutineers. The Permanent Settlement of land-tenure, which was viewed by the zemindars of Bengal as the Magna Carta of their privileges drew them in their own interest to the side of Government during the Mutiny. It is no wonder, therefore, that the rising of the sepoys could have no repercussion on the civil population of Bengal.

It was alleged by a section of the European community of Calcutta that, though the people of Bengal remained quiet during the Mutiny, they were not active supporters of Government against the mutineers. John Bruce Norton, for instance, in his work *Topics for Indian Statesmen* alleged that the people of Bengal shared in no peril, volunteered no services to Government and did not lend them their cattle without an Impressment Act. (131) He denied that the people of Bengal were sincere in their expressions of loyalty to Government. Norton's allegation is not, however, borne out by facts. Replying to the charges of Norton against the people of Bengal the *'Indian Field,'* dated February 12, 1859 wrote as follows : '...As regards the loyalty of the Bengalees, we have no hesitation in asserting that Mr. Norton is entirely wrong. They did come forward with their cattle and if they had not, we should not have been able to have procured one single hackery in spite of fifty Impressment Acts. If Mr. Norton were to go into a Bengalee village armed with an Impressment Act, he might find a few broken wheels and a blind bullock or two, but he would not find a single serviceable cart. Government, knowing this, made no use of an Impressment Act ; they appealed to the zemindars, and the zemindars responded loyally, guaranteeing payment to the unwilling owners of hackeries and promising protection to their families, advancing them money to purchase bullocks and using all those inducements which zemindars alone can use. The result was that the Government had in a few days 7,000 carts collected at Ranceganj. ...Every

(131) Norton—*Topics for Indian Statesmen*. P. 53.

elephant in Bengal was placed gratuitously by the native zemindars at the disposal of the Government... The Bengalees were not fighting men but what was in their power they readily and voluntarily performed. To say that they have shared no peril is a mistake.' (132)

As in Bengal proper, so in Orissa, the civil population remained peaceful. According to an official report, public peace remained undisturbed in Orissa during the Mutiny.(133) In Assam the sepoys were inclined to revolt but the civil population, in general, was not. "It would seem from the reports of the Government of India," writes Malleeson, "that peace in the districts of Assam was not disturbed in 1857. The inhabitants, that is to say, displayed no sympathy with the mutineers." (134) In a letter, dated June 27, 1857 to the Secretary, Government of Bengal, the Magistrate of Goalpara wrote as follows: "...With regard to the feeling of the people here towards Government I can confidently affirm that nothing can be better than that which pervades all classes of community who view with horror and dread the proceedings of the sepoys and earnestly pray for the restoration of peace and order." (135) The feeling of the people of Goalpara pervaded the rest of the population of Assam.

The south was, on the whole, quiet during the Mutiny. Madras remained tranquil. The Madras Army was formed mainly of local recruits and was composed of men of different races and castes who fraternized with one another. It was naturally susceptible to an easy control. Many regiments of the Madras Army volunteered their services against the mutinous Bengal Army in the North-Western provinces.(136) Both the civil and military classes in Madras remained quiet and pro-Government during the Mutiny.(137) The Madras of 1857 was not the Madras of 1806. Armed with past experience, the people of Madras had been convinced of the utter futility of resisting Government, and therefore, chose to remain quiet during the Mutiny, though they had reasons to complain against Government on grounds more than one. By the time the Mutiny broke out, Madras passed under the Rayatwari system, though at the same time the 'zemindari' system lingered in a few districts of the coast. Lands in Madras under the Rayatwari system were over-assessed. Grievances arose 'principally from this over-assessment of revenue and the vexations, which accompanied its collection.' The rayats were to cultivate lands at the pleasure of the 'tahsildar' (native deputy Collector) and 'the acknowledged right of private property in no wise prevented the oppression on the owner or his gradual and sure pauperization'. As to the remnants of the 'zemindari system', certain native petitioners from the province represented 'the imperative necessity for definite and effective

(132) Quoted in the Mutinies and the people by a Hindu. PP. 195-196.

(133) Vide Kaye & Malleeson, op cit, VI, P. 5.

(134) History of the Indian Mutiny. Vol. VI. P. 32.

(135) Parl. Papers. Vol. 14 Part I of 1857-58. Paper No. 364. P. 244.

(136) Vide P. 19 ante.

(137) The 8th Madras Native Cavalry betrayed a mutinous tendency. The army was disbanded in time. This was only a stray case of the mutinous disposition on the part of the Madras Army. The general attitude of the Madras Army towards Government was friendly. For details vide. P. 19 ante.

regulations to restrain the zemindar from the continual practice of oppressive extortions in taking away the best lands from their original holders for the purpose of bestowing them on his own relations and favourites, compelling the ryots to cultivate such lands without payment, and obliging the ryots to buy the zemindar's grain at prices far above the market value ; as likewise for granting greater facilities to the ryots for preferring their grievances and for the due and early enquiry into, and settlement of them by the Collectors.' (138) Despite their grievances against Government the people of the province of Madras did not rise in revolt during the Mutiny. The composition of the Madras Army was such as eliminated chances of rebellion on the part of it. (139) So the Madras Army remained quiet and attached to Government. In the absence of any general rising on the part of the Madras Army the civil population of the province chose to remain quiet during the Mutiny.

Though not as quiet as Madras, the province of Bombay was, on the whole, tranquil during the Mutiny. During the stormy period between 1857 and 1859 certain regiments in Bombay, it is true, rose in Mutiny, and the Muslims of certain areas entered into a conspiracy against Government. (140) But the mutinous sepoys were soon brought under control and the conspiracy of the Muslims was frustrated. Two Maulavies, one from Poona and the other from Belgaum, were detected plotting against the Europeans and native Christians of those places. The conspiracy proceeded with a larger plan of blowing up the arsenal at Poona. But the conspiracies failed and the conspirators were punished. The conspiracies of the Muslims of certain areas and the risings of a few regiments in Bombay were by no means supported by the population, in general, of the province. The Parsees of Bombay who had 'their worldly interests bound up with the English' remained the most powerful supporters of Government during the Mutiny. To the then Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, they submitted an address (141) of fidelity, signed by about four hundred natives of various castes and creeds. Excepting, then, a few Muslims of certain places the civil population of Bombay remained, on the whole, peaceful, and attached to Government.

In Hyderabad there was much unrest among the people, but their

(138) Vide Ludlow—Op cit. II P. 296.

(139) Vide Chapter IV.

(140) Vide P. 19 ante. According to Forjett the Wahab Muslims of Bombay were favourably disposed towards Government during the Mutiny. Vide P. 104 Footnote (8) ante. If Forjett is to be believed, Muslim conspiracy in Bombay was confined to the non-Wahab Muslim community of the province.

(141) The address ran as follows :

"We, the undersigned inhabitants of Bombay have observed with sincere regret the late lamentable spread of mutiny and disaffection among the Bengal Native soldiery, and we have read with feelings of horror and indignation the accounts of the cowardly and savage atrocities, perpetrated by the ruthless mutineers on such unfortunate Europeans as fell into their hands."

... "That we have not earlier hastened to assure your lordship of our unchangeable loyalty and to place our services at the disposal of Government has arisen from the entire absence in our minds of any apprehension of disaffection or outbreak on this side of India.

unrest could not find a mutinous expression mainly because of the opposition of the Nizam and his Prime Minister, Salar Jung. 'The city and the province were at all times thronged with predatory bands of Rohillas, Afghans, Arabs and other mercenaries in the pay of the nobles and jaigirdars of the Hyderabad Court.' The British Resident in Hyderabad had a large force at Secunderabad but it was almost free from any European element. The Nizam's own Army was composed on the same principles as those on which the revolted Bengal Army was composed. In the circumstances Hyderabad might well have turned into 'a second Oudh of the Deccan' but for the friendly attitude of the Nizam and of his minister, Salar Jung. The Nizam and his minister kept the people of Hyderabad under firm control and prevented them from rising in arms.

The Punjab was then garrisoned by Hindusthani sepoys of the so-called Bengal Army as well as by the local Punjab Army. The presence in the Punjab of the Hindusthani sepoys of the Bengal Army gave much incentive to the spirit of revolt in the province. There were, in fact, military risings at Nurpur, Ferozpur, Jullundur, Phillaur, Jhelum cantonment, Sialkot, Lahore, Dehra Ismail Khan and other places of the Punjab during the Mutiny. But those military risings were early and easily brought under control. The civil population of the Punjab kept aloof from the Mutiny and maintained a peaceful front. The then chief Commissioner of the Punjab, Sir John Lawrence had the satisfaction to record that the Chiefs and people of the Punjab were loyal and obedient.⁽¹⁴²⁾ The Muhammadans of the Punjab were fairly treated by the British Government and were, therefore, their supporters during the Mutiny. The Sikhs were also loyal to Government. Bent on thwarting the imperial designs of the Muslims, the Sikhs came forward to strengthen the hands of Government by rendering them all possible help against the mutineers.

Government also adopted certain effective measures to maintain peace in the Punjab. The whole province was disarmed after its annexation. The disarming of the entire province eliminated chances of rebellion, if any, on the part of the civil population of the province. Sir John Lawrence also issued a vigorous proclamation in which he asked the people of the Punjab to remain quiet and faithful and threatened them with dire consequences, if they revolted. Lawrence's proclamation had its desired effect. Again, the maintenance of a large British force in the Punjab frightened the civil population there into

"We still are without any fears for Bombay; but lest our silence should be misunderstood and with a view to allaying the fears, which false reports give rise to, we beg to place our services at the disposal of Government, to be employed in any manner, that your lordship may consider most conducive to the preservation of the public peace and safety."

"We beg to remain, lord, your most obedient and faithful servants. Nowrojee Jamsetjee and others."

Vide George Dodd, *op cit*, P. 289. Footnote.

remaining quiet and peaceful in the course of the Mutiny. Elsewhere in India, the glaring disproportion between the British and native soldiers and the ill-distribution of the former before 1857 went a long way in encouraging defection and rebellion among the latter.(143) In the North-Western provinces, for instance, the British soldiers were quite disproportionate to the native troops. In Agra, there was only one British regiment as against ten regiments of the Native Army. In the Kanpur military division there was scarcely more than one complete British regiment as against thirty native regiments, regular and irregular. In the Danapur military division there was likewise only one British regiment as against sixteen native corps.(144) But in the Punjab, the disproportion between the British and native forces was not so glaring as in other parts of the country. When the storm burst out in India in 1857, the Army in the Punjab was composed, roughly speaking, of 10,500 Britishers, 36,000 Hindusthanis (chiefly Regulars) and of 13,500 Punjabis (chiefly Irregulars).(145) The British soldiers, then, commanded a little over one-sixth of the total strength of the Punjab Army in 1857 according to the above computation. Differently stating, the ratio between the Britishers and the natives in the Punjab Army in 1857 was approximately 1 to 5. This ratio between the British and native soldiers in the Punjab Army was definitely higher than that between the British and native soldiers in the Bengal, Bombay and Madras Armies before the Mutiny.(146) In other, words, the strength of the British soldiers in the Punjab Army was proportionately higher than that of the British soldiers in the three Presidency Armies on the eve of the Mutiny. In the circumstances the Punjab remained quiet during the stormy period between 1857 and 1859.

In Rajputana, though the soldiers in the service of the princes revolted, the princes and nobles themselves remained loyal and helped Government much in the maintenance of law and order.(147) The

(143) Vide also Chapter IV.

(144) Vide George Dodd p. 204.

(145) Rev. Browne—The Punjab and Delhi in 1857. P. 41.

(146) Vide Chapter IV.

(147) Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Bharatpur, Maharao Raja Sheodin Singh of Alwar, Rana Bhagwant Singh of Dholpur, Maharaja Madan Pal of Karauli, Maharaja Rani Singh of Jaipur, Nawab Wazir Muhammad Khan of Tonk, Maharaja Pirthee Singh of Kishangarh, Maharaja Sardar Singh of Bikanir, Ranjit Singh of Jaisalmer, Maharaja Tukht Singh of Jodhpur, Sarup Singh, Rana of Udaipur, Uday Singh of Dungarput, Dulpur Singh of Pratapgarh, Lachman Singh of Banswara, Rao Sheo Singh of Sirohi—all these chiefs of the different Rajput states remained loyal to Government during the Mutiny. Maharao Ram Singh of Kotah evinced apathetic attitude. Grave charges of disloyalty rested on him. Again, the attitude and conduct of Maharao Raja Ram Singh of Bundi towards Government were unfriendly. But these were minor exceptional instances of the want of loyalty on the part of Rajput princes. Vide the Narrative of events in Rajputana by Brigadier General Lawrence, Governor General's agent to the Rajputana states. According to Kaye and Malletson, 'the loyalty of the nobles and of the Rajput population did not fall short of the loyalty of the princes. The fact that the Thakur of Awa rose in rebellion against his liege lord and that he resisted the British troops was a fact that stood alone.' Vol. VI page 164.

districts under their independent chiefs were, however, as recorded by Prichard, 'very much tainted with the spirit of revolt and hostility against the British Government, and had the siege of Delhi been protracted, it was exceedingly doubtful, if this feeling would not have manifested itself in a general rising of the people against their own sovereigns on account of their alliance with the British Government.' (148) But the faithful ruling class of Rajputana stood Government in good stead by preventing the civil population from rising in revolt and by maintaining law and order in the state. Though the Gujars and Mewatis in some places of Rajputana were not slow to follow in the footsteps of their rebellious brethren in the North-Western provinces, the people, in general, were kept under control by the princes of Rajputana. As recorded by Brigadier-General G. P. Lawrence, Governor-General's Agent to Rajputana, in his narrative of events in Rajputana on July 27, 1858, '...the revolt in India met with no sympathy from Rajput rulers, nobles or population generally...' (149)

So far as Sind was concerned, the province was more or less tranquil during the Mutiny. There were, of course, a few risings of the sepoys, but these were not at all serious and were easily suppressed with the help of military police. The sepoy Army, garrisoned in Sind, was then composed of the 13th, 14th, 16th and 21st Bombay Native Infantry Regiments, the 2nd European Infantry, 1st Bombay Fusiliers, 3rd troop horse-artillery, two companies of the 4th battalion of artillery, 2nd Sind Irregular horse and of the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry. The whole comprised about five thousand native troops and twelve hundred British soldiers. (150) Among the above-mentioned regiments the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry endeavoured in vain to enter into a conspiracy with some Baluchi Muhammadans against Government. The mutineers got no response from the general mass of Sind-people who still remembered with gratitude how they were rescued by the British Government from the grinding tyranny of the Amirs (151) of Sind, and how under the British rule

(148) Vide his *Mutinies in Rajpootana*. P. 147.

(149) Vide Narrative of events re : the Mutiny in India of 1857-58 and the restoration of authority Vol. II P. 315. 'Rajputana continued wonderfully quiet; the secret was, the people and Thakoor (Princes) had no desire to come again under the Muhammadan powers and to send their daughters to the harems of Delhi.' Vide the Records of the Intelligence Department of the North-Western provinces, preserved under the superintendence of Sir William Muir. Vol. I. P. 248. Stating the reasons why Rajputana remained faithfully attached to Government during the Mutiny Kaye and Malletson (Vol. IV, pages 403-404) write that the Rajputs had to suffer much from lawlessness under the Maratha rule. But under British Government they came to enjoy a security of life and property, not enjoyed before. It was this sense of security, enjoyed under British suzerainty, that ensured the loyalty of the great bulk of the Rajputs during the troublous times of the Mutiny.

(150) George Dodd—op cit. P. 208.

(151) In 1756 Sind passed under the control of Kabul Khans. Although subject to Kabul, Sind was really governed by eight or ten native princes called Amirs. Under them the Government of Sind was a sort of military despotism. The people of Sind had to suffer much from the tyranny of these Amirs. Sind becoming a British province, the tyranny of the Amirs ended and an era of enlightened rule and material prosperity dawned in the province.

their economic condition improved and their material comforts considerably increased. Occasionally some fanatical Muhammadans attempted to unfurl the green flag to instigate the Muslim community to fight for Islam. Yet, on the whole, the people of Sind remained attached to Government.

The nature of the Sepoy Mutiny may now be briefly reviewed thus : In the North-Western provinces, Bundelkhand, Saugor and Nerbada territories, west Bihar, Chatonagpur and Oudh, the movement of 1857-59 had a popular basis. In the rest of the country including the South, the Punjab, Rajputana, Sind, Hyderabad, Bengal, East Bihar, Orissa and Assam, though there were risings of the native soldiery here and there, the civil population remained, on the whole, quiet and peaceful. The Mutiny, in other words, was not a popular movement on an all-India basis. It was popular only region-wise, that is, on a zonal basis. In the regions or zones which witnessed popular risings, the civil population rose in arms against Government not, however, with the political motive of liberating India from the British yoke. In fact, the Mutiny was not a rising of the people for achieving their political freedom. Neither the revolted sepoys nor the rebels from the civil society had the common and positive ideal of realising their political self-determination. The motives with which they were actuated to rise in revolt during the Mutiny were selfish in nature. The Hindus joined the Mutiny in protest against the interference by Government with their caste and religion. The Muslims also raised the cry of religion being in danger. The dispossessed Muslim ruling class at the same time sought to avail itself of the opportunity to reestablish Muslim sovereignty in India. The dispossessed zemindars and talukdars joined the Mutiny to reverse the agrarian decisions of the civil courts and to recover their lands from the auction-purchasers. The villagers, city-rabble and run-away convicts and even many of the sepoys hailed the Mutiny as the most suitable opportunity to plunder treasuries, burn Government buildings and destroy state-records. The sepoys rose in arms to preserve the sanctity of their ancestral caste and religion which were in the danger of being defiled by the introduction of the Enfield Rifle equipped with greased cartridges. Beyond the above-mentioned motives the participants in the Mutiny had no such common political aim in view as India's emancipation from British authority. There were leaders,⁽¹⁵²⁾ it is true, at the head of the rebels in different Mutiny-stricken parts of the country but the leaders themselves could not work in harmony with one another in the course of the Mutiny. Neither could they set up an organisation like the Indian National Congress of the later days. An Administrative Court was, of course, set up in Delhi after its capture by the rebels. But this Court was not formed on an all-India basis. Its sessions were held in the Red Fort. Like the members of the Frankfurt Parliament, the members of the Administrative Court had no practical political training and could not, therefore, evolve any policy or programme from the point of view of practical statesmanship. The Court had no achieve-

(152) Vide Appendix B at the end of the Chapter for a list of local leaders.

ment to its credit. Again, the leaders had their activities, if not exclusively, at least largely, confined to their respective areas with the result that the movement failed to have an all-India basis. Kumar Singh, Lakshmi Bai, the Nana Saheb.⁽¹⁵³⁾ Maulavi Ahmad Shah and Tantia Topi who are generally honoured as the foremost among the leaders of the Mutiny could not enlist the co-operation of other local leaders like Khan Bahadur Khan, Muhammad Khan and Maulavi Liaqat Ali to work towards a common end. Such leaders as Khan Bahadur Khan, Muhammad Khan and Maulavi Liaqat Ali often sank into local factions and in some cases pursued anti-Hindu policies, which spelled disaster for the course of the Mutiny. Khan Bahadur Khan, the ruined Nawab of Rohilkhand, entered into a rivalry with another such Nawab of Rohilkhand, Mobarik Shah, both of whom hoped to obtain supremacy on the expulsion of the British. It was Khan Bahadur Khan who finally became the Viceroy of Rohilkhand under the overlordship of Bahadur Shah II. Thus was his leadership rewarded, and till his execution he remained busy solely with the affairs of Rohilkhand without seeking to co-operate with other leaders against the British Government. Muhammad Khan, the Nawab of Najibabad similarly proclaimed himself Nawab of Bijnor under Bahadur Shah II. After setting up his independent rule he followed an anti-Hindu policy and sought to chastise the Hindus who stood loyal to Government during the Mutiny. Such a leadership could not command the confidence of the nation at large. Maulavi Liaqat Ali ended his leadership merely by proclaiming himself Governor of Allahabad. Evidently such local leaders were mostly self-centred and only thought of their own immediate gains. They identified themselves with their regional or local interests. They were not inspired by pan-Indianism. Even Rani Lakshmi Bai, Kumar Singh and the Nana Saheb rose in arms out of local and personal grievances against Government. It is idle, indeed, to plead that the Mutiny was a freedom movement. It may be argued that since the dispossessed Muslim ruling class sought to avail itself of the Sepoy Revolt to overthrow the British Empire in India and to restore in its place the former Mughal Empire with Bahadur Shah at its head, the Revolt should merit to rank as a War of Independence. The argument might have carried sense, if, in the first place, Bahadur Shah had really been in sympathy with the rebels and could be looked upon by all the communities of the country as their rightful representative, and secondly, if the Muslim Government could be treated as the Government of the entire Indian people. But the above assumptions have no legs to stand upon. Bahadur Shah had not evinced any genuine sympathy for the rebels. He was never sincerely interested in the cause of the rebels. He played a double game in the course of the Mutiny. Again, to the Muslims, Bahadur Shah, who had kinship with the Great Mughals, might have appeared as the representative of the entire country, but in the eyes of the Hindus and Sikhs he was a leader of the Muslim community only. Both the Hindus and the Sikhs were opposed to the revival of

(153) It is doubtful if the Nana Saheb possessed the gift of a real leader.

the Muslim Empire in India. The attempts of Chhatrapati Shivaji to revive the Hindu power and of Guru Govind Singh to reorganise Sikh militarism are unmistakable proofs of the persistent opposition of the Hindus and Sikhs to the Muslim rule in India. It will, therefore, be anything but just to maintain that the attempt of the dispossessed Muslim ruling class to restore the Mughal Empire during the Mutiny lends it the character of a War of Independence.

There is yet another aspect of the Indian Mutiny. Behind the outbreak of the Mutiny in different regions of India the same set of causes had not been equally prominent everywhere. In some regions, the Mutiny broke out for the predominance of certain factors, while, in others, it broke out because of the preponderance of certain other factors. In other words, regional factors predominated over any general or any single common factor in bringing about the Mutiny of 1857. In the North-Western provinces, for instance, the predominant causes of the Mutiny were the resumption of rent-free tenures, auction-sale of estates as a penalty for default under the newly introduced land-revenue system, the play of passions and prejudices of the native people and their apprehension regarding the loss of caste and religion. Again, the fact that North-Western provinces were an important centre of recruitment of the sepoys of the mutinous Bengal Army supplied another predominant cause of the Mutiny in that region. One or other of these predominant causes played its role effectively in hastening the outbreak of the Mutiny in one district or another, in one group of districts or another group in the North-Western provinces. In such districts as Meerut, Allahabad and others, the play of passions and prejudices of the native people and their apprehension regarding the loss of caste and religion mainly caused the Mutiny. In the Revolt in such districts as Budaun, Saharanpur, and Muzaffarnagar, the resentment for the land-revenue policy of Government found a prominent expression. In Moradabad, Bareilly, Budaun, Bijnor, and Shahjahanpur, the hostility of the Muslim community towards Government was conspicuous during the Mutiny. In Delhi also a fanatic section of the Muslims stood aggressive during the Mutiny. In the Saugor and Narbada territories, the apprehension regarding the loss of caste and religion and the application of the Thomasonian principles to the land-revenue settlement were the predominant causes of the Mutiny. In Jhansi, the fact of annexation and the alarm, produced by the rumour that Government was seeking to invade the sacred domains of the native caste and religion, made the civil and military classes rebellious. The Rani was also ultimately forced by circumstances to throw herself into the thick of the struggle with Government to fight out her own cause. After a display of unique heroism she embraced death on the battle-field. Again, the revolt in Oudh was due to such principal causes as its annexation by Lord Dalhousie, introduction of a revenue-system, which abolished the rank of talukdars, and the disbandment of the native Army of the deposed Nawab. Again, Oudh was the nursery of the Bengal Army. The revolt of the Bengal Army naturally also paved the way for the outbreak of revolt in Oudh. So far as Bihar was concerned, the Rajputs of Sahabad rose in arms out of sympathy with

Kumar Singh, the popular zemindar of Jagadishpur. In Patna the spirit of insurrection was fomented mainly by the Muslims of the Wahabi sect. Again, the rising of the sepoys in one district in Bihar caused a sympathetic rising in the neighbouring district or districts of the province. Thus certain factors predominated over others in causing mutinous disturbances in different regions of India. The causes, considered in these pages as predominant region-wise, were not, however, the only causes leading to the outbreak of the Mutiny in any particular region. There had been also other causes at work behind the risings in different regions. What is significant to note is that different sets of causes and factors worked differently in diverse regions.

To conclude, the Sepoy Mutiny, as the foregoing analysis would show, did not find favour with the entire civil population of the country. The entire native Army had not revolted either. Majority of the landed and territorial aristocrats of the country were then favourably disposed towards the British Government. The so-called leaders of the Mutiny could set up no such central organisation with a clear-cut, commonly accepted and positive political programme as the Indian National Congress of the later days. How can, then, the Sepoy Mutiny be treated as a national or freedom movement? It was, no doubt, a popular movement on a regional basis. But a popular movement is not necessarily a national or freedom movement. People of a country may support a movement on grounds other than political. Such a movement *sans* political basis is not national, though it is popular in character. A freedom movement has a positive political ideal to attain, the ideal of building up a free and sovereign state. The movement of 1857 had no such political ideal before it. The leaders of a freedom movement instill into the minds of the people, they lead, decisive political doctrines, equip them with phrases, formulas and arguments and give their mind a revolutionary tone and cast. They destroy the prevailing regime but have at the same time a constructive programme to follow after the independence is achieved. They establish a centralised state to which common allegiance of the people is demanded, provide them with an organisation of revolutionary activities. The leaders also seek to arouse the people to their national consciousness, to the sense of their ethnological, linguistic and cultural unity in the course of the freedom movement. The leaders of the Sepoy Mutiny had no such political part to play, no such political missions to fulfil. There was then no Jefferson or Mazzini to inspire the Indian people with the ideal of fighting for freeing their country from the British control, to stamp them with oneness of political feeling and to make them conscious of their unity in the midst of diversity. They could establish no such central organisation as could claim common allegiance of the people of the country. Their motives, above all, were selfish and their interests, local. The people also were actuated, in their opposition to the established authorities, by their selfish and particular motives. The Sepoy Mutiny thus lacks the characteristics of a freedom movement. The end of the Mutiny did not see India freed from the British yoke. Rather it saw the completion of the work initiated by the battles of Plassey and Buxur.

CHAPTER IX

APPENDIX 'A'

A list of Native Regiments, Regular and Irregular, of the Bengal and the Punjab Armies that remained faithful to the British Government during the Sepoy Mutiny.

Adjutant General's Office, Headquarters, Simla, 30th July
1862. Vide Parl. Papers. Vol. XL of 1863. Paper No. 21
PP. 3-30.

Designation at the time of the Mutiny in 1857.	Present designation i.e. by 1862-63.	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
1. Bengal Native Artillery.	No longer exists.	<p>The 5th troop, 1st brigade Horse Artillery remained faithful. It served at the siege and capture of Delhi in 1857 and in the Rohilcund campaign in 1858.</p> <p>The 2nd Company, 8th battalion Golandauz remained faithful and retained its arms during the mutiny. It served in the defence of Lucknow in 1857.</p> <p>A detail of the 6th Company, 9th battalion, Golandauz, remained faithful. It served under Sir Henry Havelock.</p> <p>Gun lascars and Syce drivers of the following troops and Companies remained armed and loyal during the disturbances.</p>
1st troops 1st brigade, Horse Artillery		
3rd	1st	—do—
5th	1st	—do—
2nd	2nd	—do—
1st	3rd	—do—
2nd	3rd	—do—
3rd	3rd	—do—

Designation
at the time
of the Mutiny
in 1857.

Present
designation
i.e. by
1862-63.

Services, rendered during
the Mutiny.

1st Company 1st Battalion, Artillery

3rd	„	1st	—do—
4th	„	1st	—do—
1st	„	3rd	—do—
2nd	„	3rd	—do—
3rd	„	3rd	—do—
1st	„	4th	—do—
2nd	„	4th	—do—
4th	„	4th	—do—

1st Company 5th Battalion, Artillery

2nd	„	} 5th	—do—
3rd	„		—do—
4th	„		
2nd	„	6th	—do—
4th	„	6th	—do—

2. 1st Irregu- 1st Bengal
lar Cavalry Cavalry

The regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the mutiny. At Multan, at the commencement of the Mutiny, the native officers of the regiment were the first to give warning of the dissatisfaction in the 62nd and 69th Native Infantry, garrisoned in Multan. On 10th June 1857 the regiment in conjunction with the 1st Punjab Cavalry, a wing of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, a battery of Native Artillery and 40 Europeans disarmed the above-named 62nd and 69th regiments and traced out the ringleaders of the 69th Native Infantry who were convicted and executed. It also helped Government to crush the Mutiny at Gugera in September, 1857.

3. 2nd Irregu- 2nd Bengal
lar Cavalry Cavalry

The regiment which was stationed at Gurdaspur at the outbreak of the Mutiny remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny, escorting a treasure of 6 lakhs to Amritsar, holding the *ghats* of the Ravi and procuring boats for Briga-

Designation at the time of the Mutiny in 1857.	Present designation i.e. by 1862-63.	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
		dier General Nicholson. The regiment was employed for three months against the rebels in the Guger and Multan districts.
4. 3rd Irregular Cavalry	Disbanded	A portion of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during Mutiny. It formed a part of the Saugor garrison.
5. 6th Irregular Cavalry	4th Bengal Cavalry	The regiment remained faithful, and retained its arms. It was on duty in the North-Western frontier of Upper Sindh from March 1857 to May 1858.
6. 7th Irregular Cavalry	5th Regiment Bengal Cavalry	The regiment in a body remained faithful during the rebellion and retained its arms.
7. 8th Irregular Cavalry	6th Bengal Cavalry	A portion of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. Some escorted their officers and others from Bareilly to Nynce Tal at the outbreak of the Mutiny; others rendered good services to Mr. Wilson and other officers in different parts of the country.
8. 9th Irregular Cavalry	Disbanded	A portion of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It rendered services during the campaigns for the recovery of Delhi. Later on, it was employed in keeping order and collecting revenue in the districts of Shaharanpur and Panipat under the civil authorities.
9. 12th Irregular Cavalry	Disbanded	A portion of the regiment remained faithful, retained its arms and was actively employed during the Mutiny in the relief, siege and capture of Lucknow.
10. 16th Irregular Cavalry	Disbanded	436 men of all ranks remained faithful and retained their arms during the Mutiny. The regiment formed part of Brigadier General Chamber-

Designation at the time of the Mutiny in 1857.	Present designation i.e. by 1862-63.	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
		lain's moveable column from Rawul Pindee, when the disturbances commenced. It was also employed in the Gugera district in the pursuit of the 62nd and 69th Native Infantry after these regiments mutinied at Multan.
11. 17th Irregular Cavalry	7th Bengal Cavalry	The regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. A wing of the regiment conveyed treasure and stores to Delhi and was variously employed in that district.
12. 18th Irregular Cavalry	8th Bengal Cavalry	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. One troop was employed at Hoti Murdan by the end of May 1857 against the 55th Bengal Native Infantry mutineers. The regiment rendered services in disarming the native troops at Peshawar in May 1857 and at the outbreak of the 51st Native Infantry at Peshawar in August following.
13. Ramghur Irregular Cavalry	Disbanded	It remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. In June, 1857, when the artillery and infantry portions of the Ramghur force mutinied, the cavalry branch stood loyal. One detachment on the Grand Trunk Road kept postal and telegraphic communications free. The small detachments at Dorundah and Chyebassa remained faithful and took the first opportunity to join their officers at Hazareebagh. The detachment at Sambalpur greatly distinguished itself in the disturbances there. The Ramghur Irregular Cavalry also served with Col. Fischer's column and subsequently surprised some rebels who were threatening Lohardaggah, the chief market town of Chotanagpur. A party of it behaved with great

Designation at the time of the Mutiny in 1857.	Present designation i.e. by 1862-63.	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
		gallantry in the action at Palamau in January 1859 and another detachment did good service at the same time at Singbhum.
14. Bengal Sappers and Miners.	Bengal Sappers & Miners	Remained faithful and retained arms throughout the Mutiny. A portion served at the siege and capture of Delhi and Lucknow. It also served in Rohilcund and Oudh campaigns during 1858-59. A portion was employed in the forts of Peshawar and Attock.
15. Sebundy Sappers & Miners	Sebundy Sappers & Miners	The whole of the corps remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
16. 13th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry	Embodied as the 16th Native Infantry. Lucknow Regiment	A portion of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was actively engaged against the mutineers on the night of the 30th and morning of 31st May 1857 in the cantonment of Lucknow, in the action of Chinhut and throughout the entire defence of Lucknow. In these services nearly 2/3rds were killed or wounded.
17. 21st Regiment, Native Infantry	1st Regiment Native Infantry	The whole of the Regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was employed on ordinary escorts to and from Attock and the frontier outposts.
18. 31st Native Light Infantry	2nd Regiment Native Light Infantry	The entire regiment excepting 46 sepoy who joined the mutineers of the 42nd Native Light Infantry was continually and constantly employed from the 13th June 1857 to 21st July 1859 in active operations against rebels and mutineers in the Saugor district and Central India and co-operated with the Central India, and Saugor and Nerbudda Field Forces on various occasions.

Designation at the time of the Mutiny in 1857.	Present designation i.e. by 1862-63.	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
19. 42nd Regiment Native Light Infantry	5th Regiment, Native Light Infantry	238 men of all ranks remained armed and faithful throughout the rebellion and formed part of the Saugor garrison in 1857 and were actively employed in the Saugor district in 1857-59.
20. 48th Regiment Native Infantry	Embodied in the 16th Regiment Native Infantry (Lucknow Regiment)	A portion of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the mutiny and was engaged in the defence of Lucknow Residency.
21. 66th or Goorkha Regiment, Native Infantry	1st Goorkha Regiment	The regiment to a man remained armed and faithful, occupying and guarding Nynee Tal, Almora, and other places during the height of the rebellion.
22. 71st Regiment, Native Infantry	Embodied into 16th the Lucknow Regiment	60 men of all ranks remained faithful and retained their arms during the Mutiny. They rendered services in the defence of the Lucknow Residency and in the defeat of the Gwalior contingent.
23. 73rd Regiment, Native Infantry	Disbanded	About 460 of the regiment remained faithful and retained their arms during the Mutiny. Of these, about 145 were actively employed against mutineers.
24. Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzie	12th Regiment Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Native Infantry	The whole regiment was loyal. It garrisoned the forts on the Peshawar frontier during the Mutiny.
25. Regiment of Ferozepur	14th Native Infantry	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny and was actively employed in its suppression from the

Designation of the time of the Mutiny in 1857	Present designation i.e., by 1862-63	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
		commencement of the outbreak at Allahabad until the end of the war in 1859.
26. Sirmoor Rifle Regiment	2nd Goorkha (the Sirmoor Rifle) Regiment	The whole of the Regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was engaged at the battle of Badli-ke-serai on 8th June 1857; it served in the Oudh campaign with Brigadier Sir George Barker's column.
27. Kemaon Battalion	3rd Goorkha, the Kemaon Regiment	The whole of the battalion remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
28. Nusseree Battalion	Disbanded	15 Native Commissioned Officers and 740 of all ranks retained their arms during the Mutiny and remained faithful. They served in the Shaharapur and Muzaffernagar districts in 1857-58. Detachments of the battalion were present during the attack on the fortified village of Thammah Bhawan in September 1857.
29. Bhagulpore Hill Rangers	Absorbed into Police	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny but was not actively employed.
30. Assam Local Artillery	Assam Local Artillery	It retained its arms during the Mutiny and remained faithful but was not actively employed.
31. 1st Assam Light Infantry	42nd Assam Regiment, Native Light Infantry	The regiment remained faithful and retained its arms but was not actively employed during the Mutiny.
32. 2nd Assam Light Infantry	43rd Assam Light Infantry	The whole regiment remained faithful and retained arms during the Mutiny. A detachment of 116 men of all ranks was employed on active

Designation of the time of the Mutiny in 1857	Present designation i.e., by 1862-63	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
		service in 1857-58 in the Gawalparah district with a view to intercepting the Dacca mutineers on their way across the Brahmaputra northwards but failed in its object.
33. Mhairwarra Local Battalion	Absorbed into Police	The whole of the battalion retained its arms during the Mutiny and remained faithful.
34. Sylhet Light Infantry	44th Sylhet Light Infantry	The whole of the Sylhet Light Infantry remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was employed in intercepting the mutinous companies of the 34th Native Infantry on their march from Chittagong towards the Upper Provinces.
35. Arracan Battalion	Converted into Police	The whole regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny but was not actively employed in the suppression of the same.
36. Shekha-wattee Battalion	13th, the Shekhawattee Native Infantry	The whole of the battalion retained its arms during the Mutiny and remained faithful to the Government.
37. Pegu Light Infantry	Disbanded	The whole corps remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
38. Malwa Bheel Corps	Malwa Bheel Corps	A portion of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during Mutiny.
39. Mewar Bheel Corps	Mewar Bheel Corps	Almost the whole regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. Two Companies were engaged in the pursuit of the rebel army under Tantia Topee in December 1858 and a third Company formed a portion of the Neemuch force which defeated Tantia Topee at Pratapgarh in December 1858.

Designation of the time of the Mutiny in 1857	Present designation i.e., by 1862-63	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
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The Punjab Irregular Force.

40. Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	Peshwar Mountain Train Battery	The battery remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
41. Hazara Mountain Train	Hazara Mountain Train	The whole battery remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny but was not actively engaged.
42. 1st Punjab Light Field Battery	1st Punjab Light Field Battery	The whole of the battery remained faithful and retained its arms but was not actively employed during the Mutiny.
43. 2nd Light Field Battery, Punjab Force	2nd Light Field Battery Punjab Irregular Force	The whole battery remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was stationed at Kohat on the outbreak taking place and remained there throughout the disturbances.
44. No. 3 Pun- jab Light Field Battery	No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	The whole of this battery remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
45. No. 4 Garrison Company, Artillery, Punjab Irregular Force	No. 4 or Gar- rison Company, Artillery, Pun- jab Irregular Force	The whole company remained faithful and retained its arms, but it was not actively employed in the suppression of the Mutiny.
46. The Corps of Guides	The Corps of Guides	The Corps, horse and foot, remained faithful and retained its arms throughout the Mutiny. It was stationed at Murdan, Peshwar frontier in May 1857 whence it marched to Delhi where it was actively employed throughout the whole of the siege.

Designation of the time of the Mutiny in 1857	Present designation i.e., by 1862-63	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
47. 1st Punjab Cavalry	1st Punjab Cavalry	The whole of the regiment with the exception of 29 non-commissioned officers and men remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny and was actively employed from first to last in its suppression.
48. 2nd Punjab Cavalry	2nd Punjab Cavalry	The whole regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
49. 3rd Regi- ment, Punjab Cavalry	3rd Regiment Punjab Cavalry	The whole Regiment with the exception of 65 Hindusthanees absent on furlough remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny but was not actively employed in the suppression of the same.
50. 4th Punjab Cavalry	4th Punjab Cavalry	The whole regiment with the exception of 46 of all ranks, who being on leave joined the mutineers, remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny but was not actively employed.
51. 5th Regi- ment, Punjab Cavalry	5th Regiment Punjab Cavalry	The whole regiment with the exception of 26 Hindusthanees all of whom were disarmed and 12 of whom deserted remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. At the time of the outbreak, it volunteered its services for employment wherever it might be required either within or without the territories of the East India Company.
52. 1st Punjab Infantry	1st Punjab Infantry	The whole regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was engaged against the mutineers at the battle of Najafgarh, siege, assault and occupation of Delhi, Bareilly and other centres.

Designation of the time of the Mutiny in 1857	Present designation i.e., by 1862-63	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
53. 2nd Regiment, Punjab Infantry	2nd Regiment, Punjab Infantry	The whole of the Regiment with the exception of certain poorbeahs remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was employed in keeping in check the 62nd and 69th Regiments, Native Infantry at Multan from 23rd May to 12th July and assisted in disarming those regiments on 10th June 1857. It was present at the siege and capture of Delhi. It was also present in Lucknow, Cawnpur and Rohilkhand and rendered services to Government.
54. 3rd Regiment, Punjab Infantry	3rd Regiment, Punjab Infantry	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the rebellion.
55. 4th Punjab Infantry	4th Punjab Infantry	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. It was present at the siege and capture of Delhi, relief of Lucknow under Sir Colin Campbell, at the battle of Cawnpur, at the siege and capture of Lucknow, battle of Barcilly and many other minor engagements.
56. 5th Punjab Infantry	5th Punjab Infantry	The whole of the Regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
57. 6th Punjab Infantry	6th Punjab Infantry	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
58. 1st Seikh Infantry	1st Seikh Infantry	The whole of the regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny.
59. 2nd Seikh Infantry	2nd Seikh Infantry	The whole regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the mutiny. It was stationed at the Hazara district during the Mutiny and employed in the pursuit of the

Designation of the time of the Mutiny in 1857	Present designation i.e., by 1862-63	Services, rendered during the Mutiny.
		mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry in June and July 1857. A detachment of the regiment was stationed at Marri during the disturbances there in September 1857 and the headquarters of the regiment were marched across the hills to reinforce it. The regiment was also employed in Moradabad.
60. 3rd Regiment, Seikh Infantry	3rd Regiment, Seikh Infantry	The whole of the corps with the exception of 102 Hindusthanees remained faithful and retained its arms during the mutiny.
61. 4th Seikh Regiment, Punjab Irregular Force.	Disbanded.	The whole of the Regiment remained faithful and retained its arms during the Mutiny. The regiment opposed the Jullundhur mutineers and held the city of Ludhiana in check. The regiment subsequently served at the siege and capture of Delhi.

From the above list it would appear that in the same regiment, while some sepoy revolted, others remained true to salt. In other words, there were regiments which only partially rose in arms. Among such regiments mention may be made of the following ones :

3rd, 8th, 9th, 12th and 16th Irregular Cavalry, Bengal Army ; Ramgarh battalion—Infantry and Artillery branches rising in arms, while the Cavalry branch remaining loyal ;

13th, 31st, 42nd, 48th, 71st and 73rd Native Infantry Regiments, Bengal Army.

APPENDIX 'B'

CHAPTER IX

LEADERS OF THE MUTINY

Bankura	:	Neelmony Singh
Birbhum	:	Kureem Khan
Midnapur	:	Bindabun Tewaree Meer Jungoo Sheik Zameeroodin
Singhbhum	:	Urjoon Singh (Arjun Singh, the Zemindar of Porahat), Boijonath Singh Koonwar
Lohardugga	:	Bishonath Sahee Juggutnath Sahee Gunput Roi
Patna	:	Peer Ali Khan Aosaf Hossein Gholam Abbas Jeetun Loll Ally Kureem
Sahabad	:	Koer Sing Ummer Sing Reethnuryun Sing Nishan Sing Hurkissen Sing
Bihar	:	Reaz Ally Khan Jeodhur Sing Rajah Hossein Bux Khan Rajah Mendhee Ally Khan Rajah Hoormut Ally Khan
Sambalpur	:	Soorunder Sahee Oodut Sahee Dhoorup Sahee Oojjub Sahee Mednee Sahee Chubilo Sahee Jadub Sahee Mitterbhau Sahee Kurna Khugo Naik

Sambalpur (<i>Contd.</i>) :	Duriao Sing
	Dhun Sing
	Huttee Sing
	Arjoon
	Chundoo
	Monmohum Sing
	Markund Burheya
	Dayal Sirdar
	Dunardun Sing
	Archito Gounteah
	Annut Sahee
	Kerpa Sindhoo Burheya
	Sodashib Manjhee
	Khugsur Deo
	Kumwal Sing
	Petamber Sing Dewan
	Mohadeb Gurbantea
	Dhun Sing

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Allahabad	:	Mv. Liaquat Ali
Aligarh	:	Rao Bhopal Singh
		Mahtab Singh
		Mangal Singh
		Naism-ullah
		Muhammad Ghaus Khan
		Mahbub Khan
		Hasan Khan
Assam	:	Maniram Datta
		Madhu Mallik
		Piyali Barua
Bijnor	:	Muhammad Khan, Nawab of Naji- babad who proclaimed himself the Nawab of Bijnor
Bulandshahr	:	Walidad Khan
Delhi	:	Prince Feroze Shah
Gorakhpur	:	Rajas of Satasi, Narharpur, Barhiapar and Nagar ; Muhammad Hasan
Gaya	:	Hyder Ali Khan
		Kosheal Singh

Hamirpur	:	Landlords of 'Mauza' Ramari, Subahdar Ali Bakhsh
Jubbulpur	:	Raja Shankar Shah Raghunath Shah
Jhansi	:	Rani Lakshmi Bai
Kanpur	:	Nana Sahib Tantia Tope Azimullah Jawala Prasad
Mathura	:	Debi Singh
Muzaffarnagar	:	Khairati Khan Qazi Mahbub Ali Inayat Ali
Moradabad	:	Abbas Ali Saivad Gulzar Ali Majju Khan Asad Ali Khan Mv. Mannu
Oudh	:	Mv. Ahmad Shah Bande Husain Begum of Oudh Beni Madho
Patna	:	Waris Ali Luft Ali Khan Mv. Muhammad Hussain Mv. Waizul Huq
Palamau	:	Nilambar Pitambar
Rohilkhand	:	Khan Bahadur Khan Mobarik Shah
Saharanpur	:	Umrao Singh
Shahjahanpur	:	Mv. Sarfaraz Ali Kudrut Ali Niaz Ali Qadir Ali Ghulam Husain Khan
Sitapur (Oudh)	:	Raja of Mitauli Raja of Oel
Saugor and Narbada territories	:	Rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh Raja Shankar Shah Raghunath Shah Delun Shah

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Bijnor by A. Shakespeare, Magistrate of Bijnor.

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26	F.N. *	vide Ibid	Ibid
33	17	wil	will
36	F.N. (15)	P 82	P 49
37	F.N. (18)	P 82	P 49
83	5	so far as lay in their power	so far as it lay in their power
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